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ABSTRACT  
This research is about the production of ‗lived‘ and ‗ideal‘ citizenship in the late 
Mubarak era. It examines the ways in which national secondary schools produce 
students as gendered and classed citizens and how national identity and citizenship are 
constructed and contested in schools within the prevailing authoritarian, neoliberal and 
Islamist projects. The thesis draws on extensive research in six technical, general and 
private secondary schools catering to different social classes in Cairo between 2008 and 
2010, and an analysis of the relevant nationally unified textbooks. It highlights the ways 
in which schools serve as examples of the corrosion of state legitimacy, the weakening 
and informalization of state institutions and the associated patterns of repression, 
corruption and contestation. 
 
The research shows how informal and extralegal privatization had nullified the state's 
commitment to free public education and undermined various aspects of discipline, 
attendance and examination in the system; contributing to more violent and arbitrary 
forms of punishment, especially in public schools. It details the different forms of 
almost compulsory tutoring and arbitrary beating, humiliation and gender control by 
teachers that structured and undermined the citizenship entitlements of working as well 
as middle class students.  
 
It draws out the lines of citizenship and national identity projects as presented in 
official textbooks; discussing their prominent use of Islam and Islamist morality and the 
place of neoliberal citizenship and constructions of the ‗bad citizen‘ in them. It shows 
how schools attempt to promote feelings of love and belonging to the nation through 
school rituals and discourses. It describes the ways in which these official nationhood 
and citizenship projects were appropriated or subverted by school actors, and their use 
of themes of poverty, corruption, humiliation and injustice in reflecting on both the 
state and love of the nation. 
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Egyptian dialect; e.g. majmu„at (groups) in classical Arabic appears as magmu„at in 
transliterations of reported speech. 
 
NOTE ON ‘THE SCHOOLS’  
Throughout the thesis, for purposes of convenience, I often refer to the public technical 
schools as simply the technical schools, to the public general schools as the general 
schools and to the private general schools, as the private schools, using the article the to 
indicate the schools in which the research was concluded. For example, I refer to ‗the girls‘ 
public general school in which the research was conducted‘ simply as: the girls‘ general 
school. I sometimes refer to school administrators and teachers as a whole simply as: 
teachers or school authorities, distinguishing between administrators and teachers when 
this is relevant for the analysis.  
 
In order to protect respondents from any form of harm or embarrassment that may 
arise due to the information they discussed, I have not used the real names of 
respondents nor stated the names of the research schools. I have also not stated the 
names of the neighborhoods where the schools were located as this may make it easy to 
deduce which secondary schools are being referred to and which principals or teachers 
are being referred to. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  EDUCATION AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE L ATE 
MUBARAK ERA:  THE REG IME,  
THE MARKET,  DISCIPLINE A ND 
IDENTITY  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Bourdieu wrote that ―the sociology of education lies at the foundation of a general 
anthropology of power and legitimacy‖ (Bourdieu 1996, 5). The assumption that 
schools shape both national identity and student subjectivities is the very premise and 
purpose of the creation of modern mass schooling systems and remains central to their 
concerns. On the other hand, it is not textbooks or state desires but the larger social 
forces, social relations and young people‘s daily experiences in schools and 
communities that affect their emerging senses of themselves as civic beings (Rubin, 
Hayes and Benson 2009). School relations, norms of behavior, modes of control and 
means of punishment are the key ways in which students learn their ‗different‘ places in 
society, the ‗correct‘ behavior for them and what it means to become nationals and 
citizens of the state. Written and unwritten codes of conduct in schools are ―sites of 
knowledge production, fashioning normative, gendered citizens, and marginalizing 
those who do not easily conform‖ (Raby 2005, 71). Therefore, the school as a 
disciplinary institution (or its ‗hidden curriculum‘) tacitly teaches students unspoken 
lessons about their race, class, and gender and often manifests in how schools regulate 
their students‘ bodies (Anyon 1988, Orenstein 1994). ―In this way, schools produce 
students who not only learn specific subject matter, but also ―learn how to embody 
raced, classed, and gendered realities‖ (Morris 2005, 28). 
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There is an overwhelming sense of crisis in Egyptian education; in fact of absence, 
dysfunction and total failure. As many Egyptians say when they discuss educational 
issues, ―there is no education‖: mafish ta„lim. Given the widespread forms of corruption 
and extralegal practices and the unregulated and informal nature of privatization, the 
education system reflects some of the key features of the decay of state institutions and 
rule of law that defined the late Mubarak era. Secondary education has a special place in 
these concerns about the privatization and cost of education and the larger issues 
relating to the construction of citizenship.  Exploring the everyday world of different 
types of schools provides a rich arena for understanding the nature of the state and its 
social contracts with different classes. While there are important works that deal with 
some aspects of the production of lived and imagined citizenship in Egypt, there is 
great need for work that examines concrete institutions of the state and how they 
reflect and are shaped by dominant governance projects. Given the very limited 
literature on education in Egypt, this research hopes to begin to bring together and 
reflect on some of the key issues in Egyptian education in this historical juncture.  
 
This research is built around extensive observation and discussions in six secondary 
schools catering to different social classes in the greater Cairo area between 2008 and 
2010. It explores the ways in which secondary schools produce students as gendered 
and classed citizens and how national identity is constructed and nurtured in the 
schools within the larger neoliberal, Islamist and authoritarian projects of the late 
Mubarak era. In response to themes that presented themselves throughout the 
fieldwork, the research approaches the production of citizenship in relation to three 
interlinked topics: the privatization of education, modes of discipline and punishment 
in the schools studied, and the discourses and rituals of the nation and state. It attempts 
to draw out the lines of national identity projects as constructed in official textbooks 
and the ways in which schools attempt to promote feelings of love and belonging to the 
nation. It situates constructions of Islam and Islamist morality in these citizenship and 
nationhood projects, and examines the appropriation or subversion of these official 
discourses by school actors. In other words, it investigates both ‗lived citizenship‘ or 
actual access to protective, provision and participation rights; and ‗ideal citizenship‘ as 
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constructed in official textbook discourse and as articulated in student and teacher 
discourses. 
 
The thesis falls in seven chapters and a conclusion. The current chapter is made up of 
three parts. The first part describes the main features of the Mubarak regime that frame 
and inform an exploration of citizenship in the late Mubarak era. The following part 
discusses two key themes of the research: privatization and punishment as central 
themes of ‗lived citizenship‘ entitlement in the schools. The final part of the chapter 
discusses discourses of the nation and Islam as key themes in the construction of ‗ideal 
citizenship‘. Chapter Two details the research‘s approach to studying these issues in the 
schools, building on the literatures on discipline and subjectivation and the sociology 
and anthropology of education, and describing some of the key issues surrounding the 
way the research was conducted. Chapter Three provides an overview of key issues in 
Egyptian secondary education, paying special attention to issues around quality and 
privatization. It surveys the available official data and background information on 
education in Egypt that sets the stage for the discussion in the subsequent chapters, in 
terms of enrolment, tracking and achievement across the system, quality, teacher pay 
and public expenditures on education. It discusses private tutoring as they key feature 
of privatization across the three tracks in a comparative perspective. It surveys the 
available data on tutoring enrolment, costs and household spending; and the links 
between tutoring, quality, increased competition and corruption and their impact in the 
different tracks. 
 
Chapters Four and Five are aimed at introducing the everyday world of the schools in 
its concrete discourses and practices. They are concerned with the ‗lived‘ citizenship 
across the different schools and how the legal and constitutional rights of free 
education and protection from harm are translated and experienced in the schools. 
Chapter Four analyzes the features and impact of private tutoring across the schools 
catering to different social classes and its relationship to assessment, curriculum and, 
pedagogical policies/practices. It brings to light the discourses and practices of students 
and teachers in relation to privatization, highlighting the issues of discipline and 
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punishment across the schools surveyed and the links between privatization and future 
job or university enrollment opportunities. Chapter Five examines some of the ways in 
which classed and gendered citizenship is constructed and enacted in the everyday life 
of the schools. It presents an image of the use of physical and emotional violence in 
schools, the gendered and classed dimensions of the violence, and students‘ discourses 
about it. It expands the discussion of the breakdown of school control and regulations 
by exploring student ―noncompliance‖ with school and classroom rules, especially in its 
gendered dimensions. It sheds light on the most pronounced strategies of gender 
surveillance in schools, how these strategies are linked to concerns about sexual 
harassment, and the preoccupation of school actors with these issues.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven attempt to draw a picture of how the nation and state were 
articulated and enacted in the schools, in terms of official textbooks, in Chapter Six; 
and in student and school level rituals and discourses in Chapter Seven. Chapter Six 
traces the evolution of citizenship and nationhood discourses in national textbooks 
since Nasser and details the citizenship and nationhood discourses of the late Mubarak 
regime. It explores constructions of national identity and citizenship across a sample of 
the nationally unified 2009/2010 general and technical secondary school textbooks. It 
analyzes constructions of the nation and the citizen and the ways in which they 
intersect with the neoliberal directions of the regime as well as its complex relationship 
with different forms of Islamism. Chapter Seven discusses the key themes in student 
and teacher discourses of nationhood and citizenship and discusses the morning 
assembly ritual as a key practice and concrete example of the production and 
performance of nationhood in the schools. It discusses student, teacher and classroom 
discourses that relate to feelings of national belonging, constructions of the ‗Egyptian‘ 
self and the place of Islam and neoliberal citizenship in these discourses. It looks at the 
ways in which student and teacher discourses appropriated or subverted textbook and 
dominant constructions of nationhood and citizenship.  
 
The concluding chapter brings together the main findings of the research; reflecting on 
their links with broader political, educational and theoretical issues in terms of 
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privatization, discipline, nationhood and citizenship. It looks at how the Egyptian case 
can nuance our understanding of neoliberalism and privatization in It reflects on 
realities of discipline and punishment in the schools and how they relate to Foucauldian 
discussion of discipline. education It revisits the popular discourse of mafish ta„lim (there 
is no education), highlighting concrete examples of what this means for students across 
the system. Finally, it reflects on constructions of nationhood and citizenship and how 
they may be linked to the events of 2011. 
 
CORRUPTION, INFORMALITY AND REPRESSION 
IN THE LATE MUBARAK ERA 
The key features of the political and economic landscape in Egypt at the end of the 
Mubarak era include: the intensified application of neoliberal and pro-business 
economic policies and political arrangements, deteriorating real wages for most sections 
of the population and pervasive corruption and informality, large and widening income 
disparity, poverty rates of 40-50%, soaring inflation, deterioration of key public 
services, widening rural- urban disparities, and a growing population of almost 83 
million people1; all coupled with selective repression by a strengthened police state and 
growth in opposition movements and media. 
 
While Chapter Six describes in significant detail the citizenship and nationhood 
discourses of the late Mubarak regime as reflected in official textbooks, this section 
focuses on the main features of the regime in terms of clientelism and pervasive 
corruption, neoliberalism, privatization and income polarization and selective 
repression. The almost exclusive focus of the thesis on domestic issues and dynamics 
does not deny the general context of the increasingly close alliance of the regime with 
U.S. and Israeli interests and how this has framed its ‗security‘ concerns and economic 
policies. 
 
                                            
1 Total population in 2009 was estimated at around 82,999,000 (UNICEF 2009). 
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AUTHORITARIANISM, NEOLIBERALISM AND CRONYISM 
The position of the president as the ultimate source of power and authority has 
remained intact from Nasser to Mubarak, where ―[p]ersonal authoritarian rule in 
contemporary Egypt has become institutionalized‖ (Kassem 2004, 167). What most 
distinguishes Mubarak‘s rule is probably the corrosion of the power and authority of 
the state and the rule of law. It is the pervasiveness of informality and corruption that 
have accompanied the state‘s withdrawal, not only from the provision of social services, 
but also from the most basic policing and regulatory functions. 
 
In the early years of his rule, Mubarak relied on the elite configuration and general 
political direction he inherited from Sadat. He cemented and consolidated Egypt‘s 
alliance with the United States, the slow adoption of economic liberalization policies, 
token measures of political liberalization and rapprochement with Islamist groups. 
―Inward-looking crony capitalism, coupled to the military economy and the leviathan 
government with its still large public sector, generates the patronage and provides the 
controls required for the regime to retain its support within the state, while 
contemptuously ignoring or repressing what little autonomous political life remains‖ 
(Henry and Springborg 2001, 155). The limited bureaucratic capabilities and reach of 
the state are more evident in its increasing withdrawal from its bureaucratic and 
governance functions. Dorman has characterized the Egyptian state as a ―Lame 
Leviathan‖ that combines durable autocracy with state incompetence in a context 
where state-society relations are ―characterized by a logic of neglectful rule, entailing 
state-society disengagement; patrimonialism and clientelism; and risk avoidance‖ 
(Dorman 2007, 247). 
 
The hegemonic party that emerged from the earlier period of liberalization—the 
National Democratic Party—acted as a ―steering committee of Egypt‘s private sector‖ 
by serving as its conduit for getting access to state largesse (Bianchi 1989, 15-16). 
Parliamentary elections served as ―the regime‘s most important device for the 
distribution of rents and promotions to important groups within Egypt‘s politically 
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influential classes including family heads, businessmen, and party apparatchik‖ for the 
selection of those individuals who will be allowed to extract state rents in the future via 
both legitimate and illegitimate channels, shielded by parliamentary immunity (Blaydes 
2008a, 1). Patrimonialism and clientelism were furthered through the ‗democratic‘ 
structures of elections and political parties; and within neoliberal policies, this 
contributed to the intensification of corruption within the regime‘s mode of 
governance. The regime had therefore arrived at a formula for maintaining its hold on 
power while offering selective benefits to a changing configuration of elites, especially 
after 2003. This has translated into the further deterioration of public services and real 
wages for vast segments of the population across the country. 
 
While continuing to court and strengthen the elite created by Sadat‘s policies, Mubarak 
tried for long to court other important constituencies. Diane Singerman has described 
the ways in which, in a political system that is more repressive and polarized, citizens 
come to participate by consuming and the government maintained its legitimacy 
through distribution (1995, 245). The regime has periodically courted three important 
constituencies: public sector employees, farmers, and the urban poor with tangible 
effects including election-year inflation, a pre-election drain on reserves, and even a 
higher level of per capita calorie consumption in election years (Blaydes 2008b). This 
politics of consumption was premised on the massive depression in real terms of public 
sector wages throughout the Mubarak era. The various forms of subsidies around 
which the politics of redistribution and consumption revolved were part of a social 
contract where ―the government is in effect saying to wage earners: you will be paid 
partly in cash and partly in services and commodities‖ (Harik 1992, 486).2  
 
The social contracts implied in these practices of distribution and consumption have 
been changing with the intensification of neoliberal policies. The process of neoliberal 
reform initiated in 1991, with its roots in Sadat‘s Infitah policies of the 1970s, has 
                                            
2 While rationalizing the subsidy system is widely discussed as an important policy goal, the overlooked fact is that 
subsidies are ―supplementary wages and cannot be removed or reformed without overhauling the whole structure 
of prices and wages and the type of management the state has used to run the economy‖ (Harik 1992, 497). 
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resulted in significant changes in both the Egyptian economy and the nature of the 
social contract between the state and society (Alissa 2007). It entailed a massive 
retrenchment of the state from its provision and social protection functions. This was 
manifested in pervasive forms of privatization [formal and informal] across social and 
economic sectors, and a deterioration of the quality of the key social services of health 
and education as well as the state of other public services such as transportation and 
public safety. Accompanied by rising prices and consecutive waves of inflation due to 
currency devaluation, this has resulted in pervasive poverty and widening inequality. 
These, coupled with widening forms of corruption, extralegal and informal practices, 
undermined the rule of law and further structured access to protective citizenship rights 
along class lines.  
 
The most recent wave of pro-business liberalization and privatization came around 
2003/2004 with the devaluation of the Egyptian pound and the appointment of the 
Nazif cabinet, which was removed by the January 2011 protests. The appointment of 
the Nazif government not only indicated an intensified neoliberal direction, more overt 
forms of corruption and conflicts of interest, but also the intent to pass on the 
‗presidency‘ to Mubarak‘s son, Gamal, as signaled by the 2005 constitutional 
amendments, paving the way for his succession. In March 2007, the Constitution was 
finally purged of references to socialism and replaced with the declaration that ―the 
economy of the Arab Republic of Egypt is founded on the development of the spirit of 
enterprise.‖ These changes were finally pushed through in response to international 
pressures and within a corresponding change in the political elite. Changes in the 
political landscape involved a significant reshuffling of the so-called ―Old Guard‖ of 
the ruling elite, and the rise of a new guard associated with Gamal Mubarak. His 
selected associates from the business community were installed in the ruling Party‘s 
Policy Secretariat and eventually into the key ministerial positions. ―Under sweeping 
privatisation policies, [Mubarak and the clique surrounding him] appropriated 
profitable public enterprises and vast areas of state-owned lands. A small group of 
businessmen seized public assets and acquired monopoly positions in strategic 
commodity markets such as iron and steel, cement and wood‖ and ―local industries that 
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were once the backbone of the economy were left to decline‖ (Ismail 2011a). Under 
structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms, levels of growth and job creation have 
not have not been high enough to balance these negative patterns. Further, the 
government has not been able to successfully achieve the chief aims of these economic 
policies in terms of lowering its levels of debt and expanding its exports (Henry and 
Springborg 2001, Abo El-Abass and Gunn 2011). 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT, INFORMALITY AND WAGE POLARIZATION  
be maintained only because the salaries remained below a living wage (Mitchell 1999). 
The continued decline of public-sector employment coincided with the rise of the 
informal sector and the withdrawal of women from the labor force. The increasing 
precariousness and informalization of public sector employment [glaringly evident in a 
major employer such as the Ministry of Education- as detailed in Chapter Three] 
signaled a significant shift in the strategies of the regime, albeit one moving at the slow 
encroaching speed characteristic of the Mubarak regime. While public servants were 
still courted with annual bonuses and raises, an increasing proportion of public sector 
employees was being hired on differentiated ‗temporary contracts‘, that offered varying 
pay structures and minimal wages below the poverty lines [most receiving monthly 
wages of 100- 350 EGP; i.e. 15- 50 USD]. Such trends largely remained below the 
public radar and were reported in small scale oppositional media (see Al-Marsad al-
Naqabi 2007). There is little official data available about the actual pay structures in the 
public sector, whereas a commonly discussed figure in recent (post-‗January 25 
Revolution‘) public statements is of half a million public sector workers hired on 
temporary contracts. Furthermore multiple patterns of wage polarization within the 
public sector were occurring at once.  Take-home Salaries in the higher echelons of the 
administrative structure were expanding based on mechanisms that were legal but 
lacking in transparency and based far less on any measure of merit than direct 
patrimonialism [rewards for serving on various committees, travel expenses, 
percentages of contracts executed].  Salaries increased for employees working directly 
or indirectly with donor agencies or in departments of key ministries that were 
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upgraded to attract more qualified employees; and where adequate pay was offered, but 
the pay structure across the ministry remained the same. This was over and above 
normalized forms of corruption across all levels of public administration, which 
benefitted some public sector employees exponentially more than others, as discussed 
below. 
 
Informality is also critical for understanding the labor market and the fundamental 
problem of unemployment among youth, which shapes their perceptions, investment 
and engagement with education. The most pronounced impact, especially on youth, of 
neoliberal policies and diminished rule of law has been increased unemployment and 
informalization, informing distinct forms of exploitation and inequality of opportunity, 
especially affecting women and secondary school graduates. Informalization has 
increased in the Egyptian labor market during the 1990s (McCormick and Wahba 
2004), where the informal sector has been estimated to employ about 55% of the 
Egyptian labor force (Radwan 2007; World Bank 2003, 81). The ―informal sector‖ 
involves employment activities linked to industrial and service work in formal settings 
in which job-holders are not ―recognized, supported, or regulated by the government 
and even when they are registered, and respect certain aspects of the law, they are 
almost invariably beyond social protection, labor legislation, and protective measures at 
the workplace‖ (Mokhtar and Wahba 2002, 133). In fact in addition to these practices, 
most medium and large ―formal‖ institutions also resort to a range of serious violations 
to Egyptian labor laws, such as the dominant practice whereby employees are required 
to sign their resignation when they are hired so that they can be terminated without 
notice, are seldom given copies of their contracts and their social insurance documents 
are falsified, stating lower salaries so that firms pay lower social insurance contributions.  
 
Youth in Egypt continue to be the most disadvantaged group in terms of higher rates 
of unemployment, lower earnings, and limited job security and stability, with the 
majority of new entrants finding jobs in the informal economy (Assaad and Barsoum 
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2007).3 Over the period of neoliberal reforms, while 7.5 per cent growth rates are 
proclaimed by the government, real unemployment was estimated at around 26.3 per 
cent (Shatz 2010). Because jobs are so scarce and of such low quality, a large 
proportion of youth have had to stop searching for work (counted as ‗out of the labor 
force‘) and are therefore not counted among the ‗unemployed‘. A shocking 80% of 
those aged 22 to 29 were counted as ‗out of the labor force‘ in recent figures, the 
majority of them women (UNDP 2010). Technical school graduates suffer the highest 
rates of unemployment, lowest earnings and a devaluation of their educational 
credentials, and are concentrated within the informal economy‘s poor-quality jobs and 
precarious working conditions (Assaad and Barsoum 2007). By 2006, first employment 
in the informal sector represented half the jobs obtained by female commercial school 
graduates, a phenomenon that was virtually nonexistent three or four decades earlier 
(Amer 2007). More alarming, however, is that this informal sector is not a temporary 
situation and that those whose first job after graduating is in this sector will be unable 
to transition into formal-sector employment; 95 percent of those who were employed 
in informal jobs in 1990 were still in those or similar jobs in 1998 (Mokhtar and Wahba 
2002, cited in World Bank 2003, 83). Young people are among the lowest-paid workers, 
often taking poor quality jobs in which they receive few benefits, such as medical 
insurance, union representation, and paid vacations, and do not earn enough to start 
families and complete their transitions to adulthood (Assaad and Barsoum 2007). 
 
Because of the very large number of applicants, employers resort to accepting 
‗recommendations‘ for specific candidates in order to avoid a long and time-consuming 
selection process. Personal recommendations and connections are invaluable for 
obtaining informal and private sector jobs and Barsoum (2004) points out that 
wasta/connections is indispensable in securing a government job. This clearly shapes 
and exacerbates the sense of injustice and inequality of opportunity articulated in 
student and teacher discourses, discussed in Chapter Seven. Along with unemployment, 
                                            
3 From 1998-2006, there has been: a decrease in female labor force participation; and substantial increase in 
unemployment rates among post-secondary and university graduates who have become the most vulnerable 
group towards unemployment (Amer 2007). 
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informality and low job quality, job seekers also face various forms of exploitation and 
fraud, such as being hired for long periods ‗on probation‘ and released without pay 
after completing certain tasks, not being paid the agreed upon sums, not being paid 
regularly, and female applicants may also respond to advertisement that have intentions 
of sexual exploitation (Barsoum 2004). As Elgeziri (2010) notes, for women working in 
small shops and offices with few coworkers and staff members, sexual harassment is a 
genuine risk, which partly explains why they are reluctant to work in such places despite 
the limited availability of opportunities. Therefore, the breakdown in the rule of law 
manifested in increasingly corruption and informality has severely impacted young 
people and their feelings of injustices and may have exacerbated unemployment in the 
country.4 
 
CORRUPTION AND INFORMALITY 
Key to understanding the regime‘s distributional paradigm is not only how subsidies are 
essential to the state‘s contract with wage-earners, but in fact how corruption and 
informal privatization have also become fundamental to the wage structure of state—
and even private—employees. For Amin (2009), rampant and systematic corruption in 
the Mubarak era was a direct result of the state being both weak and totalitarian (rakhwa 
wa shumuliya). Dorman portrays the informal neighborhoods themselves as ―both a 
consequence of an authoritarian political order and embedded in the informal control 
stratagems used by Egyptian governments to bolster their rule‖ (Dorman 2009, 419).  
 
Corruption intensified in all layers of public as well as private institutions, especially 
during the last 10 years of the Mubarak era. From the larger patterns of crony 
                                            
4 While it is often believed that informalization is driven by widespread unemployment, it has been 
argued that informalization also drives unemployment. Boughzala and Kouki (2003) argue that 
unemployment persistence in countries like Tunisia is not caused only by labor market rigidities and by 
population growth. The size of the informal sector and the low level of investment within the formal 
sector and in public infrastructure and services are other important factors. They show that the larger 
the size of the informal sector the more persistent unemployment will be, and that the larger the share 
of investment allocated to the formal sector, the lower and less persistent unemployment will be 
(Boughzala and Kouki 2003). 
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capitalism at the top to everyday petty corruption, Galal Amin (2009) portrays 
corruption under Mubarak as ―inseparable from the regime itself‖ (Amin 2009, 58).  5 
According to Transparency International‘s 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, Egypt 
ranked 105 among 163 countries, with a score of 2.9, on a scale of 0 (―rampant 
corruption‖) to 10 (―least corrupt‖) (Alissa 2007). An opinion survey conducted by the 
Egyptian National Center for Social and Criminal Research revealed that 94% of 
respondents agreed that corruption has become a big problem and 70% felt that 
corruption had increased over the past year alone (Salih 2010). Another survey also 
concluded that ―the majority of Egyptians do not feel safe in their country, due to 
increasing crime rates and escalating corruption and abuse of power and the hegemony 
of capital and the aggravation of the phenomenon of disregard to the law‖ (Al-Iraqi 
2011). This was facilitated by the lack of interest on the part of authorities in combating 
it: corruption cases rarely reached the courts and when they did, those in power were 
able to disregard court decisions. Under generalized and systematic corruption, the 
police also engaged in extortion and offered their services to private interests, while 
―thugs became an arm of the police‖ and ―practices of thuggery have been adopted by 
the regime to maintain itself and protect the interests of the ruling elite for decades‖ 
(Ismail 2011a). Importantly, the pervasiveness of corruption and informality has led to 
a sense of vilification of the citizen based on his or her everyday complicity in 
illegitimate practices, where the citizen has to engage in illegal or extralegal activity 
simply to make a living. This complicity, fundamental to reproduction of the system, is 
also critical to discourses that malign, silence and disentitle the ‗bad citizen‘, as 
elaborated in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
Discussions of informality in Egypt have significantly focused on informal 
neighborhoods (Singerman 1995, Elyachar 2005, Ismail 2006, Dorman 2007, Sabry 
                                            
5 The rapid population increase in itself, with the relaxation of development efforts and the decrease in 
the rate of increase of income beginning in the mid-1980s, after the ebbing of the wave of migration [to 
the Gulf States], and therefore the raising of unemployment levels, the increasing inflation since the 
1980s and rising food prices, the increasing overcrowding of people in poor quarters and the growth of 
informal housing, the growth of the phenomenon of street children all pushed people to break the law, 
as there was a continuous increase in the numbers of people who cannot stay alive without breaking the 
law (Amin 2009, 62- 5). 
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2010), where housing is constructed without official permits, key services are accessed 
by ‗illegally‘ tapping into the official means of provision; and this is all done with the 
complicity of officials of the state, typically in return for direct payments, bribes and 
favors. There is a thin line between informality, extralegal or illegitimate practices and 
corruption; in a reality where they all feed on each other. Informality/corruption is also 
a key feature of the functioning of critical public services and almost normalized as 
means of supplementing the salaries of public sector employees. This has implied very 
uneven access to such forms of additional income among public sector employees. 
Simply, not all employees work in departments that control critical services to the 
public, nor do all departments across the country cater to wealthier citizens from whom 
greater sums can be extracted. In the education sector, this is visibly paralleled for 
example in the ability of public school teachers of ‗core‘ subjects to make an 
adequate—and sometimes massive—income from tutoring [unregulated, untaxed and 
outside the formal schooling framework], whereas teachers of subjects that do not 
enter student totals like art or music, do not have access to such informal markets; 
resulting in large shortages in teachers for those subjects and the eventual shrinkage of 
that aspect of education altogether (see Chapters Three and Four). The massive profits 
available on the informal market are the best engine for its survival, perpetuation and 
deepening. Corruption has been tolerated by the regime since it ensures the long-term 
loyalty of its influential political class because there is ―little doubt that the majority of 
these individuals would do worse under a democratic system where increased 
accountability would limit opportunities for graft and corruption‖ (Blaydes 2008a, 26). 
As Dorman puts it, informality ―opens the door to the kind of clientelism in search of 
public services upon which the micropolitics of many Cairo neighbourhoods revolves. 
It thus links them to the countrywide networks of devolved patronage that have long 
underpinned the political order. Hence informality, again ironically, allows Egypt‘s 
rulers to achieve a considerable degree of state–society integration by other means – 
despite a political order grounded in elite privilege‖ (2009, 435). Emerging research on 
developing countries has suggested that not only do informality and corruption grow 
together and feed on each other, but they may be both driven by increasing inequality 
(Mishra and Ray 2010). 
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REPRESSION AND PROTEST 
Since Mubarak came to power in 1981, Egypt has been ruled under a declared ―state of 
emergency‖ by which the regime ―has rationalized the outlawing of demonstrations, the 
use of indefinite detentions without trial, and the endowment of presidential decrees 
with the power of law‖ (Brownlee 2002, 6-7). Mubarak acquired substantial liberty to 
have his opponents convicted in military trials, to shut down newspapers and 
professional syndicates, or to jail human rights activists (Brownlee 2002, 6). This was 
consolidated through ―the use of a legal-constitutional framework to curtail the 
influence and powers of institutions, groupings, and individuals, the distribution of 
state patronage to create a dependent clientelist network, the presence of electoral 
malpractice, and the use of state coercion to control perceived challengers‖ (Kassem 
2004, 167). 
 
This deteriorating political, economic and social situation has not been met with silent 
approval. Protest and opposition movements and media have been growing over the 
past few years, especially since 2003. According to labor historian Joel Benin (2011), 
since 1998 well more than two million workers have participated in some 3,500 strikes, 
sit-ins and other forms of protest, with major strikes in nearly every sector of the 
Egyptian economy. 6 Importantly, in the 2000s, unlike in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
government did not routinely repress workers‘ protests through massive use of violence 
and typically offered limited concessions to protestors, so that people sensed that 
protest brought about significant gains (Benin 2011). The growth of independent and 
citizen media has been critical in this regard, where since 2003–04 some two dozen 
newspapers and magazines independent of the regime have appeared, which along with 
the Arab satellite stations and the Internet, offer access to information that was 
                                            
6 Workers‘ collective actions over the past decade ―have usually targeted bread-and-butter issues—the 
failure of owners of newly privatized enterprises to abide by the terms of the contracts in force before 
privatization, as the law requires; failure to pay long-overdue bonuses, incentives and other wage 
supplements; failure of public enterprises to pay workers their share of profits; fear of large-scale firings 
before or after privatization; and low wages‖ (Benin 2011, 8). 
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unimaginable a decade ago (Benin 2009, Meital 2006). News and videos circulated 
about police practices or other state practices and forms of corruption played a critical 
role in exposing and deterring state repression and mobilizing for protest.  
 
Opposition has generally been met with different forms of repression from the state, 
ranging from the imprisonment of well-known oppositional figures such as Ayman 
Nour, to the extension of State Security oversight to every sector of society and every 
school. The repression of opposition in these local contexts was carried out with the 
use of intimidation, torture and other extra-legal measures. Several scholars have shown 
patterns of de-liberalization throughout the Mubarak era (Brownlee 2002, Perry 2004, 
Singerman 1995) as well as increasing use of blatantly coercive tactics spiraling cycles of 
violence (Kassem 2004). It has been argued that participation and pluralism in the early 
2000s were at lower levels than at any time since Mubarak assumed the presidency, with 
a tenuous period of political opening in the 1980s and very early 1990s (Brownlee 
2002).  Oppositional action that ‗takes to the streets‘ and organized action of 
‗oppositional Islamism‘ (see below) were the critical ‗red lines‘ that defined the 
―freedoms allowed‖ by the regime. State Security officials reportedly told one detained 
secular activist who inquired about ‗the ground rules‘: no street, no Brotherhood (cited 
in Kassem 2004, 175). While the regime‘s Islamist opponents were the main focus of 
repression in recent years, secular political activists, human rights activists, workers and 
voters have all been targeted. This has been viewed ―as an indication of the increasing 
insecurity of an authoritarian regime determined to maintain its monopoly on power‖ 
(Kassem 2004, 187). 
 
Different levels and forms of repression were applied to dissenting voices, whether they 
were protesting administrative decisions or irregularities in schools, organizing workers 
from medium-sized institutions (such as state-owned or even private factories), or 
exposing larger forms of corruption. Repression was more likely if dissent was related 
to the vast networks of allies and members of the ruling party or to the regime itself. 
State repression varied greatly based on class position as the poor received the largest 
share of a wide range of repressive policies. Importantly however, violent and 
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humiliating treatment by police and other state officials permeated the daily lives of 
citizens, regardless of whether they were engaged in forms of dissent or resistance or 
not (see for example, Ismail 2006; Chapters Four and Five). As Hani Shukrallah, editor 
of an independent newspaper, pointed out, ―the regime has pursued a deliberate policy 
of selective repression based on class... The middle-class professionals in Kifaya can 
chant slogans like ―Down with Mubarak‖ because they risk, at worst, a beating. But 
most Egyptians live in a world where anything goes, where they‘re treated like 
barbarians who need to be conquered, and women are molested by the security forces. 
The average Egyptian can be dragged into a police station and tortured simply because 
a police officer doesn‘t like his face‖ (cited in Shatz 2010). Humiliation and physical 
punishment for such ‗average‘ Egyptians was therefore an increasingly common feature 
of state-society relations and a regular pattern in their everyday interactions with the 
state. 
 
Education has been a key arena of struggle with oppositional forces, especially in the 
1990s when thousands of teachers were purged from teaching positions under ‗security 
pretexts‘ and accused of propagating ‗extremist‘ views and practices. Education was 
seen by the regime as an arena where identity struggles could be won or lost. Children 
could be exposed and ‗schooled‘ in Islamist discourses and practices and develop 
Islamist orientations and loyalties. The so-called ‗war on terror‘ has fuelled an 
expansion of the U.S. government‘s work to improve schools overseas with the hope 
of combating Islamic fundamentalism (Herrera 2008a, Zehr 2004, Essam El Din 2003). 
In official pronouncement, education was frequently articulated ―as a matter of national 
security‖.7 This terminology gained special currency after the wave of terrorist attacks 
in the 1990s and confrontation between the state and Islamist groups. This was 
translated into two main areas: on the one hand, within a neoliberal framework it 
emphasizes developing a ‗competent‘ workforce that is an asset for the economy and 
                                            
7 Political security, according to a Ministry of Education (MOE) publication, is achieved through democracy and 
‗social peace‘ (al-salam al ijtima„i), whereas economic security is to be achieved through the growth of human 
capital and the economic productivity of individuals, and military security is achievable through the kind of 
scientific and technological progress that can be achieved only through an information technology ‗revolution‘ 
linked to education reform (See Sayed 2006, 29). 
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helps attract foreign investment; a task in which public education almost entirely fails. 
On the other hand, it is linked to creating ‗loyal‘ citizens, reflected in periodical 
attempts to control the growth of Islamist influences across the nation‘s schools and 
classrooms, along with the standard measures for controlling any form of potential 
dissent in the schools. 
 
Protest- and repression- had also extended to the education sector. Teachers, 
administrative staff, students, and parents have engaged in various protests and 
demonstrations. Teachers resorted to techniques similar to those used in the wider 
protest movement, from demonstrations to hunger strikes to litigation.8 For example, 
in 2008, technical education teachers filed a case against the minister of education for 
excluding them from the Teachers Cadre [new improved pay scale, see Chapter Three]. 
Other teachers and administrators have since successfully fought for the legal right to 
be included in the Cadre; periodically staging protests in front of MOE. They had been 
repeatedly promised that they would be transferred to the higher par rate of Special 
Contract system. After the protests that brought down the Mubarak regime, thousands 
of teachers, especially in Mahala Kubra Governorate continued to protest demanding 
the disbanding of the Teachers‘ Syndicate and investigations into its financial violations. 
Teacher demonstrations and strikes continued with sizable strike action by newly 
formed independent syndicates in the beginning of the 2011/2012 school year, 
demanding better pay and conditions. 
 
Parents and students, in both urban and rural areas, have also protested decisions that 
they deemed to have a significant negative impact on their children: such as a change in 
the location of the school or being joined with another school into a double shift 
system. The most visible protests were in elite schools immediately before the events of 
January 2011. In December 2010 and January 2011, students of a number of the quasi-
private National Institutes and their parents initiated a successful wave of 
                                            
8 For example, a large group of technical education teachers in Ismailiya who had been working for five years 
under the minimally paid Reward System demonstrated and threatened to enter into a hunger strike demanding a 
change in their contractual arrangements (Mu‗alimu al-Ta‗lim al-Fanni fil-Ismailiya 2008). 
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demonstrations and sit-ins, especially in Alexandria, against a ministerial decision to 
convert their (formally nationalized but largely independent) schools into public 
Experimental schools. While the formal justification was allegations of corruption in 
the management of the schools, there were also claims that the ministerial decision (by 
Minister Badr, referred to in Chapters Five and the Conclusion) was partly motivated 
by the desire to divide the schools‘ assets, including large plots of land, and sell them to 
well-connected businessmen. These different types of protests were all faced with the 
standard forms of typical levels of intimidation and police intervention, including police 
intimidation and measured repression of the upper-middle class protests of the 
National Institutes.  
 
As highly securitized spaces, schools were closely monitored for oppositional behavior. 
To ensure that all school discourses—including every teacher‘s exam questions, and 
every student‘s answers—were devoid of any oppositional themes, especially under the 
banner of combating terrorism, educational officials and state security personnel 
retained tight control over political and religious expression in schools. The 1990s 
especially, saw literally thousands of teachers transferred from teaching jobs on 
‗security‘ grounds. Then-Minister of Education Hussein Kamel Bahaa Al-Din declared 
that he has expelled thousands of extremist teachers (Bahaa Al-Din 2004).9 In fact, any 
form of protest on the part of teachers could be dealt with through the security 
apparatus of the ministry or State Security officials. State Security officers ―responsible 
for the educational file in each district or governorate‖ quickly get involved if there is 
any sign of collective action in the schools (see Badr Yu‘akid Istimrar 2010). Those who 
praised the regime, specifically the president, and later his wife and son, were rewarded 
and promoted. In fact, Bahaa Al-Din, the regime‘s longest serving education minister, 
issued a new series of educational reports named ―Mubarak and Education‖, praising 
Mubarak‘s ‗achievements‘ in the educational field. The numbers of schools given 
Mubarak‘s name was the greatest under his tenure, reaching 388 schools across the 
                                            
9 Bahaa Al-Din pointed to the security reports received in this regard; ongoing reports from the 
supervisory apparatuses of the [Education] Ministry, and from the authorized bodies, and publications 
from the media.  
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country, with an additional 160 schools named after Suzanne Mubarak (and one after 
Gamal) (Tawfiq 2011).  
 
In sum, a number of key features characterized the mode of governance of Mubarak‘s 
authoritarianism. These features have shaped the distributive patterns and style of 
governance of the Mubarak regime. Within the overall neoliberal and authoritarian 
setting, this include: the pervasiveness of cronyism and corruption in the everyday 
functioning of the state; the widening reach of informality—as fundamentally linked to 
privatization and state withdrawal from service-provision—in the functioning of 
various state services; and the selective repression of dissent and harassment by police 
and state agents. These features were heightened by the intensification of ‗crony 
capitalism‘ in the ‗late Mubarak era;‘ coinciding with the rise of Gamal Mubarak and the 
accompanying shift in elite configuration. The remainder of the Chapter focuses on the 
related themes of exploring lived citizenship contracts and ideal citizenship and 
nationhood discourses, especially in terms of privatization, punishment and 
Islamization. 
 
CITIZENSHIP 
Citizenship is a contested concept that can be defined in different ways and with 
varying levels of complexity and comprehensiveness. ―Broadly conceived, citizenship 
emphasizes the legal relation between an individual and a national state‖ (Berezin 2001, 
95). As defined in the classic work of T. H. Marshall, citizenship is understood as the 
civil, political, social and economic rights that define the relationship between 
individuals and the state (Marshall 1992). Although many scholars continue to build on 
it, ―Marshallian citizenship has been subject to extensive criticism over the last two 
decades and the social model of citizenship has been expanded and deepened by 
approaches that emphasize the flexibility of social membership, the limitations of 
citizenship merely as rights, and by perspectives that emphasize identity and difference‖ 
(Isin and Turner 2007, 5). There are critical emotional, cultural and symbolic 
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dimensions to citizenship. Citizenship signifies ―a field of struggle: an arena in which 
relations linking individuals to their wider community, social and political contexts are 
continually discussed, reworked and contested‖ (Hall, Williamson and Coffey 2000, 
461).  
 
In educational research, citizenship is often discussed in more limited ways with a focus 
on developing citizenship textbooks, media, programs, and activities, especially with the 
aim of promoting multicultural citizenship. This is distinct from the focus on the 
school as a site where citizenship projects are lived and experienced. Citizenship here is 
used as a tool to articulate and differentiate themes and experiences that emerged 
across the schools. This is mainly carried out along the lines of protection, provision 
and participation rights. This is used to organize and compare official and student 
discourses of citizenship as well as ‗lived‘ citizenship in the schools. Different 
citizenship contracts and realities also necessitate corresponding citizenship discourses 
that legitimize them. Such discourses of ‗ideal‘ citizenship also have implications 
protection, provision and participation rights. 
 
As Isin and Turner (2007, 6) put it, ―investigating citizenship… inevitably involves the 
comparative study of the rights and duties of citizens across diverse states‖. This work 
is concerned with exploring the comparative rights of citizens within the same state and 
across different social classes. Citizenship rights may be divided into categories of 
protective, provision and participation rights (Raby 2008). Protective citizenship rights 
address safety from discrimination, abuse and injustice, while provision rights include 
access to services such as health care, education and recreation (Archard 2004). 
Participation rights include rights to speech, representation, information and 
participation in decision-making (Lansdown 1994). Free public education is 
fundamentally about a clear ‗provision‘ right, but other citizenship rights are relevant to 
the school contexts. Rights to ‗participation‘ and freedom of expression in the schools 
can be examined by looking at different school activities from wall journals and student 
elections, to the freedom students and teachers perceive for deviating from mandated 
state discourses and narratives in the classroom, to in-school activities, essays, 
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assignments and examinations. Rights to ‗protection‘ can be examined in terms of equal 
and fair opportunity in assessment and judgment of student work) and freedom from 
physical and emotional harm and discrimination, as well as the right to voice 
complaints and grievances. This is fundamentally linked to issues around discipline and 
punishment in schools.  
 
PRIVATIZATION AND NEOLIBERAL CITIZENSHIP 
Free education is a constitutional principle, necessary for maintaining social harmony. 
Hussein Kamel Bahaeddin, Former Minister of Education (Cited in Tadros 2001). 
 
Greater efforts are being exerted to broaden the scope of private funding of education, and to relieve the state 
budget of major financial burdens. 
Gamal Mubarak, Head of National Democratic Party Policy Secretariat (Cited in Essam El Din 
2003) 
 
The construction of citizenship in Egyptian schools cannot be understood without 
reference to the pervasive informal privatization of education and its varying 
manifestations across schools catering to different social classes. Examining the state-
market nexus that structures the educational field enables the tracking of ―persistent yet 
transformed understandings of the relationship between private and public through 
which the meanings and functions of education and citizenship are debated and 
struggled over‖ (Lukose 2005). The Mubarak regime periodically claimed education as a 
‗national project‘ and priority for Egypt. Official statements frequently affirmed the 
inviolability of the constitutional right to free education and often voiced criticism of 
private tutoring and even declarations of its illegality. This was accompanied by little 
concrete action to deter tutoring and the encouragement of the expansion of the role of 
―civil society‖ and the private sector in the provision of education.  
The privatization of education is a phenomenon that has swept across much of the 
global North and South under neoliberalism. ―Privatization is not just neoliberalism‘s 
strategy for dealing with the public sector‖, but ―a consistent element of its particular 
form of governmentality, its ethos‖ (Read 2009, 35). Under neoliberalism, the 
objectives in education are the same as those that guide neoliberalism‘s economic and 
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social welfare goals. As Michael W. Apple puts it, neoliberal reforms promote 
expansion of ―the free market; the drastic reduction of government responsibility for 
social needs; the reinforcement of intensely competitive structures of mobility both 
inside and outside the school; the lowering of people‘s expectations for economic 
security; the ―disciplining‖ of culture and the body‖ (Apple 2004, 15). The key 
components of neoliberal reforms in the global North have included efforts to 
implement standardized tests in order to hold students, teachers and schools 
accountable, to increase ‗school choice‘, and to privatize education provision. 
 
However, despite the significant literature on these issues in the North, educational 
neoliberalism and privatization take on very different meanings and scope in Egyptian 
education. The basic conditions in these contexts are radically different. At one level, 
per student expenditures on education in Egypt stand at USD 129.6 per student per 
year, compared to USD 289.5 in Tunisia, USD 1,337.6 in Saudi Arabia, USD 4,763.4 in 
America, and USD 6,959.8 in Japan (Essam El Din 2003). The key differences are not 
only in the resources, training and daily functioning of these systems, but also that 
privatization takes place differently. No educational system in the North is 
characterized by the level of de-facto privatization witnessed in Egyptian secondary 
education, where most students obtain most of their education on the market. Beyond 
the general meanings of privatization as the growing involvement of the private sector 
in the provision of education; and the inequality this creates, privatization has occurred 
through very different mechanisms and patterns than those described in the global 
North. This has shaped a distinct- and more acute- crisis of state legitimacy and far 
more fundamental changes in schooling relations, as explored throughout this research. 
This is critically premised on poorer resources as well as the extralegality 10  and 
informality of the practices around privatization. A context where privatization happens 
through private tutoring that is not entirely legal, or through practices such as teachers 
and parents having to pay school cleaners directly because the state does not do so, is 
very different from the sub-contracting of cleaning services in some schools or the 
                                            
10 Many practices described throughout the thesis are not strictly punishable by law, but are in violation of official 
regulations or have an ambiguous legal status.  
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introduction of school vouchers described in the literature on privatization in the 
North. The research explores the concrete ways in which privatization takes places 
across the schools and how this reflects available citizenship contracts across the 
system. 
 
What is particularly relevant to Egypt and understanding citizenship contracts and 
discourses is the way that the neoliberal program has increasingly come to be 
―represented in ‗cultural‘ terms as concerned with the attitudes, values and forms of self 
understanding embedded in both individual and institutional activities‖ (Keat and 
Abercrombie 1991, 1). Underlying the neoliberal notion of the autonomous chooser, is 
a more general vision that every human being is an entrepreneur managing their own 
life, and should act as such (Olssen 1996). In this sense, it has profound implications 
for citizenship. As Henry Giroux puts it, ―citizenship is portrayed as an utterly 
privatized affair whose aim is to produce competitive self-interested individuals vying 
for their own material and ideological gain‖ (Giroux 2001, 30). As Lukose puts it, 
privatization is accompanied by ―a shift from an understanding of citizenship as 
building the nation to one in which one ought to be free to consume the nation‖ 
(Lukose 2005, 522).  
 
The withdrawal of the welfare state and the spread of neoliberalism across the world 
have led to the promotion of what are articulated as successful neoliberal subjectivities 
and a change in the conception of the ‗ideal citizen‘. In Britain, the concept of ‗active 
citizenship‘ introduced in 1988 ―employed the language of citizenship explicitly to help 
legitimize the shift towards the citizen as entrepreneur rather than state dependent‖ 
(Faulks 2006, 124). As Faulks notes, the concept of active citizenship was consistent 
with the commodification and individualization of social relations associated with 
Thatcherism at the heart of which were different forms of privatization (Faulks 1998).11 
Citizenship is re-conceptualized away from a ‗rights‘ focus towards a citizen who adapts 
                                            
11 At the heart of the neo-liberal redefinition of citizenship is the idea of market rights. These rights, such as 
property ownership, consumer rights, and choice between service providers, were seen as more empowering than 
collectivist welfare rights. They were promoted through such policies as the privatization of public utilities, the 
introduction of market forces into the public sector, and the selling off of council houses (Faulks 2006, 125). 
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to a new precarious labor conditions and exploits market opportunities. Critically, 
neoliberal citizenship necessitates a different conception and relationship to social 
services, poverty and the poor. The ideal neoliberal citizen is ―a law abiding, materially 
successful individual who was willing and able to exploit the opportunities created by 
the promotion of market rights, while demonstrating occasional compassion for those 
less fortunate than themselves – charity rather than democratic citizenship was to be 
the main instrument of ‗active citizenship‘‖ (Faulks 2006, 125).  
 
In 2006, the mission of Egyptian pre-university education explicitly included the notion 
of active citizenship:  
The Ministry of Education fosters equal opportunities for all Egyptian students to 
realize a quality education that empowers them to become creative, life-long learners 
who are tolerant critical thinkers with strong values and a wide range of skills for active 
citizenship and dynamic participation in an ever-changing global society (MOE 2006, 
76).  
Therefore, this research examines whether and how similar notions of ideal citizenship 
are reflected in secondary school textbooks, and the extent to which these concepts of 
citizenship take hold among students and or successfully ‗discipline‘ new neoliberal 
subjectivities. Given the pervasiveness of marketization, the research explores the ways 
in which themes of successful neoliberal citizenship are appropriated and employed in 
student and school level discourses.  
 
 
 
PUNISHMENT, SURVEILLANCE AND GENDER 
Punishment has had a special place in the evolution of schooling and its production of 
subjectivities, as it did in the discourses of students and the observable practices in the 
schools. The manner in which discipline, punishment and codes of conduct in schools 
are ―organized, justified and presented to students‖ is part of the processes by which 
certain kinds of students ―are assumed and created, particularly in terms of citizens and 
future workers‖ (Raby 2005, 71). As Deacon has pointed out, corporal punishment 
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loomed remarkably large in criticisms of educational practice in early modern 
educational institutions, which ―were perceived as poorly regulated, arbitrarily managed, 
abusive, ineffective, generating resistance‖ (2006, 179). Their lack of regulation was 
associated ―with a poor economy of coercion‖; that is, ―the concern was less about 
inhumanity or violence per se and more about the kind or degree of violence that might 
best mould particular individuals‖ (Deacon 2006, 179-180). Studies of school 
punishment in countries of the North portray a general progression from ‗negative‘ to 
‗positive‘ forms of discipline. Schools increasingly resorted to other methods such as 
codes of conduct, suspension and teachers‘ management of student behaviors inside 
the classroom to maintain safe and orderly environments that are conducive to 
effective teaching and learning (Cameron 2006). 
 
On the other hand, while physical and emotional punishment is clearly prohibited in 
official regulations in Egypt, it is reportedly practiced widely across the system. Cases of 
severe beating of students by teachers have received significant media coverage and 
visibility in recent years. The prevalence of this phenomenon may not be surprising as 
physical and emotional violence are common features of social relations in the home, in 
the workplace and in the public sphere. Abdul Hamid (2000) has argued that the 
dominant means of social control in Egyptian society are reflected in the means of 
control in the boys‘ general secondary schools he studied, in terms of lack of dialogue, 
authoritarian relations, absence of freedom of expression and dissent, and forms of 
exclusion and symbolic violence against disadvantaged students. Salwa Ismail has 
described, in her study of the production and control of social space in new urban 
quarters of Cairo, the humiliation of young men in encounters with the everyday state, 
which is ―embodied especially in such police tactics as roughing up, beating, and 
slapping‖ (2006, 123).  
 
In his ethnography of state-owned textile companies in Alexandria, Shehata (2003) has 
also described the absolute concentration of power and repression in the hands of the 
top manager and the regular use of humiliation, intimidation and even physical violence 
in highly delineated hierarchical relations within the factory. Shehata (2003, 2009) 
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describes the existence of an ideology justifying inequality and authoritarian social 
relations within the factory, where managers as well as many workers believed that 
superiors needed to be tough and distant and, in some cases, abusive and 
condescending to be respected. This expression of social distance and hierarchy recalls 
the ways in which Foucault linked punishment with the superiority of the sovereign. 
Punishment, as Foucault put it, is ―a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured 
sovereignty is reconstituted ... by manifesting it at its most spectacular‖ (Foucault 1977, 
48). 12  In the pre-modern state as well as the modern day household, corporal 
punishment is deployed as a means of avenging perceived contempt for an authority 
figure (Westlund 1999).  
 
The research explores modes of discipline and punishment in the schools and the ways 
in which they are linked the maintenance of hierarchies of respect and authority and 
with the gender and socioeconomic location of students. The research explores the 
dynamics around practices of punishment in the schools in their relationships to the 
neoliberal project of the state in education. It explores the modes of verbal and physical 
violence directed at students and how these are understood and explained by students 
and school authorities.  
 
In exploring the issues around discipline and punishment in the schools, the research 
also looks at the seeming increase in noncompliant behavior on the part of students. A 
number of works have linked working class students‘ perceptions of job opportunities 
to noncompliance, the rejection of the values and knowledges of the school and the 
appropriation of more ‗traditional‘ gender discourses, practices and identities. This 
increased ‗gender traditionalism‘ means that boys tend to gravitate towards more rough, 
challenging and ‗macho‘ discourses and practices, while girls give great importance to 
expressions of femininity and concerns with romance, relationships, marriage and 
                                            
12 The punishment ―is carried out in such a way as to give a spectacle not of measure, but of imbalance and 
excess; in this liturgy of punishment, there must be an emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic 
superiority‖. The superiority in question, moreover, is ―that of the physical strength of the sovereign beating 
down upon the body of his adversary and mastering it‖ in an ―exercise of terror‖ that makes clear the 
asymmetrical relation of power between ―sovereign‖ and ―subject‖ (Foucault 1977, 48). 
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motherhood. The research explores the links between noncompliance and the 
construction and performance of gender identities across the schools, in light of 
dominant gender discourses informed by Islamist morality as well as requirements of 
fashion and social distinction. 
 
Schools obviously and importantly discipline students into gendered citizens; an area 
that deserves its own detailed analysis as a key feature and function of school life from 
early childhood onwards. The construction of gendered subjectivities or ideal 
femininities and masculinities in and by schools is not however a major focus of this 
work. I did not explore in detail, for instance, the ways in which ―students‘ mundane 
and day-to-day practices—including bodily deportment, physical games, linguistic 
accounts, and uses of clothing, hairstyles and accessories—are implicated in the 
discursive constitution of student subjectivities‖ or the construction of 
heteronormativity (Youdell 2005, 249). In looking at key themes of discipline and 
punishment in the schools, I do however devote attention to the most pronounced 
gender surveillance strategies in the schools and some of the ways in which the schools 
actively reinforce the good girl/bad girl (virgin/whore) dichotomy; drawing the 
contours of femininities that are required of students across the different types of 
schools and ‗rewarded‘ within prevailing gender constructions. This role of the school 
parallels systems of control in local communities and on the streets that have 
accompanied the rise of Islamist piety. ―Techniques of enforcing moral rule in space 
include the monitoring and surveillance of gender mixing, of women‘s comings and 
goings, of women‘s attire, and of their conduct in public‖ (Ismail 2006, xxxviii). The 
research explores whether and how such techniques were reflected in the schools; 
looking at how state regulations, idiosyncratic school-level practices and student 
preferences interacted to shape some of the overall dynamics of gender control in each 
school. 
 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ISLAMISM  
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The thesis treats citizenship and national identity as fundamentally interlinked themes; 
not only in terms of discourses of imagined and ideal citizenship, but sometimes more 
powerfully in terms of lived citizenship. That is, the way the nation (and the citizen of 
the nation) is constructed and talked about in official narratives is critically linked to the 
available citizenship contracts and discourses. Furthermore, unofficial and everyday 
discourses of the nation arguably are linked to lived citizenship contracts and 
entitlements. The research explores the linkages between nationhood and citizenship, 
both in official discourses, as well as in student and teacher discourses in the schools; 
and looks at the use of emotion and ritual in cementing and elaborating these 
discourses. 
 
THE NATION IN THE SCHOOL 
The use of publicly funded mass schooling to create and promulgate a national identity 
and to cement geo-political units as nations has been one of the key processes 
associated with the rise and consolidation of the modern nation-state. The state 
accomplishes the task of creating a nation through key mechanisms; including ―setting 
up national school systems that impose a single linguistic standard and a cobbled-
together ―national‖ history, and by establishing conscript armies that throw young men 
from all over the country together and forge affective links among them‖ (Cole and 
Kandiyoti 2002, 196). The emergence of mass public education systems is tied to 
different purposes of state; from the control of urban populations due the changing 
structures of the economy (Katz 1995, Jones and Williamson 1979, Hunter 1996) to the 
construction of modern armies, the consolidation of nation-states and the crafting of 
new unified national identities. Mass schooling has been used as a vehicle for intensive 
state formation in response to internal or external threats to stability in many nations 
(Green 1997), such as France (Bell 2003), India (Advani 1996), and others.  
 
National identity and its ongoing redefinition are manifested in schools through various 
discourses and practices; key among them are official textbook discourses and other 
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school rituals and activities. The ―intellectual and emotional relationship between a 
nation‘s present, future and past is shaped through the selection, manufacture and 
transmission of powerful narratives promoting a sense of history and identity based 
upon a mixture of myth, remembrance and official knowledge‖ (Crawford 2004, 10). 
Nationally unified official textbooks in Egypt represent the clearest expression of 
official nationhood and citizenship projects in the schools. The research analyzes the 
official narratives of nationhood by examining at a sample of current nationally unified 
textbooks, as well as tracing the evolution of citizenship and nationhood discourses in 
national textbooks since Nasser. Textbook discourses are taken to reflect official 
discourses on national identity and citizenship. They arguably signal to students the 
boundaries of accepted and sanctioned discourse on the nation and state. Students‘ 
own discourses of nationhood and citizenship are approached as reflecting the degree 
of deployment with official discourses, the appropriation of alternative registers and 
discourses, and how these are linked with students‘ daily concerns and experiences. The 
research also looks at the morning assembly as the key daily ritual through which the 
nation is meant to be revered in the schools. 
 
The promotion of strong nationalist devotion, especially in schools, is a key technique 
of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. ―In authoritarian states, political elites use 
state-sponsored historical memory to foster feelings of paranoia, xenophobia, and 
distrust‖ (Davis 2005, 6). Devotion to the nation and focus on its external enemies is 
critical for legitimizing violations against any form of opposition. ―[S]uccessive 
Egyptian regimes have managed to justify a national security state with all the 
restrictions on liberty that go with that‖ (Kienle 2004, 79).  Maha Abdelrahman (2007, 
297) has shed light on some of the ways in which the Egyptian state has ―made 
strategic use of nationalism as a mechanism for survival and for shoring up its failing 
legitimacy‖. The state has typically used claims of foreign/ western affiliation to malign 
opposition forces and the human rights campaigns that attempt to protect these forces 
from the violations the state inflicts on them. The research pay special attention to how 
secondary school textbooks deal with the theme of external threat and relate it to the 
importance of love and sacrifice for the nation.  
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Promoting love and belonging to the nation is one of the key goals of Egyptian 
education. The research also looks at these two key themes of 'love' and belonging as 
promoted in the textbooks, in school rituals and as discussed by students and teachers. 
Recent studies in social and political sciences have emphasized that emotions are 
fundamental to political identity and its concomitant issues of citizenship and national 
identity (Goodwin, Jasper, and Poletta 2001; Nicholson 1999; Marcus 2002; Marcus, 
Neuman and McKuen 2002). Emotion is ―fundamental to the formation of borders, 
nationhood and citizenship‖, and the nation-state plays a key role as a mobilizer of 
political emotion (Zembylas 2009, 370). In approaching nationhood in schools, some 
scholars such as Veronique Benei (2008) have focused on how children—through 
morning liturgies in (Indian) schools—create their physical selves while enacting and 
embodying the nation into existence. Significant literature has focused on ritual and 
other school activities in the construction of collective identities (McLaren 1999, Bjork 
2002, Bekerman 2003, Ben-Amos and Bet-El 1999, Adely 2010). The daily morning 
assembly (tabur) in Egyptian schools is meant to be the primary means through which a 
physical and emotional experience and embodiment of the nation is performed. Like 
other public rituals, it is meant to serve as an arena ―of identity, bounded spaces, where 
collective national selfhood is enacted‖ (Berezin 2001, 93). This enactment may not 
however be smooth or straightforward. Given the general dysfunction of schools, this 
work focuses on how secondary school students may avoid or subvert these rituals; or 
may receive them with boredom, nonchalance, ridicule, anger or insult: sets of 
emotions and bodily procedures that no doubt constitute modes of pronouncing the 
nation. Therefore, instead of asking, ―how does the nation become this natural object 
of devotion‖ (Benei 2008, 72), it is important to ask as well whether and when the 
nation ceases to represent an object of devotion. 
 
The focus on schools is not premised on an assumption that they do shape national 
identity, but that they are locations for the expression of different identity projects and 
more importantly, lived citizenship and concrete day-to-day experiences of state 
institutions. Schools are not the only sites where students are exposed to official or 
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alternative constructions of the nation and state. Young people learn about themselves 
and the nation in popular and widely viewed soap operas, religious satellite channels, 
music videos, cassette sermons, youth magazines, internet chat rooms, and Facebook. 
Strategies and discourses of governmental apparatuses in schools tell only part of the 
story; and ―it is equally important to look at the unrecorded but resourceful 
improvisations of everyday life‖, especially including the impact of popular media 
(Donald 1992, 2–3). It has even been suggested that the media have become an even 
more powerful locus of education and identity formation than schools (see Levinson 
and Holland 1996, 36). The reach and diversity of mass media and their insertion deep 
into daily life of most segments of the populations of contemporary societies seriously 
undermines the role and raison d‘être of the institution of mass schooling in producing 
student subjectivities. It may even partly explain the wide-scale withdrawal of the state 
from the provision of schooling. Clearly, other technologies of political 
communication, from television to the internet, compete with ritual [and textbooks] in 
the production of national identities (Berezin 2001). Indeed, as Lila Abu-Lughod has 
argued, ―television is a key institution for the production of national culture in Egypt‖ 
and has been used by the government as a tool of citizen education since the 1960s 
(2005, 7-10).  
 
Arab Satellite television, news channels, and private Egyptian television play a major 
role in shaping the political discourse of Egyptians. In fact, over the past few years, a 
number of studies have highlighted the role of Arab satellite channels in youth political 
‗socialization‘ in Egypt and the shaping of youth political priorities and perspectives  
(Abdullah 2007, Al-Tukhi 1999 and Mahmud 2004). The focus on the school 
acknowledges, however, the ongoing centrality of formal schooling in the socialization 
of youth, as well as the romance between states and schools that constitutes one of 
modernity‘s central features (Green 1997). The point, of course, is not to judge whether 
schools or the media are more powerful resources for constructing identity; but rather 
to examine what kind of power they have (Levinson 1999) and to look at them as 
arenas for the expression of different identity and citizenship projects.  
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ISLAM AND ISLAMISM IN EGYPTIAN EDUCATION 
In its exploration of the discourses of school textbooks, the research looks at how 
Islamist discourses articulated with constructions of both citizenship and nationhood. 
Religious instruction and discourse have been at the heart of modern education since 
its inception under Muhammad Ali and under British occupation. Islam has always 
been an integral component of the Egyptian state‘s nationalist discourse, and a critical 
pillar of regime legitimacy. It has been argued that the current modes of attachment to 
religious values in Egypt are the result of the functionalization of Islam in religious 
instruction since the inception of modern education (Starrett 1998). However, the 
nature and extent of the use of Islam in the crafting of Egyptian national identity and in 
the broader cultural and moral canvas has varied considerably over time, as well as in 
educational discourses and textbooks. Current levels of Islamization can be traced back 
specifically to the Sadat era (1970-81), who emphasized religious identity and 
symbolism, called himself the Faithful President (al-ra‟is al-mu‟min). Sadat consciously 
promoted the positioning of Islam at the center of moral and political identity; 
primarily to replace the centrality of Nasser‘s Arab Socialism. This was gradually 
accompanied by the granting of far greater space for various Islamist discourses.  
 
Rushdi Sa‗id has argued that the Islamist control over education was the product of an 
actual deal brokered between Muslim Brotherhood leaders and Sadat, whereby Sadat 
handed over the control over teacher institutes to members of the Brotherhood so that 
Islamism not only dominated teacher preparation, but that these institutions enrolled 
greater numbers of their members of Islamist groups, especially in Upper Egypt (cited 
in Khalil 2009, see also Adli 2001). The Mubarak regime‘s accommodation with 
Islamists also included the recruitment of numerous Islamists on university campuses, 
in schools and as social workers putting them in direct contact with the public, 
especially in Upper Egypt (Roussillion 1998, 387). Imad Siyam has documented some 
of the ways in which Islamist groups have set out to Islamize the educational process in 
Egypt over the past four decades. Based on court cases where Islamist organizations 
were involved, he collected lists of tens of thousands of teachers and students 
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belonging to Islamist groups of various kinds; citing a Ministry of Interior report for 
1992 which indicates that schools controlled by extremist groups in Cairo and Giza 
alone had reached 78 schools (cited in Khalil 2010). Many of these groups, argues Siam, 
intentionally targeted educational institutions, either to recruit for violent groups or to 
infiltrate state institutions for bottom-up intellectual and political control. These groups 
also spread religious discrimination and a form of religious chauvinism, in fact targeting 
poorer areas and areas with larger Christian communities, focusing on Upper Egypt 
and popular quarters in larger cities. Siam also documented the numbers of Islamist 
parliamentarians who work in the educational field and their membership in education 
committees for the purpose of forestalling alternative policies under the pretext of 
resistance to cultural invasion and attempts to destroy Islamic identity and culture. This 
was combined with the influence of tens of thousands of teachers who went to work in 
the Gulf and returned with Wahabi ideas to Egyptian classrooms (Siyam 2010 cited in 
Khalil 2010). Many Egyptian teachers preferred to work abroad, where salaries were 
higher and classroom conditions better. During the 1980s, the government granted 
30,000 exit visas a year to teachers who had contracts to teach in Arab countries (Metz 
1990). The outcome has been a pervasive Islamization of education, especially outside 
of Cairo. The interest of Islamist groups has been not only in reaching school and 
university students and education parliamentary committees, but included a strategy of 
urging members to join faculties of education and teacher institutes and training them 
on how to spread their ideas in these educational institutions. 
 
The Mubarak regime engaged in combinations of accommodation and repression with 
different Islamist groups; depending on the historical phase and the group in question. 
Roussillon has argued that the trial of Sadat‘s assassins and Asyut rebels in the 
beginning of Mubarak‘s reign provided the opportunity for the regime to send a clear 
message of appeasement to the Islamists through acquittals and reduced sentences 
(1998, 385).  In fact, he has argued that for Sadat, Islamization of legislation was mere 
gesturing, whereas for Mubarak, Islamizing the framework of Egyptians‘ daily lives was 
perceived as the means of quelling Islamism itself (Rousillion 1998). This included the 
informal integration of ―moderate‖ Islamists into the formal political scene through 
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parties and professional associations (Roussillon 1998, 385). The tolerance for ―Islamic 
resocializing‖ included tolerance of the activities of Islamic investment companies, 
Islamist control over numerous mosques and sporting and youth clubs, de-facto 
prohibition on the distribution of alcohol and de-facto gender segregation in 
universities in certain governorates (Roussillon 1998, 386). In this way, Mubarak sought 
to use the Islamists as intermediaries between the regime and ‗real society‘; and the 
failure of this attempt is what constitutes the framework of later confrontation and the 
differentiation between ―moderates‖ and ―radicals‖ (Roussillion 1998, 391). The 
embracing of the Islamic referential was also ―instrumental in Egypt‘s alignment with 
the petro-monarchies‖ and well suited to the expanded labor migration to the Gulf 
(Roussillion 1998, 393). 
 
While a detailed discussion of ‗Islamism‘ is beyond the scope of this work, there may be 
a need to briefly clarify the sense in which ‗Islamist‘ and ‗Islamism‘ are used in this 
research. Islamist of course is not used to indicate ‗Islamic‘, or something that is ‗true‘ 
to Islam. It is certainly not used to imply ‗militant‘, ‗terrorist‘ or ‗extremist‘. I use the 
term ‗Islamist‘ to refer to the wide variety of groups and discourses that place Islam at 
the center of their political, national or civic identity. More concretely, this refers to 
discourses that adhere to and promote the ‗Islamist Creed‘ that only the faithful 
adherence to ‗Islam‘ can bring about power and prosperity for Muslims (see Sobhy 
2009).  The character and focus of this ‗adherence to Islam‘ is defined differently by 
different groups, so are the means for achieving such greater adherence and ‗return to 
Islam‘.  Clearly, a wide range of groups and ideas fall under this umbrella, and I 
sometimes refer to them in more specific terms or qualifiers wherever relevant. Many 
of these terms are in common use in Egyptian public discourse or scholarly literature; 
including Salafis, extremist/terrorist Islamist groups, or referring to the name of an 
Islamist grouping, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. As will become clearer in the 
subsequent discussion and throughout the chapters, the main distinction I make is 
between non-oppositional Islamism/mainstream Islamism and strands of more 
politicized and oppositional Islamism. 
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Especially in its later years, the regime encouraged and gave space to versions of 
Islamism that commanded legitimacy, but did not destabilize its hold on power. These 
discourses were allowed to operate as counter-balance to more oppositional or militant 
Islamism. This increasingly dominant mainstream Islamism retained the ‗Islamist Creed‘ 
(Sobhy 2009) that Islam was the route to power and prosperity, but de-politicized 
Islamism by ignoring the role of the state in applying sharia or in bringing about a 
better more just society, while emphasizing personal morality and ritual performance. 
This is articulated in the emphasis on personal morality, chastity, charity/ volunteer 
work and industrial and business entrepreneurship (see Sobhy 2009 on the discourses 
of Amr Khaled as an example of desirable mainstream Islamism). ‗Islam‘ is redefined 
around these (personal) qualities; and it is through the cultivation of these qualities by 
each individual, that the real goals of Islamism can be achieved: power and prosperity, 
or ‗renaissance‘; which can be roughly understood as being as ‗advanced‘ or ‗developed‘ 
as the powerful ‗West‘. It is in this way that non-oppositional ‗Islam‘ revolving around 
personal morality and charity is constructed as ‗the solution‘. This vision cohered—
unintentionally by many of its faithful—with U.S. [neoliberal and geopolitical] projects 
and interests in the region and was often hailed and promoted as ‗moderate‘ Islam 
(Sobhy 2009).  
 
The regime further tolerated and gave space to more conservative ‗Salafi‘ (as they have 
come to be known in Egyptian politics) groups and preachers. These groups also 
emphasized individual morality and stricter controls on modesty and gender mixing. 
They forcefully condemned protest (and often democracy itself as removing 
sovereignty from God and placing it in the hands of the people), propagated obedience 
to the ruler and were frequently promoted in opposition to and in competition with the 
more oppositional groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in mosques and 
university campuses across the country, as well as cassette sermons and later in 
numerous satellite channels. Both the popular Salafi trend and the more ‗elite‘ Islamism 
(Wise 2003 and 2004, Haenni and Tammam 2003, Sobhy 2009) cohered with the state‘s 
citizenship projects and were allowed far greater margins of freedom than other 
Islamist trends, despite periodic repression and limitations. Roussillion has also pointed 
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out that since the earlier stages of the inclusion of Islamists in the 1980s, in the 
professional syndicates for example, these syndicates were not foci of opposition; but 
rather enjoyed the most ―relaxed‖ relations with the regime; and their political 
involvement centered on foreign issues, such as supporting the Afghan jihad and 
solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada (Roussillion 1998, 383). 
 
Although this is critical background for the issues discussed throughout the chapters, 
this research is of course not about Islam or Islamism in the schools. It discusses 
critical areas where religious discourse was deployed in relation to the themes of 
punishment, surveillance of female modesty and national identity. Apart from 
highlighting the use of Islam in constructions of citizenship and nationhood in 
textbook and student discourses, various other facets of Islamization in the regular 
functioning of schools are not explored in this research.  
 
The research acknowledges the pervasive growth of Islamization across schools in 
various forms and intensities. However, the mainstream school should not be seen as a 
key source of religious discourses for students who are exposed to a wide range of 
religious and Islamist discourses. The sermons, satellite channels programs and 
discourses of concrete preachers that many students listened to, or a visit to the Cairo 
Annual Book Fair, would be a far better ‗fields‘ to study Islamization and dominant 
religious discourses than mainstream schools. In fact, my own experience conducting 
field research with early childhood education providers across Upper Egypt indicates 
that a study of charitable, public and private pre-school textbooks, rituals, interactive 
CDs, computer-based instruction programs and teacher discourses would reveal not 
only the extent of Islamization, but the powerful Wahabi and Salafi influence in the 
education of the youngest children across the country (especially outside the capital 
region).Many public schools, apart from private ‗Islamic‘ Schools (see Herrera 2006), 
where school actors and authorities have taken far more active roles in placing Islam at 
the center of school rituals and discourse. As Youssof Ahmed Saad (2006) found in his 
ethnography of a mainstream public school in Cairo, the Ministry of Education-
sanctioned daily morning assembly program was altered and infused with an Islamic 
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Flag salutation, repeated by Muslim and Christian students, starting with: ―Allah is my 
God, Islam is my religion, Mohammed is my Prophet, the Quran is my book, and good 
deed is my path‖ and continuing: ―Salute this flag with me. Allahu Akbar (God is great), 
Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar‖ and ending with the officially sanctioned flag salutation: 
Long Live the Arab Republic of Egypt (Saad 2006, 97). There are therefore schools 
where Islamic symbolism and identity is raised to a very distinct prominence.  
 
Other researchers such as Hala Tal‗at have studied the spread of different forms of 
‗extremism‘ and discrimination in schools and concluded that religious discourse 
dominates all aspects of the educational process in schools. This ranges from the 
organization of the school day to sciences which are classified into religiously-
sanctioned or forbidden (halal or haram) up to exam questions where religious questions 
are inserted out of context, even in applied sciences (MARED 2010). Tal‗at surveys 
common school practices such as schools taking pride that its most important 
achievements is winning a Quran memorization competition; Quran recitation and 
memorization being at the forefront of school ―activities‖; school radio resembling a 
religious sermon; flag salutations are followed by religious prayers (ad„iya) and school 
celebrations are centered on Islamic occasions only and teachers incessantly pressuring 
non-veiled students and teachers to compel them to wear the hijab, even spreading 
malicious rumors about them until they succumb. 
 
The schools in which the fieldwork was conducted did not show such levels of 
Islamization and seemed to be less saturated with Islamic symbols than other social and 
public spaces in Egypt. For example, there were no stickers on the walls emphasizing 
the importance of hijab and the performance of prayers, nor was there constant airing 
of religious sermons or Quran recitation as in other public and private buildings across 
the country. There were of course various other signs of Islamization in the schools. 
For example, promotional material advertizing the vision and mission of one of the 
schools (a requirement under new accreditation rules) were made in the form of 
religious prayers (athkar) and Ramadan calendars. Posters and artwork in the different 
schools also reflected religious themes, but only if they did not include oppositional 
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themes or meanings, focusing primarily on rituals and relations with ‗the other‘, such as 
the artwork in Figure 1 from the corridors of the technical school, where the large text 
reads: the sad al-Aqsa [mosque] is calling unto Muslims. 
 
 
Figure 1: Artwork in the Boys‘ Technical School 
 
During its prolonged confrontation with Islamists, specifically after the wave of 
terrorist attacks in the early 1990s, the state took multiple measures to loosen the hold 
of different Islamist groups on educational institutions (Sayed 2006, 34). The 
crackdown included closing down private tutoring centers run by Islamist 
organizations, under the pretext of a campaign against private lessons and imposing 
more stringent controls on private education and Islamist NGOs that had established 
charity schools and private tutoring classes. The Ministry of Education also removed 
large numbers of school teachers accused of advocating religious fundamentalism from 
their teaching jobs and transferred them to administrative jobs. In fact, state security 
affiliated ―political communication‖ representatives are present in every educational 
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district to ‗monitor‘ teachers and receive any reports about oppositional discourses in 
the classrooms. This partly explains why this study finds less expression of alternative 
Islamist views than previous works. 
 
Finally, constructions of citizenship and nationhood have strong gendered 
components, whether implicitly or explicitly. This is particularly so in light of the 
Islamization of the public sphere and the focus on female modesty in contemporary 
Islamist discourses. The modesty and chastity of women are constructed as central to 
the power and prosperity of society and the Muslim nation in almost all popular 
Islamist discourses (see Sobhy 2009). Where young women are consistently condemned 
for violating the norms of chastity and therefore undermining the nation, their 
citizenship status may be rendered more precarious as a result. Kandiyoti has indicated 
―the extent to which elements of national identity and cultural difference are articulated 
as forms of control over women and which infringe upon their rights as enfranchised 
citizens‖ (1991, 429). The construction of women as ―privileged bearers of corporate 
identities and boundary markers of their communities has had a deleterious effect on 
their emergence as full-fledged citizens of modern-nations states‖ (Kandiyoti 1991, 
441). Although these issues are not explored in depth in the research, there is an 
interest in investigating the gendered differences in the articulation of the nation and 
the gendered experience and discourse of citizenship among students. The research 
looks at gender differences in emotional expressions around nationhood and the links 
between constructions of citizenship and constructions of masculinity and femininity.  
 
Similarly, while the research does not focus on the citizenship rights and status of 
Christians per se, it acknowledges the fundamental concerns about full citizenship for 
the Coptic Christian minority in light of pervasive forms of Islamization in the 
education system. The lived citizenship of Christian students and teachers across 
different interactions is a critical area for future research. There has been some research 
on textbook discourses on Christians and non-Muslims and the promotion of 
―tolerance‖ or ―extremism‖ in Islamic Religious Education textbooks (see Toronto and 
Eissa 2008, Starrett 1998, MARED 2010 and Groiss 2004). For example, Toronto and 
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Eissa argue that Islamic education textbooks exhibit ―the inherent contradiction in 
promoting tolerance and respect for other religions and at the same time including 
material that instills an exclusivist, triumphalist attitude by emphasizing the pre-
eminence of the Muslim community‖ (2007, 49, see also Groiss 2004).13 It should be 
noted however that the discourses of the textbooks are actually more tolerant than 
many variants of public discourse in the country. They do therefore signal to students 
and teachers the ‗official line‘ and the parameters of sanctioned discourse on Christians 
and Muslim-Christian relations. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The research approaches the production of citizenship in Egyptian schools as being 
defined by the four key elements dealt with in this chapter and developed throughout 
the thesis. The first element is the nature and particular style of governance of the 
Mubarak regime, especially in its final years coinciding with the rise of Gamal Mubarak, 
characterized by pervasiveness of cronyism and corruption, informality and selective 
repression of dissent. The second element is neoliberalism and privatization as critically 
shaping official citizenship discourses, the actual provision of education and the 
everyday realities of the schools. The third element is modes of discipline and 
punishment in the schools in a context of precarious citizenship rights, informality and 
                                            
13 In his detailed report on the content of Egyptian school textbooks of all grades and subjects, Groiss (2004) 
documented the passages that relate to Jews, Christians, war, peace, the Palestinian problem, jihad, terror and 
tolerance. Groiss, who has conducted similar studies on Saudi Arabian, Iranian and Palestinian Authority 
textbooks, surveyed 103 Egyptian textbooks for use in primary, preparatory and secondary state schools and 16 
textbooks for use in preparatory and secondary schools within the religious Azharite school system, published 
between 1999 and 2002. His conclusions can be summarized as follows: Judaism and Christianity are both 
respected as monotheistic religions and despised as unbelief; The Christian West is not presented as a rival as 
such, but the Crusades and modern Imperialism, are vividly described, using hostile language; Egyptian textbooks 
endeavor to foster a positive attitude among the students towards the Copts, who are depicted as an integral part 
of the Egyptian nation (but incidents of strife are not discussed); the image of the Jews, both historically and at 
present, is very negative; Zionism is portrayed negatively; the Middle East conflict is depicted as a usurpation of 
Palestinian land by foreigners with the help of Western Imperialism; the solution of the conflict depends on the 
attainment by the Palestinians of their rights; the 1973 war is depicted as a major Egyptian victory; martyrhood 
for the nation is exalted; jihad is portrayed in its military connotation only; there is a rejection of terrorism in 
principle, but a support of Palestinian operations in Israel. 
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lack of effective accountability. The fourth element is the use of constructions of the 
nation and Islam in legitimizing and framing these citizenship projects and patterns of 
governance. The main parameters that define the citizenship projects embodied in the 
schools are therefore shaped by general authoritarian context and nature of the regime, 
privatization, pervasive extralegality and informality and Islamist and nationalist 
discourses. 
 
The following chapter explains the research‘s approach to studying citizenship in the 
schools. It lays out the approach of the study and its theoretical and methodological 
underpinnings, building on the literatures on discipline and subjectivation and the 
sociology and anthropology of education. It describes key features of the research sites 
and the context of conducting research on education in Egypt and elaborates on how 
the research was carried out. 
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CHAPTER T WO: STUDYING THE 
PRODUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP 
IN THE SCHOOLS  
Apart from its analysis of national textbooks, this research approaches schooling 
ethnographically in the first instance. School-level observations and discussions are 
employed to arrive at the school‘s role in the production of classed and gendered 
subjects and in the production of the ‗state‘ and state-society relations. The assumption 
is that students ―know the state through its public discourses … and through their 
direct interaction with its officials, institutions, and agents‖ (Ghannam 2002, 173). 
―Subjects‘ understandings based on daily experiences of interaction with agents and 
institutions of the state enter into the construction and making of the state‖ (Ismail 
2011b, 846). Mundane and repetitive experiences in the school play a key role in the 
students‘ understanding of their relationship with the state. Such experiences range 
from practices of punishment, preoccupation of school actors with appearances to the 
appeasement of supervisors while not insisting that teachers enter classes in the first 
place. For example, student everyday experiences in the schools would include 
knowledge that resources are made available to paint the walls and write the common 
slogan ―My School is clean, beautiful and developed‖ but funds will not be allocated to 
hire cleaners, but in fact students themselves may be compelled to clean the school in 
some cases.  
 
The research assumes that citizenship and subjectivation are rendered visible in such 
everyday experiences of institutions of ‗the state‘. The research builds on other key 
approaches in the study of how institutions construct individuals as subjects. It builds 
on Foucauldian approaches to discipline, punishment and subjectivation and their 
implications for the use of violence. It draws on the sociology and anthropology of 
education in understanding the different schooling experiences of students across 
different social classes. This chapter details the theoretical and methodological 
approaches that guide and define this study and explains how the study was conducted, 
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how the schools were selected and what this research can or cannot say about Egyptian 
secondary schooling and citizenship. 
 
SCHOOLING, SUBJECTIVATION AND DISCIPLINE 
Different approaches have employed notions of culture, habitus, identity, personality, 
the hidden curriculum or subjectivity in order to understand the relationship between 
institutions and the shaping of the discourses and practices of subjects who are subject 
to their power. The notion of an internalization of social control is present in the work 
of many authors such as Bourdieu, Norbert Elias, Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault. 
Notions of subjectivity typically place greater emphasis on indeterminacy and 
multiplicity (with their associated assumptions regarding power and ―truth‖) and allow 
for individual ‗agency‘ drawn on the multiple discursive resources available to actors in 
different situations (see Ortner 2005, Blackman et al 2008). In particular, Discipline and 
Punish (Foucault 1977) and History of Sexuality Volume 1 (Foucault 1990) ―show how the 
subject is subjected to relations of power as she/ he is individualized, categorized, 
classified, hierarchized, normalized, surveilled and provoked to self-surveillance. These 
are technologies of subjection brought into play within institutions that… improvise, 
cite and circulate discursive frames and coterminous technologies that render subjects 
in relations of power‖ (Youdell 2006b, 518). 
 
The school for all of these authors is one of the key institutions in which the 
disciplinary techniques of subjectivation are exercised and where the self is constituted. 
Schools are places where one learns what can be said and what must be left unsaid, 
what is acceptable to do and be – and what is not. ―Once the individual comes to know 
what to expect as ‗normal‘ through the dominant regimes of truth that circulate in 
schooling, she actually constructs herself – and is constructed – through particular speech 
acts that are the effects of these dominant discursive practices‖ (Kohli 1999, 323). Most 
approaches to subjectivation and schooling focus on facets of school relations and not 
on more explicit rules and textbook content. In examining the performative power of 
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the schooling process, the manifest content of syllabuses matters less ―than the cultural 
rules embodied in what is taught and how it is taught: those implicit rules that define 
what is true, what is relevant, what is normal, what is valuable, and who has the right to 
give voice to a particular discourse‖ (Donald 1992, 46). In Butler‘s words, not only are 
schools places of/for official discourses, but they are sites where ritualized production 
occurs ―under and through the force of prohibition and taboo, with the threat of 
ostracism‖ (Butler 1993, 95). For example, ―[T]he racialization of the subject or its 
gendering or, indeed, its social abjection more generally is performatively induced from 
various and diffuse quarters that do not always operate as ―official‖ discourse (Butler 
1997, 157). 
 
On the other hand, it has been argued that Bourdieu- and other scholars in the 
sociology of education- ―afforded children little social agency and portrayed them as 
primarily passive in the face of the inculcation they receive (Reed-Danahay 2004, 63-
66). In this research, students are certainly understood as a having ‗agency‘ in the face 
of school discourses and practices. This is not to suggest that either ―people make 
society‖ or ―society makes people‖. The relationship is neither a one-way 
determination, nor even a dialectic; but rather ―it is characterized by oscillation, 
slippage and unpredictable transformations‖ (Donald 1992, 2). As Foucault puts it, 
individual practices are not invented by the individual himself, but ―are models that he 
finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his 
society, his social group‖ (Foucault 1997, 291).  Butler explains it as follows: ―to claim 
that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the 
constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency. For what is it 
that enables a purposive and significant reconfiguration of cultural and political 
relations, if not a relation that can be turned against itself, reworked and resisted‖ 
(Butler 1995, 46)? Agency here is not ―some natural or originary will; it takes shape as 
specific desires and intentions within a matrix of subjectivity – of (culturally 
constituted) feelings, thoughts, and meanings‖ (Ortner 2005, 34).  
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Putting it differently, these discussions suggest that ‗resistance‘ imbricates within power 
not outside of it (Young 1990), as distinct from philosophies of consciousness, where 
resistance was posed as outside of power, and specific acts of will were ―privileged as if 
individuals were sovereign agents responding to universal categories and universal 
claims about emancipation‖ (Popkewitz and Brennan 1997, 312). The purpose is not 
―to deny the existence of hegemonic processes in schools but, rather, to problematize 
their assumed coherence and point to their inherent ambiguity‖ (Reed-Danahay and 
Anderson-Levitt 1991, 546). As Deborah Youdell puts it, ―[s]ubjectivities are not the 
stable, interior possessions of a self-knowing subject, but are instead artifacts of 
discourses that produce these subjects as though they were pre-existing... These 
constituting processes are deeply implicated in social and educational exclusions‖ 
(Youdell 2006a, 55). 
 
Foucault and studies informed by his work have used the vocabulary of ‗discipline‘ in 
their accounts of the ways in which schools and other institutions produce subjects or 
shape subjectivities. In this view, the production of docile citizens is embedded in the 
disciplinary technique of mass schooling. ―Discipline ‗makes‘ individuals,‖ argues 
Foucault (1977, 170). ―It is the specific technique of power that regards individuals 
both as objects and as instruments of its exercise. The success of disciplinary power 
derives no doubt from the use of simple instruments, hierarchical observation, 
normalizing judgment and their combination into a procedure that is specific to it, the 
examination‖ (Foucault 1977, 170). 
 
There is also a sense in Foucault‘s treatments of the subject that ‗disciplines‘ or 
‗disciplinary mechanisms‘ began to displace sovereign power in the ‗modern era‘. There 
seems to have been for Foucault a ―point of junction of the monarchical, ritual exercise 
of sovereignty and the hierarchical, permanent exercise of indefinite discipline‖ 
(Foucault 1977, 217). Foucault has contrasted the disciplines to the power of the 
sovereign in several instances, in that the former extract time and labor, not wealth and 
commodities from bodies (Foucault 1977, 239). The functions of disciplinary 
institutions therefore shifted from attempting to neutralize dangers to positively seeking 
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―to increase the possible utility of individuals‖ (Foucault 1977, 210). 14 Along those 
lines, Foucault therefore establishes, in The Subject and Power, a distinction between a 
relationship of violence and a power relationship: 
A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks 
on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities… On the other hand, 
a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are 
each indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that ―the other‖ (the one 
over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very 
end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of 
responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up (Foucault 1982, 
789). 
 
The distinction is between repression and violent punishment on the one hand, and on 
the other, institutionalized power relations, which employ punishment in a measured 
(and typically codified) manner as part of its disciplinary project and techniques, and as 
means of carrying out its key function of ‗normalization.‘ Punishment within a 
disciplinary power relationship aims neither at expiation nor at repression but ‗brings 
five quite distinct operations into play: . . . [it] compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, 
homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes‘ (Foucault 1977, 182-3).  
 
While This research does not approach discipline in schools in the broader sense of 
understanding the very organization, architecture and normalizing judgment integral to 
the institution of schooling. The interest is not in ‗modern schooling‘ as a fairly 
homogenous phenomenon or disciplining technique that produces a particular kind of 
citizen or subject. Rather, the focus of this work is on how these disciplining 
mechanisms work in different school contexts reflecting different material realities and 
producing different kinds of subjects. 
 
                                            
14 Foucault argues that during the 17th century, schooling was justified in terms of its presumed capacity to 
prevent ‗ignorance‘, ‗idleness‘ and ‗. . . public disorder‘ (Foucault 1977, 210); but by the time of the French 
Revolution, the aims of primary education had become ‗to ―fortify‖, to ―develop the body‖, to prepare the child 
―for a future in some mechanical work‖, to give him ―an observant eye, a sure hand, and prompt habits‖ 
(Foucault 1977, 210–11). The disciplines also take the perennial enterprise of sovereign power, of seeking to 
inculcate obedience in, and make use of, their subjects, to a new level through ―the formation of a relation that in 
the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely‖ (Foucault 1977, 138). 
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THE SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY OF 
EDUCATION 
This research clearly privileges class differences and material conditions in attempting 
to understand schooling and subjectivity. In this regard, it has been argued that ―[o]ne 
of the major differences between [Bourdieu‘s] approach and that of Foucault and Elias 
is Bourdieu‘s focus on social class and stratification, showing that socialization 
processes and educational institutions work in different ways for different segments of 
the population‖ (Reed-Danahay 2005, 63). Bourdieu‘s and other key work in the 
sociology of education therefore provide invaluable insights for the study of schooling 
across different classes. ―The tradition of critical sociology of education has been 
underpinned by concerns about the role that schools play in the reproduction of 
inequitable social relations along axes of class, gender, race, and, more recently, 
sexuality‖ (Youdell 2005, 250).  
 
There are different ways in which schools are seen to be ―reproducing‖ class relations, 
dominant discourses, and inequalities within society. For example, by the mere fact of 
integrating students into a credential market and a system of urban segregation, they 
roughly reproduce a hierarchically organized labor force (Collins 1979, Ogbu 1978, 
Bowles and Gintis 1976). Furthermore, Bernstein (1977), Bourdieu and Passeron 
(1990), and others have argued that the organization of knowledge, the form of its 
transmission and the assessment of its acquisition are crucial factors in the cultural 
reproduction of class relations in industrial societies. The argument therefore is that, as 
students are hierarchically ordered- an ordering generally based on the cultural forms of 
dominant groups- different groups of students are taught different norms, skills, values 
knowledge, and dispositions by race, class and sex. 
 
Some of these studies of social stratification and student achievement relied on 
―external‖ and ―objective‖ data that in some sense did not allow them to treat schools 
as more than as a black box, in ways that did not capture ―what is actually taught, what 
is actually learned, what is rejected, and how the lived experiences of class, race, and 
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gender actors mediates the outcomes so well studied‖ (Apple and Weis 1986, 17). 
Scholars such as Michael Apple, Lois Weis, Peter Woods, Geoff Whittey and others 
have provided important insights for surpassing the more rigid models of cultural 
reproduction of earlier studies. They emphasized that reproduction is contested and not 
always successful (Apple 1982 and Apple and Weis 1983) and more attention began to 
be paid not only to content but to the form and organization of knowledge, pedagogy, 
and evaluation and the principles that underpinned them and to the ways all of this was 
actually experienced by students and teachers (Apple 1982). 
 
Ethnographic programs of analysis were seen as more appropriate in aiding the 
understanding of what schools actually do (Foley, Levinson and Hurtig 2000, Sewell 
and Hauser 1980, Weis 1982). Studies of domination had to be mitigated by the study 
of class conflict and student resistance within the school. In essence, analysis of schools 
had to be more speculative, less ‗determined‘ and conceiving schools as part of the 
contested terrain where day-to-day struggles at the level of curriculum and teaching 
practice are taking place. ―The notion of the educational system as assisting in the 
production of economically and ideologically useful knowledge points to the fact that 
schools are cultural as well as economic institutions‖ (Apple and Weis 1986, 11).  
 
Schools are appropriated as organic institutions within society, within ‗culture‘. They 
are populated and operated by people, not by an abstract entity named ‗the state,‘ or 
‗the dominant classes.‘ The people that make up the school are near or far from the 
gaze of those other people we identify more closely as: the state, officials, central 
ministries and inspectors. Any state aim imprinted onto education may act as a 
constraint, desire, or structural pressure upon the school, but by no means determines 
the actual schooling experience or its impact on students. Working class students, for 
instance, often expressly reject the credentials, the overt and hidden curriculum, and the 
norms that are purportedly taught in schools (Apple 1982, Willis 1977). Therefore the 
school ―can serve as a site for the production of alternative and/or oppositional 
cultural practices which do not serve (at least not in any straightforward manner) the 
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accumulation, legitimation, or production needs of the state or capital‖ (Apple and 
Weis 1986, 11).  
 
Ethnographic description however may not help in the further task of understanding: 
―how and why reality comes to be constructed in particular ways and how and why 
particular constructions of reality seem to have the power to resist subversion‖ 
(Whittey 1974, 125). Apple and Weis (1986) have emphasized the importance of 
attention to class, gender, race and a general historical element, so that ethnographic 
work can be linked to changes over time in the division and control of labor, to 
ongoing alterations in class composition, and the historically changing functions of the 
state in education. The ethnographies of youth culture and schooling produced by the 
Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural studies and its followers had a major 
impact on educational sociology during the late 1970s and 1980s. Despite this 
invaluable contribution, important theoretical and methodological problems emerged in 
their treatment of class, culture and resistance (Watson 1993, Davies 1995). This thesis 
draws upon such works considerably (especially in discussions around school discipline, 
control and noncompliance). Nevertheless, it is still clear that—as with the literature on 
educational neoliberalism in the North—although some concepts may be applicable, 
the underlying realities they are applied to may be divergent indeed.  
 
Scholars of the political economy and the sociology of education have emphasized that 
public schools (at least in industrial societies) make available different types of 
educational experience and curriculum knowledge to students in different social classes 
(Bowles and Gintis 1976, Bernstein 1977, Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, and Apple 
1979, Anyon 1988, Da Silva 1988, Hempel-Jorgensen 2009, Ivinson and Duveen 2006). 
The argument is that students are differentially processed in schools according to social 
class and this, in turn, predisposes them to fit into certain positions in the occupational 
structure. Children of the subordinate classes are taught, through the manifest and 
hidden curricula of school, the virtues of compliance and submission to direct orders. 
Children of petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeois origins are socialized in school to be 
independent, autonomous and to internalize control. 
59 
 
While the latter receive a cognitive content of higher status, the former are either taught 
knowledge of ‗practical‘ nature, or none at all.  Focusing on school knowledge, Basil 
Bernstein (1977), Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron (1990) and Michael W. 
Apple (1979), have argued that knowledge and skills leading to social power and reward 
(e.g. medical, legal, managerial) are made available to the advantaged social groups and 
withheld from the working classes, to whom a more ‗practical‘ curriculum is offered 
(e.g. manual skills, clerical knowledge). Anyon (1988) concluded that the ―hidden 
curriculum‖ of school work is a tacit preparation for relating to the process of 
production in a particular way. Differing curricular, pedagogical, and pupil evaluation 
practices emphasize different cognitive and behavioral skills in each social setting and 
thus contribute to the development in the children of certain potential relationships to 
physical and symbolic capital, to authority, and to the process of work. 
 
Such patterns are clearly visible in the organization of the tracking system in Egyptian 
secondary education as detailed in Chapter Three, where the different tracks of 
schooling have different curricula with an emphasis on occupational skills for lower 
tracks (technical education). However, boys and girls in technical schools showed 
plenty of assertiveness and initiative in both educational contexts and outside the 
school. Many technical school boys showed not only initiative but entrepreneurship in 
undertaking small business operations in addition to their continuous efforts in 
searching for and securing jobs (often multiple) and apprenticeship opportunities. 
While studies that emphasize the role of school in reproducing social classes through 
the impact of educational tracking would apply to the highly tracked system in Egypt, 
they do assume that such practical, less mental or managerial skills are actually delivered 
to working class students. Most working class youth in the technical schools felt that 
they are not taught, asked or expected to learn any useful skills (practical or otherwise) 
at all (see Chapter Three). The students‘ very entitlement to respect, as well as 
knowledge and skills, was clearly undermined in the public schools. 
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Similarly, insights about class reproduction, cultural capital and ―symbolic violence‖15 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1990) are quite relevant for different educational contexts. 
Here the focus on how figures of authority may treat and value students differently 
based on an ‗internalized‘ habitus that privileges and rewards certain forms of symbolic 
capital. However, the idea of students being systematically humiliated, beaten or 
intimidated at school simply does not come up in education research in the North. 
Therefore, working class students may ‗benefit‘ at different levels from schooling 
contexts based on how much their learnt and acquired cultural capital corresponds with 
that of teachers, and dominant classes. However, there is little consideration in these 
studies that teachers in poor schools may teach differently or not at all, have different 
training and qualifications- or none at all, vastly different resources or receive below 
subsistence wages; issues all too basic and familiar to educational scholars of the South. 
A question which arises then is: do these theoretical articulations have relevance for 
Egyptian schools where the symbolic, emotional and corporal violence facing public 
school students is of a different magnitude and nature? While this is indeed ‗symbolic‘ 
of power relations and citizenship contracts across social classes, it is not the ‗symbolic 
violence‘ that Bourdieu and Passeron explain. 
 
Finally, while this body of research provides rich grounding for this study, I do not of 
course look at the schools from an educational or pedagogical lens. Despite the rich 
field data and exposure to modes of instruction in the schools, my focus was not on the 
content of education, or the knowledge and skills it hopes to impart to students (except 
in relation to nationhood and citizenship). In this sense, the research does not cover 
                                            
15 Bourdieu and Passeron argued that in any given social formation, the dominant mode of inculcation tends to 
correspond to the interests of the dominant classes. Key to Bourdieu‘s theory of social/economic reproduction is 
how cultural reproduction occurs and, for subordinate groups, the disconnect between the cultural capital they 
obtain through child-rearing (primary pedagogical work) and cultural capital implicitly valued in formal schooling and 
the mass media. The ‗legitimate addressees‘ of pedagogical work (primarily in schools) are those groups who 
already have acquired the dominant habitus through childrearing and other early cultural experiences. In fact, 
according to Bourdieu and Passeron (1990, 4), it is the very invisibility of the operation of symbolic power that 
makes it so effective: ―Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose 
meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds 
its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.‖ Bourdieu and Passeron continuously remind us that 
these micro (home, classroom) and meso-level (school) practices of symbolic violence (cultural reproduction) 
produce macro-level outcomes as they ―contribute to the reproduction of the relations between the groups or 
classes (social reproduction)‖ (1990, 54). 
61 
key aspects of the production of classed citizens in relation to the actual knowledge and 
skills of schooling. It also does not cover the learning processes or skills intended in 
each educational track. Instead, it focuses on general aspects of the latter and its 
relationship to issues of citizenship. It is primarily interested in the related modes of 
discipline and social skills that are part of these processes. It acknowledges that schools 
offer different skills to students from different social backgrounds, through the explicit 
curriculum and programs of the schools, as well as school relations and modes of 
discipline and punishment described as the ‗hidden curriculum‘ of schooling.  
 
Therefore this literature constitutes invaluable foundation for the current study but may 
not present sufficient tools to understand contexts where education has reached such a 
level of dysfunction (where as Egyptians say: mafish ta„lim / ‗there is no education‘). 
Teacher paid sub-subsistence wages, students who do not come to school, a system 
that has almost been completely privatized in an informal manner and teachers who 
beat and humiliate students systematically simply do not appear in this literature. 
Combined with notions of discipline however, it helps provide a framework for 
understanding the production of citizens in the schools. 
 
THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The contribution of any research is critically dependent on the literature it recalls and 
enters into dialogue with. In addition to the issues discussed above in terms of 
approaches to studying education and lived citizenship, this research has confronted 
significant difficulty due to the very limited literature on Egyptian education, especially 
of ethnographic or qualitative nature and in the areas of subjectivation, discipline and 
even national identity. Only a limited number of ethnographic studies conducted in the 
global South have approached schools and education and their entanglement in the 
production of political subjectivities and the construction of citizens (Levinson 2001, 
Lulyx 1999, Benei 2008). Only few works in English have studied schooling, citizenship 
and the political socialization of youth in Latin America (Astiz and Mendez 2006). This 
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research should be considered as an initial step to detailed analyses of the notions of 
citizenship, the everyday construction of national identities, educational marketization 
and gendered and classed modes of discipline and punishment in Egyptian and Arab 
schools.  
 
RESEARCH ON EDUCATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN EGYPT 
The intersections of education, class and nationalism have been little studied in many 
areas of the world, especially in the global South, including the Middle East. In the 
wider Arab world, Fida Adely‘s (2010) ethnographic work on schooling and national 
identity in Jordan almost stands alone in contemporary studies that relate to national 
identity and schooling in the English language, although there are several works that 
discuss education in relation to Islam, ‗extremism‘ and youth (Hefner and Zaman 2007, 
Nelson 2008, Talbani 1996). Key works on these issues in Egypt in English include the 
work of Linda Herrera (1992, 2006, 2008a, 2008b), Gregory Starrett‘s (1998) work on 
religious education, the collection on Cultures of Arab Schooling (Herrera and Torres 
2006) including the work of Kamal Naguib and Ahmed Youssof Saad; and Fatma El-
Sayed‘s Transforming Education in Egypt (2006). Sarah Hartmann is also currently 
completing excellent ethnographic work on private tutoring centers in Cairo (see 
Hartmann 2008). Donor reports and publication constitute a key source for any data or 
analysis. Therefore, a significant part of the available literature is focused on donor 
areas of interest and formal aspects of the system, such as enrolment rates and teacher 
training programs.  There is some historical analysis on Egyptian education either as 
part of colonial history or general social history or of official discourse, some of which 
discuss the class dimensions of educational content and purposes for boys and girls. 
This includes works by Lisa Pollard (2006), Timothy Mitchell (1998) and Mona Russell 
(2002).  
 
There are significant published and unpublished works on related topics in Arabic as 
referred to throughout the thesis, notably including the work of Tala‗t Abdul Hamid 
(2000) and the MARED 2010 Collection. Without oversimplifying the available 
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literature, works on contemporary education and citizenship in Egypt tends to be 
divided between traditionalist (mainly Islamist-influenced), critical and ‗liberal‘ 
commentaries, with some overlap especially in the latter two categories. A significant 
subset of the literature in Arabic is concerned with strengthening the teaching of Arabic 
and Islam. Other studies are concerned with the ways in which education may be 
breading intolerance and extremism (see MARED 2010). A smaller subset of the 
literature is more concerned with patterns of oppression and exclusion in education, 
especially in poor schools (see Herrera and Torres 2006).  
 
Several scholars of Arab education have focused on school relations and pedagogical 
relations in schools as manufacturers of submissive and uncritical students and causing 
the persistence of authoritarianism in Arab societies, without always distinguishing 
between schools for different social classes (Sharabi 1987, Barakat 1984, Watfa 1999, 
Naguib 2006, Radwan et al 1970). Leading Arab intellectuals such as Hisham Sharabi 
(1975, 1987) and Halim Barakat (1984) have criticized Arab culture, home-rearing 
practices, and schools as barriers to democracy. Sharabi focused on the patriarchal 
structure of Arab society, and identified child-rearing and schooling practices that 
reflect and maintain this society, while Barakat identified many traditional values 
reflected in schools that are in dissonance with democratic values, attitudes and habits 
of mind. Watfa (1996, 1999) has emphasized how the authoritarian culture is reflected 
in, and maintained by, family and school relations and practices. Watfa (1999), 
additionally, reviewed a diverse literature in the Arab States that addresses these issues 
and concluded that authoritarianism is closely related to the patriarchal structure of 
Arab societies, and that Arab culture emphasizes obedience of the young to the old, 
that schools train students to become obedient and submissive by embodying these 
values in student-teacher relations.  
 
In reference to Egypt specifically, it has also been argued that the despotism inside 
schools is based on a monopoly of decision-making processes, relationships of 
dominance and submission, and the negation of difference or alternative points of 
view. Based on an ethnographic study of classroom and school culture in preparatory 
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schools in Alexandria, Egypt, Kamal Naguib concludes that ―the public-sector school 
represents a microcosm of the authoritarian state‖; arguing that ―the values that 
dominate classroom culture- authoritarianism, dominance, control, suppression and 
submission- permeate school social organization, and society as a whole‖ (2006, 68). He 
concludes that schools clearly reproduce a despotic personality, which is characterized 
by values of passivity, servility, fear, resentment, impotence, lying and cheating (Naguib 
2006). Radwan et al (1970) explain the expected outcome for authoritarian schooling in 
terms of disinterest or even hatred to the school, a tendency for rebellion whenever 
possible, a spirit of cowardice, selfishness, passivity, hypocrisy and backstabbing among 
members of the school community; as well as training them for absolute submission to 
superiors and limiting innovation, discussion, sound scientific thinking or cooperation 
amongst them to solve their problems. In essence, the student is characterized with 
obedience, passivity, fear, fatalism; and becomes a slave to the text received from a 
higher authority, incapable of scientific thinking, experimentation, doubt, measurement, 
proof and criticism; thus with a deadened capacity for discussion, dialogue, creativity or 
desire for change (see Bilawi 2000, 178-9).  
 
More recently, this debate has been framed in terms of student versus teacher-centered 
pedagogies. This was partly influenced by ideas of critical education, especially Brazilian 
educator Paulo Freire (1970), whose work has been very influential in many countries 
of the South. In Egyptian policy discourses, child-centered pedagogy has already 
become a panacea and policy recommendation to deal with all sorts of ‗problems‘ in 
the system, from the quality of education to religious tolerance. This research departs 
from some of these arguments by privileging the role of material and structural 
conditions of the school in shaping school relations (see Chapter Five) and 
understanding subjectivation as more contingent and indeterminate, without crediting 
schools with the production of stable ‗personalities‘ or fixed identities. 
 
 
 
65 
THIS STUDY 
This research is primarily based on extensive field study including interviews and 
classroom observation over a period of over two years. Most of the fieldwork was 
conducted in six schools in the greater Cairo area between 2008 and 2010. The main 
research schools included two public technical secondary schools, two public general 
secondary schools; the latter four in an informal neighborhood, and two private general 
secondary English language schools, in predominantly upper-middle class 
neighborhoods. There was one boys‘ school and one girls‘ school of each category of 
public schools. However, middle and upper range private boys (only) schools are not 
common, as most boys enroll in mixed schools. Therefore I conducted interviews in a 
girls (only) school and a mixed school. In order to protect respondents from any form 
of harm or embarrassment due to the information they discussed, I have not used the 
real names of respondents or stated the names of the research schools. I have also not 
stated the names of the neighborhoods where the schools were located as this may 
make it easy to deduce which secondary schools are being referred to and which 
principals—and sometimes individual teachers—are being referred to. This was 
combined with numerous individual interviews and discussions with teachers, students 
and school staff from different schools across the city and different educational stages.  
 
In each one of the research schools, in addition to classroom observation, I conducted 
group and individual interviews with teachers, students and the principal of the school, 
and sometimes other administrative staff.  In sum, I have conducted extensive one-on-
one and group discussions with: 6 school principals, 33 teachers (and 1 social worker), 
and 109 students. In terms of classroom observation, I spent the school day inside 
different classrooms in each school for an average of two days/per week over a period 
of one semester for each school (amounting to about 480 hours spent in the schools 
altogether). I have also carried out analyses of textbook material, policy documents, 
recent press coverage, commentary and reports on relevant issues, and a number of 
expert interviews. I reviewed 2009/2010 textbooks for the three years of secondary 
education in all tracks (specializations) with a focus on sections impacting production 
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of national identity and citizenship. Due to the lack of scholarly/academic sources, 
press coverage and investigative reports on key educational issues offered an invaluable 
resource for this research. The recently-thriving national press, with a number of more 
independent newspapers, pays considerable attention to key issues in education 
including curricula, assessment issues, school conditions, teacher practices and physical 
beating of students. 
 
Despite the peripheral quasi- rural geographical location of some schools, these can still 
be considered urban Cairene schools well under the control of the centralized Ministry 
of Education bureaucracy. This has implications for the daily functioning of the schools 
and the space school members may perceive for ideological diversity. It may also 
impact the orientation of teachers, families, students and administrators in a less 
conservative urban setting. In sum, this research is focuses on a very limited number of 
Cairene schools in a system of 17 million students across a vast country, although there 
is an attempt to contextualize different patterns wherever possible.  
 
 
Figure 2: Informal Neighborhood- Remaining Green Fields near the General Schools 
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Figure 3: Informal Neighborhood- Weekly Market 
 
 
Figure 4: Informal Neighborhood- Busy Streets 
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Although I have classified neighborhoods in terms of social class, this glosses over the 
specific conditions, composition and trajectories of the neighborhoods. For example, to 
call one of the neighborhoods informal, may imply that it is a predominantly working 
class, understating the middle class presence in parts of the neighborhood. To state that 
it is in the Greater Cairo area, ignores its strong rural background. Furthermore, this 
―working class‖ neighborhood should not be simply assumed to be like ‗any other‘ 
working class neighborhoods in Cairo, and the differences with other places can be 
pronounced and constructed by the residents themselves to be quite significant. Class is 
―not the same everywhere;‖ class meanings are ―inflected by culture and place,‖ and 
importantly, ―Schools themselves are classed places, within which some students feel at 
home and others can be distinctly uncomfortable‖ (Ball 2006, 7). This is clear not only 
in manifestations of differences in ‗taste,‘ clothing or other symbols of ‗distinction‘ that 
could be noted among students, but also among teachers; and importantly: between 
teachers and students. Furthermore, the technical and general schools, although 
existing in below-average educational district, have been the object of significant 
upgrading efforts by non-governmental bodies. In fact the general schools are newly 
built schools, with funding provided by a donor agency (see Figure 5). The private 
school and the mixed school are considered some of the best schools for upper middle 
income families. 
 
This research is primarily concerned with the production of classed citizenship in 
‗national‘ secondary schools. By focusing on secondary schooling under the national 
system, it looks at the system that incorporates the bulk of students, but can say very 
little about ‗international‘ schools for the elite and very little about the poorest children. 
Although this work refers to ‗working class‘, ‗disadvantaged‘ and ‗poor‘ students, these 
students—despite their diminished citizenship entitlements—should not be mistaken 
for the poorest of the poor or the most disadvantaged children. As detailed in Chapter 
Three, secondary schooling is a far more urban phenomenon in the first place, as many 
villages, towns and small rural centers do not even have any secondary schools, and 
certainly not general secondary schools. This research is not about the schooling of the 
‗poor‘ (certainly not the poorest of the poor) who are less likely to enroll in secondary 
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education or live in urban centers in the first place. These youth and children never 
make it to secondary education. According to one estimate, only 29% of children who 
come from the poorest households complete technical secondary education, whereas 
the rest of the children never enroll in school or drop out before completing basic 
education (UNDP 2010, 44). At least one fifth of all children do not access secondary 
education in the first place according to official figures (MOE 2007). These 
disadvantaged children include street children and homeless children, who have been 
estimated to reach over one million children in Egypt (see Zu‗bi 2007). They also 
include children with disabilities and serious illnesses or children who are residents of 
care institutions. The research not only primarily relates to the bulk of youth in the 
mainstream ‗national‘ system, but also focuses on urban Cairene youth.  
 
 
Figure 5: Brand New Schools- Girls‘ General School 
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For purposes of convenience, I often refer to the public technical schools as simply the „technical‟ schools , 
to the public general schools as the „general‟ schools and to the private general schools, as the „private‟ 
schools, using the article „the‟ to indicate „the schools in which the research was concluded‟. I sometimes 
refer to „school administrators and teachers‟ as a whole simply as „teachers‟ or „school authorities‟, 
distinguishing between administrators and teachers when this is relevant for the analysis. 
 
CONDUCTING THE RESEARCH IN ‗THE SCHOOLS‘  
Access of researchers to public schools is severely inhibited by the need for formal 
approval- essentially from the highest echelons of the Ministry of Education involving a 
number of security approvals- in order to even enter schools, and more so for the 
purpose of conducting research in them.  It took months of waiting and lengthy 
bureaucratic procedures, before I was finally able to obtain the formal approval to 
conduct research in public schools. As I later came to appreciate, this was no small 
victory and has indeed fully enabled me to enter schools and engage the school 
community.  
 
Like many researchers, the schools chose me as much as I chose them. Guided by 
specific criteria, I studied the schools where I was able to gain access through existing 
personal connections. I wanted to study mainstream schools under the national system; 
that is not religious schools, which represent about 8% of the system. I wanted to look 
at ‗urban upper middle range private schools‘, ‗urban public general secondary schools‘ 
and ‗urban technical schools‘. Although I wanted to study private schools, catering to 
about 3% of secondary schools, I did not want study elite schools catering to the most 
affluent strata of societies. My focus was on schools from the bulk of the system: 
general secondary schools (25% of the system) and technical schools (60% of the 
system). 
 
I made use of the usual ethnographic methods of interview, observation, and collected 
other material given or made available to me. I also took numerous photos in all of the 
schools. In separate interviews and discussions with different groups, I asked them 
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directly to describe the school, to describe what they like or dislike about it, to describe 
relations between students, teachers and administrators, modes of discipline and 
punishment in the schools, their involvement in private tutoring and its causes, costs 
and implications. I asked them about love and belonging to the country among their 
generation and for themselves. I asked them about their reflections on educational 
curricula, examinations and about their hopes for the future and current employment 
or future employment aspirations. The students and teachers I interviewed were not 
necessarily the ones I attended class with during my observations within the schools. 
These initial interviews were invaluable in adjusting my research focus when I actually 
started to attend school. In my observations in the classrooms, I refrained from asking 
direct questions and tried to see how issues arise within the everyday context of the 
school. 
 
I did not devote most of my time to one classroom in each school followed over a long 
period of time, as some school ethnographies do. Instead, I moved between different 
grades and different classes. My attempt at classroom ‗observation‘ was also frequently 
futile. Many times, the attention in the classroom was turned to me and the 
‗observation‘ turned into a group discussion. This happened for two main reasons. 
Many teachers simply did not show up to class, especially in the public schools. Other 
teachers showed up but decided not to teach or enter the class when they saw that I 
was inside- although I explained to them that I had no desire to speak with the students 
and only wanted to attend with them. They either did not feel like teaching the class or 
had something else to do and could use my presence as an excuse- sometimes stating 
this explicitly, and/or they did not want in fact to be ‗observed.‘ This meant that after 
many classes [in the class time of the subsequent class], there was ample time to engage 
with students about what had happened, as well as discussing other contextual issues 
about the school and student experiences. It also meant that students got more familiar 
with me, asked me many questions about my own life and experience and we formed 
bonds more rapidly. In the end, this proved incredibly enriching to my own 
understanding and sense of the schools, at least as articulated by students. It is 
obviously a testament of some of the things student meant by ‗mafish ta„lim‘ (there is no 
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education), as there was frequently, literally, no education going on in the classrooms. 
In the private schools, teachers entered classes far more regularly (if students came to 
school), although many also allowed students to chat, sleep, listen to music on 
earphones or do as they please.  
 
Most of my time in the schools was spent with students, whether in their classrooms or 
accompanying them to labs and the playground. Most of my fieldwork was not in the 
school at large; not in teachers‘ rooms and not in the principal‘s office; areas where 
further research would be very fruitful. This means that as in-depth as my classroom 
involvement may have been, I came and went from the schools with only a passing 
knowledge of the religious/political gatherings in the library in one school, interactions 
of principals with education authorities or teachers or how teachers and staff used the 
school and spent their time in it, the saving schemes organized by women in another, 
or the interactions around circulating Chinese and Egyptian salesmen and saleswomen.  
 
I have often been occasionally invited many times to have tea and a chat in the 
teachers‘ room, especially during break time. In several instances, I waited in the 
principal‘s office while other business was attended to. This provided me with ‗a feel‘ 
for certain dynamics in the school. My work, however, is not on the vast world of the 
―micropolitics of the school‖ 16  in social and work-related teacher-teacher relations, 
teacher-principal relations, or school-district and school-Ministry relations. This also 
means that despite long interviews with teacher and principals, I became far more 
familiar with and ‗closer‘ to student perspectives, discourses and concerns. 
 
There is no assumption that any of my interlocutors had a stable, previously-developed, 
and/or coherent articulation of their position on such complex and emotional issues as 
nation and state, humiliation and physical punishment or privatization. As all of us do, 
students were continually picking up and incorporating themes they felt resonated with 
                                            
16 These can be understood as the strategies that individuals and groups use in a particular organization to gain 
control of it and achieve their interests (Ball 1990, 7). Micropolitics of the school can be studied in terms of 
power, goal diversity, ideological disputation, conflict, interests, political activity and control (Ball 1990, 8). 
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them, with their sense of self, their needs and concerns, and served their purposes. 
What I understood from these discourses is what fit into my own register of meanings 
and experiences. My own expectations and assumptions about classroom functioning 
informed what I considered normal and expected and what was ‗different‘ or 
‗interesting,‘ or more worthy of noting or comparing. My findings and analysis are, as 
Deborah Youdell puts it in reference to her work, ―wholly constrained by my own 
discursive repertoire – the discourse that I see and name – and my capacity to represent 
these… I am not seeking to describe the nuances of the context and tease out what is 
happening within it. Rather, I am seeking to construct compelling representations of 
moments inside schools in order to untangle the discursive frames that guide meaning 
there‖ (Youdell 2006a, 56). 
 
Furthermore, I only heard those who spoke up and I only engaged with those who 
engaged with me. I cannot claim to be writing about students who were too shy to 
speak to me; or the one who were uninterested, or the ones who were crowded out by 
those who gathered around me. Sometimes I tried to engage these students 
intentionally, but I cannot claim that their voices are as present in my story as other 
voices. I have struggled with my desire to retain the voice and intensities of the actual 
people I am writing about. Every articulation, even of similar ideas carries its own 
idiosyncrasies, subtleties and intensities. I have had to accept however that because I 
am not focusing on these idiosyncrasies and subtleties per se, I was going to be able to 
reproduce only some of what students expressed and that in the end I am writing my 
own discourse and interpretation of what I saw and experienced. I frequently use 
student and teacher quotes however to preface many sections of the chapters as well as 
throughout the analysis itself, as they usually provide the most succinct idea and flavor 
of the discussion at hand. 
 
In addition to discourses, I tried to be more attentive to the feelings in the classroom- 
my own and the students‘; silent and permeating discourses. For example, the anxiety, 
outrage or shame I felt when a student was being physically or verbally abused, I noted 
were not always- or certainly uniformly- shared by students. I noted how I too learned 
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to put a brave face, composure and even nonchalance, until the ―silly‖ performance 
passed. My ‗bias‘ in the concepts and meanings I use (―abuse‖ in this case) as clearly 
classed and otherwise socially/culturally felt and constructed, have not yielded a 
complete abandonment of these concepts. But I do not hold the same understanding 
and feeling about ‗abuse‘ as I did without such a critical awareness. To move beyond a 
simple rejection and emotional distance from a set of behaviors is also to be open to 
receiving and understanding the different ways that these behaviors are enacted, their 
goals and the multiple modes of reception to them, as well as their ever incomplete 
‗normalization.‘ 
 
Like many researchers, I have struggled with the expectation that I can render ―the 
social more real, more orderly, more predictable than it is‖ (Ball 2006, 4). The world as 
it is, is ‗‗complicated, confused, impure, uncertain‘‘ (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and 
Passeron 1991, 259). In approaching student, teacher and textbook discourses, I am 
cognizant that I have imposed on those discourses categories and labels that are not 
organic to them, although in some areas more than others. I constructed and organized 
their words as discourses on concepts and themes like ―privatization‖, ―punishment‖ 
and ―citizenship‖. Discourses deployed by students and teachers (and researcher) may 
be both intentional and unintentional; and discourses intentionally deployed may escape 
or exceed the intent of the subject who speaks or acts, and/or the subject may 
unwittingly deploy discourses whose historicities and/or intersections assert 
unanticipated meanings (Youdell 2006b). Discourses do not need to be explicitly cited 
in order to be deployed (Butler 1997a). Indeed, discursive practices may entail the 
deployment of complex combinations of intentional and unintentional discourses and 
their discursive effects, which assumes multiple degrees of both intent and 
understanding among subjects in terms of the embedded meanings and effects of 
discourses. In fact, ―[u]nderstanding the researching and researched subject to be 
perpetually but provisionally constituted through discourse means that research practice 
is wholly implicated in processes of ongoing subjectivation (of both the researcher and 
the researched) even as these subjectivities form the objects of study‖ (Youdell 2006b, 
514). ―This cannot be factored out, overcome or otherwise neutralised. Instead, it 
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means that the research and the researcher must proceed from a recognition of how it 
(s/he) is implicated in constituting subject and an acceptance that analysis can only ever 
be a set of interpretations of the discourses the researcher imagines s/he can identify‖ 
(Youdell 2006a, 64). 
 
INFLUENCING THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
I have shaped and created my own findings in many important ways, from defining and 
redefining my research focus, to the way I posed certain questions or inquired about 
issues when they happened, to how respondents may have adjusted their discourses and 
practices depending on who they thought I was. Every researcher enters a research site 
with their own gendered, classed and theoretically influenced viewing ―glasses‖ and can 
only see the classroom from behind those glasses. 
 
Researchers influence the contexts in which data are gathered (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995) not only because their presence changes the dynamics of relations in 
the setting, or because participants may act or respond differently in the presence of the 
researcher based on the researcher‘s ‗apparent‘ identity (gender, class, religion and 
nationality) as well as their perceptions of the researcher‘s views, attitudes and power. I 
can never know what or how much was concealed from me or adjusted in my presence, 
but I assume that the general outcome was that I was not shown the uglier realities of 
the school, nor became exposed to the full oppositional discourse of students on the 
state. However, I do not believe that an unrealistic portrayal was shared with me, due to 
trust and complicity with students and the significant period of time spent in the 
schools. Therefore, as shocking as many of my observations may seem to some readers, 
especially in terms of the scale of physical and emotional abuse that occurred in my 
presence, as well as the lack of any instruction in so many classes I attended, they 
should be seen with this background in mind. 
 
Just as participants may have adjusted theirs in my presence, I consciously and 
unconsciously adjusted my behavior in the research setting. Like most researchers, I 
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engaged in forms of ‗impression management‘, through dress, speech and demeanor, as 
well as the presentation of ‗different selves‘ (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995, 83-87) 
appropriate to different research contexts. I- almost unthinkingly- attempted to 
downplay the social class difference between myself and respondents in the informal 
neighborhood. I also attempted to control many of my emotions and actions, ending 
up in many class a witness to humiliating physical and verbal abuse of students without 
even uttering a word of protest. I had been made to collaborate in the normalization of 
abuse in the schools, no matter how this may have been balanced in subsequent 
discussions with students, or complicit glances and my facial expressions during 
episodes of abuse. I also adopted various aspects of the gendered comportment I 
understood was expected of me. I dressed very modestly and maintained greater 
distance with male students and teachers.  
 
A number of concrete elements about my insertion into the schools arguably affected 
the kind of ―results‖ I obtained and patterns I was able to witness. This includes 
perceptions of nationality, class, gender, religion and power position. The exposure we 
receive is no doubt influenced by the trust and complicity that occurs in research sites 
and is critical to ethnographic work. I made it clear to students that I had no power to 
‗change‘ things in the schools; and many students were visibly disappointed to hear this 
and may have had less incentive to explain the issues that ‗need fixing‘ in the school. In 
general however my presence was warmly welcomed by the students across the schools 
(but not always by teachers and administrators). Many students were very eager to 
speak with me and to seize this opportunity express their opinions, in a sense simply ‗to 
be heard‘. Being a woman meant much easier access and ease in talking to girls and 
perhaps more curious attitudes from boys. 
 
Being in the school with an official permit was a matter which had contradictory 
implications. On the one hand, it conferred legitimacy and assuaged ‗security‘ fears that 
may relate to ‗foreign‘ researchers, who are almost always suspected of being foreign 
spies. However, even if I was a confirmed Egyptian, as someone studying in the West, I 
was faced with the common concern about ‗tarnishing the image of Egypt abroad.‘ 
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Some students visibly censored others (and arguably themselves) for this purpose when 
negative aspects of educational processes in the school were discussed; and frequently 
asked me about this explicitly: ‗will you tell them this ―abroad‖?‘ Arguably, this reduced 
the amount of negative issues discussed in my presence. On the other hand, a 
perception sometimes developed among the administrators that I had some 
‗supervision‘ role in affiliation with the Ministry of Education (henceforth MOE). This 
was invariably conveyed to students and it was clear that they were reserved in the 
initial interviews and attempted to portray a largely positive image of the school. 
However, spending time in the schools usually reversed this attitude. 
 
Expectedly, I was classified in terms of religion. This information was always solicited 
at the onset quite candidly by asking about my ―full name‖. I later learned to present 
myself using my longer full name, which is unambiguously Muslim. The majority of 
students were Muslim, although there was a visible Christian minority in several classes. 
Students placed a symbolic importance on this issue; and I imagine that many of the 
Muslim students were more open with me after inquiring about my religion, at least in 
initial encounters. This may have also meant however that Christian students and 
teachers could not feel at great liberty to speak with me relating to aspects of their own 
lived citizenship entitlement in the schools. The lived citizenship of Christian students 
was not only beyond the scope of my exploration but was also hardly discussed in my 
presence in the schools. This in itself reflects the silence of students and teachers in the 
schools on these matters, and perhaps the legacy of silence within the Christian 
community, especially in the presence of a Muslim researcher and speaking typically in 
a collective context that would expectedly be very hostile to discourses that depart from 
the rehearsed assertions of ‗national unity‘ and the ‗normality‘ of the saturation of the 
public space with Muslim symbols.  I also did not wear a headscarf and this arguably 
had an impact for how students saw and dealt with me. It is safe to say students did not 
feel that they had to express adherence to mainstream piety and could for example 
more easily discuss their relationships with me. It may have also meant that more 
conservative students may have not been as interested in talking with me. Recent 
research in Cairo has suggested that Muslim women, especially younger, poorer and less 
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educated women, indicate that they are more religious and adherent to Islamic cultural 
norms when interviewed by an enumerator donning the Islamic headscarf; while 
Christian women tend to downplay their religious identity to avoid appearing 
antagonistic to the dominant, Muslim majority  (Blaydes and Gillum 2011).   
 
Finally and importantly, the schools are ‗securitized‘ spaces as argued throughout this 
work. This meant that I could not put forward oppositional or overtly political issues, 
certainly not in my research permit request to MOE, nor in my discussion with 
students. I was always aware that my actions were being monitored and the students 
were asked by school authorities what I talked with them about. When their discourses 
became too oppositional or discussions on the regime were too extended, I (pretended 
to) censor them and tried to change the topic back to ‗education‘. I truly feared this 
might jeopardize my research permit and access to the schools. As I had not hit the 
boundaries of appropriate discourse (I was never warned or questioned about the types 
of issues I raised with students), I am not sure if I simply managed the balance well, or 
actually failed to exploit spaces that were indeed available to discuss more controversial 
issues, not only around politics and protest, but also around the politics of the school in 
general, and issues of corruption especially. Despite any trust in me or rapport between 
me and the students, they were frequently voicing their opinions in front of other 
students, sometimes including sons or daughters of teachers or school administrators.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The research approaches the production of citizenship in the schools in a number of 
different ways. It relies on the available quantitative data, secondary reporting and 
analysis relating to the main themes of the literature (Chapter Three). Beyond this 
general image that frames the realities of Egyptian education, the research relies on 
analysis of nationally unified secondary education textbooks as they relate to the themes 
of the research. It focuses especially on subjects (Nationalist Education and Arabic 
Language) that have received little or no analysis, but are key for illuminating the 
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official state project of nationhood and citizenship in the late Mubarak era (Chapter 
Six). The bulk of the research and its primary approach is qualitative and ethnographic 
(Chapters Four, Five and Seven). Guided by the relevant theoretical and applied 
literature from different contexts, the research approaches the key themes of the 
literature by exploring the concrete realities of a small number of schools catering to 
different social classes. It hopes to arrive through school-level observations and 
discussions at how the schools, as institutions of the state reflect the different 
citizenship contracts available to boys and girls from different social classes. 
 
I have tried in this chapter to explain in some detail how I went about doing the 
research and the kinds of limitations and opportunities this approach may have. I have 
also explained the theoretical and methodological literatures I drew up, including the 
literatures on discipline and subjectivation and the sociology and anthropology of 
education. I have also discussed some of the potential limitations of their use in the 
Egyptian context. I revisit some of these issues throughout the thesis and in the final 
chapter.   
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CHAPTER THREE:  MAFISH 
TA‘LIM :  FAILED EDUCATION 
AND INFORMAL PRIVATIZ ATION  
We will take further steps to expand access to basic education and upgrade its quality. These 
include, but are not limited to, the development of technical education and vocational training 
centers, promotion of Public- Private Partnerships, and involvement of the civil society in the 
educational sector. We will also enlarge the scope of decentralization in managing the 
educational process at governorate-level and beyond; and we believe that we are taking the right 
way towards goal attainment. 
Hosni Mubarak, on the Occasion of Promulgating the Teachers Cadre‘s Law 
(Cited in MOE 2007, III). 
 
The Ministry of Education (henceforth MOE) has acknowledged this profound failing 
of quality in general secondary and across the system and articulated them around three 
major factors that reflect quite well the key concerns of students: 1) the prevalence of 
obsolete teaching methods that focus on the traditional rote memorization approaches; 
2) the prevalence of the traditional assessment system that measures student‘s 
memorization skills; 3) the prevalence of the culture of the school textbook, which is 
the unique source of knowledge for students; a situation that has led to private tutoring, 
and reveals the absence of the equal opportunity principle in education, as well as the 
―Free Education for All‖ right according to the Constitution (MOE 2007, 278). 
 
This chapter provides an overview of key issues in Egyptian education, especially 
secondary education. It surveys the available data and background information that sets 
the stage for the discussion in the subsequent chapters. It describes the basic features 
of the Egyptian education system especially in terms of secondary education and key 
issues relating its declining quality, teacher pay, expenditure levels, marketization and 
the issue of emotional and physical punishment. It charts the key features of the state-
market nexus that constitutes the basis of contemporary secondary education in Egypt 
in terms of the formal and informal privatization of education. 
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SECONDARY EDUCATION: DECLINING QUALITY, 
PRIVATIZATION AND EXTRALEGAL PRACTICES  
The pre-university education system in Egypt includes the primary; preparatory and 
secondary stages, in a huge system of over 39,926 schools and close to 17 million 
students in 2005/06 (MOE 2007, 32). The Basic Education stage encompassing the six 
years of the primary stage and the three years of the preparatory stage is free and 
compulsory constitutionally guaranteed right for all children aged 6-14. Those who 
successfully complete the basic education leaving exam can enroll in secondary 
education. Secondary education comprises a three-year general secondary education 
track, from which successful students can go on to study at post-secondary level; and a 
technical secondary education track. In the eleventh and twelfth grades of general 
secondary track, famously known as thanawiya „amma, students choose concentration in 
the humanities, mathematics, or the sciences, or combinations thereof. There are two 
types of technical secondary schools. The majority of technical schools are the three-
year technical secondary schools leading to a formal qualification (diblum) as 
‗Technician‘; but there are also five-year advanced vocational secondary schools leading 
to qualification as ‗First Technician‘. Students in the technical schools study industrial, 
agricultural or commercial studies. Tourism is sometimes available as a specialization, 
there are a few military schools across the country and there a number of more 
specialized technical schools as well as a small number of elite technical schools that 
focus on technically advanced areas.  
 
In 2007, students enrolled in industrial education accounted for 50.6 percent of all 
students enrolled in technical education and agricultural and commercial education 
accounted for 11.4 percent and 38 percent, respectively (MOE 2007, Annexes, 104). 
Technical secondary degrees are ‗terminal‘ degrees that can be used as qualifications 
when applying for formal jobs, whereas a general secondary degree is- currently- only a 
route to university and higher education. Tracking into technical schooling and 
determination of specialization within technical education is determined by student 
scores on the basic education leaving exams. MOE identifies the cutoff point beyond 
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which students cannot enroll in general secondary schooling every year. This is 
currently set between 60 and 70%, so that the highest scoring 30% of students have the 
right to enroll in general secondary, while other students can only enroll in technical 
education and are allocated to specializations within their schools based on their scores, 
regardless of their desires or aptitudes. It is of course very significant for students that 
they had little choice over what subjects they studied, especially that grades were 
dependent on cheating and other variables. They are well aware however that there is 
little practical difference between the specializations in terms of career or job prospects, 
and that mafish ta‟lim applies across the system; expressing that in any case, they will just 
receive a ‗diblum.‘ 
 
According to MOE figures, the enrolment rate in secondary education (including 
enrolments in all sub-tracks) amounts to 78.4 percent, so that 21.6 percent of the age 
cohort outside secondary education (MOE 2007, Annexes 77). There are very large 
disparities in access to general secondary schooling. General secondary students living 
in rural areas account for only 24.2 percent of all secondary education students, 
compared to 75.8 percent in urban areas (MOE 2007, Annexes 79), even though 
approximately 55 percent of Egypt‘s population lives in rural areas (ElSaharty, 
Richardson and Chase 2005). In Cairo, opportunities to enroll in general secondary 
education in 2006/07 were available to 46.8 percent of the age group concerned, while 
in Fayoum, opportunities to enter general secondary were available to just 13 percent of 
the age group (MOE 2007, Annexes, 80). Of course, schools for all types of secondary 
education, as well as special education, are more numerous in urban areas (MOE 2007, 
32). 
 
DECLINING QUALITY  
The Egyptian education system has been expanding massively in terms of enrollment 
numbers while investment in teacher salaries, hiring and training and school 
construction have lagged behind. This has had a devastating impact on the quality of 
education in the system, through low teacher qualification and training and poor 
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resources, very high teacher/student ratios, and short school days in double –and 
triple- shift schools. While enrollment rates increased significantly over the last 20 
years, Egypt has not yet reached universal primary education and suffers low adult 
literacy rates of around 70.4% in 2007 (UNDP 2010), although other estimates have 
placed literacy rates at around 50% (see Metz 1990 and Antoninis 2001). 
 
Rising enrollment has translated into class densities of 60 and even 80 students in 
primary schools in urban areas, conditions where learning becomes virtually impossible.  
The average class density in Cairo‘s primary schools is 53 students per class in 
2007/2008 (UNDP 2010, 265) with many classes reaching 80 students per class. 17 
There are currently three types of shifts in Egyptian schools in addition to the full day: 
morning (four to five hours), evening (four hours), and double (four hours each shift). 
Full day schools represent only 24% of technical secondary schools, but 63% of general 
secondary schools. They represent 39% of primary schools and 37% of preparatory 
schools (MOE 2007, Annexes, 36). Secondary schools are also overcrowded, with more 
than 49 percent of general secondary classes and 35 percent of technical secondary 
classes having a density above 41 students per class (MOE 2007, 277).18 The quality of 
secondary schooling and of education more generally is very low indeed. 
 
According to MOE analysis, technical education is inadequate to meet the needs of 
society, and of internal and external labor markets; weaknesses which have translated 
into lack of respect for technical education (MOE 2007, 278). In addition to its chronic 
problems of poor-quality education due to outdated curricula and poorly trained and 
paid teachers (European Training Foundation and World Bank 2005; Richards and 
Waterbury 1996), most schools lack the basic equipment and maintenance needed for 
functioning even on the outmoded curricula and programs of the 1960s. Although in 
                                            
17 Classrooms in some governorates like North Sinai typically have lower densities; and secondary 
schools have lower densities than primary schools, so the national average is usually around 40 students 
per class (MOE 2007, 45). According to official statistics, 30% of state-run classrooms have 70 or more 
students at any one time (El-Sayed 2005). 
18 A significant number of classes have very large density over 50 or even over 70 students. The average 
class density in all types of public secondary schools reached 38.6 students/classroom in 2005/06. 
There is of course significant variation across governorates (MOE 2007, 277). 
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recent years it became increasingly obvious that technical education was superfluous 
and no longer serving any need (Elgeziri 2010), the government continued to steer 
students toward it merely to limit demand on general secondary education and 
universities- to such an extent that technical education is now described as merely 
serving as the government‘s safety valve for young men and women of poor 
socioeconomic backgrounds (Antoninis 2001, Gill and Heyneman 2000). Even among 
educational officials, it is now common to refer to technical schools qualification as no 
more than a proof of literacy (mish aktar min shihadat mahw ummiya).  
 
Teacher qualification and training are obviously the most central issues in relation to 
quality. In addition to low and nominal salaries discussed below, many classrooms 
remain without teachers possessing the most basic types of instruction and content 
competencies. According to the 2005 Egypt Human Development Report, only 46 % 
of employed teachers are graduates of Faculties of Education (UNDP 2005, 64). In 
technical schools there is a massive shortage of teachers in academic subjects, 
workshops and labs. The shortage in teachers is estimated at 13,596 teachers, affecting 
Industrial specializations for the most part (MOE 2007, Annexes, 106). An MOE 
report pointed out that ―technical education lacks specialized technicians to provide 
regular maintenance of the schools‘ equipment and devices. Most of the teachers 
employed lack skills, which may be attributed to a lack of adequate training. This 
situation has affected the quality of technical education graduates and has decreased 
their opportunities to find suitable jobs in the labor market‖ (MOE 2007, Annexes, 
106). Indeed, in most of the workshops in the boys‘ [industrial] technical school, less 
than one third of the machines were operational and only one or two students would 
be allowed to use them ‗so that they do not spoil them‘. Those trusted students were 
the ones who already worked in the same trade outside the schools (and in fact 
sometimes used more advanced versions of the outdated equipment in the ‗modest‘ 
workshops they work in). However, as part of its strategy to deflect criticism of the 
very poor quality of technical education and perhaps as an attempt to provide 
competent technicians for businesses and industries, there has been a direction towards 
the establishment of elite technical school. As John Waterbury‘s observed concerning 
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higher education almost thirty years ago, ―There is a tendency to let the crisis worsen 
because, it is felt, whatever its dimensions it is no longer susceptible to reform. The 
standard tactic is then to seek a solution outside the afflicted institutions‖ (1983, 240-
241). Some of these Specialized Technical Schools are of even higher quality and 
equipment than private schools and even universities, and they are frequently displayed 
to Ministers and foreign assistance consultants in organized visits.19 They require very 
high entrance scores (sometimes enrolling the very highest scoring students in the basic 
education leaving exam who would otherwise enroll in general secondary education) 
and typically strong wasta (connections/ personal recommendations by connected 
people).  
 
Weaknesses in secondary education can only be understood however by examining the 
quality of basic education. In most disadvantaged public schools and many low end 
private schools, primary schooling remains unable to provide children with even basic 
literacy skills, which obviously fundamentally cripples their progress in higher stages of 
education. Surely not all basic education public schools graduate illiterate students, 
especially that a large proportion of students end up enrolling in private tutoring. 
However, the quality of basic education is so poor that it has been estimated that over 
one third of those who complete the nine years of compulsory primary and preparatory 
education remain effectively illiterate, concentrated in public schools, poor areas and 
rural governorates (see for example, Maat 2009). The result of this very poor quality can 
be seen in the prevalence of both private tutoring and cheating in its various forms, as 
key mechanisms for passing students from one grade to another. In fact by the time 
they arrive to secondary school, many students, especially from disadvantaged schools, 
                                            
19 The Specialized Technical Schools include: (a) The Advanced Technical School for Information 
Technology in Ismailia, which offers specializations in computer technology, information system, and 
programming; (b) The Technical School for Maintenance Technology in Nasr City, which is associated 
with the advanced maintenance techniques; (c) The Advanced School for Hotel Affairs and Tourism 
Services, which prepares first-class technicians in hotels and in tourism services and provides them with 
opportunities to learn English and other languages. The schools have advanced language training 
laboratories, multiple disciplinary laboratories, and computer laboratories; (d) The Advanced Technical 
Secondary School, Sultan Al-Awees, in the 10th of Ramadan City, which includes several modern 
specializations such as maintenance of medical equipment, elevators, and electronics; and (e) The 
Advanced Agricultural Technical School for land reclamation and agricultural mechanization in Ismailia 
(MOE 2007, 280). 
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are considered by teachers (and students themselves) to be ―too used to cheating,‖ 
needing to adjust to the very idea that they actually need to study and almost incapable 
of ‗studying‘ independently, especially without tutoring support.  
 
 
Figure 6: Being Allowed to Work the Machine in the Boys‘ Technical School 
 
For general secondary education, even with huge costs incurred on tutoring, the MOE 
National Strategic Plan (MOE 2007, 278), acknowledged, as highlighted in the 
introduction of this chapter, the low performance of the secondary education level as 
well as its inability to interact with economic and technological changes; leading to a 
high unemployment rate among secondary education graduates. Probably due to rising 
unemployment and its high tutoring cost, demand for general secondary education has 
actually decreased by 20-40% over the past few years according to official figures; 
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increasing from 2001/02 to 2005/06 by 23% in Cairo for example and 43% in 
governorates like Beheira (MOE 2007, Annexes, 79). 
 
Low quality and high unemployment have led to two distinct patterns in educational 
assessment: increasing leniency and increasing competitiveness. There are different 
worlds of assessment in Egyptian education. In public education, easy examinations 
predominate in the basic education years. Teachers and students frequently observe 
that children are passed from one year to the other with little scrutiny. This is 
importantly facilitated through cheating- as well as legislation whereby schools are 
required to pass children by law if they had already repeated the year once. In lower end 
private schools in the basic education stage, students also expect great leniency (so long 
as they write ‗an answer,‘ they will get the grade for the question) or significant scope 
for cheating. This leniency is perpetuated and intensified into the technical secondary 
stage, as explained in Chapter Four. The very low academic requirements and 
assessment ―leniency‖ in technical secondary have almost become necessary based on 
the realization that if assessment were ‗real,‘ most students would fail; a politically 
unacceptable outcome. In general secondary on the other hand, exams are considered 
very difficult and requiring very rigorous preparation- and extensive tutoring. Therefore 
in secondary education, there are two vastly different worlds of assessment. The strict 
and stressful general secondary testing, which filters students into university and the 
completely permissive theatrical technical secondary testing, where graduates receive 
jobs entirely independent of their schooling, through connections, and based on 
competences obtained through work experience typically obtained while studying. The 
paradoxes involved in lenient examination, cheating and predominant private tutoring 
are explored in greater depth in Chapter Four. 
 
Finally, while, it is difficult to find alternative measures of student literacy, knowledge 
or abilities, official data on student achievement does paint a vivid picture of the 
disparities in quality of education across Egyptian schools, where socio-economic status 
and family background are the main predictors of educational achievement (UNDP 
2010, 44). The poor consistently perform poorly in education, having low enrollment 
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rates, leaving school early, or being tracked to programs that have second-rate learning 
and labor market outcomes. According to the national Survey of Young People in 
Egypt (SYPE), those who come from the poorest households are distributed among 
three main groups: those who never enrolled (29%), those who dropped out before 
finishing basic education (24%), and those who completed technical secondary 
education (29%) (UNDP 2010, 44). Those who come from poor households 
constituted 5.3% of achievers in the primary education stage, 3% of achievers in the 
preparatory stage and only 0.5% of achievers in the general secondary education stage, 
implying that the presence of students from poor families is at its highest rate in the 
primary stage (UNDP 2010, 44). Children whose families are in the middle and upper 
wealth quintiles are more likely to perform better in certificate examinations and to join 
the higher education system. There are also pronounced urban-rural difference in 
achievement, where school achievers predominately come from urban areas. Rural 
students have their lowest presence among achievers in the general secondary 
completion exam and their highest presence in the primary education stage. In terms of 
school type, while the majority of achievers come from government schools (90% in 
the secondary stage completion exam), the likelihood of being an achiever increases 
exponentially if a student is in a private school or in a governmental experimental 
school. More than 50% of those in governmental experimental schools are achievers, 
compared to 9% of those who come from regular governmental schools (UNDP 2010). 
Among students in private schools, 35% were among the high achievers. School type is 
of course a proxy for socio-economic background, with private and experimental 
government schools charging relatively high fees compared to regular government 
schools. The link between achievement and poverty is of course not unique to Egypt. 
However, the degree of income polarization and the quality of public schooling 
arguably have an impact on the gap between the high and low achievers (for a 
comparative example, see Croxford 2004). 
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TEACHER SALARIES 
As detailed in Chapters Four and Five, teacher salaries have a clear impact on quality 
across the system, as well as patterns of private tutoring and discipline and punishment 
in the schools. Detailed data on teacher salaries are simply unavailable however and the 
system is highly tracked and differentiated. On the one hand, there has been a highly 
publicized increase in teacher salaries called the Teachers‘ Cadre, approved in 2006 and 
implemented over several stages. On the other hand, most teachers in the system, 
especially outside of Cairo and in disadvantaged regions and governorates, are simply 
not hired on the Cadre system.  
 
The historical evolution of teacher pay is of course critical for understanding the 
current quality of the system. While it is understood that teacher‘s salaries, like other 
government employees, eroded greatly in real terms since the 1980s, there is virtually 
no tracking of the evolution over time in real wages of teachers, especially in light of 
the divergent hiring arrangements and pay scales. In sum, teachers hired on temporary 
contracts receive pay as low as 2 EGP/class (amounting to 60 cents/day), while full-
contract beginner teachers receive a basic salary that is typically equivalent to the rent of 
a modest dwelling in a low income neighborhood. In 1996, starting base salaries for 
teachers were 100 EGP/month, while about 900 EGP was needed to provide a decent 
living for an average Egyptian family (World Bank 1996, Annex 2, 1). The Cadre was 
effectively a 30% increase in the salaries of contracted teachers. However, even with the 
Cadre system, a beginner teacher receives a salary of around 500 EGP/month, which 
increases throughout her career to reach 2000 EGP (Leila 2008); whereas only an 
income of around 1200 EGP would put a family of 4 above the poverty line of 2 
USD/day20. As many teachers agreed, a salary of 500 EGP/month (after nine years of 
service) is enough to meet one week of household expenditures. While pay levels for 
experienced tenured teachers would place those teachers (back) into middle class 
incomes (especially in rural areas), for beginner teachers they remain inadequate for 
                                            
20 It should be noted that many Egyptian households are single income, due to high unemployment rates and low 
female labor force participation rate, ‗officially‘ estimated at 18.5% (UNDP 2010, 7). 
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meeting middle class demands including the cost of private tutoring for their own 
dependents.  
 
Unfortunately however, most teachers are not on the Cadre system. Teachers who are 
not on the Cadre are hired either on the Reward System (Nizam al-Mukaf‟a, or Nizam al-
Mukaf‟a al-Shamila) or on the Special Contract System („Aqd Mumayaz). Pay on the 
Reward System is 120 EGP/month (and can be as low as 105 EGP in some cases with 
deductions) plus 1600 EGP annual Reward, while teachers on the Special Contract 
receive around 360 EGP/month (which can be as low as 325 depending on 
deductions). While data on teacher pay rates are considered sensitive and not circulated 
even among educational district personnel21, there is credible indication that teachers 
receiving the two lower pay scales constitute 30-70% of all teachers in the system, but 
are disproportionately allocated to rural or poor areas, to technical rather than general 
education and to lower educational stages rather than the secondary stage. For example, 
in the early childhood sector, teachers on the Cadre system constituted no more than 
30% of teachers in most educational districts. Therefore research in the capital would 
not reveal the real proportion of Reward System teachers. However, in Fayoum for 
example, a rural Governorate, a recent report indicated that out of over 13,000 
teachers, 2,936 were hired on the Cadre system and 8,254 remained on the reward 
system ―until they become transferred‖ to the intermediate Special Contract System 
(Ta‘yin 3 Alaf Mudaris 2011). Not only are teacher hiring arrangements predominantly 
precarious, their chances of being chosen to the Cadre do not follow clear guidelines; 
and especially in poorer provinces, are fraught with ‗irregularities‘ and favoritism. For 
                                            
21 Because these teachers perform almost identical jobs and get widely divergent pay, their pay and 
hiring status need to remain vigilantly segregated. For example, educational district officials explained to 
me that they had to be very careful to end the contractual agreement with the lowest paid teachers at 
least one day before they renewed them for the next year, to ensure that the teachers could not make 
any claims that they are continuous or permanent workers of the ministry and claim entitlement to any 
additional financial benefits. Moreover, even with gaps in the contracts, teachers had to be prevented 
from demanding that they move to the higher scale after two years of working at the low pay scale, 
which seemed to be mandated by a regulation that was not put into effect by most educational districts. 
It was understood that only very strong personal connections (wasta) and effectively being from an 
urban middle class background (especially working in an Experimental School) could help a teacher 
arrive to the Cadre. Unfortunately, it was even reported that there are violations even of such low pay, 
where more than one teacher was being hired on the same per-class pay scale contract, in order for the 
Governor to claim that he had generated more work opportunities. 
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other teachers, the Cadre serves as an illusion they are repeatedly promised as the key 
means of attracting them to accept jobs they were effectively financing from their own 
savings with pay that only covered their transport costs, or that they had to supplement 
with private tutoring. 
 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
Inadequate financial resources obviously have very negative consequences for the 
functioning of the system. According to available official figures, education spending 
has been declining since 2003 both as percentage of GDP and as a percentage of 
government spending. 22  Moreover, three important features characterized public 
education spending : 1) most spending (over 80%) goes to salary costs23; 2) salary costs 
include a very large proportion of non-teachers and at all levels of the system; where 
non-teaching staff constitute up to 50% of education staff24; and 3) free university 
education continues to take up one third of education spending. In 2004, close to 1.5 
million full and part-time teachers and administrators were employed by the Ministry of 
Education (UNDP 2005, 69). However, like data on teacher salaries, data on public 
spending is similarly ambiguous. According to MOE figures (UNESCO 2009), 
expenditure on education as a percentage of total public expenditure, and as a 
percentage of GDP, has been declining since 2000. Spending declined to 10.4% by 
                                            
22 Public education expenditures had reportedly increased by 80 percent in real terms from 1990 to 
2000; and according to official figures, the Education share of the Government budget increased from 
under 10% in 1990-91 to 17% in 1999-2000 (Ammar 2006). In absolute figures, the total budget 
allocated to the whole system increased from less than 3 billion EGP in 1992 to about 26 billion EGP 
in 2006, while school and university enrolment has risen from 6 million to 18 million students (Ammar 
2006). Overall expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP has grown from 3.9% in 1991 to 
5.2% in 2002 of which 27.3% was allocated to higher education (Selim 2008). It had declined to 3.3% 
by 2008/2009 (UNESCO 2009). 
23 For example, as a proportion of total general secondary education spending, teaching and non-
teaching staff wages absorb about 78 percent, whereas only seven percent is allocated to capital 
investment; other recurrent expenditure accounts for 14.96 percent. As a proportion of recurrent 
expenditure, the share of wages is 84 percent, confining other current expenses to 21 percent. In fact, 
this latter facet of spending is one of utmost importance since all funds allocated to this category are 
spent on items demanded by educational processes such as school equipment routine maintenance; 
paying telephone, water, and electricity bills; and purchasing instructional materials along with all 
spending aspects that impact education quality (MOE 2007, Annexes, 95).   
24 Of the ministry‘s employees, 43.8 per cent are administrative and non-teaching staff, according to the 
Egypt Human Development Report 1997/98 (Tadros 2001). 
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2008/2009 (UNESCO 2009). Egypt‘s overall public expenditure on education reached 
4.9 percent of the GDP in 2002/03 and 4.8 percent in 2004/05. While expenditures of 
around 5% of GDP are similar to those of other lower/middle income countries, as 
well as OECD countries, expenditure on pre-university education is relatively lower 
than in similar countries (MOE 2007, 48). 
 
Egypt‘s expenditure on primary education is 30.2 percent of total expenditure on 
education, compared to 43.3 percent in Jordan, 60.4 percent in Philippines, 48.4 
percent in Turkey, and 40.4 percent in OECD countries (MOE 2007, 49). Expenditures 
on pre-primary, general secondary, and technical secondary are two percent, 11 percent, 
and 17 percent, respectively, while allocations for tertiary education amount to 28-30 
percent of total public expenditure, although it only serves 13 percent of the total 
number of students (MOE 2007, 49). The financing of public university education is 
clearly a subsidy to the middle and upper middle classes, even in times of austerity and 
despite the deterioration of quality at lower stages affecting most of the population. 
University students disproportionately come from private or semi-private Experimental 
schools. The unit cost of total expenditure on higher education amounted to LE 3,467 
1 which, according to the Egyptian Human Development Report, is more than seven 
times its value at the basic educational level, so that subsidizing higher education 
generates an opportunity cost per student of seven other students at the basic 
education level (Selim 2008). 
 
However, any serious study of education expenditures over time necessitates far more 
rigorous data that indicates spending in real Egyptian pounds (accounting for 
successive waves of inflation), changes in rates of expenditure per student in the 
context of steady population growth, levels of spending on different educational stages, 
as well as covering longer time frames. In any case, educational spending per student in 
Egypt is very low indeed, even according to official figures and pronouncements. 
Expenditures on education in Egypt stand at 129.6 USD per student per year, 
compared to 289.5 USD in Tunisia, 1,337.6 USD in Saudi Arabia, 4,763.4 USD in 
America, and 6,959.8 USD in Japan (Essam El Din 2003). 
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PRIVATIZATION 
The impact of neoliberal policies on education was not only manifested in decreased 
spending but the pervasive formal and informal privatization of education at all levels, 
from early childhood education to university education. Increasing marketization, 
privatization and the pervasive spread of private tutoring are now key features of the 
Egyptian educational landscape. The ministry has recently sponsored a privately 
financed and NGO-provided early childhood education system (see MOE 2007), and 
private tutoring in public universities has reportedly reached 50% (Selim 2008), while 
private institutes and universities have mushroomed across urban centers of country.  
 
One of the first MOE measures of privatization and stratification in the system was the 
establishment of an additional elite track within public education: Madaris Tajribiya 
Experimental Schools in the late 1970s, which charged high fees and catered to middle 
class parents. They retain a reputation of good quality schooling and are often 
academically superior to many private schools. They remain a very small part of the 
system, to be found mainly in the major cities across the country. This pattern was also 
manifested in partial privatization in Egyptian public universities, by creating separate 
programs with fees, and where instruction is typically carried out in English, and 
sometimes in French. The 1990s saw the growth of new private universities and 
institutes catering to different social classes. Two visible features of the growth of 
private schooling have been the growth of Islamic schools and the growth of 
enrolment schools offering foreign diplomas. Existing or new schools offered further 
tracking to private school students, where students who can afford the very high fees 
can study to obtain American, British or French secondary school diplomas. Between 
2001 and 2006 alone, the proportions of private classrooms at primary level increased 
by 31% while the numbers of pupils increased by 24% (MOE 2007, Annexes, 48). The 
growth in private schools is not restricted to the middle or upper classes. In recent 
years, due to the pressure to enroll in tutoring, low-income families in urban centers 
typically prefer private schools whenever they can afford them. The general perception 
is that there is far less pressure to enroll in tutoring with school teachers, abuse and 
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beating of students by teachers is less severe and les systematic and cheating is more 
facilitated. Private schools still remain a small part of the system, where 7.4% of 
students were enrolled in private education and only 2.7% of students were enrolled in 
private secondary schools (MOE 2007). 
 
Private tutoring is of course the most visible, powerful and pervasive form of 
educational marketisation in Egypt. It is the most strongly felt by students and parents 
in Egyptian schools across the different educational stages. A recent official study 
found that 81% of households had children who received private tutoring in secondary 
stage, while 69% received tutoring in the primary and preparatory stages (74% in 
preparatory and 50% in primary) (Abdul Wahab 2009). A 2002 World Bank study 
found that private tuition accounted for fully 1.6% of GDP. Private tutoring and its 
impact on the schools are covered in greater depth in Chapter Four. 
 
THE INFORMAL MARKET AND ITS 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Although many Egyptians are convinced that tutoring at the scale found in Egypt is a 
purely Egyptian phenomenon, private tutoring has been growing in the past few 
decades in many countries of the world, including higher income countries. There are 
also a few countries where tutoring may be as pervasive across educational stages as in 
Egypt, such as Mauritius and Sri Lanka and in some respects India, Iran, North Africa 
and Turkey, especially in the secondary stage (Bray 1999, 2003, Akkari 2010).  The 
Ministry of Education has long acknowledged that the widespread practice of out-of-
school tutoring ―partly defeats the democratic purpose embedded in the constitutional 
provision of ‗free‘ public education‖ (Megahed 2004, 5). The spread of tutoring began 
in the 1980s to cater to public and private school students who were preparing for 
increasingly competitive general secondary certificate (thanawiya „amma) examinations 
leading to university admission. It was therefore a phenomenon that primarily affected 
middle class families. Tutoring has now spread to lower educational stages as well as 
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higher education, therefore affecting almost every Egyptian household. Almost from a 
child‘s first year in school, poor families (constituting about 40% of the population) are 
pressured and intimidated by poorly paid teachers to enroll their children in private 
tutoring simply in order to pass from one year to another. There are two main types of 
tutoring25 in Egypt. The first are officially sanctioned after school classes called in-
school tutoring (majmu„at al-taqwiya al-madrasiya or simply magmu„at). They are provided 
by the school‘s teachers after school time and organized by MOE regulations. 
Introduced as early as 1952, Law No. 149 for the Year 1986 made them a mandatory 
service of the school (Herrera 1992, 75). This was seen as a way to combat private 
tutoring and alleviate part of its financial burden on families, by providing tutoring in 
school at lower prices. This is a strategy that has not only failed, but fuelled the present 
levels of tutoring dependence. Instead, it primarily functioned as a means of increasing 
teacher salaries from the private purse. According to MOE regulations, 85% of the 
income generated from in-school tutoring goes to the teacher and 15% to the 
administration at different levels of the system from the school all the way up to the 
minister; creating clear stakes for them to ‗encourage‘ or condone tutoring. 
Unfortunately, official in-school tutoring regulations are not observed in many schools 
in terms of maximum class size, the actual fees charged and conditions for fee 
exemptions (see also Tadros 2006). The second type of tutoring is the more 
straightforward private lessons (durus khususiya) that are conducted either in student 
homes, or increasingly in especially established tutoring centers (marakiz). 
 
TUTORING ENROLMENT, SPENDING AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
Several studies have attempted to document enrolment in private tutoring in Egypt 
over the past 15 years. According to a UNDP survey in 1997, 51% of poor students 
and 60% for the rich took private lessons (UNDP 2005). Rates have been increasing 
                                            
25 ―Tutoring‖ in this research refers to classes provided for a fee, which take place outside and in addition to the 
formal school timetable. They closely follow and are oriented towards the national MOE syllabus, with the goal of 
improving student exam performance. Private tutoring in a particular subject usually takes place once or twice a 
week from the start of the school year (and for general secondary even one month before the start), frequently 
with numerous additional revision and examination practice classes scheduled throughout the year. 
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over the years and the phenomenon has gained increasing momentum over the past 
few years alone. Tutoring centers, which have been mushrooming since the mid-1990s, 
cater to almost every socioeconomic group, although they are more concentrated in 
urban centers. A recent official study found that 81% of households had children who 
received private tutoring in secondary stage, while 69% received tutoring in the primary 
and preparatory stages (74% in preparatory and 50% in primary) (Abdul Wahab 2009).  
 
Private tutoring at this scale, especially in general secondary, has had a profound impact 
on student attendance at schools. A known fact in Egyptian households, low general 
secondary certificate attendance rates of less than 10% for much for the school year 
may be difficult to imagine for anyone unfamiliar with the system (See Herrera 2008b 
and for recent news coverage, see Imsik Harami 2009 and Al-Masry Al-Youm 2009). 
Although reliable official statistics are not available, teacher and student absenteeism is 
rampant throughout the system, to the extent of simply having schools without 
students at all for several months of the school year and either ‗lenient‘ and permissive 
attitudes to teacher absenteeism or strict measures to keep them coming to school and 
signing in attendance registers (even locking the school gates so that teachers do not 
leave after signing-in, see Herrera 2008b). 
 
Spending on private tutoring is simply immense. According to a survey by the Egyptian 
National Institute of Planning in 2000, poor households spent a fifth of their yearly 
income on (supposedly free) schooling (Tadros 2001). Middle class households have 
been estimated to spend about one third of their income on tutoring (UNESCO 2003). 
A recent official nation-wide study found that 66% of households spent more than 500 
EGP/month on private tutoring (Abdul Wahab 2009). GDP/capita was around 12,000 
EGP/year in 2009 (around 2000 USD/year) (UNICEF 2009). Household spending on 
private tutoring is estimated to have exceeded government spending on education 
(UNESCO 2003). Recent official estimates of households spending on tutoring have 
put it between 12 and 15 billion EGP every year, compared to a 10 billion EGP MOE 
budget (see Kader al-Mu‗alimin 2009, Al-Samni 2009).  
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The cost of tutoring varies widely across neighborhoods, educational stages and tracks 
in a highly differentiated market. While more affluent households consume somewhat 
more private tutoring than lower income brackets, they spend disproportionately higher 
amounts on it. According to one official study, per-household expenditure of the 
richest quintile on private tutoring is more than seven times that of the poorest 
(CAPMAS 2004). In some tutoring centers, students may be charged 5-8 EGP/ class, 
usually in packed lecture halls in low income neighborhoods (Al-Samni 2009).  In 
affluent neighborhoods, tutoring for private school students can reach 120 EGP/ class. 
Literally, the cost of one class varies from 5 to 120 EGP, and revision classes and 
summary notes are typically more expensive than regular ones. 
 
The rising cost of ―free‖ education, in terms of private tutoring, has been a key concern 
articulated by and on behalf of parents of almost all social classes; especially the poor 
(see Sabry 2010 and Tadros 2006). It fundamentally structures student access to 
education. According to official figures, demand for general secondary education- 
where tutoring cost is at its highest- has decreased by 20 to 40% from 2001/02 to 
2005/06 alone across different parts of the country (falling by 23% in Cairo and 43% in 
Beheira, for example) (MOE 2007, Annex 2, 79- 83).26 Due to the declining quality of 
public education, rising unemployment and the resulting increased job competition, the 
status and expected returns for general secondary have been steadily declining, even in 
private secondary schools. Most of the affluent classes have abandoned it altogether to 
study for foreign diplomas (such as I.G.C.S.E and the American High School Diploma) 
in order to secure a greater edge in the market.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
26 Although longitudinal data is not provided in the report, MOE data point out that over twenty percent of the 
age cohort- mostly from the poorest households- does not enroll in secondary education in the first place (MOE 
2007, Annex 2, 77).  
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EDUCATIONAL QUALITY AND TEACHER PAY 
A key proposition in studies of private tutoring is that tutoring is caused by the low 
quality of education in public schools (Bray 2009). Given the situation of education 
quality described in Chapter Three, this would appear to be a very good candidate for 
explaining private tutoring in Egypt, although it does not explain greater rates of 
tutoring among more affluent households enrolled in private schools. Private tutoring 
has been especially attributed not only to low educational quality, but also to the low 
pay received by teachers. Biswal (1999) analyzed tutoring as a form of corruption where 
teachers in public schools intentionally reduce their teaching efforts to create demand 
for private tutoring in order to supplement their low incomes. In this way, governments 
have used tutoring as a mechanism of providing education at a lower cost (Biswal 
1999). Private tutoring in developing countries therefore cannot be understood without 
reference to teacher pay as compared to living expenses. The initial spread of tutoring 
in Egypt after the first wave of economic liberalization in 1970s and 1980s came in a 
period when inflation had reached around 30% while increases in salaries were 
negligible (Tadros 2006). More recently, and despite consecutive waves of inflation and 
currency devaluation, public school teachers hired on temporary contracts receive pay 
as low as 2 EGP/class (see Abdul Wahab 2009), which amounts to a sub-subsistence 
wage of 105-120 EGP/month. This amounts to less than 0.67 USD/day; which is far 
lower than any poverty line estimated for Egypt or globally (see UNDP 2010 and Sabry 
2010). Low wages are not exclusive to teachers but extend to administrators and 
officials across the system, creating strong pressures for corruption of various forms, 
including the facilitation of student coercion into tutoring. As mentioned earlier, the 
new ―Teachers‘ Cadre‖ system has significantly raised the salaries of ‗full contract‘ hired 
teachers, but does not cover most teachers and the situation remains that for most 
teachers, their salaries are not sufficient to meet living expenses and in some cases not 
even to lift them above the poverty line.  
 
One of the clearest testaments to teacher dependence on tutoring is the resulting 
teacher shortages in ‗non-tutoring‘ subjects. Teacher shortages in Egypt are massive 
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indeed (see MOE 2007). Once estimated at 50,000 teachers, they are mostly 
concentrated in subjects that do not enter final student grades and therefore do not 
warrant private tutoring, such as art, music and sports, or concentrated in rural areas 
where even tutoring is not profitable enough for teachers to make a living (Tadros 
1999). This means that not only are rural and poorer areas additionally disadvantaged, 
but also most schools simply cease to conduct music, sport or arts classes or any school 
activities at all. 
 
In most public schools, paying for tutoring has become compulsory almost from the 
first year of primary school to avoid abuse and expulsion (Sabry 2010, Tadros 2006).27 
This obviously involves serious emotional and physical harm to children, especially 
poor children. While physical and verbal abuse is commonplace in Egyptian public 
schools (see Chapter Five, Naguib 2006 and Saad 2006), it is intensified as part of the 
means used to intimidate students to enroll in tutoring, an issue that is regularly covered 
in the local press (for recent examples of violence by teachers receiving national press 
coverage, see Mu‗aqabat 3 Mudiri 2010, Jaza‘at bil-Jumla 2010 and Mudaris Yuhadid 
2010).  
 
Finally, it has been argued that the uncontrolled spread of tutoring has left limited 
realistic scope for effective reform in teacher pay as means of curbing the reliance on 
tutoring in the short run. As a World Bank document simply put it, any increase in 
teacher pay could not be sufficient enough to deter teachers from tutoring (World Bank 
1996, Annex 2). This means that even if the budget of MOE is doubled or even tripled 
(as 90% of the budget goes to salaries), pay would still be low and the market is so 
entrenched and so much more profitable that there would still be strong incentive to 
provide tutoring.  The clearest recommendation of the report was to promote private 
                                            
27 In middle range schools, teachers typically depend on less direct means of coercion and students perceive and 
enact greater freedom in choosing their tutors. A study of a number of urban and rural technical and general 
schools in Giza, Egypt, found that more than 60% of students said that their in-school tutor teacher is their 
regular school teacher and more than 30% said that their private lesson teacher is also their regular teacher 
(Megahed 2004, 144-7). In a study of a high performing public preparatory school, Linda Herrera (1992) found 
that only a minority of teachers used tactics of intimidation, poor teaching, favoritism, and sometimes physical 
punishment so that students in their class would take private lessons with them. 
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education. However, regardless of the equity implications of this proposal, now even 
private schools cannot increase teacher pay enough to compensate teachers for the 
profit they are able to make easily on the market. In fact, in many private schools, 
administration feels entitled to push down teacher wages to levels similar to public 
schools fully assuming that teachers essentially make their living ‗elsewhere‘.  
 
While tutoring may prevail as a means for teachers to increase their income in 
disadvantaged public schools, competitive high-stakes examinations may be a more 
critical factor for the spread of tutoring in private general secondary schools and elite 
tagribiya public schools. 
 
COMPETITION AND HIGH STAKES EXAMINATIONS  
In contexts where teachers are relatively well paid, such as Hong Kong, Korea, Japan 
and Singapore, it has been argued that the chief driving force for private tutoring has 
been ―the competitive nature of society and the scale of perceived rewards that can be 
achieved for new generations by investment in tutoring‖ (Bray 2009, 101-2). Scholars 
have also linked international variations in the market demand for tutoring to whether 
countries have post secondary entrance exams, major status differences among their 
post secondary institutions, and direct occupational rewards for entry into those 
institutions (Bray 1999). A World Bank study in fact concluded that the nature of 
exams may be the chief causal factor for the prevalence of private tutoring in Egypt 
(World Bank 1996, Annex 2). The stakes are indeed high for general secondary 
students. Public university entrance scores (unified and centralized) have been 
continually rising to the point that top faculties have effectively restricted their 
admission to those who score higher than 90%. If one does not score above the 
required grades for admission to a certain Faculty or Department, he or she simply 
cannot study their desired discipline, but has to accept whatever other specialization has 
lower entrance requirements. Attempts have been made to improve the thanaiwya „amma 
(general secondary school leaving) examination system, such as the current system of 
spreading examinations over two years (second and third secondary) instead of one 
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[Law 2 for the Year 1994], but with requirements for public university admission 
continually rising and teaching quality in schools declining, the stress and tutoring cost 
of general secondary education has only risen. 
 
The sense of heightened competition, especially for general secondary students, also 
relates to increasing competition for jobs in light of high levels of unemployment. As 
detailed in Chapter Three, from 1998 to 2006, there has been a substantial increase in 
unemployment rates among post-secondary and university graduates who have become 
the most vulnerable group to unemployment. This has been accompanied by a decrease 
in female labour force participation (arguably due to widespread unemployment and the 
shrinking of public sector employment), and an increased informalization of the first 
job obtained by youth (see Antoninis 2001, Amer 2007 and UNDP 2010). Entering a 
top faculty therefore provides a critical edge in competing with large cohorts of 
university graduates. As elaborated in the following Chapter as well, grades mattered 
very little however for technical school students and their future prospects. 
 
Students in university predominately come from the highest fourth (27.1%) and fifth 
(46.5%) wealth quintiles and only 4.3% of higher education students come from the 
lowest income quintile (UNDP 2010). The poor tend to be more represented among 
students in two-year institutions, constituting 11% of the student body and with higher 
rural representation. University enrolment largely excludes technical education students. 
Technical school graduates discover that entering college, while sometimes a postponed 
project and dream, is frequently not possible because college is expensive and even the 
Egyptian Open University not only requires the passage of five years after graduation 
from commercial school before applying, but also a prohibitively large fee, which new 
graduates of modest means and no job cannot afford (Elgeziri 2010). University 
education suffers very serious quality issues, very similar to the issues in pre-university 
education, in terms of instruction styles, high densities (lectures of 1000 students!), and 
increasing private tutoring. The proportion of students enrolling in private tutoring in 
universities is reportedly more than 51%, with an average tutoring cost per student that 
amounts to a an estimated figure of 933 EGP per student, per year (Selim 2008). 
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Egypt therefore seems to experience, as in other aspects of the ‗dual‘ neoliberal 
economy, tutoring driven by low teacher pay as well as tutoring driven by high 
competition. Larger institutional variables however drive and inform both ‗types‘ of 
tutoring. 
 
CORRUPTION AND THE MANUFACTURING AND PERPETUATION OF 
THE MARKET  
In a national context where corruption is widespread and accountability at high levels 
of government minimal, the impoverishment of education employees encouraged and 
intertwined with networks of interests to facilitate the initial growth of private tutoring 
and set in place strong self-perpetuating patterns. The growth of the multi billion 
pound tutoring industry was dependent upon different forms of corruption and 
conflicts of interests across the system. For example, examination setting committee 
members at MOE were tempted to provide expensive ‗highly valued‘ tutoring and 
author ‗external‘ textbooks and practice workbooks for the market. It also became 
‗known‘ that there was only one way of answering the exams that was acceptable to 
markers, so that even high achieving students had strong incentives to enroll with 
tutors who were privy to that ‗way‘ of answering. Until today, tutors promote 
themselves based on links- often weak or fabricated- to such insider information (see 
Abatirat al-Durus 2010). Apart from sporadic and arbitrary measures, there has been 
little interest in controlling the massive growth of unlicensed (and un-taxed) tutoring 
centers, many of which are owned by local cronies of the [then ruling and now 
dissolved] National Democratic Party (see Inflwanza al-Khanazir 2009). The highly 
profitable tutoring and private textbooks businesses became part of a powerful web of 
corruption and patrimonial relations across the system; often described as a ‗mafia‘ in 
the media, as discussed below.  
 
Other forms of ‗corruption‘ and conflicts of interest compounded these patterns. This 
includes for example MOE curriculum setting committee members being 
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interchangeably- and sometimes concurrently- private (external) textbook authors. Over 
several decades, these authors have continued to create for private publishers more 
―efficient,‖ organized, succinct and attractive texts while authoring un-approachable 
official textbooks and sabotaging any efforts at textbook reform, thereby forcing 
students to rely on private textbooks.  Textbooks received a considerable part of 
student grievances and rejection, where they were often described in strong language as 
rubbish and contemptible, as a group of students in the girls‘ general school said almost 
in the same breath (zibala, nila, zai il-zift), and were almost always condemned as being 
too long and unclear in their presentation.28  
 
Throughout the years, this has exploded into a huge and powerful industry. It has been 
estimated that Egyptians spend 1.5 billion EGP on ‗external‘ textbooks every year 
(Kadir al-Mu‗alimin 2009).  With such interests at stake, examination, curriculum and 
even teacher pay reforms that may undermine the private market for education were 
blocked or resisted. For example, the Teachers‘ Syndicate has proposed that students 
hand in their books at the end of each school year for use by students in the following 
years, releasing very significant funds for supplementing teachers‘ salaries. However, 
―Ministry of Education officials, who receive a commission on every printed copy and 
make money from selling books at the start of every school year, blocked the plan‖ (El-
Sayed 2006). In addition, maintaining a long and crammed national curriculum for a 
very short school year means that many students know that the material could not 
possibly be covered at school. This is coupled with the lax institutional setting across 
the system that left the growth of unlicensed tutoring centers unchecked and school 
teachers unaccountable for their classroom practices. Therefore while (middle class) 
parents are sometimes blamed for perpetuating tutoring by enrolling their children in it 
regardless of their actual academic need, this ignores these institutional realities and the 
divorce between knowledge of the material and ideal exam answers. Although it was 
                                            
28 Students also expressed those who set the curricula could not properly estimate the abilities of students; that the 
distribution of material across the school years was almost arbitrary and becoming progressively more difficult, 
where their younger siblings were studying material they had studied only in later year and material was being 
moved across the years without clear rationale. 
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not the focus of this study, there were frequent claims concerning corruption within the 
schools and abuse of funds, even in private schools. Many teachers in the public 
schools in fact opined that most school principals are corrupt and only a very small 
minority of principals is clean-handed. While the study did not cover forms of financial 
corruption in the school; an area where future research is greatly needed, it seemed that 
almost all financial issues involved either such restrictive regulations that school 
spending on anything from toilet maintenance to educational materials was completely 
deterred, or financial issues involved significant irregularities; ranging from what was 
being spent on (new fittings for the principal‘s office), how the contracting and 
accounting for spending happened, accounting for donations collected from parents 
and how they were used, to teacher attendance and vacation allowances and records 
and arrangements for sharing out of school tutoring profits with teachers.  
 
Finally, while the assessment system in general secondary is lacking indeed, there has 
been some political will in maintaining its basic fairness in terms of marking and 
monitoring (invigilation). More recently however, there have been disturbing signs of 
decline in even this basic premise, in terms of patterns of collective cheating, cases of 
leaking of exam questions, irregularities in marking and ranking, and tampering with 
pass rates (See Mizaniyat Hirasat 2009 and Al-Ghazali Harb 2009). On the other hand, 
while difficult to imagine for outsiders to the system, the reality in most technical 
education schools is one of predominant exam cheating and dysfunctional marking, as 
elaborated in the following chapter. This absence of examination integrity is only 
possible because it is facilitated and perpetuated by education officials across the 
system.  
 
In fact, not unlike other sectors of the Egyptian state, the education system is mired in 
corruption at all levels, from the highest level of MOE, and above, to the classroom. 
Corruption and conflicts of interest are rampant in key sectors of the ministry, 
especially in the textbook printing and school construction sectors (GAEB), in terms of 
relationships with textbook publishers or the set up and execution of school 
construction contracts, as well as various other violations and irregularities in relation to 
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huge rewards and incentives related to the membership of ―committees‖ for exam 
preparation, curriculum development or work with donor agencies. Other forms of 
corruption in educational districts and at the level of the school deserve their own 
detailed and rigorous study. In fact days before the start of the January 2011 protests, 
there was parliamentary questioning about EGP 2.5 billion of USAID education 
assistance funds said to have been spent on education reform in seven governorates 
and on bonuses given to consultants (Azma fi Majlis al-Sha‗b 2011). MOE was simply 
unable to provide appropriate documentation as to how the funds were spent and the 
documentation it did provide was criticized by the committee as being of exaggerated 
costs and questionable returns on educational quality (Ta‗lim al-Sha‗b Tumhil al-Wazara 
2011). Sources inside MOE and USAID would assert of course that even seemingly 
sound documentation submitted by MOE does not really account for actual spending. 
Finally, as detailed in Chapter Five, extralegal practices in schools involve various forms 
of pressure on students to enroll in private tutoring with teachers, as well as forms of 
emotional and physical punishment that are contrary to MOE regulations. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Education was portrayed by the Mubarak regime as ―a national project‖ and repeatedly 
listed as a reform priority, especially from the 1990s onwards. At the end of his era, the 
state of education in Egypt was so negative that many Egyptians habitually commented 
on educational issues using the simple phrase: mafish ta„lim: there is no education. The 
education system has been left to cope with rising enrolment without the minimum 
level of adequate resources, teacher pay or institutional support. The result has been 
severely declining quality coupled with pervasive forms of corruption and extralegal 
practices, and the eventual desire to displace the system and its problems unto the 
citizens via various forms of tracking and privatization.  
 
This chapter has provided background information on the key issues in Egyptian 
education. It has presented the available data on educational quality, student-teacher 
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ratios, educational tracking, achievement figures and multiple shift schools. It has 
explained the special issues around technical education quality and assessment,. Despite 
serious data limitations, it has explained the evolution of and complex issues 
surrounding teacher pay and educational expenditure across the system. It has provided 
an overview of issues of corruption and conflicts of interest in the system, especially in 
relation to formal and informal privatization and the private tutoring market. This 
analysis contextualizes and forms the basis of various arguments developed throughout 
the chapters.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  THE THREE 
WORLDS OF DE-FACTO 
PRIVATIZATION IN THE 
SCHOOLS 
“I can work and satisfy my conscience as much as the money the ministry gives me. I get 2.5 EGP per 
class. If a supervisor comes in, here is my work on the board. Hijri date [Islamic calendar] for 50 
piaster, Miladi [A.D.] date  for 50 piaster, the title of the lesson for 50 piaster, and the lesson 
prepared in my notebook for 50 piaster. So I owe you 50 piaster worth of explanation. What do you 
think I will tell you for 50 piaster?” General school teacher 
 
Along with the discussion of discipline and punishment in the following chapter, this 
chapter aims at introducing the everyday world of the schools in its concrete discourses 
and practices.  This detailed image of school relations should help provide concrete 
meaning to more abstract terms used by students and discussed in the later chapters in 
terms of humiliation and corruption and their links to social class and poverty. In this 
sense, it is concerned with the ‗lived‘ citizenship across the different schools and how 
the legal and constitutional rights of education and protection from harm and 
discrimination are translated and experienced in the schools. Tutoring and the material 
realities underpinning it are in fact the primary causes of the ‗breakdown of discipline‘ 
described in Chapter Five, and a critical factor in the breakdown of regime legitimacy in 
student discourses on the state described in Chapter Seven. It is the different ways in 
which ‗informal‘ tutoring markets are established within and alongside formal 
institutions that have significant implications for the functioning of state institutions 
and the injustice perceived in their operation.  
 
Most of the arguments in the following chapters cannot solidly be made without an 
appreciation of the implications of private tutoring for the everyday school and for the 
very notion and project of schooling in each educational track. After all, I argue that 
what we have in Egypt is an almost complete ‗informal‘ privatization of ‗public‘ 
institutions that are still existing, and I claim that this critically informs how students 
understand the state and its institutions at this historical juncture.  
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The current crisis in education in Egypt is intimately linked with neoliberalism and 
privatization. It is a result of low investment in schooling at all levels, complicated by 
economic and labor market conditions set in place by neoliberal policies.  This chapter 
therefore builds significantly on the background provided on Egyptian education in 
Chapter Three, especially in terms of educational quality, educational spending and 
privatization measures as well as the larger issues of informality and unemployment.  
The main aim of the chapter is to show the differentiated functioning and impact of 
private tutoring across the schools as mediated by politically determined assessment, 
curriculum and pedagogical policies and practices that are fundamentally premised on 
social class. It brings to light the actual discourses and practices of students and 
teachers in relation to privatization. It highlights the related discourses and practices 
around physical and emotional abuse and exam cheating that come with this type of 
commodification of education and the resulting marginalization. These are issues that 
frame subsequent discussions of the differentiated citizenship project mediated by 
different schooling experiences. Importantly, they underline the meaning of ‗mafish 
ta„lim‘ for students across the system. Close examination of these different modes of 
privatization also challenges many of the ‗common sense‘ and scholarly explanations of 
tutoring that see it as a ‗remedy to poor education‘, as a result of peer pressure, as a 
strategy to deal with increased competition and unemployment in a neoliberal economy 
or as a result of high-stakes examinations. Although all of these issues play a role in 
perpetuating tutoring in Egypt, the chapter points to the complexities and unexpected 
ways in how they play out in different tracks of the system; and how they are informed 
by concrete state policies and practices.  
 
The previous Chapter presented the available background data on private tutoring in 
Egypt in terms of the policy and institutional context, estimated rates of tutoring 
enrolment and levels of nationwide household spending on tutoring. It provided an 
overview of the key issues that are linked with the spread of tutoring: educational 
quality, teacher pay, curriculum and assessment policies and equity implications. This 
chapter on the other hand explores the dynamics of tutoring in the six schools. The 
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first section focuses on the dynamic of tutoring in the technical schools. The second 
section presents the main issues of general secondary tutoring and the third deals with 
issues more relevant to private schools. Each of the sections opens with student or 
teacher comments that capture some of the key issues around tutoring in each type of 
school, briefly lies out patterns of tutoring for each school type, then proceeds to the 
implications of tutoring for classroom and school dynamics. 
 
There is however considerable overlap in the key issues, especially among the four 
public schools (technical and general), as well as among the four general secondary 
schools (public and private) and the chapter section as a whole draws a picture of 
marketization across the three systems. The final section brings together the key 
arguments of the chapter. 
TUTORING IN THE TECHNICAL SCHOOLS: ABUSE 
AND SYSTEMATIC CHEATING 
Here they write the answers on the walls, on the desks, on their skirts, on the calculator. I learned 
cheating here. “Study and you‟ll pass, cheat and you‟ll get good grades” (zakir tengah, ghish tigib 
magmu„) that‟s the system of the school.  Student in the girls‘ technical school 
 
It all depends on tutoring. The ones who have money and can pay pass. The others don‟t pass. 75% of 
teachers do not explain because they save their energy for tutoring, or they make students not 
understand so that they need the tutoring.  Social Worker in the boys‘ technical school 
 
In the boys technical school, between 60 and 75% of first and second year students and 
about half of the final year third secondary students enrolled in in-school tutoring. First 
and second year students seemed to have been more vulnerable than third year students 
to teacher pressure to enroll, both physically and practically. Their marks had a larger 
component controlled by school teachers, whereas final year students went through 
national exams that are not marked in the school, although they still could not pass the 
year without obtaining marks for ‗practical‘ skills determined by school teachers. The 
rates were very similar in the girls‘ technical school, although in third secondary, some 
students took classes in tutoring centers instead of the school. Average tutoring cost for 
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students was about 80 EGP/month. 29   There was also irregularity in applying the 
regulations of in-school tutoring. The price of in-schooling tutoring should be 12 EGP, 
students reported paying the double: 25 EGP for each subject and a total of 100 EGP, 
unless they were able to obtain an exemption. There was very significant student 
absenteeism in the technical schools. In the boys‘ school, attendance was around 50% 
in most classes I attended. As students explained, ―one can attend the first four 
practical classes in the year then ditch the rest because if he passes this, he will pass the 
rest... and he can make an agreement with the teacher to leave school and just say he 
went to the bathroom‖. Especially boys in public schools, many students left the school 
in the middle of the day. In addition to absenteeism and escaping school (katatan, as 
students called it), if they stayed in school, students did not always enter class and 
found places in the school to hang around and ‗do their thing‘, whether it was playing 
soccer, running errands for teachers, trying to talk to girls across the fence or just 
chatting. Along with truancy, students in all the schools often arrived after the morning 
assembly, which was not always organized with a set program, as per MOE regulations. 
As part of the general ‗dysfunction of education‘, especially in technical schools, 
students often did not even know the schedule of classes for each day, because the 
schedule was frequently changed without prior notice as teachers shifted classes 
between them or did not show up to class. Many did not bring any notebooks, or other 
material. 
 
In the girls‘ technical secondary school, there was higher actual attendance in classes as 
well as in tutoring, due in part to the fact that girls did not have work commitments as 
the boys did. Girls in the two types of public schools attended school far more regularly 
than boys. Many girls wanted to come to school because it was their main arena of 
socialization (il-madrasa dih fushitna: ―school is our outing‖, as one student put it), 
allowed for legitimate mobility outside the house and implied avoidance of extensive 
                                            
29 Those who enrolled in tutoring mostly took classes 4 days/ week for the four core ―specialization‖ subjects. 
They often took revision classes for other subjects before the exam, such as Arabic and English. In-school 
tutoring for technical school students in each subject cost around 25 EGP for 4 classes/ month for each subject. 
Students could- and some did- negotiate a discount of up to 50% for in-school tutoring fees, based on financial 
need. Therefore, the average monthly cost of tutoring for technical school students varied between 50 and 100 
EGP/month, with an average across the years of somewhere around 80 EGP/month. 
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household chores. Teacher ‗actual‘ absenteeism from classrooms was rampant in the 
four public schools. In fact, teachers did not arrive to 30-50% of the classes during my 
time in the schools (even though my presence implied that certain appearances were 
preserved). Sometimes they arrived to the classroom, but did not engage in much 
instruction. Most teachers came to school fairly regularly and signed in the school 
registers, which are heavily monitored by educational authorities. But this did not mean 
that they did not come late, leave for an errand or just not enter class. 
 
 
Figure 7: Playing Soccer in the Boys‘ Technical School 
 
Given the very poor quality of technical education detailed in Chapter Three, such 
tutoring rates may not be very surprising. Even though many teachers attempted to 
improve their general performance in my presence, there was very little ‗teaching‘ in 
most classes I attended in the boys‘ school. Most classes consisted of teachers dictating 
very short excerpts of lessons- a few sentences and key points to be written out in 
student notebooks, which are monitored by MOE supervisors- and disciplining their 
every murmur through verbal and physical abuse. This occurs in a very short school 
day of about 4 hours, where many classes were cancelled or teachers simply did not 
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arrive to class. Some teachers did actually attempt to ‗explain‘ the material at hand and a 
minority of students engaged with them. When this happened, it became apparent how 
much of the material was beyond the level of most students, some of whom were 
effectively illiterate, some with very poor basics in the subjects being taught and others 
so irregular in their attendance that they could not possibly follow the material. The 
situation was somewhat better in the girls‘ school, both in terms of somewhat better 
instruction and better suitability of the material to student abilities. 
 
 
Figure 8: Tutoring Advertisements on the Walls of the Girls‘ Technical School  
 
Such poor learning conditions may easily point to tutoring as an understandable 
remedy. Tutoring in the technical schools however did not perform such function. It 
was structured around memorizing only what was enough to pass the exam- which was 
very little indeed. In fact, students did not need to really understand even that limited 
material. They could obtain the summary notes provided through tutoring and 
memorize them, and in many cases simply bring them to the exam and copy from them 
during the exam itself. Students, teachers, administrators—and some newspaper reports 
(see for example Al-Saqqar 2009)—explained the key facts known to insiders to the 
system: that exams are very easy, that no one really invigilates, that exam papers are 
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very ‗irregularly‘ marked and that most students who provide ‗some‘ answer pass. 
Students casually explained this ‗normal‘ state of affairs of tutoring and cheating. For 
example, as a third year student in the boys technical school put it: ―Students go to 
magmu„at (in-school tutoring groups) but they don‘t understand.. they just take the 
muthakirra [tutoring summary notes]. That‘s 90% of the cases‖. I assumed that students 
then just studied these summary notes before the exam. The student continued 
however: ―They just put it under the exam paper when they are solving.‖ As a student 
in another class put it: ―people don‘t take these sheets to study them, they [enroll in in-
school tutoring] and know that the teacher will ‗cheat them‘ [yighashishhom] the exam.‖ 
This means giving them the questions and answers ahead of time and/or letting them 
cheat during the exam. As a student in the girls‘ technical school put it in explaining in-
school tutoring enrolment, ―you have most of the exam questions, so you feel safe. 
Otherwise, the teacher singles you out (yista‟sadik)‖. Students in the girls‘ school also 
noted not benefitting from tutoring, but that they had to go in order not to be singled 
out [yista‟sadna]. Even if students wanted to ‗understand‘ the material, this was not really 
available to them through tutoring. In fact, students reported being told explicitly by 
some teachers that they do not need to ‗understand‘ because all exam papers are 
marked similarly (without really looking at them). Therefore, students who entertained 
some aspiration of attempting to attain marks high enough to apply for university 
admission expressed that they had little faith that their marks would in fact reflect their 
performance on the exam. Less than half of all students who enroll at the secondary 
stage gain access to higher education; where the vast majority attend universities and 
6.7% attend lower status technical institutes (Megahed and Ginsburg 2008).  
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Figure 9: Copying Notes in the Workshop in the Boys‘ Technical School 
 
In addition to the organized facilitation of cheating, as a senior administrator in the 
technical school recounted, when transfer and completion rates are not high enough to 
be politically acceptable (which was the case almost every year), the Ministry simply 
instructed districts and schools to raise their rates and the marks of students so that 
they could pass. The same pattern is found in basic education and it is also commonly 
reported that when principals submit unsatisfactory completion results, they are 
personally penalized and rebuked; a clear incentive to inflate and falsify school results. 
There is some indication that the extent of facilitated cheating varies based on type of 
technical school (industrial, commercial, boys, girls) as well as the educational district, 
with some being more strict than others. Cheating seemed to be less overt in the girls‘ 
school. Although they devised many ways of cheating, they said that they could not 
openly use their tutoring summary notes or books. They were aware however that their 
exams were not really marked: ―the teacher marks one exam and marks the rest the 
same‖, or ―some do not mark but they know the level of the school‖. ―They don‘t care. 
They just put the question on the board and leave the room‖.  However when she 
continued by saying: ―They should be invigilating‖, another student immediately 
responded that ―every student should monitor herself.‖ Cheating was so entrenched 
that students were not going to easily entertain the idea of real examinations. 
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The very low academic requirements and assessment ―leniency‖ in technical secondary 
have almost become necessary based on the realization that if assessment were ‗real,‘ 
most students would fail due to the poor quality in the basic education stage; a 
politically unacceptable outcome. Cheating may be necessary because technical schools 
are not in fact equipped, in terms of workshop equipment and specialized teachers, to 
teach students the required skills. The ―leniency‖ of technical education exam 
monitoring starts in disadvantaged basic education schools. Teachers in the public 
general boys‘ school frequently attributed the state of general secondary to what 
happens in basic education: ―they are too used to cheating‖. As another teacher put it, 
―the students are used to buying teachers with tutoring‖. Technical school teachers 
expressed that they had no faith in the marks presented by students- based on which 
they were allocated into specializations within the school- as they did not reflect the 
abilities they encountered from each student. Teachers in all public schools typically 
expressed very negative assessment of the state of basic education and its impact on the 
students they receive. As one teacher in the girls‘ technical school vividly captured 
many of the common themes as such:  
Preparatory school is a disaster. The teacher who teaches has no idea about the subject 
he is teaching. I have supervision duties over these teachers. In primary, a large number 
of teachers are diblumat [two-year institute diploma holders, not university graduates]. 
They just hire anyone. The whole thing needs a nuclear bomb [to clear it up] from its 
base. The most important thing is the teacher receiving a good salary. If you look at the 
school across the street, there are 90 students in class in primary. There is no 
education. How can a teacher teach 90 people? When I was supervising, there was a 
teacher eating falafel and lettuce and told the students to take down what is on the 
board and if they do not finish, she will do ‗this and that‘ to them. These are specimens 
that have no relationship whatsoever to education and manners. 
 
Students themselves were in fact keen to share stories of cheating and bribery as 
indications of the poor conditions of education and their exploitation by school 
authorities across the different educational stages. As one student in the girls‘ technical 
school put it, ―in the school I was in, if the parents paid 450 EGP, the teachers gave 
them answers. The cleaners help with that.‖ As students in the girls‘ public general 
school collectively reflected: ―they just keep passing us and passing us, even if you don‘t 
answer they pass you, until we get to the certificate year [transition from one 
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educational stage to the other through national exams] and we know our real level and 
even in the certificate, teachers told my dad, ‗give me 500 EGP and I will get her the 
answers‘... It‘s the same in public and private schools... The answers were written for 
me on the board... The new generations are coming out bad (bayza). My sister is in 4th 
grade. She told my mother: why should I study? The teacher told me you are passing 
without studying‖. Students also highlighted other financial violations in the secondary 
schools. They emphasized that one needed a bribe to enter their desired school. Many 
of these payments were presented as ‗parental contributions‘ for school improvement. 
Contributions ranged from fans to learning materials and posters, clocks, to waste 
baskets, but students said they never saw any of it and much of it was later ‗stolen‘ from 
classrooms. They were also made to pay for any photocopying demanded by teachers, 
even of the monthly exam. Therefore, those students who did not enroll in tutoring 
were not necessarily school or self-reliant, but more often counted on obtaining 
summary notes from friends, being able to cheat on the exam or just being passed by 
ministerial directive, although a small proportion of around 5% do fail (MOE 2007, 
70).30 The overwhelming majority of technical school students were concerned mainly 
with passing and expressed that their marks do not matter for either jobs or entrance 
into a two year college. Not only do final marks not matter, graduates typically obtain 
jobs entirely independent of their specializations; through connections and based on 
competences developed through work experience typically obtained while studying (see 
also Antoninis 2001).  
 
In such context, coercion was the basic means by which teachers ensured student 
enrolment in tutoring. As one member of the school staff explained, teachers ―use all 
official and unofficial means‖ to harass students until they enrolled in in-school 
tutoring. This ranges from physical beating to verbal humiliation, threats of expulsion 
and actual expulsion to students who had not yet enrolled. This is typically done under 
the pretext of non-compliant uniform, attendance, tardiness or misbehavior. After 
enrolling in tutoring, this wave of teacher ‗complaints‘ ends and many violations are 
                                            
30 In 2005/06, the official promotion rate was 92 percent, the repetition rate was 5.1 percent, and the dropout rate 
was 2.9 percent (MOE 2007, 70). 
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tolerated. Students took this abuse as a fact, and some of those who did not enroll in 
tutoring perhaps simply could not afford the extra expense.  In fact, at one point 
students explained non-enrolment in tutoring to me simply in terms of whose father is 
deceased, does not live with the family or does not provide for his son; implying that all 
those who were financially capable enrolled in tutoring; a clear implication of the equity 
impact of tutoring. As in many working class households, most of the students in the 
boys‘ school worked fulltime. This is why some of them even enrolled in tutoring 
mostly on paper, effectively paying for the leniency required to have irregular school 
attendance in order to accommodate their working hours, but securing the summary 
notes needed to pass the exam.  
 
In the girls‘ school, there were clearly lower levels of physical abuse, but the pressure to 
enroll in in-school tutoring was equally relentless. This was so normalized that students 
were more attuned to variations within the norm. As one student put it, there are 
―some good teachers; they reduce the prices and take into account the conditions of 
student‖, while ―others just divide the students up into tutoring groups from the 
beginning‖. Girls described that in the first weeks of school, many classes consisted of 
exhortations to join tutoring, with the full support of the principal. In-school tutoring is 
after all a legal practice established by MOE.  The fact that tutoring promotion replaced 
actual teaching also sent a clear signal that no teaching would happen until [enough] 
tutoring enrolment was guaranteed. While pressure to enroll in tutoring can be explicit, 
abusive and severe, in many cases it is non-confrontational, implicit and masked. The 
following narrative from the girls‘ technical school may shed some light on the 
discourses and practices around tutoring in the technical schools. 
It was time for two computer classes for a first secondary class. We moved to the 
computer lab. That there was a computer lab, that classes were actually held there and 
that students actually sat at the computers is not something ‗normal‘ in public 
schools.31 There were two or three students per computer. The teacher started dictating 
the lesson and the students started writing after her. The teacher said that the class was 
behind in the curriculum and they had to complete the lessons in their notebooks. She 
                                            
31 Where computers are introduced into schools, they are typically locked up and away from students ‗so that they 
don‘t ruin them.‘  Lab teachers are held responsible for any damage to the equipment and are simply not willing 
to take the risk or pay the costs of any damage or repair. 
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dictated features of the computer and steps for making certain simple operations 
(copying and pasting into folders). With frequent stops to discipline chatting, late 
comers to class and other ‗misbehavior,‘ the dictation lingered. One girl who seemed to 
have significant knowledge of computer use was ignored or silenced when she 
attempted to answer questions. Finally, the teacher demonstrated something on the 
computer and students were allowed to replicate it on theirs. As this is the moment I 
had been waiting for, I looked at my watch. This lasted for about two minutes. Soon 
the class ended. As we walked up to the classroom, I asked students how they felt 
about not spending more time working at the computers. They said this was normal. 
But how would they learn, I wanted to know. They said that those who wanted to, 
could go later to the teacher to get an explanation. They would enroll in private 
tutoring with her. A couple of students then went on to explain their understanding of 
the silencing of the knowledgeable student and the lingering of the discipline and the 
dictation as all related to ‗saving‘ the material and the explanation for the private 
tutoring. 
 
Similar situations of dictation and disciplining to avoid actual explanation were 
replicated in different classes and subjects. These were not thought of as appropriate or 
viable pedagogies, but they were almost completely normalized. Students expressed 
very little surprise in relation to patterns of instruction, cheating, marking or 
invigilation. These were simply the ‗norms‘ of the schools. 
 
Finally, tutoring coercion varied among teachers and was arguably linked to teacher 
class background, gender and educational training and background. Students frequently 
observed that female teachers, and especially Christian teachers, were less abusive and 
more committed to their classroom teaching more generally. In the case of women, this 
was likely driven by the fact they were not considered primary breadwinners and did 
not have to fight for their livelihoods. It may have also been dictated by the fact that 
too much private tutoring and absence from the home was not ‗appropriate for them‘. 
In the case of Christian teachers, this may be driven by a lower entitlement to the de-
facto right to engage in extralegal practices available to other teachers.  Several teachers 
in the technical schools argued that teachers who were university graduates were better 
teachers and were less likely to coerce students into tutoring and generally had a 
different approach than Higher Institute Diploma holders. This was linked to their class 
background but also to the level of training they received in their respective subjects. 
As a teacher in the technical girls‘ school explain it in this narrative:  
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Diploma holders are the same type [sic] as the students. They cheated and continued. 
There were shortages so they hired them.  There is no awareness [sic], so forcing 
students into tutoring is a necessity. There is no choice. They even pay if they do not 
attend. One of the teachers told a student who does not take a lesson with him: if you 
have a chicken and you raise it and feed it and it goes to the neighbor to lay its egg 
there, you would slaughter it. You will find worse types in Industrial schools. They are 
from workshops. The others, we are embarrassed to even talk about this, because of 
our principles, values and embarrassment. We need this too [the money]. 
 
In sum, tutoring in the technical schools prevailed despite the lack of any sense of 
competition over consequential marks, without remedying the profound quality issues, 
and at significance emotional cost to students and their families, thereby increasing the 
exclusion of poorer families. It should be noted however that while the stakes may not 
have been high for students in the sense of final marks, they can be quite significant in 
terms of actual passing or ‗completion‘ of technical secondary. Obtaining a secondary 
certificate opens up the desired (but ever elusive) possibility of obtaining formal secure 
employment, possibly better marriage prospects (due to higher social status), and 
avoidance of prolonged compulsory drafting into the army. The latter is understood as 
a very negative experience, including higher levels of verbal and physical abuse, very 
low living, sanitary and nutritional conditions and lost income for the family and 
student.  
 
TUTORING IN THE GENERAL SCHOOLS: VEILED 
COERCION AND CLOSED OPPORTUNITIES 
You have to come as a student. You will see the teachers for what they really are („ala ha‟i‟ithum). 
When a supervisor comes, we don‟t believe ourselves. They never explain with conscience, except when 
we have someone in the class.  Students in the girls‘ general school 
Me too, my choice for university is engineering... Well… all of this they are saying is nonsense... We 
will all end up in an institute anyway. Student in the boys‘ general school 
The [English] teacher‟s goal is not to teach us the language. He teaches us what we enter the exam 
with. The subjects are so many and the curricula are so long… A few days ago the teacher told the 
girls something very upsetting when they asked him to explain something. He said: you will not 
understand more than this… this is your level (mustawaku kida). Shouldn‟t he tell us that we are 
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capable?... We are not being educated in the first place (ihna mish binidris aslan). Students in 
the girls‘ general school 
There are considerable similarities between tutoring in the public and private general 
schools, despite the clear difference in student knowledge base, the quality of teacher 
instruction, the resources of the schools and the different cost of tutoring. This section 
presents the key issues for the public general schools, while the following section deals 
specifically with issues more relevant to private schools.  
 
While students were usually not overtly coerced, beaten or humiliated in order to enroll 
in tutoring, a variety of more subtle techniques, an accumulation of poor learning in 
basic education, and increased university competition has facilitated the disintegration 
of the general secondary school too as a site of learning. In the public general 
secondary schools, apart from some exceptions, all students in first secondary enrolled 
in private tutoring in all key32 subjects. Almost all were enrolled in tutoring in nearby 
tutoring centers (marakiz). As for thanawiya „amma students (second and third 
secondary), their enrolment in tutoring was similarly universal, but they tended combine 
private lessons with smaller number of students (durus) in some subjects with tutoring 
in centers with large classes in other subjects. Although some teachers attempted to 
organize in-school revision sessions, there was almost no enrolment in in-school 
tutoring in the public general schools (and none in the private schools). However, while 
this ensures better profits for teachers through more expensive private lessons, it 
deprives administrators in public schools of their percentages of in-school tutoring 
revenue. Teachers conveyed that ‗in many schools‘ (deciding not to discuss their own 
school), there was an understanding that informal arrangements had to be made to re-
balance the financial benefits across the school, mainly through periodic gifts to key 
administrators; primarily the principal. Reportedly, in some schools, principals simply 
imposed ‗fees‘ on teachers (a kind of private lessons tax/ protection fee) in return for 
showing leniency in terms of teacher absenteeism, complaints of poor teaching or 
veiled coercion of students to enroll in tutoring.   
                                            
32 This excludes subjects such as religious studies, nationalist education, arts, music and physical education, which 
do not enter the student‘s final marks. 
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First secondary students attended school fairly regularly, despite their enrolment in 
tutoring, as a proportion of their mark is determined by monthly exams marked by 
school teachers and in-school performance.  Thanawiya „amma students attended school 
fairly regularly for the first couple of weeks and then they worked their way through 
reaching minimum- and variably enforced and reported- attendance requirements for 
the rest of the year, coming to school once every one or two weeks. Often boys came 
only to jump the fence a couple of hours later. Some were more attached to school as 
they came to play soccer in the playground, meet friends or attempt to talk to girls from 
the adjacent girls‘ school. For most of the school year, attendance in most thanawiya 
„amma classrooms was no more than one tenth of the enrolled numbers. In many cases, 
thanawiya „amma students from different classes were placed together in one classroom, 
so that only one teacher would have to enter class and that they would not be left 
alone. Students frequently commented that if I had not been present, no teacher would 
have entered the classroom. 
 
 
Figure 10: Playing Soccer in the Boys‘ General School   
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The cost of tutoring in general secondary was huge indeed, greater than many teacher 
and public sector employee salaries and greater than salaries in many private sector low 
skilled jobs in the city (usually between 300 and 400 EGP). The cost of tutoring for 
general secondary students of around 500 EGP/month was more than five times 
higher than it was for technical secondary students (around 80 EGP/month) and it was 
paid for a longer period of time.33 Some students actually shared that their parents had 
entered into debt in order to pay for tutoring. Many students felt the huge burden of 
tutoring on their families, where more than one child was receiving tutoring, 
commuting across neighborhoods took much time and energy, the mother did not 
work and the father had to work two or three jobs. As one student described it after 
detailing her tutoring costs and enrolment across three neighborhoods: 
My father tells me you could support a whole family on your own (fatha bit liwahdik). 
My mother drives all of us to the lessons. There‘s four of us. One in KG... Yes, she 
takes lessons too. Where else would she learn? And the higher the fees of the school, 
the more expensive the tutoring. Two of us are in certificate years. And my father, 
[sarcastically] he is happy. He does not come home from happiness (mabyidkhulsh il-bit 
min il-farah) [because of taking up multiple jobs]. 
 
Students found my questions about ‗why‘ they enrolled in tutoring counter-intuitive, as 
tutoring was obviously an almost universal norm. They did however try to explain that 
tutoring offered regular follow-up, homework and quizzes and more time to cover the 
very long curricula. This more intensive teaching geared towards exam preparation and 
memorization of the right way to answer ‗expected‘ questions was simply only available 
in tutoring. And according to students, it was especially available in more expensive 
tutoring with smaller numbers and more personalized help and follow-up, rather than 
tutoring in large classes in tutoring centers. In this sense, students consistently linked 
the ―quality‖ of tutoring to how much it cost. They also recognized that they could not 
possibly afford the ‗really good‘ tutoring offered in more affluent neighborhoods.  
 
                                            
33 The average cost of tutoring for general secondary students was 70 EGP/subject/month; and students typically 
enrolled in tutoring for 5 to 7 subjects. The total monthly expenditure was: 350 EGP at the minimum and 500 
EGP on average, especially when including significant additional expenses for private textbooks and workbooks, 
summary sheets, photocopying, revision sessions, and commuting. Almost all students relied on either tutoring 
notes and/or external textbooks and rarely studied from the official MOE textbooks. Students and parents also 
had to factor in associated costs of a meal or snack in long tutoring sessions and significant additional clothing 
costs. 
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With enrolment in tutoring almost universal and absenteeism among students the 
norm, most teachers, when they actually arrived to class, were not invested in 
communicating the material at hand, but mostly dictated key points and touched on 
small sections of the material. Alternatively, some teachers did not really ‗teach‘ the 
lessons, but rather quizzed the students about their existing knowledge, in a manner 
that would completely exclude any student who did not enroll in tutoring. However, in 
contrast with the technical schools, student participation in classrooms, especially in 
thanawiya „amma, frequently reflected more advanced familiarity with the material than 
what could realistically be obtained from the class in progress. This is because in 
tutoring, students were typically a few lessons ahead of the school. For example, in an 
English language class, the teacher quickly skimmed over the lesson and began asking 
questions. A number of students shot back the answers and translations of difficult 
vocabulary; and not one student complained or asked for an explanation or repetition. 
The teacher neither commended the answers as exceptional, nor did students explain 
the meaning from their own understanding, but rather called out the Arabic translations 
of the words, in classical Arabic (the ‗formal‘ definition they had memorized earlier).34 
In discussions after class, students said that ‗of course‘ those who were answering knew 
the material from before. In fact, as one student put it, ―they take a private lesson with 
him, so this is kind of a revision for them.‖  
 
Other teachers gave religious advice to students or let them read the Quran, study for 
tutoring exams or listen to music. Classroom teaching could then be a marketing 
opportunity for potential clients, especially in the beginning of the year, a revision for a 
teacher‘s own private tutoring students (exhibiting their competence in comparison to 
others), a time of rest, a religious sermon or a simple endeavor to get students to 
complete their notes, so that they can be available for inspection by MOE supervisors. 
A number of teachers expressed dismay at the prevalence of tutoring, because it left 
them in the classroom with disinterested students- who came one day and skipped a 
                                            
34 For example, the teacher asked: ―exhausted‖ and one student shouted out the translation: ―mut„ab,‖ or he said: 
―sail‖ and another student immediately called out: ―yubhir.‖ 
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week or two; and effectively rendered any attempt at ‗teaching‘ on their part 
meaningless and futile.  
 
 
Figure 11: Students Having Just Jumped the Fence of the Boys‘ General Secondary School 
 
On the other hand, in all six schools, there were committed teachers who were not seen 
as abusing their position or ‗withholding‘ any teaching from students. They were 
present in almost every grade. They were clearly the exception, but they were not a 
rarity. Students often referred to them as conscientious [„anduhum damir]. Students often 
expressed that they wanted to attend the classes of those teachers, but did not want to 
come to school regularly just for one class. The general reliance on tutoring meant that 
student could enroll in tutoring even when their school teacher was ‗exemplary‘. 
Conscientious teachers were not always the best teachers who were able to 
communicate the material to students, and excellent teachers could be the best at 
communicating the material, but not interested in teaching ‗to the exam‘. Mrs. Mirvat 
however was an ‗exemplary‘ teacher because she was conscientious, able at delivering 
the material, as well as steering students towards the best ways of answering exam 
questions. The following narrative may shed light on the construction of an exemplary 
125 
teacher in light of private tutoring and the complex intersections with constructions of 
social class, learning, gender norms and possibly even religion. 
Mrs. Mirvat immediately stood out. She was always elegantly dressed with her 
hair made into a simple up-do. She was perhaps the only teacher in the school 
who had a car. This, her demeanor and her elegant style placed her in a different 
social class than the students and the rest of the teachers. She was widely 
admired by students. She taught O level English at the girls‘ public general 
secondary school. She seemed strict and did not allow much joking in class. 
However, she betrayed a tender deep concern whenever a student was going 
through trouble. She did not seem to be scared of intervening or helping out in 
such incidents. She navigated the school, classroom and students with smooth 
confidence and grace. She was well-reputed as an excellent teacher and one of 
those who taught ―conscientiously‖ inside the classroom, as the students 
frequently put it. This meant: not wasting class time, not withholding material or 
obscuring it, not discriminating against students who did not enrol in her private 
tutoring classes and not trying to encourage or force them to do so. 
Unfortunately, the Christians are better than us in this,‖ one Muslim student 
told me, referring to Mrs. Mirvat and other ―conscientious‖ teachers in the 
school. Several told me that many times they only came to school for her class; 
regretting that they frequently could not do even that, as it was difficult to come 
to school just for one class.  Mrs. Mirvat had a real command of English (in 
contrast with many public school teachers). She also had a real command of the 
curriculum and the way questions were asked and marked on the final exam. 
Her classes were rigorous and students were expected to know all the answers 
by heart, as the exam demanded. Students were asked to read and solve 
questions in every class. In ‗story‘ class, students read in turn from the book and 
were expected to know by heart ideal answers to factual questions they might 
encounter in the exam about situations in the short story: like why did Manal get 
upset when she heard the discovery of the scientist? Mrs. Mirvat therefore 
taught to the expected learning outcomes focused on rote learning that the 
ministry demanded. Mrs. Mirvat also stood out as probably the most respectful 
teacher to students in almost all the schools [including the private schools]. She 
never used rude, accusatory or humiliating language and also always called 
students ‗miss‘ or ‗daughter‘. Finally, Mrs. Mirvat actually gave private tutoring 
on a regular basis, including to some students from the school. Although she 
was not a ‗star tutor‘, this likely meant that she secured adequate income to 
maintain her style and living standard. Not all students would have liked to 
enroll with her however. While some viewed her as too strict or academically 
demanding, it was also implied that she was also ‗morally‘ demanding. That 
meant that if a student was late or did not show up to class (possibly to go out 
with friends [spending tutoring money on an outing], or to meet a male friend); 
Mrs. Mirvat would make sure to inform her parents.  
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In this kind of context, it is not entirely clear what role competitive high stakes 
examinations had in the universality of general secondary tutoring. After all, the school 
was no longer available as a site of learning anyway. First secondary students, whose 
marks have very little stakes, overwhelmingly enrolled in tutoring. They enrolled in 
tutoring even while expressing disinterest in marks and frequently articulating first 
secondary as a ‗break‘ between the more stressful third preparatory and thanawiya „amma 
certificate exams. Some expressed that they would simply fail if they did not enroll in 
tutoring. This is not only because of lack of instruction at school, but the key issues 
with basic education quality and assessment, in contrast to the long and difficult first 
secondary curriculum. Public general secondary students seemed to perceive a very 
clear break between the general secondary stage and previous educational stages, 
especially for those who had been through (low end) private schools in pervious stages. 
Like their counterparts in the technical schools, many students conveyed that their 
education in the previous stages required no real effort on their part; that most answers 
were accepted; cheating was commonplace‘ exams were easy and everyone passed. 
 
On the other hand, although some thanawiya „amma students did show interest in their 
final marks, it is not entirely clear that most students were indeed competing for 
university. Most students in fact exhibited paradoxical attitudes as though they had not 
yet come to terms with their loss of middle class status and privileges. On the one 
hand, they enrolled in general secondary (an expensive route that is meant to lead to 
university), while on the other hand expressing that they would never get the high 
marks needed for entering their desired colleges, or college at all. As a student 
commented: ―we will all end up in the ma„had (institute) anyway‖- a nearby low status 
two year college accepting low scores. Less than half of all students who enroll at the 
secondary stage gain access to higher education; where the vast majority attend 
universities and 6.7% attend lower status technical institutes (Megahed and Ginsburg 
2008). Other than the highest achievers, the chances for the rest of the students in 
these public schools seemed bleak indeed. Students in university predominately come 
from the highest fourth (27.1%) and fifth (46.5%) wealth quintiles and only 4.3% of 
higher education students come from the lowest income quintile (UNDP 2010). 
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Among girls, there seemed to be even less interest in marks. For example, when one 
high achieving student explained her tutoring enrolment in terms of the importance of 
marks, other students countered that ―people who care about one tenth of a mark are 
rare. Most girls want to get married.‖ Then she said pointing to other students: ―This 
one and this one and this one are already engaged‖. 
 
Many students also felt that university enrolment was no longer worthwhile, as many of 
their acquaintances who were university graduates were unemployed or severely under-
employed (law graduates working as cleaners or commerce graduates working as 
security guards in malls). Students were profoundly discouraged by the level of 
unemployment and underemployment they saw in their circles and expressed 
education, not only their marks, as futile, because ―we will all end up ‗on the sidewalk‘ 
[jobless] anyway‖. They also expressed that university was a continuation of the 
effectively privatized system of almost compulsory tutoring and low quality of 
instruction. I saw it myself in the university, the professor writes some stuff on board 
and then erase it and in the end of the year he makes summary notes for 500 or 1000 
EGP and the exam comes from it.. that‘s it. We had one teacher who didn‘t know 
anything we explained the material to her. They graduate without knowledge. She just 
enters university and takes the university degree just to boast about it‖.  In a sense, they 
were stuck between their (theoretically middle class) background and expectations that 
they enroll in general secondary and seek university admission, and the knowledge that 
there were very limited opportunities for them among the multitude of graduates from 
public and private schools in more affluent neighborhoods competing for the same 
university places and the same jobs. 
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TUTORING IN THE PRIVATE SCHOOLS: 
MILLIONAIRES, STARS AND REPUBLICS 
Salaries in the private schools are almost worse than the public. It‟s like in the gas stations, you know 
[where people work for tips]; the school‟s attitude is “I‟m getting you income” (ana bagiblak rizq). 
Teacher in a private school 
 
Perhaps we could rely on school if they explain and correct homework and give exercises, but if the 
curriculum is too long, it still won‟t work. Student in the private girls‘ school. 
 
The private schools not only had lower class densities, far superior quality of teachers 
and far better learning conditions, they even employed some of the sought-after ‗star 
tutors‘, which students in other private schools aspired to reserve a place with. They 
still exhibited an almost universal enrolment in tutoring in second and third secondary 
and at least 60% tutoring enrolment for first secondary. Students however enrolled in 
far more expensive tutoring with famous teachers usually in nearby tutoring centers in 
the affluent neighborhoods where the schools were located. As there are many costs 
related to tutoring, from transport (usually by taxi) to extra classes that ―pop up,‖ to 
having to pay to reserve a place with a good tutor, overall costs are both hard to 
estimate, even for students themselves, and varied greatly between students. The 
average total tutoring cost for private school students was about double that of public 
general schools at around 1000 EGP/month (for about 8-9 months).35 Some students 
were able to lower their costs below this figure while others in higher end private 
schools paid more. They exhibited even lower attendance rates than public general 
schools, despite the fact that they were paying up to 6000 EGP/year in school fees in 
both schools. In contrast to the public school however, teachers entered classes even 
when only small numbers of students attended. Thanawiya „amma students stopped 
attending school altogether beyond the beginning of the year, so teachers did not 
always have to enter classes beyond that time. On the other hand, having become so 
                                            
35 Private school students mostly had a two-hour class every day of the week including weekends; and frequently 
had special revision or exam classes that lasted up to four hours and sometimes much longer. Private school 
students could mix between 25 EGP classes, for the ―easiest‖ subject: O Level English; and 100 EGP or more for 
subjects like Physics and Math, especially as they are taught in English for most private school students. Private 
tutoring in Arabic usually cost around 50 EGP. A proportion of private school students have the foreign language 
of instruction as French- not English. For them, tutoring is typically more expensive than for English Language 
schools. 
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universal, tutoring also meant that many teachers in private schools also did not teach 
well in class, knowing that their students obtained their instruction elsewhere. 
 
In the private schools too, many teachers lowered the quality of their instruction in the 
school to encourage tutoring enrolment, or simply to save their energy for more 
rewarding activity. One private school teacher, who taught in school the same way she 
did in tutoring, explained that her colleagues criticized her practice of giving revision 
sheets and frequent quizzes in school. They blocked her attempt to spread this practice 
across the school; one of them asking her explicitly: ―what then would we offer in the 
private tutoring?‖  As some teachers put it delicately, most teachers ‗leave something‘ 
for the private lesson. With salaries effectively under the poverty line, even in private 
schools, this is not very surprising. The reward to be obtained from tutoring as 
compared to the school salary is simply incomparable. Some teachers in private schools 
received pay as low as 300 EGP. Beginner teachers in the girls‘ school received 400 
EGP/month, while teachers in the mixed ‗national institute‘ received salaries mainly 
based on the Teachers‘ Cadre rates at around 500 EGP as a starting salary. Teachers in 
the girls‘ school eventually received that right of Cadre pay rates as well. More 
experienced teachers received higher salaries and star tutors received even higher 
salaries, although the school was still a client and status base, rather than a source of 
income, for them. 
 
In many or perhaps most private schools, because there is an assumption that teachers 
are making a living elsewhere, and therefore in a way that they are ‗using the school‘ to 
build up a clientele, not only were their wages very low, their financial rights are 
frequently violated, a pattern noted by teachers interviews from different private 
schools. Furthermore, many ―extra costs,‖ including pay to cleaners or photocopying 
sheets for students are delegated to teachers and students. This obviously had a 
profound effect on teaching quality, especially in foundational stages where tutoring is 
not yet universal. As a teacher in the girls‘ school vividly explained: 
We had to pay to use the teachers‘ toilet. The supervisor had the key to the toilet and 
to get a copy of the key we had to pay. We paid 5 EGP every month to get it cleaned 
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by the school cleaners.  We also had to pay for the teachers‘ room to be cleaned. We 
bought our own rubbish bins and anything else we used, like materials or resources for 
any activities or class decoration or photocopying sheets. It was up to each teacher 
really. I did the photocopying extra sheets thing once, but not again. In the beginning 
of the year, I bought materials for about 400 EGP... [laughing]… my salary. 
 
Private school students equally saw tutoring as fundamentally interlinked with the ways 
in which exams and curricula were designed, regardless of how well teachers taught at 
school.  It is not class density or even the quality of teachers per se that created the 
appeal of tutoring, but rather considerably longer teaching hours and the way in which 
tutoring sessions were conducted. Marian, a student in the mixed school and I had been 
discussing tutoring, when she mentioned Ms. Naila. This was one of the most 
successful and sought after tutors; the famous star-tutors; the multi- millionaire tutors. 
Marian described with fascination and amusement the setting and organization of the 
lessons she enrolled in. First, there were ―bodyguards‖ checking if the homework has 
been completed at the entrance of the tutoring centre. They were part of Ms. Naila‘s 
staff, but Marian joked at how they seemed to be selected based on body size. They 
immediately called parents from student mobile phones if the student had not attended 
the previous class, if the homework had not been completed and sometimes if the 
student was obtaining bad marks in assignments or quizzes. Inside the lesson, silence 
and behavior were monitored by about six members of staff in a lecture hall of about 
350 students. With such economies of scale, this was one of the cheapest lessons 
available to private school students at 25 EGP/lesson. Marian was not only interested 
in getting the highest scores on the exams, she also seemed to value how the context of 
the tutoring helped and forced her to study and solve exams. Not only was there a quiz 
and homework in every class, but also there were frequent, lengthy and fully monitored 
exams marked by assistants and then reviewed by Ms. Naila in sessions that extended 
well beyond class time- and frequently involved extensive tahzi‟: mocking reproach for 
bad performers and stern reminders of the necessity of studying hard. As the MOE 
end of year exam approached, Ms. Naila held exams where students literally spent the 
whole day in the centre solving hundreds of invented and previous exam questions. 
MOE‘s exam questions never departed from Naila‘s questions, asserted Marian. 
Ending her vivid description, she came back to the issue of the new minister‘s moves 
towards making students attend school and not rely on tutoring. She said that even if 
he tried to close the tutoring centers, Naila could set up a whole school in seconds. 
Pointing at a building inside the school, she said ―for sure Naila could buy any building 
like this and tomorrow the lessons would continue; she‘s a republic on her own. 
 
It should be mentioned that Ms. Naila teaches ―Ordinary Level‖ (O Level) English, but 
that her entire enterprise is in place to ‗learn English‘ not at all. O Level English is 
decidedly below the level of most of Naila‘s private school students. In fact their focus 
on O Level English has arguably reduced their overall English language skills as they 
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stop attending school or studying for High Level English. Naila‘s ―Republic‖, as Marian 
called it, is an empty republic; an elaborate system, hours and hours of intense work by 
students whose skill levels in English supersedes that offered by the Republic. The 
purpose however is different. It is a chase after 20 marks of the final total, achieved by 
memorizing almost word for word a short story on which they answer questions on the 
exam and absorbing the way that certain MOE examiners structure and render 
controllable the rules of English grammar (ways that were not always grammatically 
correct). It is sought and labored after by citizens who were never required to speak 
English. They were in fact citizens who planned to enroll in even more ‗private‘ 
instruction in English throughout their university years in order to actually improve 
their language skills.  The way that the system had developed meant that instruction 
geared at higher language skills (High Level English) in these ‗English Language 
schools‘ was sidelined to focus on areas that determined student marks. All other 
school activities and subjects aimed at a more holistic development of student skills and 
abilities were equally marginalized; and students frequently expressed dismay at having 
to abandon their sports practice and other social, intellectual and creative activities 
outside the school as well. Along their tutoring journey, these students frequently 
endure grilling reproach and reminders of the limited chances that exist for enrolling in 
good colleges. In her magnificent edifice, Ms. Naila and other Kings of Mathematics, 
Monsters of Chemistry and Emperors of Physics- as they advertise themselves- were 
selling nothing more than a very small tranche of a chance at the middle class dream. 
Although these stars do not offer classes in the working classes neighborhoods, each 
area of the city has its own stars, monsters and emperors, vividly advertised on walls 
and buildings, across from schools or on the walls of metro tracks. Outside of the 
affluent neighborhoods, however, what is being sold is increasingly an illusion rather 
than an opportunity.  
 
However, in addition to creating emperors and millionaires, the tutoring market has 
equally clearly created impoverished and marginalized teachers. These were the teachers 
who taught subjects that did not enter official student totals. These were the arts, music 
and sports teachers who saw their importance and status take a very deep dive over the 
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past decades. These also included teachers who wanted to teach differently; who did 
not want to teach to the exam; who want to help students learn and acquire important 
sets of social and learning skills. These also included teachers who considered tutoring 
to be morally questionable and those who considered it taught students dependency 
and gave an unfair advantage to those who could pay more. They also particularly 
disadvantaged a great proportion of female teachers who had other household 
responsibilities and could not spend their evenings in tutoring centers or student 
homes. They also ironically included teachers of foreign languages at an advanced level. 
Once the pride of private ‗language‘ schools and providing arguably the skill most 
valued by the labor market facing their students, they have seen their incomes remain 
below the poverty level while other teachers became millionaires. They are aware of the 
disinterest of students in their subject, which is not counted in official totals and even 
the space for them to just be ‗teachers‘ has almost evaporated in today‘s de-populated 
schools. The following narrative about an exceptional English teacher sheds light on 
many of these issues: 
―This is one of the best teachers we have,‖ a thanawiya amma student in a private school 
told me. ―She is like our friend. She really gets us working and participating... Well, we 
were really active in the first semester preparing the lesson and all this… but then.. I 
don‘t know.. we lost the energy... we stopped answering in class, stopped preparing.. 
Well and this year we don‘t come to school, so...‖ I got an appointment to meet the 
teacher. Ms. Huda teaches ―High Level‖ English. This is the more advanced English 
taught at English language private schools. It is more advanced than the Ministry‘s 
curriculum ―Ordinary Level‖ and organized differently; using famous classical novels, 
such as Jane Eyre and Great Expectations, and focusing on writing, comprehension 
and more advanced grammar. She invited me to meet her in her home. It seemed like a 
‗middle class home‘, but one that had not been cared for probably for decades, with 
collapsed furniture and decaying walls. Ms. Huda quickly shared with me her 
reflections about this. She explained her inability to renovate the apartment, and that 
they simply ―do not buy meat;‖ she cannot afford it. She is separated from her 
husband and is the main provider for herself and two children. Her private school 
salary was exactly in the range of public school teachers- embarrassingly small to state 
to me openly, but explained within the general pay scale of the school. She did not give 
private tutoring although she sometimes gave extra help to students without charge. 
Ms. Huda was very proud of her teaching and gave special importance to her close 
relationship with students. She tried to teach the students well, to get them engaged 
with the material and to develop their English language skills. She talked and joked 
with them openly about their concerns and problems inside and outside school. She 
tried to teach them to be independent, for example, extracting their own questions 
from the novels, instead of giving them set questions and model answers as other 
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teachers do, encouraging them to speak up and to express themselves in English. 
Throughout my presence in the school, I came to appreciate that she articulated a 
sense of herself as being ‗a rebel,‘ in more ways than one: in defending student 
interests, in talking openly with them about sensitive topics like religion and sexuality, 
in having their trust, in teaching them in a different way, in being a ‗moderate‘ Muslim, 
in countering the ‗superficial‘ understandings of religion she felt her students were 
beginning to espouse, in questioning their seeming alienation from having a career and 
their preference to be housewives. But at moments throughout my involvement in the 
school, a heavy feeling seem to take her over. She expressed a sense of futility or 
despair and a deep sadness about how things ‗were.‘ It seemed to me that she also felt 
devalued and perhaps ‗defeated.‘  
 
It is possible to understand the lack of incentive students may have to give their energy 
to Ms. Huda‘s attempt to get them engaged with ―High Level‖ English at school and 
her increasing marginality as a passionate teacher, the majority of whose students do 
not even come to school. Students certainly have little incentive to enroll in tutoring 
with her than with Ms. Naila, as the grade for High Level English does not enter into 
the total which determines university admission. Further, her ethic of teaching directly 
contradicts the logic of a pervasive dependency called private tutoring.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Enough enough enough enough 
Thanawiya Amma for me is a nightmare 
For years we‟ve been sitting dazed like bulls 
Enough means enough 
I‟ve been pushed around for too long 
But I want to know the end of the story 
I will not get into any college 
There are no teachers 
There are no invigilators 
If you have money, you will live like the others 
I thought I‟d leave the book and start to rap 
Maybe I‟ll find the door to escape from the agony 
 
Abridged lyrics from the popular 
Thanawiya ‗Amma Rap Song (Thanawiya 
Rap 2010) 
 خٌبفو  خٌبفو  خٌبفو  خٌبفو 
 طٛثبو ًٌ خجغٌٕبث يد خِبعٌا خٌٛٔبثٌا 
يص ٍٍّٓجِ ٌٓذعبل ٍٕٓع بٌٕبمث طٍٛزٌا 
خٌبفو ًٕعٌ خٌبفو 
ىٍع شٍزو ذثشضرا بٌبفل  
 ٓىٌخٌبىحٌا شخآ ً٘ ٌٗإ فشعا ًغفٔ 
خٍٍو لاٚ كحٍ٘ ؼِ ؿلاخ 
ؼٍفبِ ٍٓعسذِ 
ؼٍفبِ ٍٓجلاشِ 
يص ؼٍعز٘ طٍٛف نبعِ ٌٛ ٍٍٓلبجٌا 
ًٕغا أذثاٚ ةبزىٌا تٍعأ ذٍل  ةاس 
ِٓ ًٕثشٌٙ ًٌٍا ةبجٌا ًللاأ ٓىٌّ ةازعٌا 
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Private tutoring almost shaped the very reality of the schools.  The tutoring market has 
entrenched itself so deeply into the fabric of public and private schools that it affects 
almost every aspect of school life, from whether the morning assembly ritual is 
performed, to whether students and teachers come to school and enter classrooms in 
the first place. It ends up determining which subjects actually get taught and which get 
sidelined, and which subjects attract teachers and which suffer shortages in the 
thousands. It sets up the parameters of not just teaching styles but of desired and 
rewarded entrepreneurial, abusive, permissive or ‗conscientious‘ teacher subjectivities in 
the informally privatized educational realm. It also aids in understanding the different 
meanings of ‗mafish ta„lim‘.The assertion that there is no education‘ or ‗mafish ta„lim‘ 
means different things to students across the system; from little or no instruction 
occurring in technical school classrooms to rigorous instruction and exam drilling in 
affluent tutoring centers, where students are required to memorize vast amounts of 
material, while using very little analytical, social or creative skills. 
 
As with other informal markets, making sense of the ‗‗informal‘‘ is ―impossible without 
a parallel story of the state‖ (Elyachar 2005, 81). The growth of this informal 
educational market has been fundamentally driven and determined by various state 
policies and practices. The uncontrolled spread of private tutoring has been carried out 
and facilitated by a state that has determined the material conditions of teachers, failed 
to prevent related abuse and corruption and reduced its investment in education to the 
point that the market, especially in the general track, has almost emptied out and 
displaced public schooling. MOE practices and the general institutional and political 
environment has allowed and perpetuated the growth of multi-billion pound industries 
of private tutoring and private textbooks. Tutoring has effectively nullified the state‘s 
legal and constitutional commitment to free public education and imposed a huge 
financial burden on most families, effectively structuring and undermining their access 
to education. In fact, this has culminated in extreme cases of public school authorities 
simply going ahead and privatizing their own school by running it as a tutoring centre 
(see for example, Mukhalafat Ta‗lim 2009 and Al-Mudarisun Hawalu 2011). Tutoring at 
this scale has obviously created a system that is both very inequitable and very 
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expensive (World Bank 1996, Annex 2). It effectively amounts to huge resource 
wastage as public spending on education continues while at least half of the students 
across different levels of the system obtain their education elsewhere. This 
‗privatization through tutoring‘ therefore has profound implications for access to 
education, equity, the functioning of the institution of schooling and the very legitimacy 
of the state. In the three school systems, access to the available forms of schooling [and 
freedom from emotional harm] was largely structured by the ability to pay for private 
tutoring. 
 
It has been argued in various settings that private tutoring maintains and exacerbates 
social stratification (Bray 2006, Akkari 2010). However, in a context where private 
tutoring effectively replaces mainstream schooling, arguments on ‗privatization‘ and 
equity are more relevant than studies of the impact of private tutoring per se36.  The 
implications of a largely private education system for equity are obvious: access to 
education is premised upon income. In fact, official achievement data in Egypt show 
clear- and extreme- polarization based on social class/financial ability. Those who come 
from poor households constitute 5.3% of achievers in the primary education stage, 3% 
of achievers in the preparatory stage and 0.5% of achievers in the general secondary 
education stage; and achievement is highly dependent on school type, which is a proxy 
for social class (UNDP 2010, 45-6). Despite the lack of detailed data, tutoring is a 
plausible cause for at least a significant part of this extreme polarization in achievement. 
The general argument that privatization increases inequality is documented in many 
parts of the world. For example, in reference to increasing privatization in Chinese 
education Mok (1997) has argued that especially in the largest cities, it is unquestionable 
that the growth in private education has caused disparities among different income 
groups. In Singapore, a country where reforms were carried out against the backdrop of 
                                            
36 When discussing tutoring in more detail, students offered more nuanced pictures of the relationship between 
tutoring and their marks/ ‗achievement‘. For example, sometimes they simply chose the wrong tutor, sometimes 
they did not pay much attention in tutoring, sometimes they hated the subject, sometimes they felt more or less 
motivated, interested or hopeful and sometimes they were too tired to study if they went out to long tutoring 
classes every day, especially for girls who also attended school. In this sense, tutoring was somewhat 'like school;' 
not a magical solution for the fundamental issues that determine how students interact with learning, schooling 
and achievement.  
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heavy government investment in education, Tan (1998) has argued that the 
marketization of education to exacerbate not only the disparities between schools in 
terms of educational outcomes but also social inequalities. 
 
This extreme marketization of education and teacher [and school] impoverishment has 
meant that teachers who do not provide tutoring simply cannot make a living. In fact, 
they can hardly cover their transport and associated costs through their salaries. This 
has especially affected ‗non-tutoring‘ subjects such as art, music and sports, and rural 
areas where even tutoring is not profitable enough for teachers to make a living (Tadros 
1999); so that many schools cease to conduct music, sport or arts classes or any school 
activities at all. Many school activities do continue to exist on paper and appearance 
only. This varies from the principal entering a class I was attending, asking the teachers 
about the ‗good students‘ and taking them to be presented to school guests as the 
school‘s elected ‗Student Union‘, or teachers asking students to write a research ‗off the 
internet‘, put it in good binding and submit it to a district contest [and in fact asking me 
if I could perform such task!], or parents completing out artwork to be hung in the 
school corridors with a teacher‘s signature underneath. The only ‗real‘ activities where 
students actually participated in the public schools were the seminars and trips 
organized and funded by the NGO that was sponsoring the school. In fact, teachers in 
the general school for complained that any creative or even illustrative work by young 
children is rejected by supervisors and they as parents also did the homework and 
activities of their children so that they can be at the appropriate quality that a teacher 
would approve, would not mark down and would be comfortable showing to a 
supervisor. 
 
Therefore, ―Activities‖ classes, such as art, music and sports were usually cancelled, 
ignored or taken over by other teachers. Practical classes in the boys industrial technical 
schools were also implicitly cancelled and replaced by dictation of main points (due to 
lack of materials, machinery or teacher motivation). Students often moved to the 
‗workshop‘ or lab to be dictated the lesson constituted of a few sentences. The 
breakdown in school activities is only one symptom of a more general breakdown of 
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schooling and school discipline across the system, premised on both weak resources 
and privatization. There were multiple features of the breakdown of discipline 
(observation, normalization and examination) and control in the schools. The clearest 
and most important issues were related to: attendance monitoring, the role of 
supervisors (see Chapter Three) and examination and invigilation. 
 
Private tutoring in Egypt emerges as a phenomenon that is not easily explained as a 
remedy to poor education, as a strategy to subsidize low teacher pay or as driven by job 
competition and high stakes examinations. It is a complex relationship between these 
factors and the related educational and institutional policies and practices. The school 
level dynamics described here only amplified the impact of the policies and practices 
supporting this type of marketization across the system. The growth of tutoring has 
been effectively backed by government policy intent on privatizing the financing of 
education and embedded in a complex web of corruption extending from high up in 
the structure of MOE to the community and school levels. The above song, which 
students listened to on their mobile phones and shared with me, shows the themes of 
disentitlement and anger in the voice of the singer and lyrics of the song. Apart from 
other themes in the rest of the lyrics, the song expresses key issues put forward by 
students, including a sense of anger and deep frustration with the state of education, a 
sense of blocked opportunities and a sense that money determines one‘s fate, and 
ending with the futility of education itself.  
 
In the technical schools, the market entrenched itself not by manufacturing demand, or 
to remedy poor quality, but primarily through intimidation and abuse of students by 
poorly paid and unaccountable teachers. The current educational context has allowed 
for greater physical and emotional abuse, especially of poor students, with serious 
implications for their need for respect, dignity and safety from physical and emotional 
harm. In a context where education is ‗absent‘ and cheating pervasive, technical school 
students were forced to ‗buy‘ their degrees by paying for tutoring in return for almost 
no education at all. This privatization through forced tutoring has contributed to 
fundamentally undermining notions of equity, merit and fairness. Passing was 
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effectively conditional upon a negotiated payment to teachers, as well as cheating, laxity 
and corruption across the system. This payment- for supposedly free education- is 
being extracted from families already struggling to secure their basic needs and from 
boys (below the legal working age) working fulltime to support their families.  
 
The market initially presented itself to general secondary students as providing an edge 
in exam performance in the context of greater competition for university admission and 
jobs. This myth perpetuated itself through a web of interests and corruption in a billion 
pound industry supported by MOE‘s remuneration, curriculum, textbook, examination 
and marking policies and practices, and an overall absence of accountability. The 
outcome is that the general school has been almost completely eliminated as a site of 
learning, as it becomes displaced by tutoring centers and home tutoring. Private 
tutoring is no longer seen by individual students as a ‗choice‘. Students are forced to 
obtain tutoring, each family according to its means, in a highly differentiated market. 
Lower middle class students were equally forced into this market, increasingly without a 
solid expectation of entering university or competing for high quality jobs. This has 
imposed a massive cost on middle class families constitutionally entitled to free 
education. 
 
Private school students had more realistic chances of joining public and private 
universities, but suffered more than double the cost of education, essentially due to the 
ways in which curriculum and assessment policies were set up in secondary and tertiary 
education. They were also keenly aware of the ironies of parallel schooling where they 
paid fees for schools they hardly attended and tutoring costs for instruction that was 
only geared towards exam success and very little learning, especially on skills they 
valued highly, such as English language acquisition. Their tutoring involvement and 
spending however represent the real core of the tutoring industry and is of greater 
consequence for the big players in the market. Upper middle class parents could not 
hold schools accountable to tutoring center exam preparation standards and were 
equally reduced to buying additional education elsewhere. 
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Informal privatization has reinforced the transformation of much of formal youth 
schooling experiences into private tutoring focused on exam readiness in a few ‗key‘ 
subjects. It has implied the effective removal of art, music and sports components from 
the actual curricula of public schools, eliminating key spaces that had been intended to 
allow young people to develop a range of skills, abilities and experiences. Ultimately, 
the forms and mechanisms of privatization described here reinforce the patterns 
whereby access to constitutional and legal rights of schooling and freedom from 
physical and emotional harm are dependent upon each citizen‘s financial ability. The 
progressive de-facto privatization of schooling in Egypt has therefore profoundly 
contributed to undermining the legitimacy of the state and its institutions by altering 
the social contract and subjecting poor and middle classes to heightened forms of 
exclusion and abuse.  
 
Through the focus on the key modes of discipline and punishment in the schools, the 
next chapter contributes to the thesis of a breakdown of the school as a state institution 
and the collapse of schooling, especially technical schooling, as a social contract of 
reciprocity. The increased prominence of violent punishment in public schools is linked 
to a sense of the impotence of the institution, to the breakdown of its role and 
authority.  It also highlights that struggles around gender and sexuality were central to 
school‘s efforts to ‗educate‘ and discipline girls and boys. Neither beating nor the 
practiced controls of femininity are sanctioned by law or formal state power. In fact, 
the inability to summon ‗the law‘ and the power of the state defined the position of 
poor students as susceptible to the abuse of power by school authorities in these 
regards, despite their will to contest these realities in many cases.  
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CHAPTER FIVE :  CLASS AND 
GENDER IN SCHOOL 
PUNISHMENT AND 
SURVEILLANCE  
It was the second half of the day at the boys‘ technical school. It was time for practical 
classes („amali) and our class was to move to the ‗workshop‘ for a geometrical drawing 
(rasm handasi) class. We proceeded at the usual relaxed pace, trickling slowly into the 
workshop. The teacher was inside and did not appear to pay much attention to us as he 
was working on something at his desk. The few students in the workshop gradually 
took out their notebooks and started chatting quietly to each other. More students 
trickled in and some left again. The teacher was still working at his desk. Another 
student came in and then started to walk out. The teacher got up, moved towards the 
student and began beating and cursing him, hitting him on the back, head and face and 
kicking and beating other students who were in his reach near the entrance of the 
workshop. I was in shock and the student who had received most of the abuse seemed 
to be about to cry. He protested at the teacher‘s insults, and this was met with more 
insults. Then the situation dissipated and the teacher returned to his desk after a few 
more insults directed at the students as a whole. The teacher spoke very little, but it was 
implicit that this treatment was deserved due to the tardiness and carelessness of the 
students. He did not really note their names or take any further disciplinary measures 
against the violators. He eventually talked briefly to the class, tasking them with copying 
a drawing from the blackboard using a method that many of them did not quite 
understand. He went back to his desk and continued what he was doing. The students 
chatted quietly—with me and with each other—throughout the rest of the class, as 
some of them attempted the drawing while others did not. The teacher did not attempt 
to monitor or assist them. A photocopied exam question from a previous year was 
being circulated among the students and arrived to our table. The students understood 
that this would be the exam question they would find in their next exam. Some began 
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to discuss arrangements for obtaining a copy of the model answer so that they could 
paste it in their notebooks and, later, enter the exam hall with it in order to copy or 
paste it into the exam paper.  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The violent, arbitrary and humiliating modes of school discipline and punishment may 
be clear in this incident. The absolute normalcy of abuse is also evident in the 
willingness to display it in front of an external guest such as myself. But is the school 
―disciplined‖? If so, why did students do as they pleased during class time and while 
coming to class and why did some not arrive to class at all? Are students docile, afraid 
of teachers? Do they learn to cower, appease, obey and be hypocritical with those in 
positions of authority? If so, why did they not come to class in a timely manner and 
have their material ready? How, furthermore, can these forms of systematic cheating be 
understood?  What does it say about the functioning of the school as a disciplinary 
institution which is meant to observe, normalize and examine?  
 
Common incidents such as these and their implications are part of and result from a 
breakdown of schooling itself [mafish ta„lim]. As discussed in the previous chapter, this 
breakdown manifested itself in rampant student and teacher truancy across the schools; 
and, in the case of technical schools, systematic cheating. While official MOE 
regulations definitively protect students from beating and humiliation, and regular 
instructions to teachers indicate that ―physical and emotional punishment‖ (al-„iqab al-
badani wal-nafsi) is strictly forbidden, the breakdown in schooling evident in scenes like 
those above demonstrates the difference between official regulation and lived 
experience. In fact, ironically, amendments to the 2008 The Law of the Child went 
further to criminalize school violence against children instead of being subject to MOE 
regulations- in a context where violence intensified and the law was little known or 
implemented across schools.  
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This chapter discusses the key patterns of discipline and punishment in the schools. It 
starts with an overview of the issue around school punishment in Egypt from a 
comparative perspective. It then provides an image of the use of physical and 
emotional violence in schools, the gendered and classed dimensions of the violence and 
students‘ discourses about it. It looks at the key discourses used to construct and 
legitimize beating by teachers and MOE officials. It discusses the main issues around 
gender surveillance in the schools.  Whereas Chapter Four emphasized key aspects of 
the subversion of school rules by students, this chapter expands the discussion by 
exploring the issue of student ―noncompliance‖37 with school and classroom rules, and 
links to traditional gender norms.  
 
It is appropriate to note on the onset that the physical and emotional punishment of 
students is by no means exclusive to Egyptian schools. The findings of a 2007 report 
conducted in thirteen Indian states, for example, pointed out that about sixty-five per 
cent of school children underwent corporal punishment, with nearly fifty-five per cent 
of those affected boys and more than seventy per cent of affected children never 
reporting the matter to anyone (Nagar 2007). In other countries of the South, beating 
can also be common (see Pineiro 2006), but it is very difficult to make meaningful 
comparisons across countries from available survey data where definitions of ‗corporal 
punishment, ‗harshness‘ and social class are not always comparable. It may seem from 
anecdotal evidence however that current levels of beating in Egyptian schools are not 
paralleled in other Arab countries such as Morocco, Tunisia or Jordan 
 
The forms of violence found in schools are both physical and psychological, and 
usually occur together. From the initial introduction of universal education in the 
North in the nineteenth century until well into the last century, beating, humiliation and 
isolation were routinely used as methods of teaching and discipline (Pinheiro 2006). At 
                                            
37 Compared with terms like ―misconduct‖ or ―resistance,‖ ―noncompliance‖ indicates behaviors that do not 
comply with the expectations and the structured activities of adult authorities in schools (Stevick and Levinson 
2003). 
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home and school, corporal punishment 38  and other forms of cruel or degrading 
punishment were widely favored methods of ‗discipline, perceived as ‗taming‘ unruly 
children, training presumptuous children to take their ‗proper places‘ in the social  
order and hardening unseasoned children to the difficult, brutal and abrasive world 
(Pinheiro 2006). As Middleton (2008) notes in the case of Britain, what might be 
considered cruel now was likely considered unremarkable in the early twentieth century, 
at a time when physical violence was a part of everyday life. Corporal punishment and 
the implements of such punishment were a regular part of the spectacle of power 
within the school (Middleton 2008). It has been argued however that corporal 
punishment did not constitute the sort of individual that the state in the late twentieth 
century deemed appropriate because corporal punishment tended to exclude rather 
than include (Marshall and Marshall 1997). ―Punishment in schools began to shift away 
from the public, the spectacular and the physically violent, to the personal, the 
mundane and the psychologically compelling, from ‗threats or blows‘ to ‗a cold and 
neglectful countenance‘... The body, once made to be tortured, became something to 
be trained and corrected‖ (Deacon 2006, 182).  The historical development of school 
discipline in the North is therefore generally portrayed as moving from harsh and 
humiliating means to less physically violent and exclusionary forms of discipline and 
punishment. Studies in the global North have observed however that children of color, 
boys and students receiving compensatory services at schools for disabilities are 
disproportionately and more severely subjected to school discipline (for reviews see 
Cameron 2006 and Hyman 1995). As mentioned in Chapter Two, studies in the 
sociology of education have emphasized the ways in which students of different social 
classes are taught different skills in schools. The virtues of compliance and submission 
to direct orders are emphasized to disadvantaged children, while middle class children 
are socialized in school to be independent, autonomous and to internalize control (Da 
                                            
38 The Committee on the Rights of the Child defines corporal or physical punishment as any punishment in which 
physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however slight (Pinheiro 2006). 
Most such punishment involves hitting (smacking, slapping, spanking) children, with the hand or with an 
implement. It can also, though, involve kicking, shaking or throwing children, scratching, pinching, biting, pulling 
hair or boxing ears, forcing children to stay in uncomfortable positions, burning, scalding or forced ingestion (for 
example, washing children‘s mouths out with soap or forcing them to swallow hot spices). Non-physical forms of 
punishment include, for example, punishment which belittles, humiliates, denigrates, scapegoats, threatens, scares 
or ridicules the child. 
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Silva 1988, Hempel-Jorgensen 2009, Ivinson and Duveen 2006). Bowles and Gintis 
(1976), for example, have argued that students from different social class backgrounds 
are rewarded for classroom behaviors that corresponded to personality traits allegedly 
rewarded in the different occupational strata- the working classes for docility and 
obedience, the managerial classes for initiative and personal assertiveness.  
 
Although it may be tempting to consider Egyptian schools to be at an earlier point in 
the same ‗developmental trajectory‘ as countries of the North, this chapter suggests that 
there has in fact been a rise in violence in Egyptian schools. Corporal punishment has 
been a regular feature of public and private schools since the inception of modern 
schooling in the Middle East (see Fortna 2002), but the level of violence and 
humiliation in today‘s schools in Egypt is generally seen as being unprecedented.  In 
2007, a study by the Egyptian Center for the Right to Education (ECER) linked rising 
violence to critical patterns of school governance, resources and pedagogy; including 
the focus on memorization, abuse and physical punishment by teachers, weak oversight 
over education, high class densities, lack of school activities because of short school 
days and multiple shift schools (Yunus 2009). One report of the Egyptian Centre for 
Human Rights on incidents of teachers‘ severe violence against students detailed forty-
one cases reported in the media over one academic year; which included severe beating, 
the breaking of an arm, a nose or a finger, threats of pushing students from higher 
floors or of beating students with shoes, stepping on their neck, hitting them with 
sticks, puncturing their ears, using an electric Taser, injuring their faces, slandering 
them and preventing them from entering school (Nasif 2010). According to the report, 
the reasons for this violence included: students not understanding the material, 
speaking out-of-turn with a classmate, excess noise in the classroom, attempts to coerce 
students to enroll in in-school tutoring or private lessons, students‘ long hair, students‘ 
rejection of punishment, requests to leave early, failure to bring the proper notebook or 
to do the homework, jumping the fence or not attending the morning assembly (Nasif 
2010). A study by the National Center for Social and Criminal research showed that 
91% of noncompliant students experienced violent punishment, that 42% of teacher 
resort to violence to control the educational process, and that the same percentage of 
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families believed in violence as a means of education and upbringing (Yunus 2009).  
Around 80% of the boys and 60% of the girls in one study reported being beaten by 
teachers with the use of hands, sticks, straps, shoes, and kicks (Youssef, Attia and 
Kamel 1998). In addition, 38% of Egyptian children were harshly physically disciplined 
in the form of beating with implements; where the most common reported injuries 
were bumps and contusions. There is little systematic data however on how a host of 
different factors affect school punishment, from teacher training and qualification the 
rural or urban location of the school.39 Therefore, while there is no claim that the 
modes of punishment in the six schools are somehow ‗representative‘ of violence 
across Egypt‘s 40,000 schools, the aim of this discussion is to show the discourses and 
practices around punishment in concrete school contexts. This is an area of research 
however that is in great need for far more extensive treatment.  
 
BEATING, HUMILIATION AND UNSANCTIONED 
TASKS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
There is no education in the first place... The teacher comes in, beats the kids around a little and goes 
out (Huwa mafish ta„lim aslan... huwa il mudarris biyudkhul yidrab il „iyal shiwaya wi yitla„).  
Student in the boys‘ technical school 
 
They make us sweep the floors. Is this a school for education or for sweeping and mopping? (di 
madrasit ta„lim walla kans wi mash). Student in the boys‘ technical school  
 
 ―Zifta‖, or ―scum‖, 40  was the first word I heard inside a classroom during my 
fieldwork. ―Zifta‖ was simply shouted at different corners of the room and at particular 
girls by the teacher in the girls‘ technical school until all students were seated and quiet. 
Students were also told, in reference to my presence, ―if we are not respectable, at least 
we can pretend to be respectable‖ (law makunash muhtaramin, „ala el a‟al ni„mel nafsina 
                                            
39 Other studies may suggest that the factors associated with harsh corporal punishment include: rural 
area, male gender of the child, low maternal education, and large family size [or larges class size, for 
school contexts] (see Alyahri and Goodman 2008). This may suggest that large class size and low 
teacher qualification are especially important determinants of corporal punishment, especially of boys. 
40 Feminine of: ―zift‖: literally, the black tar used for covering asphalt roads, it means ―bad‖, someone or 
something of low quality, with connotations of being disgusting or disgraceful. 
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muhtaramin). Name-calling, humiliation and scolding (shitima, ihana or tahzi‟) were the 
main ways which many (but not all) teachers used to establish order and calm or rebuke 
non-compliant or under-performing students in the public schools. Real or perceived 
noncompliance was typically responded to with ―shitima‖—name-calling—often 
directed at the whole class and often extended to more general derogatory statements 
about the students as a whole, their future potential and the families and parents who 
had failed to ―raise them‖ properly. Students were regularly called ―stupid‖, ―rubbish‖, 
―retarded‖, or animal. Even sympathetic teachers often labeled and described students 
as being without future [prospects], purpose or ambition. ―Hayawan/a‖ (animal), 
―zift/a‖, and ―humar/a‖ (donkey) were the most common curses I heard used to 
address students in public schools—considered mild enough to use in front of a 
―guest‖. For example, a teacher who often used beating, kicking and abusive language 
and gestures with students, at one pointed started to call out the names of each student 
in class by using ―il-hayawan‖ before each name: the animal Ahmed, the animal Fadi and 
so on. This was not due to any individual or collective offense, but simply for them to 
come to the front of the class to receive their medical insurance cards. Harsher terms 
were used when I was not in close range or were reported to me by students. The 
spectrum of swear words extended across the full range used on Egyptian streets, 
especially in the boys‘ schools. There was a clear awareness among all school actors 
however that beating and humiliation were not considered proper, were not sanctioned 
and should therefore not be used in front of a guest, especially a researcher with a 
formal MOE research permit. What I observed was therefore likely no more than half 
the normal severity and frequency of abuse. Students frequently remarked that abuse 
was considerably reduced in my presence.  
 
Public schools are certainly not uniform in this regard. In more affluent neighborhoods 
in urban centers across the country and especially in semi-private Experimental schools, 
better quality education and less physical and emotional abuse are the norm. Physical 
and emotional punishment may still be commonplace, but it is not as severe. In a study 
of one of the best preparatory schools in its district, for example, Linda Herrera (1992, 
31–2) found that the most common methods used in physical punishment were hitting 
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the palms of the hand with a stick, making a girl stand with her hands up in the air and 
punching her in the arm or back. Other common forms of punishment sought to 
embarrass or shame the student: by sending her to the corridor with a paper attached to 
her back with the word ―stupid‖ written on it, for example. As Herrera (1992) has 
explained in terms of punishment, teachers make a clear distinction between the male 
and the female student and the more effective way of dealing with each one‘s ―nature‖; 
so that girls are ―shamed‖; they are punished more verbally and embarrassed in front of 
peers, while boys have to be beaten and beaten harshly as they do not respond to 
‗slight‘ punishment.  
 
In the two boys‘ public schools and, to a lesser extent, in the girls‘ schools, many 
teachers carried with them hard plastic hoses or medium-sized canes of roughly one 
meter in length, which they used in the courtyard, corridors and classroom. Others 
used their hands—and legs—to deal with noncompliant students. This was not a legacy 
of secondary schools alone and was portrayed as being the norm in most primary and 
preparatory public schools (see Naguib 2006). My presence did not affect the 
prominent display and use of the canes and hoses in school courtyards and corridors, 
although my presence in the classroom did seem to temper their use therein. In the 
boys‘ technical school, students were still slapped on the face and harshly beaten in my 
presence. Furthermore, if the principal was made aware of student noncompliance, 
students also risked enduring his courtyard drills as additional punishment: a number of 
very challenging squats and physical exercises.  
 
Beating was not only an unsanctioned response to student noncompliance; it was also 
arbitrary and dependent on a number of factors and patterns of exchange in the school 
context. Punishment was not uniformly employed with students, and therefore did not 
represent the same kind of grievance for all students. This added a critical element of 
arbitrariness or ambiguity in the extra-legal application of punishment. For example, 
older third secondary students in the boys‘ technical school were often notably spared 
some of the harsher humiliation and beating that many first and second secondary 
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students endured. This is because they could better retaliate against it or perhaps 
because many had become more assertive and resourceful due to greater years of work 
experience in difficult conditions outside the school. As students put it, ―teachers are 
scared of third secondary; they treat us differently‖. As discussed in Chapter Four, this 
also reduced teachers‘ ability to pressure them into enrolling in tutoring groups, 
resulting in their lower enrollment in tutoring. Family background was also seen as 
important for tempering abuse. Many students implied that the disrespect of teachers 
was predicated on their low social class. As students in the girls‘ general school put it, 
―teachers treat us as though they are above us.‖ Others declared that ―they treat us as 
though we are from the street‖ and ―they look down on us‖.  Some students expressed 
that their fathers were able to intimidate teachers in order to deter them from further 
abuse. Orphans or those whose fathers had left the household were seen as being the 
worst off in this regard. Attentive mothers could however intervene and plead for 
better treatment or fewer financial demands on their children. Students who came from 
more affluent or better ―connected‖ families were typically afforded better treatment, 
especially the children of school teachers. In the technical schools, students who paid 
in-school tutoring fees regularly and enrolled early were spared the related abuse. 
Students who excelled in (non-oppositional) areas of religious learning such as Quran 
recitation tended to receive better treatment. High-achieving students did as well; 
although their number was limited in the public schools and they significantly 
overlapped with the previous categories of more affluent and connected students. 
Others yet had privileged positions due to their relationships with particular teachers, 
won by running errands for them or otherwise gaining their favor. The same behavior 
could clearly therefore elicit different levels of punishment from teachers. This applied 
to the ability to coerce students to perform additional chores in the technical schools 
(see below). While students often expressed beating as arbitrary and unfair; and 
ascribed its occurrence to financial issues or compliance with extra-legal demands, 
beating was not always seen as reprehensible per se, likely due to its normalization in 
household settings, as discussed below.  
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In the girls‘ public schools, teachers‘ attitudes were similar in terms of the regular use of 
humiliation, but physical beating took different and less severe forms. As described by 
students, the major causes of punishment were girls‘ perceived immodesty, the payment 
of tutoring fees, the personality of the teacher, classroom disturbances and efforts to 
deter students‘ complaints. Teachers responded to student noncompliance using 
punishments that ranged from verbal abuse, twisting the student‘s ear, hitting her on 
the back or shoulder, to calling her parents and sending her to the principal. While 
some teachers reportedly slapped students on the face, threats of slapping, and the 
general use of intimidating language, were more common. Pulling girls from their 
scarves and punching them in the shoulder was far more common than actual slapping 
of the face or the harsher beating I saw and was informed of in the boys‘ schools.  
 
In both technical schools, students were often forced to clean the labs and perform 
other chores in the school. In the boys‘ technical school especially, students were made 
to sweep the floors and carry out different tasks, such as making tea for teachers and 
running private errands for them. Boys particularly resented being compelled to clean 
the floors and were fully aware that this was against official regulations. Some students 
also explained that they were the ones who set up the labs and arranged classroom 
furniture. This work was seen as less humiliating, but it was nonetheless resented for 
being an extra-legal means by which teachers and the school took advantage of student 
labor (arguably saving a portion of the contractual costs provided by the school‘s 
affluent sponsors for this purpose and distributing it amongst themselves). As one 
student commented, ―if I did this work in a workshop outside, I would be treated 
better and I would get paid.‖ In my presence, some teachers tried to justify these 
practices, arguing that it was laudable to keep one‘s surroundings clean and that this 
was a normal practice in good schools and ―abroad‖. Not all teachers forced students 
to perform such chores and not all students complied with such directives. It was clear 
that some students had more leeway than others in performing these chores and would 
actively resist being forced to do them.  
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Many students understood that those who challenged teachers or complained about 
them would receive especially severe punishment. This may have been especially true 
because of the extra-legal, unsanctioned practices pervading the schools [from 
withholding teaching to encourage tutoring enrollment to beating and teacher 
absenteeism], which could be used in recriminations against teachers. Nada, a diligent 
student who sat in the front row in a first secondary class in the technical school 
recounted an incident where she protested an exam result where most students had 
failed or had scored very badly. The exam questions covered material that the teacher 
had not covered in class and had not indicated would be covered in the exam. She 
objected in class, was harshly rebuked and was sent to the Principal‘s office for 
punishment. There, she was further rebuked and humiliated until she entered into a 
crying fit. She later managed to secure the support of friends to uphold her claims and 
teachers to vouch for her. In the end, some remedial action was actually taken. The 
scores for some exam questions were cancelled. She seemed however to have been 
emotionally injured by the experience. The educational injustice had been partly 
mitigated, but her humiliation in the process was left unaddressed. Her right to object, 
her justified grievance and her dignity were not fully acknowledged nor respected. 
Therefore, complaints had some chance of ―success‖ if they came from individuals 
who were able to gain wider support, but their emotional and practical costs were very 
high. In fact, based on his fieldwork in a public preparatory school, Naguib (2006) has 
observed that those who confront the power of the school, through police complaints 
for example, eventually lose out and even drop out of school. 
 
In another incident in the girls‘ technical school, parents had come to the principal with 
a complaint against a teacher who had insulted their daughter. The principal spoke to 
them in a rude manner, told them they had been unable to raise their daughter properly 
and abused the mother in particular; telling her not to talk during the meeting and 
saying that, as the father was a respectable and reasonable man, only he should talk. 
The parents threatened to raise the issue at the district level, and the principal 
reportedly colluded with the teacher in question to fabricate a memorandum that 
accused the girl of being the one who had used foul language with the teacher. 
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Therefore, not only were students humiliated if they complained, but also if they were 
of modest social standing, their parents were humiliated as well. This explains why 
students felt that their modest backgrounds were the main cause of abuses against 
them. Many also knew that students in private schools were not beaten, even in local 
[low-end] private schools, where many of them in the general schools had enrolled in 
the primary and preparatory stages. 
 
BEATING AND SHAMING IN THE PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS 
Beating was allowed in my day, but it was a certain number of strikes, on the hand only and 
the teacher never resorted to beating without prior warning and repetition of mistakes. But 
beating students on the nape of the neck and kicking them [darb al-talib bil-‗afa wil-
shallut]; These are thuggish practices that people do not undertake on the street, let alone that 
could be practiced in institutions that bring up young people. Private School Teacher  
In the two private schools, the physical punishment of students was the exception 
rather than the rule. Aside from the fact that the schools were a relaxed space only 
occasionally frequented by students for reasons other than learning (see Chapter Four), 
the levels of abuse in the public schools were simply unthinkable. Parents paid for the 
schooling services their children enjoyed and did not expect them to be physically or 
emotionally abused in school. They possessed the material and cultural resources to 
bring to bear if abuse did occur against their children. There were, however, forms of 
physical and verbal punishment that were telling in terms of how punishment was 
framed and justified by teachers and students.   
The practices of Mr. Samir and Mrs. Samia are good examples of modes of physical 
and emotional punishment in middle and upper range private schools.  Students were 
so afraid of Mr. Samir that some even reported panicking when they saw his cup of tea 
being brought in by the cleaner; signaling his imminent arrival. Mr. Samir was a strict 
physics teacher who was also a ―star tutor‖ (see Chapter Four). While he did not 
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physically punish female students, he often used rude remarks and negative labels to 
keep students in check. As he told me, he knew which students he could shout at or 
call ―rotten‖ (m„afina) and which ones he could not. For him, students understood these 
insults as endearing, funny and as a sign of care; so much so that some girls would ask 
him if he were upset with them if he did not call them names as he usually did. He and 
other private school teachers did hit students, especially boys. Usually this comprised 
punches in the shoulder and back, as they are considered less humiliating. Most of his 
punishment was related to academic performance, although disruptive behavior was 
also not tolerated. He took pride in his power to intimidate students, which not only 
established him as a feared and elevated authority, but also effectively scared and 
shamed students to perform the hard work needed to obtain high scores. He offered a 
route to the coveted scores needed for admission into prestigious colleges.  
 
Mrs. Samia, however generated far less fear and deference on the part of students. She 
continually used negative labels and insults but mostly did so jokingly with a feigned 
angry demeanor. Throughout her classes, she would make remarks (in English) such as 
―very bad behavior... you are not human beings‖; ―I think I‘ve come to a zoo‖; or 
―Here we have a PhD student... She is here to see your stupidity.‖ Throughout the class 
time, students would be portrayed as not ―civilized‖, refined or industrious enough. 
This was seen as endearing and funny by some students, some of whom even tried to 
provoke her further. It was ignored and perhaps disliked by other students. In Mrs. 
Samia‘s classes, students generally displayed the usual level of limited interest and 
compliance as they showed for other teachers (except for especially ‗strict‘ teachers); 
mainly because they enrolled in tutoring in most subjects. Furthermore, Mrs. Samia 
taught High-Level English; a subject which did not affect students‘ overall totals. She 
was not teaching an ‗important‘ subject like Mr. Samir was, was not a millionaire start 
tutor and could not rely on similar incentives and pressures for students to remain 
attentive. She may well have been dealing with her own frustration at the declining 
importance and status given to her subject, her own meager income relative to other 
teachers who offered tutoring (see Chapter Four); and more generally the diminished 
authority and audience for the school‘s civilizing role in producing proper middle class 
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girls and boys. Ironically, her subject, advanced English Language, is actually the most 
marketable and desirable skill for the students, many of whom actually chose this 
school based on its historical reputation for strong English instruction. The market, the 
system and the school simply failed to reward or increasingly even provide effective 
instruction in this key subject.  
 
PUNISHMENT AND AUTHORITY 
You see me: I come in with a stick and a hose. I beat and I scold but they accept it. I tell them: “I am 
glad to be your mother, would you accept me to be your mother?” If not, here is the local police station, 
go complain if you want because “teachers are not allowed to beat students”. Psychology and 
sociology teacher in the boys‘ general school 
 
Why were beating and humiliation normalized in the public schools? Was it really a 
question of ‗middle class‘ teachers looking down upon working class students? What 
generated the perceived increase in the use and severity of emotional and physical 
punishment? How did teachers articulate beating? Were they simply reacting to the 
increasing disrespect and noncompliance they perceived among students? This section 
explores the discourses on physical punishment among teachers in the public schools. 
There were four main frameworks for articulating beating: beating as means of 
preserving respect and authority, beating as a form of caring and moral instruction in 
an extension of parental roles, beating as the only effectively available mode of 
discipline in the school system, and finally beating as sanctioned by Islam.  Ultimately, 
however, physical punishment was made possible because it went unpunished by the 
ministry and students did not have access to the means of deterring it. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT 
On February 2, 2010, then Egyptian Minister of Education Ahmad Zaki Badr stated 
while addressing the upper and lower houses of Parliament that ―teachers have lost 
their hiba (status) after the banning of beating in schools, and have become easy targets 
of abuse (maltasha).... The filing of police complaints by parents when their children are 
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beaten has led to the destruction of the educational process‖ (see Shihata 2010). Hiba is 
a quality attributed to someone who has a natural claim on the respect of others; 
someone who commands authority, respect and a measure of deference. Beating thus 
maintained the superior and sovereign position of the teacher. While this was an 
unprecedented official statement, it echoed the sentiments of many teachers. Teachers 
frequently identified the law on the prohibition of physical and psychological 
punishment as one of the reasons for the deterioration of education and the diminished 
power and status of the teacher. Most teachers considered such punishment to be their 
right: a positive, normal and required practice needed to maintain order, to properly 
―bring up‖ (yurabi) students and to maintain teachers‘ hiba. A few days later, however, 
the Minister had to retract his statement, assert that it had been misunderstood and 
emphasize that beating is prohibited, unacceptable in all its forms and considered to be 
against sound educational principles (Difa‗an ‗an al-Darb 2010). The minister‘s 
retraction reportedly resulted from the condemnation of donor agencies and a veiled 
threat by USAID to suspend all loans and grants supporting Egyptian education (Sadiq 
2010).41  
 
Previous ministers were more consistently vocal in their condemnation of beating (see 
Tadros 2001), although beating continued freely throughout the system. 42  Some 
teachers are ultimately held accountable for major cases of abuse, notably when those 
cases attract media coverage and calls for accountability.  It is safe to say that the 
majority of beatings in schools happen with full immunity and the complete approval 
of school actors and authorities. Teachers‘ actions are almost only questioned if parents 
                                            
41 Exemplified by the Egyptian Centre for the Right to Education (ECER [sic]), a number of education experts, 
researchers and commentators reacted very strongly to Badr‘s statements on beating in schools and teachers‘ 
authority and respect. ECER forcefully rejected the opinion that violence would restore teachers‘ authority, 
declaring that ―the weakness of the teacher is a natural result of the policy of transforming education from a right 
to a commodity as well as a natural result of the violation of teacher rights at the hands of the ministry and 
syndicate‖ (ECER 2010a). 
42 If a complaint against beating is lodged only at the school, the principal determines the punishment. If the 
student needs more than twenty days‘ medical treatment, however, an educational Legal Affairs Department is 
made aware of the case and penalizes the teacher, usually by deducting a portion of his monthly salary, 
withholding benefits or delaying promotion (Herrera 1992, 32). If a parent reports an incident of a teacher‘s abuse 
to the police, the court will take up the case and pass an appropriate sentence. The accused may face a prison 
term, in which case he is not allowed to return to the teaching profession, or be required to pay compensation to 
the victim‘s family. 
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take their grievances to the police station, typically doing so in cases where students 
have been gravely injured and they are able to demonstrate this with medical reports. In 
these cases, teachers may expect to face considerable repercussions. Parents do, 
however, need considerable cultural capital for the police to show any interest in their 
cases. Individuals of more modest socioeconomic background ―are [often] unwilling 
and incapable of calling on the state or invoking its powers‖ (Ismail 2006, 43). Teachers 
were therefore fully aware that they could beat students with impunity and that students 
had no effective access to the law 
 
Furthermore, the harsh style of punishment, including humiliation and rebuke was 
applied to teachers themselves (see Chapter Three). Naguib (2006) has presented a 
vivid image of how the oppressive structure inside the classroom extends upwards into 
a punitive, oppressive and humiliating relationship between teachers and principals and 
between school principals and those higher up in the hierarchy of the educational 
system. The absolute power of the principal was frequently maintained through 
intimidation and humiliation; not through codes of conduct but rather through 
unwritten codes of silence and obedience (Naguib 2006). Therefore, despite 
considerable license to beat students with impunity, higher educational authorities 
established harsh control over teachers. This may have lead directly to teachers being 
harsh with students and resorting to various extralegal practices (and not simply as a 
means of displacing anger and frustration). For example, if teachers are held 
accountable and harshly rebuked for classroom cleanliness; while insufficient cleaning 
staff are employed and properly paid, they clearly had an incentive to force students to 
perform such tasks. As elaborated in Chapters Three and Four, this kind of institutional 
setting also informed teacher practices such as the facilitation of cheating, the 
presentation of inaccurate attendance data and other school information and activities 
and various other issues around the appeasement of supervisors and inspectors. 
According to Kamal Naguib, teachers experience three levels of impotence: social and 
economic impotence stemming from their low salaries preventing them from earning a 
decent living; creative impotence because they have little autonomy in the classroom 
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and are subject to surveillance and institutional pressure; and an impotence that results 
from students‘ full awareness of all of these conditions (2006, 66).  
 
As described in Chapter Four, teachers in the public schools also had great leeway in 
whether or not to enter classes and they quite regularly did not; and diligent class by 
class recording of attendance is coupled with rampant absenteeism of 50 to 90%, which 
does not show up in official school records submitted to MOE.  Administrators are of 
course fully complicit in regularized games of ‗pretend discipline‘ in the schools. Just as 
teachers dutifully collected attendance records in each class, principals and 
administrators continuously filled out reports about the smooth functioning and 
discipline of the school. Even though principals hold substantial power in their schools, 
they are subject to continuous monitoring and supervision from higher educational 
authorities; their work is regulated by ministerial orders pertaining to every minute 
detail of their work. Punishment and harsh penalties are the fate of dissenting directors 
who fail to implement the regulations and instructions coming from above (see Naguib 
2006). District and MOE supervisors—sometimes two or three visiting a school per 
day—collect constant data about various aspects of school performance. Supervisors 
have little real power to assist schools however; and are frequently charged, often 
accurately, of monitoring the most superficial and least important aspects of school or 
classroom life, especially cleanliness and maintenance, issues on which the school has 
little control, due to centralized hiring and resource decisions and other limitations on 
school spending. Some also monitor the morning assembly (and its pro-regime 
content), the presence of the ex-president‘s photos in every classroom. Many are aware 
that they are monitoring issues over which neither they nor the schools have real power 
and keep their visits brief and focused on fulfilling the minimal formalities that 
complete the required paperwork. As frequently noted, this leads to a situation where 
most schools maintain excellent records and most teachers across the system receive 
―excellent‖ annual appraisals (an issue that is meant to be remedied under the new 
Cadre system).  
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WITHDRAWAL OF DISCIPLINARY POWERS 
Teachers frequently argued that beating was necessary because the system had deprived 
them of all other disciplinary measures. Principals and teachers almost always 
complained of their lack of power over students, including in private schools (see also 
Saad 2006). Disciplinary procedures had progressively become more complex and 
prohibitive, with teachers feeling that they had no measures either to hold students 
accountable for their behavior or incentivize them to study. Teachers emphasized that, 
in effect, students could not be penalized or expelled for tardiness, absence, poor 
academic performance or classroom disturbance. Teacher powers in this regard had 
been curtailed precisely because of the potential (and reality) of their abuse to extract 
resources from students through rewards and punishments for those who do or do not 
enroll in tutoring. This has meant, however, that some of the teachers who had used 
marks to extract resources from students would now resort to physical coercion.  
 
The resentment and reluctance of principal and teachers to give up control is reflected 
in the continued investment on their part in a semblance of observation and 
normalization. Teachers and administrators continually threatened students, for 
example, with grade reduction or suspension for absenteeism. Most schools, including 
private schools, resorted to arbitrary and reversible dismissal letters in order to maintain 
a semblance of control. Teachers typically spread rumors that this year is different and 
students will really get expelled if they exceed absenteeism limits. Although most 
students knew this was not true, there was still some ambiguity about whether they 
could indeed get expelled if they exceeded the maximum number of permitted 
absences.  
 
INCREASED NONCOMPLIANCE AND MAINTAINING ORDER 
Teachers portrayed beating as necessary to maintain order and control and as 
appropriate for the ―types‖ of students they dealt with, frequently describing students 
as ―only responding to beating‖ (maygush ghir bil-darb) or ―not [properly] raised by their 
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parents‖ (ahluhum marabuhumsh). Students‘ supposed poor upbringings and 
noncompliance were typical justifications given for the use of severe punishment.  It is 
not at all clear that beating enhanced the teachers‘ authority or their control over their 
classrooms. In most cases, order and calm in the classroom were better promoted 
without violence.  In both the boys‘ technical and boys‘ general school, it seemed that 
the harsher the teacher, the more disruptions there were in the classroom. Although 
teachers repeatedly emphasized that students could only be treated in this manner, it 
was clear that students behaved differently depending on the teacher in the classroom. 
One experience in the boys‘ technical school made this vividly apparent to me. During 
the lesson of one particularly harsh teacher, students were disruptive throughout her 
class; as she continued to verbally and physically assault them. She later explained to me 
that ―animals have to be treated like animals;‖ and that if the students were human, she 
would treat them as such. In a subsequent lesson, under a different teacher, the same 
students engaged in very little challenging or noncompliant behavior. The next teacher 
was strict, but used very little verbal abuse or physical punishment. She stuck to the 
material she was teaching and did not seem to be wasting class time.  
 
Harsh punishment and humiliation was clearly not needed to ensure the compliance or 
respect of technical school boys. In a study of Egyptian technical and general secondary 
schools, Zayid (2006) similarly concluded that the more dictatorial the teacher was, the 
more he prompted the students to contradict him out of stubbornness or abandon 
attending his classes; and the more chaotic he was the more it encouraged the students 
to create havoc and chaos. As Middleton (2008) concluded, children felt most respect 
for those teachers who could keep order without relying on corporal punishment.43 
That said, violence and intimidation may have been necessary for teachers engaged in 
extra-legal behavior such as subtle or overt coercion to enroll in tutoring or the 
assignment of extra chores to students. As noted in Chapter Four, excessive emphasis 
on compliance and order is used by many teachers to waste class time and to create 
student dependence and ‗demand‘ for private tutoring services.  
                                            
43 Davidson (1999) found that students facing borders liked and respected adults who maintained their 
authority yet managed to establish relaxed, friendly relationships with students. 
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In fact, it should not be very surprising that harsh and repeated beating did not produce 
the desired results. Since the time when it was first prescribed in British teaching 
manuals, the excessive use of corporal punishment has been understood to produce 
what educational psychologists referred to as the ―hardened offender‖, who believed 
that he (or she) was ―an ill-used person‖, suffering punishment merely because the 
teacher was ―in a position arbitrarily to exercise a coercive authority‖ (Middleton 2008, 
269). As educationists have long observed, the value of any punishment in school was 
in inverse proportion to its frequency of application.  ―Corporal punishment was 
simply a hazard of school life, a painful correction to be borne with stoicism and which 
ultimately had little effect on behavior‖ (Middleton 2008, 270). In this sense, it generally 
only taught children to dislike their teachers. This attitude arising from routine corporal 
punishment explains students‘ nonchalance in the face of the prospect of being beaten 
in the opening narrative of this chapter. In many classes, students simply did what they 
pleased, regardless of the likely response in terms of humiliation or physical 
punishment.  
 
BEATING AS A RELIGIOUSLY SANCTIONED PRACTICE 
Some teachers wondered however how beating could be prohibited by the Ministry 
when it is sanctioned by shar„ (Islamic jurisprudence). Because beating of children by 
parents for the sake of promoting religious observance is sanctioned by Islamic texts, 
teachers in public schools (and parents) reasoned that they were entitled, by analogy, to 
beat students to instill in them proper discipline and moral upbringing. In contrast, 
most teachers in private schools rejected the beating practiced in public schools and 
many expressed that it had no grounding in Islam. Some reacted particularly strongly to 
the use of religious justifications for beating by public school teachers, elaborating on 
how they understood the religious sanction for beating and how it related to practices 
in public schools. As one teacher put it, ―shar„ does not sanction beating… this is an 
incorrect use of religion. These teachers say it‘s sanctioned by shar„ just so that no-one 
objects. The basis of education in Islam is dignity, how can there be dignity with 
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beating?... This issue of beating in the schools is disgusting habits that they falsely 
attribute to religion (biyilza‟uha fil-din).‖ Another religiously learned teacher in a private 
school reacted by elaborating on the restrictions on beating in Islamic jurisprudence: 
that it not be severe, that it never be on the face and that it never be perpetrated against 
children younger than ten years of age. He added that the only clear sanction for 
smacking children was to encourage them to practice their religious obligations beyond 
the age of ten, but not for other reasons. He added: ―I personally do not think in any 
way that a jurist would sanction what happens in Egypt‘s public schools. This is torture, 
not beating.‖  This claim was still used by teachers to legitimize beating across the 
different educational stages.  
 
BEATING AS A SOCIALLY-ACCEPTED EDUCATIONAL AND 
PARENTING TECHNIQUE 
A recent incident concerning teachers‘ beating of students received considerable media 
attention in 2011. The incident was revealed in a video of a teacher in a small 
community nursery in a rural village beating a crying kindergarten child harshly and 
repeatedly, while pulling her hair and also beating other children on their hands, backs, 
heads and feet (see Baladna Muthaharat Ahali 2011, for a brief report and footage from 
the video). The video was widely viewed on the internet, received considerable news 
coverage leading to significant public outrage and condemnation. This public furor 
brought about a swift official response: the suspension of the teacher and the 
announcement of the closure of the day care center. However, reporters covering the 
issue were confronted with a gathering of the mothers and their children outside the 
closed kindergarten in a ‗demonstration‘ of sorts. They were expressing their support 
for the teacher—who was also the manager of the nursery—calling for his release from 
police custody and for the re-opening of the nursery; emphasizing that the beating 
happened with their full approval. Although their main concern may have been that the 
nursery remain open, chanting: ―we want the nursery‖ („ayzin il-hadana), they clearly 
supported the teacher‘s beating of their children. In interviews with the media, they also 
referred to their own corporal punishment of their children. As one parent declared in 
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reference to her child, ―I beat him to death by the time he gets to the nursery‖ (see 
Baladna Muthaharat Ahali 2011). Another parent stated that beating was necessary 
given the ―nature‖ of the rural child: ―we are here in a rural area, children are a bit 
stubborn… beat the child, it‘s ok. What‘s important is that he comes out educated.‖ 
The young child that was seen being beaten in the video was actually interviewed by the 
media as well. She said that the teacher was beating them because they had not done 
their homework, that he loved them and brought them sweets. Another—older child—
presented the matter this way: ―the basis of education is beating, but not with this 
cruelty;‖ adding that ―just as there is beating, there were also means of education and 
entertainment‖ in the center. Beating for promoting education and beating in the 
context of the provision of other forms of care were therefore accepted by many 
parents and children. Children recognized beating as the norm in the educational 
setting, but saw it as balanced by other forms of ―provision‖. It is worth noting that 
even in the context of attempting to salvage the day care center; some children still 
spoke out against corporal punishment that is unnecessarily ‗cruel‘. This may however 
shed light on why beating had become so contested in public schools, as it is not clear 
that either ‗education‘ or other forms of provision were framing its exercise in the 
schools. .  
 
This incident shows not only how normalized physical beating in education, but also in 
the family. It is not surprising therefore that teachers used analogies with parents to 
legitimize the beating of children. Physical and emotional violence is seen by parents as 
an effective and normal practice in child-rearing in many parts of the Arab world 
(Fernea 1995, see also Makhoul, Shayboub and Jamal 2004).44 Indeed, students in the 
public schools frequently confided that their parents treated in them in disparaging and 
insulting ways; calling them stupid, failures or declaring them to be with little potential 
for success. Although they were not as frequently beaten nor as harshly humiliated, 
private school students were also reportedly not spared the verbal aggression and 
                                            
44 Makhoul, Shayboub and Jamal (2004) note in their study of working children in disadvantaged suburbs of 
Beirut that the children were exposed to physical as well as emotional violence. Their parents, furthermore, often 
openly expressed pessimistic views and negative opinions about them, views and opinions which influenced how 
the children viewed themselves. 
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negative labeling of their parents. Despite the lack of significant literature on the matter 
in Egypt, one study conducted in a middle-class neighborhood indicated just how 
widespread a harsh disciplinary approach is: about half of parents beat their children 
and roughly thirteen per cent did so severely (Hassan et al 1999 cited in Alyahri and 
Goodman 2008). 45  Teachers therefore legitimated their beating [despite the other 
purposes it may have been serving] by saying that they are like parents to the children. 
This was an analogy that many students forcefully rejected; asserting that no, teachers 
are not like parents to them. This is likely because this would in fact give legitimacy to 
teacher beating.  
 
BEATING, POVERTY AND MASCULINITY 
If teachers treated their children in the same manner as they treated students, beating 
could be seen as a social norm that penetrated the school and overrode school 
regulations, so that the state could not dictate behavior in the schools. There was 
frequently a class difference between teachers and students in the public schools, 
however, and many teachers saw themselves as coming from a higher social class than 
their students (with the exception of teachers of practical or technical subjects in the 
technical school). This may indicate that they likely treated their own children with 
significantly less violence and greater respect. Many of them certainly enrolled their 
own children in private schools where they were not beaten or humiliated in the ways 
seen in public schools. Many teachers also explicitly linked engagement in extralegal 
practices, such as beating and coercion into tutoring, with the social class background 
of the teacher; arguing that teachers of ‗technical‘ subjects, who came from a different 
social background, were more likely to engage in such practices. .  
                                            
45 The study explored disciplinary practices in a sample of 602 families with children aged between one and 
seventeen. It found that just over half of parents used positive corrective approaches such as verbal reasoning 
with their children; just under half used either psychological or emotional maltreatment, or both, with verbal 
aggression; and just under half used mild to moderate physical maltreatment, with severe corporal punishment 
(physical abuse) regularly practiced with thirteen per cent of the children, with particularly high rates for those 
aged from nine to twelve. Factors associated with emotional and physical abuse included the child being difficult 
to care for, marital violence and the parents themselves having been abused during their childhoods by their own 
parents. 
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Styles of parenting that are more democratic, dialogic, ―involved‖ or ―sensitive‖ reflect 
not only distinctly middle-class values, but also resources and possibilities. Walkerdine 
and Lucey‘s (1989) classic study, Democracy in the Kitchen, emphasized how middle-class 
child-rearing practices of ―sensitive mothering‖ are articulated as normal and desirable 
through the language of developmental psychology. As such, they are accepted as self-
evident markers of ―good parenting‖, particularly when compared with representations 
of ignorant, insensitive working-class practices (Walkerdine and Lucey 1989, 102).  
Research on parenting in working and middle-class families in the UK suggests that 
children who are encouraged to reason and negotiate can become assertive and defiant 
(Gillies 2008). While this might be considered precious or self-assured for a middle-
class child, such outspoken working class children are likely to be viewed as dangerous 
and their assertiveness as having severe consequences (Gillies 2008, 107, see also 
Baumrind 1991).46 It has been suggested that the same set of behaviors or attributes 
could be evaluated by the school according to the social class of their bearers: assertive 
behavior from middle-class girls being met with approval, but seen as ‗troublemaking‘ 
from working-class girls (Walker 1989, 267).  For some working class parents, the use 
of relatively harsh disciplinary strategies could be related to a belief that their children 
―must become strong individuals in order to survive the risks and demands of inner-
city life‖ (Holloway, et al. 1997). Different studies have therefore concluded that there 
exist clear relationships between the resources held by particular parents and the child-
rearing practices they pursue (Gillies 2008).47 Extreme poverty also creates a variety of 
stressors that reduce parents‘ resources and abilities to raise their children in a caring, 
                                            
46 Baumrind (1991) has discussed the relationship between parental choices of disciplinary style and the contextual 
realities of their communities. The authoritarian parenting Baumrind found among African-Americans appeared 
to be suitably protective of children living in dangerous communities; where authoritarian behavior may reflect—
and indicate to children—nurturance and protectiveness. 
47 Parenting and teaching literature often refer to authoritarian, authoritative and permissive adult styles to 
describe approaches to discipline (see Baumrind 1971, Firmin and Castle 2008). Authoritarian parents are 
controlling, rigid and cold; they are strict and demand unquestioning obedience from their children. Above all, 
children of authoritarian parents are not allowed to question or disagree with their parents. Permissive parents 
provide lax and inconsistent feedback to their children. They are typically less involved in their children‘s lives 
than other parents. Such parents may also place fewer limits on their children‘s behaviors. Authoritative parents 
are firm, setting clear limits on their children‘s behavior. Although they seem to be somewhat strict, compared 
with authoritarian parents these authoritative parents allow interaction and dialogue with their children. 
Authoritative styles are typically promoted by parenting and teaching literature. 
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supportive and involved manner; where in many such cases, parents are absent, abusive 
or lack the capacity to be supportive (Currie 1998). In fact, it has been suggested that 
the level of stress a parent experiences is lessened by the parent‘s belief that corporal 
punishment is valuable (Crouch and Behl 2001). .  
 
There is also arguably a link not only between beating and social class, but also between 
beating and masculinity. Low teacher salaries in light of rising living expenses may also 
have increased teachers‘ stress.  However for male teachers in particular (the key 
perpetrators of the more severe forms of beating), it also arguably undermined their 
claims to reflecting ideal masculinities as able primary breadwinners. Being unable to 
provide for their families (their nuclear families as well as their parents and siblings) 
injures ideal masculinities in ways that do not apply to women. Fodor (2006) argues 
that one of the major gender differences in the experience of poverty is that men often 
find themselves in a gender role crisis when they are too poor to function as successful 
breadwinners. This bears strongly on the greater frustration, or ‗impotence‘, that male 
teachers may feel and the greater pressure to secure additional funds, even if this 
includes intimidating and coercing students to enroll in private tutoring.48 Bringing up 
boys using corporal punishment can be a ―way of claiming or asserting masculinity‖ 
(Connell 1995, 83; Moore 1994). The use of beating by male teachers may, therefore, be 
related to an acute sense of vulnerability in the face of a perceived assault on their 
masculinity due to the poor wages and working conditions of many teachers.  As Ismail 
demonstrates, the encounters of young men ―with the state destabilize their masculine 
constructs and necessitate a renegotiation of their masculinity‖ (2006, 127). ―Through a 
reassertion of practices of patriarchy, they seek to reproduce the dominant position of 
men, that of hegemonic masculinity. Yet this connection with hegemonic masculinity is 
scarred, bearing the wounds inflicted through its articulation with class and state 
power‖ (2006, 112). In this sense, every humiliating encounter with higher education 
                                            
48 Manhood can also be defined around certain forms of integrity and independence in terms of income 
generation. The lesson on ‗manhood‘ in the technical secondary Arabic textbook for example highlighted 
manhood in terms of integrity in taking up public office, so that the minister who is a real man, for example, 
remains in office so long as he preserves the rights of his nation and only cares for the voice of his conscience. 
The real man does not use his public office to extract additional resources, a practice many teachers were forced 
into in different intensities. 
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authorities or wider forms of abuse by police or agents of the state could drive male 
teachers and parents to reassert their sense of dominance through violence in the 
classroom and household. Such assertion of domination could also be expressed in 
terms of control of female modesty in girls‘ schools. .  
 
GENDER SURVEILLANCE AND HARASSMENT  
They talk about things that should not be said. They are always making insinuations about “girls who 
stand at street corners” or at the bus stop. They assume you must be waiting for a boy. They always 
talk harshly. Student in girls‘ technical school 
They always hit and never talk softly. They talk with their hands or hit with the stick.  Student in 
girls‘ technical school 
While girls were subjected to corporally less severe forms of punishment, they endured 
an additional form of control and punishment. All of the schools employed practices of 
discipline, punishment and surveillance in relation to the performance of gender 
identity, but especially as it related to female attire, mobility and comportment. Schools 
are expected to teach children about the proper and available gender roles for them to 
take up. Ideal modesty and femininity, however, were articulated and enforced 
differently across the schools. Constructions of modesty and the control of modesty 
overlapped with constructions and embodiments of social class, distinction and 
‗coolness‘; and this was critical to the daily struggles around the attire and behavior of 
girls across the different schools.  
 
In the public schools in particular, girls were monitored and harshly rebuked on a daily 
basis for violations of the modesty/femininity code. In fact, one of the most 
contentious issues in the general public school was the girls‘ desire to layer their 
headscarves with scarves of different colors; a style which is currently in fashion. This 
was perceived by students as unreasonable and cruel. There were disputes about scarves 
almost every day in the school. Girls were rebuked and threatened that the violating 
scarves would be confiscated and cut up with scissors, even when less than one 
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centimeter of the colored scarf was showing or the white scarf had any kind of pattern. 
Regular forms of ‗punishment‘ also included pulling girls from their scarves. Such 
disputes frequently escalated and quickly become framed around the impoliteness and 
poor upbringing of students if they contested teacher statements or practices. Students 
especially resented the associated implication—and often explicit accusation—that they 
were ‗bad girls;‘ that they only wore the colored scarves to attract the attention of boys 
or because they were planning to meet with boys after school (removing the mandated 
plain white scarf to reveal the more appealing colored layer). The situation was similar 
in the technical girls‘ school. 49  Girls in both schools felt themselves to be under 
constant surveillance and the subjects of regular judgment inside and outside the 
school. 
 
Tearing up ‗violating‘ scarves with scissors and pulling girls by the scarf are not of 
course part of MOE codes of punishment. In fact, the headscarf itself was ―approved‖ 
as an acceptable part of public school uniform after its pervasive and de facto 
incorporation into student attire, and after much cultural and ‗security‘ struggles (see 
Herrera 2006 for an insightful analysis). The role of MOE was only to organize and 
formalize its use by identifying acceptable colors that match school uniforms. Gender 
disciplining was neither centralized nor formalized; it was instead diffuse and extended 
outside schools‘ walls. Nearly any teacher or administrator would feel entitled to rebuke 
and humiliate students in the school, around the school or elsewhere in the 
neighborhood. Most teachers and administrators felt they had the right to enforce 
standards of morality. The enforcement of rules of modesty and comportment was 
mostly independent of MOE regulations and varied based on the aesthetic sensibilities 
and sense of religious duty of each teacher.  This not only meant the effective 
                                            
49 There seemed to be less zeal and vigor in monitoring and dealing with violations in the technical school. The 
principal was not as strict on this matter as the principal of the general secondary school, or perhaps was not 
forced to become as involved in the issues surrounding sexual policing of girls that emerged due to the close 
proximity of boys‘ schools to the general secondary girls‘ school. It is also possible that this reflected greater 
modesty as more of a middle class ideal. In a concrete sense, technical school girls were closer to their expected 
marriage age, whereas general school girls were generally not expected to marry except after university. This may 
have meant that general school girls should not be searching for husbands and may be more likely to be taken 
advantage of in relationships without a viable prospect of marriage.   
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enforcement of the wearing of the hijab and of austere and unadorned uniforms; it also 
meant the enforcement of more conservative interpretations, such as the prohibition 
on wearing trousers (commonly held to be un-Islamic in popular quarters in Cairo and 
the rest of Egypt), even though trousers are sanctioned under MOE guidelines.  
 
 
Figure 12: Scarf Styles—and Cheating on the Walls—in the Girls‘ Technical School 
 
On the other hand, the purposes and strategies of control and constructions of ideal 
femininity and ideal gender relations were quite separate from girls‘ everyday practices. 
Work on femininities and masculinities within the sociology of education has suggested 
that schools not only reinforce dominant societal gender roles but also ―enforc[e] a set 
of sex and gender roles which are more rigid than those current in the wider society‖ 
(Delamont 1990, 5). In fact the harshness of desperate attempts at surveillance, 
normalization (through humiliation), control and punishment may indicate a failure of 
‗discipline‘. Like the physical beating of boys, it did to seem to deter noncompliance, 
but rather indicated a failure to discipline. Many girls did regularly violate the modesty 
rules promoted by school authorities and did in fact reportedly engage in frowned up 
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communication with boys. Several related to me their own successive liaisons, which 
they understood as an active search for a husband. They certainly did not see 
themselves as too young to marry and many were already engaged. As one student put 
it, ―most of the girls are ‗in love‘/ [in liaison]‖ (ulayil awy illi mabithibish). Another 
responded to my surprise:  ―what do you think mobile phones and 2 a.m. phone calls 
are for?‖  
 
School rules were separate from the girls‘ desires, not only for meeting with boys and 
searching for life partners, but also for greater social distinction. For most—but not 
all—girls, the ideal conservative femininity promoted by the schools was seen as less 
cool or classy. Seeming cool and of higher social status was seen as demanding less 
conservative attire and comportment. The way the girls dressed when I met with them 
outside school or when they came to school for revision sessions after the end of the 
school year was telling of the vast gulf between the school ideal and everyday styles. 
Although virtually all the Muslim girls were veiled, a majority of them seemed to prefer 
close-fitting and very colorful clothing to accentuate their femininity. Teachers were 
obviously aware of this, and many were not particularly disapproving. Some teachers 
seemed equally torn therefore between the conflicting ideal and desires. In one instance 
in the middle of a [rather relaxed] philosophy class in the girls‘ public general school, a 
student brought out recently taken professional photos to show to the small group—
not only to classmates but also to the teacher and to me. The students loved the 
photos, and the teacher commented in a rather neutral tone: ―flirty and all‖ (dallu„a wi 
kulu). The student was indeed in a flirtatious pose in the photos, wearing tight and 
colorful clothes, full make-up and an elaborate scarf style. Another girl then showed me 
her own professional photo. This was in fact in the form of a business card with the 
word ―hot‖ and other English words on a colorful embossed background. She was also 
in colorful, tight clothes and a flirtatious pose. Additionally, she was not wearing a 
headscarf in the photo, and it was a full body shot. I thought the picture would be 
considered scandalous. Again, there was approval from students. In response to my 
stated surprise at how ―different‖ the girls looked in the pictures, I was told that, ―of 
course, in the photos we look upper class‖ (asl ihna fil suwar binib‟a wilad nas). Being flirty 
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and feminine was desired and cool across the different schools and seemed to 
successfully override and disrupt the schools‘ attempts at promoting more conservative 
behavior. The actual practices of girls, their attire and comportment and their relations 
with boys were almost completely divorced from the control the schools attempted to 
assert. The rules, the reprimands, the threats and the maligning were subverted as a 
daily practice.  
 
For private schools in general, there is considerable variation in the monitoring of 
female comportment, depending on the neighborhood, the school‘s proximity to boys‘ 
schools, the tradition of the school and the current administration. Most schools do 
monitor quite intrusively various details of student attire—nail polish, hair coloring and 
styling, the style and tightness of trousers and the length of skirts and the height of 
socks, for example—in an effort to foster and preserve a certain image and reputation 
for the school. This varies from seeking a conservative Islamic image in lower middle, 
middle-class and Islamic schools, to a ―reserved‖ and ―proper‖ image in traditional 
middle-class and ex-missionary schools; to a relaxed and cool image in higher end and 
mixed schools. Students, boys and girls, across different private and public schools 
complained of strict school rules and the control of personal expressions of style. In 
this Egyptian students were not alone of course. The rejection of school rules and 
guidelines on attire pervades almost all schools that enforce any kind of dress guidelines 
in different parts of the world (Thornberg 2008).  
 
In the two private schools, control of attire was more formalized and the rebuke far 
less humiliating. The response of school authorities in the private schools to violations 
of these codes was typically a brief and strict rebuke. This could comprise having 
offending students stand outside the principal‘s office for some time. In some cases, 
this could be followed by a formal warning and a ―follow-up slip‖ sent to parents for 
acknowledgement. This could be followed by later escalation (e.g. after a certain 
number of warnings, the parent would summoned to the school, the student suspended 
and so on). Such escalation was relatively uncommon. In the private girls‘ school, which 
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was adjacent to a boys‘ school, in addition to enforcing rules on attire, one of the 
school‘s principals reportedly patrolled the area around the school after the end of the 
school day to see if girls were talking to boys. This zealous behavior was mocked by 
several students, even those who were critical of girls who talked to boys around the 
school.  Such matters took a different hue in the mixed school and featured much less 
prominently in school dynamics. Attire regulations were less restrictive to start with, 
and most disputes occurred around new or eccentric styles worn by both boys and girls: 
most notably among boys wishing to grow their hair long or to have an ―afro‖ or boys 
wearing chokers or bracelets. Gender mixing was allowed by definition, although a girl 
and a boy sitting alone in a secluded area of the school was not sanctioned. Students in 
mixed schools were typically afforded far greater liberties by their own parents to mix 
outside the school in social clubs, private tutoring or birthdays and arranged gatherings. 
The relaxed attitude of high end schools has arguably exerted significant pressure on 
traditional schools to liberalize their attitudes, as students pressed for different 
uniforms and fewer restrictions on style. Many girls felt that these restrictions were ‗un-
cool‘ and therefore lacking in social distinction; that they undermined their class image 
in comparison with a rising and far more liberal elite. For example, the students and 
principal of an ex-missionary school explained the process by which girls were given 
choice over school uniform and voted for a change in uniform colors, less conservative 
styles and the ability to wear trousers. .  
 
HARASSMENT AND MORAL BLAME 
One morning, as I was entering the girls‘ general school, a male teacher was shouting 
abusive language at a girl and accusing the girls more generally of lacking in manners 
and modesty and being the ones who run after boys and flirt with them. The girl was 
angry and arguing with him. There seemed to be a general tense atmosphere in the 
school. I later understood that a girl had just been attacked outside the school by a boy 
who injured her hand with a razor. The principal had left the school, probably to talk to 
the principal of the adjacent school and attempt to find the perpetrator. It was 
repeatedly emphasized by the girls and teachers that the girl was a kind of ‗ideal‘ student 
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who dressed very modestly. 50  While this did not protect from being harassed and 
arguably retaliated against for not being responsive, the remarkable outcome of this 
incident was that teachers took this opportunity to level abuse at girls and accuse them 
of moral failing and of bringing about harassment through their immodest behavior.  
 
While the surveillance of modesty in public schools may have been extensive indeed, it 
had complex and mutually reinforcing relationships with patterns of sexual harassment 
around the different schools. After all, the justification that is almost always given for 
harassment is that girls are dressed provocatively. According to most boys, and to many 
girls, the ‗reputations‘51 of all of the girls‘ schools were deficient. Indeed, for most boys, 
the reputations of almost all girls were, too. Although girls in all the schools were 
monitored for their modesty, girls in public schools were more severely blamed for 
their own inappropriate behavior and were more likely suspected of moral failing if they 
were victims of harassment. Private school girls on the other hand had significantly 
greater means of minimizing their vulnerability to harassment and their very presence 
on the street; as they were often picked up by their parents in private cars, took taxis or 
the school bus. Just as a teacher‘s rebuke was premised on teachers‘ assessments of the 
modesty of a particular student rather than official rules, so harassment was justified in 
terms of girls‘ behavior rather than whether boys had the right to harass them. In this 
sense, girls were perhaps in the bottom of the entitlement pyramid and unable to draw 
upon significant discursive resources to claim access to rights and freedoms.  
 
A recent survey on sexual harassment conducted by the Egyptian Centre for Women‘s 
Rights (ECWR) found that 83% of women (most of them veiled and many wearing 
                                            
50 It was noted that she wore the very long scarf that falls from the top of the head to below the waist (khimar); 
that she was a good student; that she attended religious lessons regularly and was proficient in the proper 
recitation of the Quran and was sometimes asked to speak on the school radio. 
51 Many of the girls in the different schools made reference to the ‗reputation‘ of the school, either when I asked 
about it, or organically within their discussions. By the school‘s ‗reputation‘, they almost always meant not its 
educational profile, but how ‗loose‘ the girls were perceived to be in the school, which had an impact on their 
own reputations as members of that school community. Many parents explicitly seek and value schools that 
control and monitor female sexuality, mobility and gender mixing; and schools that teach boys discipline and 
proper behavior. In this sense, the nature of the school as a disciplinary institution was fundamentally premised 
on its structuring of female subjectivity or gendered behavior. 
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niqab or variants of more conservative veiling) reported experiencing sexual harassment. 
Male and (paradoxically) female respondents expressed that harassment was caused by 
women being immodestly dressed, with the police typically ignoring and reluctant to 
investigate harassment cases (see Abdelhadi 2008, Mayton and Ammar 2008). Girls are 
of course blamed for sexual assaults on them in many other contexts, especially those 
where such is a widespread phenomenon, such as in disadvantaged areas in countries of 
the South, where it becomes one of the key barriers to schooling and perhaps the key 
reason for school drop-out, especially in rural areas where students must travel 
significant distances to arrive to school (Pinheiro 2006). 52   Patterns of blame and 
increased sexual harassment on Egyptian streets are closely related to religious 
discourses that claim Egyptian women are not modestly dressed. That is, the religiously 
legitimized atmosphere which sanctions the rebuke and beating of a student based on 
her attire is the very same one that legitimizes sexual harassment against women in 
general, based either on the claim that they are insufficiently modest or even regardless of 
the modesty of their attire, and even they are wearing the full niqab. As Ismail has 
observed in her study in a popular neighborhood of Cairo, the headscarf was not taken 
as a guarantee of modesty by many young men and stories about its use ―as a cover for 
compromising conduct‖ were invoked to undermine women‘s claims to modesty (2006, 
109). 
 
Sexual harassment is an issue that many schools have to deal with on a daily basis. This 
was especially true for the girls‘ general public school. The fact that the school was 
directly adjacent to both the boys‘ general secondary school and another preparatory 
school meant that school authorities had to deal with harassment issues almost daily. 
Sexual harassment was a serious concern for both parents and students. Some parents 
simply did not want to bring their girls to school because of constant harassment. A 
                                            
52 As various studies from different communities especially in countries of the South, sexual aggression by male 
teachers and boys is often dismissed as ‗just boys being boys‘, while girls are blamed for ‗asking for it‘ (Pinheiro 
2006, 112). In the Middle East, sexual harassment of girls is not commonly reported, perhaps because 
girls are commonly separated from boys in schools, and because girls are reluctant to speak out; and a 
study in Ethiopia, for example, found that students attributed the sexual harassment of girls to the way 
the girls dressed and not to boys‘ attitudes toward girls (Pinheiro 2006, 119). In West and Central Africa, 
teachers justified sexual exploitation of female students by saying that their clothes and behavior were 
provocative, and that the teachers were far from home and in sexual need (Pinheiro 2006, 119). 
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group of parents and teachers had actually went to the head of the local police station 
to ask him to assign a policeman to the area to prevent harassment; a request that he 
refused; reportedly unless the parents paid the policeman themselves. Many girls 
resented, feared and were deeply hurt by the harassment they encountered, which 
ranged from bags of chips being thrown at them to draw their attention, to a whole 
range of verbal harassment and attempted physical contact. They tried different 
strategies to avoid this twice-daily ritual. Some tried to walk out of school accompanied 
by teachers, many made sure to walk out in big groups or with one other student at the 
very least and a few carried small self-defense tools such as spray, a pin or a small knife. 
The most effective strategy unfortunately was not to come to school at all. The girls 
were constantly harassed by the boys from both schools, despite the many efforts to 
prevent this: through changing the timing of the start and end of the school days for 
each school, by having teachers patrol the area around the school, or by attempting to 
prevent students from lingering outside the school. It was largely in vain. The principal 
of the school had also tried to convince district educational authorities to switch the 
newly built schools, so that the girls‘ school could be the one on the main street instead 
of being in the middle, between the two boys‘ schools and only accessed by a small 
passageway. This was also in vain. Teachers and students began to access the school 
from another gate, but this was blocked because local residents used the area outside it 
as a rubbish dump and educational and local authorities could not prevent them from 
doing so. Despite the legitimizing rhetoric of moral blame to girls, school actors did in 
fact make concerted attempts to rectify the security situation for girls, but were blocked 
by a weak and corrupt state apparatus.  
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Figure 13: Boys‘ General School and Boys‘ Preparatory School with Arched Pathway Leading 
to Girls‘ Secondary School.  
 
Beyond this everyday verbal—and limited physical—harassment, incidents of grave 
sexual assault were also not un-common; including a recent case of rape of a girl in the 
public general school. Seeing my shock when they recounted how the student had 
arrived to school in torn clothes and a hysterical state having been assaulted by one or 
more boys and was locked up in the toilet by the principal until her father and brother 
came to collect her, several students expressed that this was ―normal.‖  Several other 
stories were referred to of girls from other schools being assaulted. It was not a 
pleasant topic, however, and the girls did not want to discuss it in great detail. .  
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PUNISHMENT, NONCOMPLIANCE AND GENDER 
TRADITIONALISM 
What are the implications of these practices of discipline and punishment for student 
discourses and practices? Do they produce submissive citizens who have little self 
confidence and hypocritical subjects who understand that the best way to deal with/in 
institutions of the state is to act ‗extra-legally‘? Significant psychological and educational 
research has linked harsh punishment with four main areas of student discourse and 
practice: an increased propensity to engage in violence, an inability to internalize moral 
values, a negative self-image and increased noncompliance.  It is not straightforward 
however to relate such conclusions to the level of classroom observation because the 
research did not follow each student in either his or her reflections on experiences of 
punishment or patterns of discourse and practices relating to violence, ‗moral values‘, 
submissiveness or noncompliance. There is no necessary association between school 
disciplinary styles and how any particular individual will receive the punishment and 
incorporate it into his or her repertoire of behaviors, self-image, discourses or practices. 
Clearly, students varied greatly in their levels of assertiveness and noncompliance as 
seen in school contexts and in their own use of physical and emotional violence in their 
interaction. Too many individual, family, economic and political variables may affect 
such insertions or reverse and alter them.  
 
In any case, in terms of ‗submissiveness‘ or rebellion, for example, it may be difficult to 
consider the general attitude of most boys or girls in any of the schools as 
―submissive‖; a fluid and contextual concept (see Allan and Gilbert 1997). Age may be 
critical here as secondary students cannot be easily compared with primary and 
preparatory students in terms of fear and submissiveness. Naguib (2006) argues, 
however, that students in preparatory schools displayed an extremely aggressive and 
confrontational stance towards the school system in a way unparalleled in the history of 
Egyptian education. He describes a new wave of student violence in schools which 
includes damaging school property, beating teachers, infighting and smuggling soft 
176 
weapons such as blades and knives into school. Recent news reporting and media 
portrayals of Egyptian education also paint an [anecdotal] image of a rising assertive 
and confrontational attitude among students. Their focus is typically on general 
secondary students, the main locus of middle-class audiences‘ interest. Indeed, the 
focus is frequently on middle-range private general secondary schools in upper middle-
class neighborhoods. These reports and portrayals emphasize violence between 
students, but also stress students‘ abuse and intimidation of teachers (see for example, 
Difa‗an ‗an al-Darb 2010). .  
 
Literature on school discipline suggests that forms of student noncompliance may 
develop when teachers use harsh or arbitrary punitive measures, maintain extreme 
social distance because of classroom size or teacher personality, or use arbitrary criteria 
for judging student work (see Woods 1990 for an overview). D‘Amato has argued that 
in the absence of either compelling structural returns to education in terms of 
improved social standing, or situational rewards in terms of interest in the material and 
positive classroom relations, student frustration often escalates into more volatile forms 
of noncompliance. 53  Such a process can help students establish and modify their 
understandings of material in a way that is meaningful for them. Anne Locke Davidson 
(1996) has further argued that a number of factors contribute most to student 
alienation, and hence noncompliance; including educational tracking, negative teacher 
expectations, differential treatment of students, enforcement of hierarchy and status 
divisions, and withholding or making inaccessible knowledge that students need to 
succeed. Youth also express strong distaste for lecturing and seatwork and prefer 
personally relevant curriculum (Davidson 1999). As described throughout this thesis, all 
of these elements were characteristic of the situation in most public schools and, in 
fact, private schools as well.  
 
                                            
53 The ―structural rationale‖ refers to students‘ perceptions that doing well in school will help their career 
opportunities, social status and economic mobility. That is, education will have the ―extrinsic value‖ of improving 
their position in the broader societal structure. The ―situational rationale,‖ however, refers to students‘ perception 
that doing well and participating diligently may be a ―means of maintaining valued relationships with teachers and 
peers and of gaining access to experiences of mastery and accomplishment‖ (D‘Amato 1993, 191). 
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Noncompliance however was a key feature of classroom interactions across the 
schools. Challenging behavior was most consistently apparent among the boys at the 
different schools I became familiar with. I experienced the technical boys‘ school as a 
volatile and violent context in comparison with all the other schools, though it was not 
as violent as some schools that have received press coverage. Despite—and arguably 
because of—the use of physical violence by teachers, students frequently engaged in 
confrontational behavior. In almost every class in the boys‘ technical school, one or 
more students engaged in behavior that was guaranteed to elicit verbal humiliation and 
physical punishment from the teacher. Indeed, if the frequency and severity of their 
noncompliance is an indication of lack of fear, docility or submissiveness, the technical 
school boys were the least fearful and boys across the schools were generally quite 
assertive. While I witnessed far less challenging behavior in the girls‘ schools, female 
students seemed more engaged in ‗complaints‘ related to rectifying perceived 
educational injustices. As Ohrn has concluded (1998), girls seem more invested in 
educational justice; which can be seen by boys as ‗hacking at meaningless detail‘. It 
seemed that many boys preferred to ‗take it like a man‘ rather than filing complaints or 
overtly protesting teacher decisions. They also sometimes took it ‗in their hands‘, 
through noncompliance, ridicule, pranks or other retaliation against teachers. In fact, 
on one of first days of fieldwork in the boys‘ general secondary school when the car of 
one of the teachers had disappeared. It seems that students had arranged for the car to 
be removed from in front of the school and the teacher had to frantically leave the 
school and search the whole neighborhood for it.  
 
It has often been argued that noncompliance is a fundamental feature of working class 
education. Willis (1977), Foley (1990), Holland and Eisenhart (1990) have argued that, 
contrary to top-down models of the imposition of unequal social relations, educational 
institutions are one of many social sites within which specific populations actively 
reproduce their own subordinate status. Status negotiations within and between peer 
groups, conscious and unconscious strategies of resistance to institutional authority, 
and the realistic perception of often limited employment opportunities after leaving 
school life, together channel the creative interactions of students themselves toward the 
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reproduction of standing relations of power. 54  From Willis‘ Hammertown ‗lads‘ to 
Eckert‘s (1989) Detroit ‗burnouts‘ to McLaren‘s (1999) Toronto ‗cool guys‘ to 
Macleod‘s (1987) US Northeastern ‗hallway hangers,‘ resistance researchers identify 
rebellious subcultures and trace them to the culture of the working class. They argue 
that these youth learn in their local milieu- family, neighborhood, peer group- a discrete 
culture which clashes with a middle-class oriented school system. This is argued to 
activate a rebellion characterized by truancy, delinquency, disinterest in school, and 
troubled relations with teachers, thereby leading to poor grades and streaming into non-
academic tracks. In rejecting school, these youth rebuff irrelevant school qualifications 
and eagerly anticipate the ‗real world‘ of employment (Davies 1995, 663). However, 
while many students may be fully aware of the empty content and illusory promise of 
their education and resentful towards school authorities, confrontational behavior is 
only one way of expressing this awareness. Some of the most vulnerable or 
disadvantaged youth may not feel empowered to be noncompliant at all; if they are 
unable to rely on social or familial resources that could temper any school punishment.  
 
For girls, noncompliance revolved most around control over gender identity. Female 
students engaged in other forms of noncompliance: talking to friends, using mirrors to 
fix their headscarves or make-up, listening to music—or religious sermons—on mobile 
phones during class and displaying a general disinterest in the content of lessons. It has 
been argued in other contexts that working class girl‘s ‗opposition‘ to schools is 
articulated through different forms of ‗gender traditionalism‘ (Weis 1990, McRobbie 
1981, Lees 1986, Griffen 1985, Davies 1984, Gaskell 1985). This means that girls 
accentuate their femininity in exaggerated displays of physical maturity and hyper-
concerns with ‗romance‘ on the one hand, while prioritizing domestic roles such as 
                                            
54 In relation to these gendered dynamics, Paul Willis‘ (1977) argument was that by contesting schooling, working 
class youth reproduce themselves as future manual laborers and homemakers.54 It is therefore argued that a 
defiant masculine ethos propels school rejection, whereas female opposition to school is less confrontational and 
disruptive and lacks the bravado that the ‗lads‘ supposedly expressed (Ohrn 1998, Davies 1984, Griffin 1985, 
Anyon 1988). Based on his work on Canadian high schools, Davies (1995) challenges the argument that 
misbehavior is a conduit for differential class outcomes but agrees that gender traditionalism rather than class 
background is a more durable source of cultural reproduction through school underachievement. Several studies 
have suggested that among ‗less successful students‘, male and female roles polarize over time (Davies 1984, 
Holland and Eisenhart 1990). 
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marriage, child-rearing and household duties over schooling, on the other. This 
arguably provides students with alternative identities from which they can repudiate 
school sponsored ‗middle class‘ ideals of femininity such as diligence and passivity 
(Davies 1995). Yet this opposition is thought to also ironically trap girls into early 
marriage and motherhood, thereby reproducing their positions as working class wives 
and mothers. It is not difficult however to see why almost all the girls in the technical 
school, and many girls in the public general school, valued marriage and relationships 
over work, given high unemployment, underemployment, very low wages and sexual 
harassment in the sectors they are likely to find work (see Elgeziri 2010, see Chapter 
Three on female withdrawal from the workforce). .  
 
CONCLUSION 
Severity with learners is harm upon them, 
especially in younger children. The learner raised 
in injustice and repression becomes overpowered, 
the vastness of his self narrowed, its enthusiasm 
done away with; it brings him to lethargy, drives 
him to lying and cunning; which is to pretend 
other than what is in his conscience in fear of the 
outstretching of hands with oppression over him. It 
thus teaches him craftiness and deceit, which 
become his habit and nature; and the meanings of 
humanity that he possesses are corrupted.  
Ibn Khaldun in his Muqaddima (cited in 
Sadiq 2010). 
 
ًصف ًف ْأ حذؾٌا ىٍع ٍٍّٓعزٌّا حشضِ ،ُٙث بٍّع 
ًف شغبصأ ذٌٌٛا… ِٓ ْبو ٖبثشِ فغعٌبث شٙمٌاٚ 
ِٓ ،ٍٍّٓعزٌّا عبغ ٗث ،شٙمٌا كٍضٚ ىٍع ظفٌٕا ًف 
،بٙعبغجٔا ت٘رٚ ،بٙعبؾٕث ٖبعدٚ ىٌإ ،ًغىٌا ٍّٗحٚ 
ىٍع ةزىٌا ،ثجخٌاٚ ٛ٘ٚ ش٘بظزٌا شٍغث بِ ًف 
،ٖشٍّض بفٛخ ِٓ طبغجٔا يذٌلأا شٙمٌبث ،ٍٍٗع ٍّٗعٚ 
شىٌّا خعٌذخٌاٚ ،هٌزٌ دسبصٚ ٌٗ ٖز٘ حدبع ،بمٍخٚ 
دذغفٚ ًٔبعِ خٍٔبغٔلإا ًزٌا ٌٗ. 
 
This chapter has described the most salient issues around verbal and physical 
punishment in the schools. Humiliation and negative labeling were constant features of 
school and classroom relations in the public schools. While verbal insults were 
common in all the schools, including the private schools, the use of physical and verbal 
punishment ranged from severe to mild based on social class and gender. Boys in 
technical schools suffered the most verbal and physical assaults, even in my presence, 
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followed by general school boys. Girls in both public schools were less frequently 
beaten and were humiliated using less ―street‖ language. Boys and girls in private 
schools were not systematically beaten or humiliated. .  
 
Beating and humiliation were a part and expression of social hierarchy and relations of 
power in the schools and were legitimated by discourses that validated them and 
constructed them as common sense. Teachers used religion, patriarchy, analogies with 
the family, and cultural appropriateness to justify their harsh practices. Public school 
teachers were fully aware that they could beat students with impunity and that students 
had no effective access to the law. Importantly, beating and humiliation were used to 
compensate for the lack of formal disciplinary powers and status brought about by the 
impoverishment of teachers and the marketization of education.  These relationships of 
discipline in a key institution of the state symbolize the ways in which the Egyptian 
state had suffered profound corrosion of its key functions, and has been reduced to 
dealing with this decay through daily practices of both repression and permissiveness in 
an almost complete breakdown of the ―rule of law‖ (for the overwhelming majority of 
the nation‘s citizens who enroll in public schools). The chapter has attempted to show 
how youth experiences of schooling may inform their experiences and expectations as 
gendered and classed citizens of the state. By focusing on patterns of punishment and 
control used by school authorities, the chapter highlight has highlighted not just the 
violence but the informality or ‗extra-legality‘ of school relations of control, especially 
in public schools. These dysfunctional relations of discipline and control embody and 
are premised upon the state‘s distinct citizenship and social contracts with different 
social classes. .  
 
The observed increase in arbitrariness and violence in the public schools has critical 
links to privatization and low teacher wages. With the decline in their real wages, 
teachers had been increasingly resorting to various forms of pressure on students to 
enroll in private tutoring with them through their control over student marks and other 
disciplinary measures. Rather than raising their salaries, the state attempted to prevent 
them from this kind of abuse by removing their various ‗formal‘ powers over students; 
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leading to forms of ‗invented‘ or ‗pretend‘ discipline, arbitrary and illegal punishment as 
well as permissiveness and leniency. Teachers‘ own impoverishment may have led to 
the increased use of violence either in an effort to gain access to resources, to enforce a 
measure of order in the absence of other measures, or to compensate for feelings of 
powerlessness. It is not clear that teachers have lost their hiba because they are unable 
to beat children. Their sense of a loss of status and disciplinary control—and the actual 
withdrawal of formal disciplinary powers from them—was primarily the result of their 
low pay, their dependence on private tutoring and the very poor value of the education 
their school systems were able to offer. The increase in the use of physical beating and 
humiliation across the public schools is therefore fundamentally related to the multi-
faceted impoverishment of schools, teachers and families under neoliberalism, as well 
general governance patterns of informality, extra-legality and corruption. .  
 
Informal and extra-legal practices disentitling students from protection and provision 
rights almost necessitated the use of both continuous negative labeling and intimidation 
and repression of protest. In reference to the practice of some teachers in the technical 
school of making students clean the floors of the classrooms, one student in the boys‘ 
school recounted how a teacher had failed him in the practical exam because he took a 
video on his phone of this practice and her behavior in the classroom and threatened to 
expose her. He explained the teacher‘s degrading attitude and negative labeling of 
students; adding that ―she makes us feel hopeless [bitya‟isna].‖ This reflects the three 
interrelated patterns of abuse to which teachers resorted. Extra-legal practices are 
combined with two more forms of abuse: negative labeling and the intimidation and 
punishment of protest. Therefore, aside from beating and humiliation, forcing students 
to perform extra chores or to enroll in tutoring perhaps works best if opposition is 
forcefully deterred and there is a general and sustained discourse of the unworthiness of 
students. Themes of humiliation, negative labeling and their links with social class are 
revisited in some detail in the discussion of student citizenship discourses in Chapter 
Seven. .  
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Public school students most often linked teachers‘ beating and humiliation to 
illegitimate motives and practices. Many understood the treatment they received as 
resulting from their social class. Beating in the public schools also significantly varied 
according to the age and physical build of the student, as well as by parents‘ 
involvement and connections. Safety from physical and emotional harm—or the 
securing of protective citizenship rights—was understood to be only guaranteed in 
private schools. These citizenship rights were understood as fundamentally structured 
by the ability to pay and by social class. Indeed, one of the ways students sometimes 
argued for their entitlement to greater respect was not that this was their right as 
citizens, students or human beings. It was the possibility that they were not destined to 
failure and low social status as their teachers assumed. As one student put it, ―they 
should not treat us this way… maybe we will graduate and become doctors‖ (even if 
they were unfortunately aware that this is rather unlikely, see Chapter Four). .  
 
In describing such routine forms beating and humiliation, this chapter does not seek 
however to portray technical schools or public schools more generally as veritable 
nightmares for students. For many students, there was always time to chat, to jump the 
fence, to play soccer or to escape class by running an errand for a teacher, sometimes 
even being allowed to ride the teacher‘s motorcycle. Teachers were not unequivocal 
monsters who simply beat boys and humiliated girls at whim and exploited students 
financially. In some classes in the general and technical secondary schools, some 
teachers did not insult students at all. Students in these classes were typically more 
compliant. To address noncompliant behavior, these teachers would say, ―miss, 
concentrate here please‖ (ya anisa, rakkizi hina min fadlik), or would simply call out, 
―mister, sir, respectable‖ (ya ustaz, ya afandim, ya muhtaram), to get their attention and 
rebuke them. Mrs. Mirvat, the ‗exemplary‘ English language teacher in the girls‘ general 
secondary school (see Chapter Four), called the students ―daughter‖ (ya binti) and 
sometimes ―miss‖ (in English).  There was also complicity, leniency, the sharing of 
jokes, ringtones, religious sermons and perhaps even sexually explicit material. There 
were teachers who showed compassion for the orphaned or poorer students and always 
one or two who encouraged and believed in hard-working students and showed respect 
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for students as a whole. One teacher in the girls‘ general school actively attempted to 
help students ‗believe in themselves‘ and their power to become ‗successful‘ by 
believing that they can achieve what they want; organizing school seminars based on 
motivational themes (‗you are what you believe‘). Unfortunately, he also reinforced for 
them the middle class ideal of becoming a doctor or engineer as worthy goals to believe 
in.  
 
There were fundamental differences between the disciplinary styles of even the harsher 
private school teachers and the beating and obscenity used in the public schools. The 
underlying assumption in the private schools was not that beating was right and did not 
need justification; quite the contrary. For example, whereas teachers in public schools 
explained beating in terms of poor student upbringing, Mr. Samir told me ―I am 
impolite (ana „alil il-adab), and everyone will tell you this.‖ And while he offered students 
a highly valued service that was believed to greatly enhance their chances for success, it 
was not at all clear what public school teachers offered (see Chapters Three and Four). 
Importantly, he taught the same way at school as he did in his private tutoring.55 He 
explained diligently, did not waste class time and provided a high level of instruction. 
He did not need to withhold information to build up a clientele among students. He 
was already a sought after ―star‖ with a long waiting list every year. He had plenty of 
financial and moral capital to obviate any dependence on severity in order to extract 
resources from students or encourage their enrollment in his tutoring classes. 
 
DISCIPLINE, AUTHORITY AND NONCOMPLIANCE 
Beating was not rejected in principle; whether by most parents or by students. Beating 
in exchange for education and beating in exchange for other forms of care were widely 
accepted by parents. The public schools, however, lacked the minimum necessary 
material and cultural capacities to ‗provide‘ or care for students—educationally, 
recreationally or developmentally—- in ways that may make the violence more palatable 
                                            
55 There was still more class time, more revision classes and more exercise exams in tutoring than in school, which 
explains why most of his students still enrolled in private tutoring, either with him or with other tutors. 
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or part of a ‗disciplinary‘ project. As the example of harsh private school teachers 
shows, the ―impoliteness‖ of Mr. Samir was tolerated and even reportedly found 
endearing by many students. In fact, many students paid thousands of pounds to enroll 
with him in private tutoring despite his severity. Was he tolerated because he was 
‗conscientious‘? Students valued and were responsive to teachers‘ ‗respect;‘ both in 
terms of conscientious behavior (teaching well in class and not coercing them into 
tutoring, see Chapter Four) as well as in terms of teachers‘ encouragement them or 
taking their circumstances into account. As noted in different studies, disadvantaged 
students especially tended to define respect broadly as teachers caring for them as well 
as having positive expectations of them (Davidson 1999, Hajii 2006). 56  Mr. Samir 
certainly had very high expectations of his students and undoubtedly provided them 
with a quality of instruction considered to be one of the best in the country. He 
believed that they could get the highest grades in the difficult Physics exam and he 
methodically prepared them for this. There is no claim that his abuse was benign or 
without negative emotional consequences for students. The point, however, is that his 
teaching and his harsh discipline and punishment techniques are part of a ―disciplinary 
project‖ and of an educational endeavor, where subject matter was actually taught to 
students, who then had real prospects of competing for university placement based on 
their marks (see Chapter Four). It may well be as parents implied in the ―pro-beating 
demonstration‖ mentioned earlier: beating is ok if the child gets educated. 
 
The significant removal of disciplinary powers from teachers was a token measure by 
MOE to address the abuse of power by segments of teachers to extract additional 
income from students through private tutoring. The authority, rules and discipline of 
the school were violated in fundamental ways. Rules of attendance and good behavior 
were scarcely observed in all of the schools. Given the realities of informal privatization 
discussed in the previous chapter, this might not be very surprising. Most students got 
their education elsewhere, and many of them felt this to be an unjust situation for 
                                            
56 ―Students believe they are respected when adults challenge them to succeed academically, give attention to their 
particularities and commonalities, are responsive to their needs and foster positive expectations‖ (C.A.R.E: 
Challenge, Attention, Responsiveness, and Expectation) (Hajii 2006, 66). 
185 
which teachers carried a lot of the responsibility. Seen in this light, noncompliance was 
a fundamental symptom of the privatization and the breakdown of national school-
based secondary education in Egypt. .  
 
Furthermore, especially due to pervasive extra-legal practices, there was a sense in 
which students and parents had also become more assertive; making complaints, 
threatening escalation to higher educational authorities and, in some cases, filing police 
complaints. As argued throughout the thesis, the erosion of disciplinary powers is 
directly linked to teachers‘ impoverishment, the marketization of education and its 
declining market returns due to increasing unemployment and informality.  Many 
students displayed acute awareness of the arbitrary repression to which they were 
subjected. Many voiced their opinions and challenged the teachers‘ decisions, despite 
the dire consequences. Many teachers and administrators refused to participate in the 
repression and financial abuse of students and attempted to temper its effects on their 
students. School actors also pervasively employed various ‗weapons of the weak‘ (Scott 
1985) to neutralize the injustice of the system against them, strategies that ranged from 
falsifying rental contracts in order to enroll in better schools to fabricating stories of 
sexual abuse in order to remove emotionally and financially abusive teachers. Parents 
also came to school authorities with complaints and went to the police with litigation. .  
 
The sense of blocked opportunities and low returns to education that working class 
students experienced arguably fed into more traditional gender attitudes, where girls 
focus on relationships and motherhood over school work and boys display more 
macho and confrontational styles. Not only perceptions of the value of their education, 
but also perceptions of the unfairness and extralegality of practices pervading the public 
schools were behind forms of noncompliant and challenging behavior in the schools, 
especially for boys. The subversion of school discipline was particularly visible when it 
came to female modesty, and this subversion brings to the fore the role of schools in 
the construction of ideal femininities and masculinities. Different projects of ‗coolness‘ 
and ‗distinction‘ effectively competed with the schools‘ conservative ideals of gender 
comportment and led to continuous struggles around noncompliance in the schools.  
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IMPOSSIBLE FEMININITIES AND INJURED MASCULINITIES 
Although religious orthodoxy on these matters was not explicitly challenged, rules of 
modesty and comportment were subverted on a daily basis. A significant proportion of 
girls went ahead with whatever they wanted to do, from colored scarves to talking to 
boys; mastering ways of maneuvering the multiple modes of street, school, peer and 
family surveillance and control. Private school girls, while subject to similar patterns of 
moral blame, had access to material and cultural resources that relatively shielded them 
both from harassment and more severe and systematic certain forms of moral blame. 
Parents and the school community proactively tried to ensure better security for the 
girls, through educational administration and through the police, who did not respond 
to their needs and effectively expected them to pay for the public service of security. 
Forms of gender control around the school were fundamentally related to the 
weakening and corruption of the state‘s protective powers and functions and its 
accommodations with Islamist forces. The discourses concerning modesty and victim-
blaming and limitations placed on girls‘ behavior as a result were perhaps necessitated 
by the precarious security situation in popular quarters. These discourses and 
limitations also helped facilitate and obscure the withdrawal of the state from its 
protective functions. .  
 
I have wondered why the girls, usually very open and talkative did not really want to 
talk too much about incidents of sexual assault such as the one recounted above. Their 
distanced reaction reminded me of how boys reacted around the issue of physical 
assault by teachers. Boys often wanted me to record the beatings and insults, urging me 
to document this, gesturing to me to ―write it‖ in my notes, and checking with me: ―did 
you write that one down?‖ (katabti di ya miss?). Many wanted to shame the teachers, to 
expose them or to exact a measure of justice out of them. Some clearly expressed a 
sense of grievance and a desire for accountability. For example, after describing regular 
practices of beating and humiliation, one such student emphatically declared: ―I‘m 
talking to the minister from here and saying this. We are suffering, Miss.‖ Many 
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students refrained however from decrying the violence, and many maintained a matter-
of-fact or a playful attitude: not one of pain and indignation, but rather one of wanting 
to expose, mock and debase the teachers. For both boys and girls, there was a resigned 
or matter of fact attitude; that this was a reality one had to live with and ought not to 
dwell on. In a sense, there was nothing to do about it, nothing other than what most 
girls normally do: try to stay in groups, hope that a male relative, teacher or neighbor 
could escort them through empty or crowded streets and hope to be lucky. I imagine 
that, for girls, deepening the discussion around sexual assault would bring up the usual 
patterns of blame for the victim. If a student was attacked on the way to school, for 
example, she was likely walking alone to school. It may then be said, but why would she 
do that or why do her parents allow this; what kind of family is she from? That is, I 
imagined from the reluctance of the girls to elaborate on this matter, despite their usual 
openness, a certain awareness that any discussion of sexual assault would inevitably 
bring blame onto the girls: not only onto the victim in question but onto all girls and 
especially those who may engage in the same behaviors, even something as simple as 
walking to school un-chaperoned. The implicit assumption is of course that if the girls 
were dressed properly and behaved properly, they would not be harassed. Therefore, 
the reality of harassment, especially of a more grave nature, and the experience of being 
harassed could be seen and experienced as a moral failing; as an affront to one‘s ideal 
femininity. 
 
The reality of sexual assault and the moral blame connected with it have direct 
implications for the spaces of freedom girls try to carve out for themselves. Incidents 
of sexual assault give legitimacy to strict family and school surveillance and monitoring 
of girls on the one hand and to the various forms of limitations on their mobility on the 
other. It seemed that the girls preferred not to confront these realities out of ‗desire‘; 
the desire not to lose their limited margins of freedom; or the ‗fear that these spaces 
may be lost. Implicit in this (relative) silence is an acute realization of the limited and 
fragile legitimacy of their presence on the street, or an ‗internalization‘ and 
normalization of the assessment of their ‗deviance‘ from ideal femininity. The girls were 
aware that in most cases, their very presence on the street could easily open them to 
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accusations of moral failing. It injured ‗ideal femininity‘. Almost anything could be 
taken against them so that they could be blamed for the occurrence of harassment, 
from their attire to walking alone or simply waiting for a bus. The very presence of 
(young) women in the public space, especially the street as its epitome, could be 
incriminating and open them for violation. They had to try to be as un-present as 
possible. As one girl put it: ―in order to walk in the street, a girl should to be deaf and 
blind… and mute too‖ („ashan timshi fel shari„, il bint il mafrud tib‟a tarsha wi „amya… wi 
kharsa kaman). This ―demure femininity, rooted in the notion of a closed, contained 
body moving toward a clearly defined destination through public space, both enables 
and constrains a women‘s presence in public‖ (Lukose 2005, 514). 
 
To go back to the boys‘ reactions around physical assault by teachers, being beaten 
could also be seen and experienced as an assault on ideal masculinity (see Ismail 2006, 
127 on the destabilization of masculine constructs); one that it is not pleasant to 
confront, highlight or  dwell on. The boys may have thought that had they been better 
built or more aggressive, they would not have received as much strikes from teachers. 
If they had enough money to regularly pay for private tutoring, they would be spared 
related harassment from teachers. If they had powerful fathers who could intimidate 
teachers, they could stand on the side of the classroom while others swept the floor. If 
they could afford private education or had parents who had access to state institutions 
and could file police complaints against teachers, they would not be beaten or 
humiliated. Ultimately, if they were not poor, they would be more masculine. Being 
beaten can therefore represent a distinctly ‗masculine‘ shame, intimately linked to 
income, power and social status. Within the construction of men as primary 
breadwinners and the centrality of income earning capacity in constructions of 
masculinity, beating represented an injury to ideal masculinities both in terms of 
physical vulnerability and in terms of its relation to social class and poverty. The 
silences around harassment and beating seemed to point to how untenable the 
hegemonic ideal femininities and masculinities were for poor students under the 
neoliberal (and Islamist) citizenship projects. 
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In her powerful ethnography of impoverished families in a favela in Brazil, Donna 
Goldstein (2003) observes that the survivalist ethos of many of the mothers coping 
with a harsh world leads, in turn, to some rather harsh forms of discipline and 
punishment. She observes that mothers deeply fear that some of their children will find 
the street more attractive than their crowded, destitute, and sometimes contentious 
households. These women often initiate harsh, even brutal or degrading, forms of 
discipline in the hopes of keeping their children in line and off the street. This applied 
not only to boys but to girls as well. Girls who spent too much time on the street were 
seen as girls ‗of the street‘— without the protection of a man or a family and thus open 
to sexual predation. Despite significant differences between this context and the 
research sites, these issues may recall the strict limits teachers placed on their daughters‘ 
presence in potentially dangerous streets around the public schools and their 
vulnerability to various forms of harassment or sexual assault. They highlight the 
relationships between poverty and vulnerability, harsh punishment, gender surveillance 
and discipline at the heart of school relations. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  NATIONAL 
IDENTITY AND CITIZEN SHIP IN 
SECONDARY SCHOOL 
TEXTBOOKS  
INTRODUCTION 
The Good Citizen is characterized by: 
 Faith in God the Almighty and adherence to the correct teachings of religion and respect for the 
beliefs of others 
 Complete awareness of his civil and political rights and duties in society, so that he demands 
his rights and undertakes his duties 
 Possessing a sense of initiative and positive participation in developing his society, including 
volunteer work and participation in elections and political party work. 
 Integrity and diligence in work in pursuit of pleasing God, whether this work is religious or 
worldly. 
 Commanding virtue and forbidding vice through wisdom and good advice in his social sphere, 
in application of the God‟s words: “Invite (all) to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and 
beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious: for thy Lord 
knoweth best, who have strayed from His Path, and who receive guidance” Surat al-Nahl, 
verse 125 [Holy Quran 16:125 -Yusuf Ali Translation] 
(Nationalist Education textbook for First Secondary Technical 2009/2010, page 20) 
 
The above description proceeds to emphasize a long list of attributes of the Good 
Citizen ranging from personal skills development to respect of the constitution. The 
desired citizen subjectivity articulated by the textbook includes a host of additional 
qualities, values and attitudes: the use of scientific thinking methods, awareness of 
current events and adoption of a position on them, awareness of society‘s political, 
economic and social system, the ability to deal with modern technologies, intellectual 
tolerance, moderation and acceptance of the other, preservation of national unity, 
communication with others without prejudice or condescension (isti„la‟), awareness of 
national history and extraction of lessons from it in order to improve the present and 
the future, avoidance of passivity, selfishness, self-centeredness and apathy, a strong 
will and decision making abilities, respect for the constitution and preservation of the 
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stability of society, pride and belonging to nation, history and civilization, increased 
self-confidence, faith in one‘s skills and abilities and developing them in order to 
contribute to the elevation of one‘s nation. 
 
This comprehensive description may indicate that the citizenship project of Egyptian 
education in the late Mubarak era was Islamist (see Chapter One, pp 41-49, on defining 
Islamism), nationalist, democratic and neoliberal. To what extent are these aspects of 
the desired citizenship project reflected in the message presented to students across 
secondary school textbooks? Which aspects of Islamic thought and piety do these 
books promote as key defining attribute of the ―good‖ citizen? Which understandings, 
themes and values of Islam are emphasized in the textbooks and which are obscured or 
condemned? Is it significant that a book on the life and reign of the Caliph Umar Ibn 
al-Khattab, a symbol of the just and accountable Islamic ruler, was removed from 
Arabic Language textbooks in the early 1990s, whereas Wa Islamah, a historical novel on 
struggle against the Crusaders and Moguls remained the key literary text of the general 
secondary stage? How do the textbooks portray the nation (al-watan), Egypt, Egyptians 
and the contours of desired national identity? How do they portray the regime, the 
President and the citizen? How do the textbooks articulate protective, provision and 
participation citizenship rights and duties? 
 
This chapter and the next attempt to draw a picture of how the nation and state were 
articulated and enacted in the schools, in terms of official discourses, mainly official 
textbooks, in this chapter; and in student and school level discourses and rituals in the 
next. This chapter describes constructions of national identity and citizenship across a 
sample of secondary school textbooks. The textbooks reveal the extent to which the 
regime had arrived at an accommodation with Islamist forces whereby they gained 
increasing control of cultural and identity spheres as the regime maintained and 
increased its economic and political monopoly. This is an accommodation that 
imploded in unexpected ways in January 2011, but will continue to have a profound 
effect on issues of national identity and citizenship, and hence, on economic and 
political citizenship rights, for decades to come. Secondary school textbooks draw the 
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contours of a desired national identity where love, belonging and loyalty to a nation that 
has been under external threat throughout its history are supreme. Docile and 
politically-benign non-oppositional aspects of Muslim identity and Islamist morality 
represent the core of this national identity, and the accomplishments of ancient 
Egyptian civilization are presented as a key source of national pride. In terms of 
citizenship, the textbooks seek to erase citizenship from view by merging the state (and 
the regime and the President) with the nation, so that the primary relationship of the 
individual is to the nation; a relationship where the individual ‗naturally‘ owes the 
nation the duty of loyalty and sacrifice. Replete with fictional achievements of the 
regime and its supposed promotion of democracy, the textbooks place the blame and 
responsibility on youth to become hard-working citizens adjusted to the demands of 
the neoliberal economy and lift up the nation to higher levels of ‗progress‘ and 
development. In their articulations of Islam and Muslim identity, the textbooks 
construct ‗Islam‘ around personal morality in non-oppositional terms; and citizenship 
becomes understood in religious terms so that the Good Citizen is the one who 
adheres to religious teaching and improves his personal conduct for the elevation of the 
nation.  
 
The first section of this chapter describes its approach to textbooks as sites of the 
production of nationhood and citizenship. The second section provides an overview of 
the historical changes in constructions of national identity and citizenship in Egyptian 
school textbooks throughout the Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak eras. The third section 
focuses on current textbooks, discussing the key ways in which they construct national 
identity and citizenship. It examines a selection of the 2009/2010 textbooks in general 
and technical secondary, as well as a sample of the corresponding ‗external‘/private 
textbooks. This chapter covers deals with four subjects that are most relevant for 
identity and citizenship construction: Nationalist Education and Arabic Language are 
given detailed treatment, while examples from History and Islamic Religious Education 
are introduced to support the key arguments. The final section brings together the main 
themes of nationhood and citizenship in secondary school textbooks.  
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TEXTBOOKS, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND 
CITIZENSHIP  
This research starts out from the assumption that schooling provides students with 
powerful citizenship lessons. Much of the research is focused on how the lived 
experience of schooling structures student citizen subjectivities. This chapter shifts the 
focus to the discourses of the official texts, and the citizenship and nationhood lessons 
they explicitly and implicitly attempt to impart to students. The focus is on the state‘s 
project of nationhood and citizenship in the late Mubarak era as articulated in the 
textbooks. The first three objectives of curriculum development of the Egyptian 
Ministry of Education (henceforth MOE) in 1995 were: (1) national loyalty, (2) religion 
and respecting others, and (3) basic literacy and numeracy for communication between 
citizens (Sayed 2006, 62). 
 
School textbooks reflect the narratives, knowledge and values considered appropriate 
and important to emphasize to young people by groups in control of textbook 
authorship and production. They also reflect the changes over time in the knowledges 
and discourses promoted by powerful groups. As Apple and Christian-Smith have 
argued, textbooks reflect ―profound political, economic, and cultural relations and 
histories‖ (1991, 3.) Textbooks are ―conceived, designed and authored by real people 
with real interests‖ and are ―published within the political and economic constraints of 
markets, resources and power‖ (Apple 1993, 46). In this sense, textbooks have been 
utilized as a means of examining power relations in society (Russell 2004). ―How a 
society selects, classifies, distributes transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge 
it considers to be public reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of 
social control‖ (Bernstein 1971, 47).  
 
―Since the inception of the nation-state, political education has been bound up with the 
project of nation-building, and the inculcation of patriotism has been widely regarded 
as a primary purpose of mass schooling‖ (Callan 2004, 77). ‗Citizenship Education‘ 
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itself has grown in importance across the world in recent years in light of debates 
around multi-cultural citizenship, immigration as well as the so-called ‗war on terrorism‘. 
History textbooks occupy a privileged position in this task of promoting national 
belonging and national identity. For this reason, History textbooks are always sites of 
struggle and reflect competing ideological influences, whether in authoritarian states or 
contemporary democratic societies. For example, a study of U.S. textbook portrayal of 
slavery between 1900 and 1992 identified a pronounced shift of emphasis from the 
multicultural texts of the 1960s and 1970s generated within a climate of liberal reform 
based around the civil rights movement to the more conservative representations of the 
1980s and 1990s produced within the political context of the neo-conservative Reagan 
and Bush administrations (Washburn 1997, 478). Since ―[n]ations rarely tell the truth 
about themselves‖, it is not surprising ―that the history which is taught to children is 
often a watered-down, partial and sometimes distorted, sometimes fictional, view of a 
national past based upon cultural, ideological and political selection‖ (Crawford 2004, 
10-11). However, other textbooks also play a major role in constructions of national 
identity and citizenship. In the case of Egypt, I argue that Arabic Language textbooks 
are in fact the most critical sites of identity and citizenship construction, along with 
Islamic Religious Education and Nationalist Education, the key course/subject 
concerned with citizenship issues.  
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP 
UNDER NASSER, SADAT AND MUBARAK 
There is little doubt that throughout most of modern Egyptian history, the education 
system has been an arena for struggles around national identity, citizenship and the 
ideologies informing them. The institution of education in modern Egypt was explicitly 
premised on providing only as much education as was needed to create a modern army 
and state bureaucracy and to limit education beyond the fulfilment of these needs of 
the state (Marsot 1984). After the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, British 
government officials called for the creation of more productive, more modern 
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Egyptians to serve the state and more likely to be loyal to a central state (Pollard 2005, 
100-101). Educational reform in the nineteenth century intersected with struggles for 
political and economic autonomy from the British, national identity building, and uses 
of novel technologies to forge a public sphere (Herrera 2002). Key public intellectuals 
like Abdallah Nadim saw education as ―the panacea for society‘s ills, and teachers the 
champions of a better society that would ideally be characterized by intersectarian social 
harmony, liberation from European domination, and national unity‖ (Herrera 2002, 
18). The British, on the other hand, had very specific ideas about educating Egyptians 
and creating a literate Egyptian class, ―which clashed with those of the Egyptians‖ 
(Pollard 2005, 114). The British were determined to maintain the country‘s ―agricultural 
spirit‖ and promote its agricultural productivity in order to guarantee the supply of 
cotton to British mills, and viewed education that would have led to industrial growth 
and detract from Egyptians‘ fitness for agricultural labor as ―a national evil‖ (Pollard 
2005, 114). Russell also argues that the British maintained their rule by teaching 
submission through religion and reinforcing British hegemony in history and geography 
classes (Russell 2002). As the Egyptians‘ struggle against British occupation intensified, 
the educational system became a means through which notions of ―the nation,‖ its 
history, its future, and its characteristics were cultivated (Pollard 2005, Herrera 2002). 
Until the end of British Occupation in the 1950s, the education system was a critical 
arena for the cultivation of the modern Egyptian. As Lisa Pollard argues concerning the 
onset of modern education in Egypt, from ―the latter decades of the nineteenth century 
onward, British administrators and Egyptian nationalists who worked within the 
colonial administration subjected elite Egyptian schoolchildren to a reform of their 
personal behavior that was designed to fit the needs of the Egyptian state- both as it 
transferred itself and as it struggled to liberate itself from the British‖ (Pollard 2005, 
100). 
 
However, a ‗mass public education system‘ only truly emerged in the Nasserite period. 
The Nasser regime (1952- 1970) understood state schools to be central to establishing 
and maintaining the new revolutionary political order, both through massively 
expanding access to education and attaching considerable importance to school 
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curricula as primary means of disseminating the values, symbols and goals of the July 
1952 Revolution. As Arab Nationalism and state socialism were the key ideological 
drivers of the Nasser regime, they were also the basis upon which nationhood and 
citizenship were articulated in Nasserite textbooks. Arab nationalism, Arab unity and 
the struggle against foreign imperialist and local and Arab counter-revolutionary forces 
were the cornerstones of national identity. Textbooks emphasized issues of poverty and 
exploitation and the expanding social and economic (protective and provision) 
citizenship rights promoted by the regime. They also emphasized ‗democracy‘ as a basic 
principle of the new regime; an assertion of course that was almost purely rhetorical, 
although ‗participation‘ in state affiliated organization such as the Socialist Union was 
greatly encouraged and rewarded. Nationalist Education textbooks offered detailed 
explanations of the role and function of the organs of the state, the rights and duties of 
citizens and the various problems in the country such as ‗ignorance and poverty‘ (see 
Adli 2001, 173-75 on Nasserite Nationalist Education curricula). Since 1959, with the 
greater emphasis on Arab Socialism, the education system was tasked with preparing 
the child for life in ‗a cooperative democratic, socialist, society‘ (Adli 2007, Starrett 
1998). Educational discourse also went to considerable lengths to emphasize the role of 
women and that young men and women would build the country ‗hand in hand‘, the 
‗girl next to the boy‘ (discourses that had been normalized for the Nasser generation, 
but today would more likely be sexualized, ‗moralized‘ and deemed inappropriate).  
 
Faten Adli (2001), who conducted a detailed analysis of educational discourse in the 
Nasser and Sadat eras, notes the key themes of textbooks in the Nasserite era, which 
were aimed at instilling loyalty to the regime and affinity with its goals. Textbooks 
placed great emphasis on class struggle and the struggle against imperialism and framed 
these as the bases of regime legitimacy. These were also articulated as part of the core 
of Egyptian identity, where not only ‗struggle,‘ but in fact ‗revolution‘ was expressed as 
a common thread in Egyptian history and national identity. The textbooks were full of 
passages about the role of resistance and national liberation movements and 
revolutions, with special emphasis given to the role played by peoples, the struggles of 
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peoples and the role of youth in promoting and defending the values and goals of the 
Revolution (Adli 2001).  
 
As such, textbooks gave considerable centrality to ‗the people‘ (al-sha„b, a word that 
rarely appears in current textbooks) and other oppressed peoples across the world. 
Despite the massive personality cult that developed around Nasser, commentators and 
researchers have noted the ownership of discourses on the role of ‗the people‘ and 
expressions of their own sense of agency and contribution to the Revolution. Adli, 
along with other commentators, attributes the degree of political awareness and 
organization of the student movement of the 1970s, to the political education received 
in Nasser‘s schools. Even among Nasser‘s critics, liberal commentator Usama al-
Ghazali Harb noted that ―the efforts and practices of political propaganda and 
inculcation in the Nasser era through the massive publicity machine that matched the 
very authoritarian nature of the regime... had no doubt contributed to spreading 
awareness and educating citizens on the concepts of independence, anti-colonialism, 
social justice, Arab nationalism and Arab unity and instilling these concepts in their 
hearts‖ (Harb 2010). The Nasserite era political education may have been so powerful 
that Sadat became convinced that only the unleashing- and in some cases arming- of 
militant Islamist groups could counter the politicized left.  
 
The framing of the July Revolution and its declared principles of social justice, anti-
imperialism and Arab nationalism were progressively diluted under Sadat and entirely 
removed and revised under Mubarak. The decline in the Arab nationalist dimension 
began under Sadat after the peace treaty with Israel. In recent textbooks, Arab 
nationalism is dealt with in 38 sentences compared to 712 sentences in the history 
textbook of the Nasser era (Adli 2007). The Sadat Regime (1970-81) sought to promote 
Sadat‘s new personal vision of Egypt and Egyptian identity, where three key areas 
represented new developments in Egyptian educational discourse. This included the 
focus on ―science and faith‖ as the basis of Egypt‘s progress and desired identity, the 
beginning of the involvement of the World Bank in educational policy making and the 
initiation of experimental schools (a privatization measure whereby higher quality elite 
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public schools charged fees and accepted high performing students), in addition to a 
focus on his own personality cult. As Adli (2007) notes, the 1977 history textbook was 
full of Sadat‘s pictures with the greatest importance placed on individual leadership, and 
ignored the role of the people or even the new ‗political parties‘ that were allowed to 
form. Educational goals in the Sadat era also began to emphasize linking education to 
work, adjusting to the open door policy, and the expansion of technical education to 
absorb 60% of secondary students. In a kind of reversal to the politicization and 
emphasis on ‗participation‘ in Nasserite revolutionary discourses, a number of recurrent 
themes shaped Sadat‘s educational agenda, including the emphasis that there was to be 
―no politics in education‖ (in textbooks as well as university activism), the emphasis on 
the ‗moralities of the village,‘ the importance of tradition and respect for ‗values‘, 
obedience and deference to elders, and the emphasis on faith and religion (For an 
excellent exposition see Adli 2001). Adli (2001) also documents some of the tactics 
through which Sadat enabled Islamist groups to gain control over universities and 
university politics, with a strong base in Upper Egypt, especially the Assiut University. 
Islamist control over Teacher Colleges may have had a profound impact on education 
until the present (see detailed discussion in Chapter One, pp. 41-49). 
 
Mubarak continued most of the trends initiated by Sadat, in terms of allowing 
progressively greater Islamist influence on education, complete divorce with the values 
and rhetoric of the July Revolution, the general ‗de-politicization‘ of educational 
discourse and greater involvement of international agencies in educational policy 
making. While global and U.S. pressures relating to curriculum development and the 
promotion of ‗religious tolerance‘ are frequently highlighted, all other areas of 
education policy were heavily affected- if not entirely shaped- by foreign technical 
assistance and its agendas, with the greatest impact seen in terms greater privatization 
and lower educational spending (see Chapter Three). Textbooks also increasingly 
highlighted large pictures of Mubarak as well as Suzanne Mubarak, with smaller pictures 
for other leaders.  
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Studies of Mubarak era school curricula argue that schools prepare youth to submit that 
the movement of society is not determined by masses as by individuals, so that society‘s 
overcoming of problems and crises depends on the existence of the ruler (the manager- 
the hero- the rescuer- the savior), where the child is raised to equate the government 
with the state and country and side with political authority, depend on it, trust it and 
adopt positive attitudes towards it (see Abdul Hamid 2000, 124). The textbooks 
primarily tackle the history of state authority and ignore the people‘s history, failing to 
mention the flaws of different rulers or their relationships with different classes, and 
refraining from the treatment of any controversial issues (MARED 2010). 
Contemporary textbooks ignore European, American or Japanese history, as well as the 
histories of other colonized people in order to focus only on the ‗injured self‘ (unique 
in its injury as it was unique in its historic greatness), with constant expressions of pride 
in the self and parallel condemnation of others (MARED 2010). The History textbook 
examined for this chapter not only places the origin of all virtue, civilization and 
innovation in either Ancient Egypt or Islam, but thoroughly de-politicizes and voids of 
ideology and struggle the entire history of the ‗self‘: from modern Egyptian history, to 
Arab nations and Egypt‘s relation to them, to Islamic history. There is almost no 
discussion of any intellectual trend in Egypt or the Arab World (from socialism to 
Political Islam to Baathism to Wahabism), internal or regional struggles, hierarchies, 
differences or divisions. There is Egypt, Islam and ‗the other‘. As for the July 
Revolution, only the nationalization of foreign companies is portrayed as a positive 
nationalist act, but there is no reference to the nationalization of local industries, 
socialist legislation, practices, symbols or rhetoric (MARED 2010). Similarly the Sadat 
era is reduced to the permanent constitution and the 1973 war, without any reference 
to economic liberalization, openings with Islamism or even the assassination of Sadat. 
Research on History textbooks has also emphasized their factual mistakes, ignoring 
certain periods in Egyptian history, lack of vision or strategy, as well as the boring 
nature of the textbooks geared towards the memorization of dates and lists of causal 
factors, and their control by a ‗mafia‘ that prevents reform (see MARED 2010). 
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In terms of portrayals of relations with Israel in official textbooks, critics have argued 
that MOE is deliberately rewriting and revising history textbooks in order to 
marginalize the contemporary history of the period surrounding the 1952 revolution 
and 1967 Arab-Israeli war, in a conscious conspiracy on the part of consecutive 
education ministers to privilege Ancient Egyptian identity, in favor of neo-colonial 
project (see Sayed 2006, 99). According to Linda Herrera, initial interventions of the 
controversial Center for Curriculum and Instructional Materials, to which local and 
foreign USAID-hired advisors provide technical assistance, involved either changing or 
removing material from social studies, geography, and history books at all pre-
university levels. For example, numerous maps of the Arab region, such as that of the 
Sinai, were eliminated from textbooks, and the name ―Palestine‖ was replaced with 
―Israel‖ (Herrera 2008). Because the curricula do portray Zionism as hostile and 
Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, Fatma El-Sayed has attempted to show that ―most 
arguments in support of the presumed foreign conspiracy are not based on valid 
argument and facts; and are expressed by actors that are not directly involved in the 
decision-making process‖ (2006, 122 and 114). Despite these debates and 
controversies, Islamization and the shaping of student knowledge and subjectivities 
around morals, values, Christians, Jews and Palestine continue to be powerfully 
informed by discourses circulating outside the school, from mosque and cassette 
sermons to satellite channel programs to the internet. On the other hand, the toning 
down and elimination of the rhetoric against Israel and its illegal occupation of Arab 
lands, has perhaps been replaced by the religious messages where Jews are portrayed 
negatively based on Islamic teachings as presented in the curricula.  
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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN 
CONTEMPORARY SECONDARY SCHOOL 
TEXTBOOKS 
This section examines a sample of the key identity related textbooks in general and 
technical secondary in terms of their constructions of nationhood and citizenship. 
Textbooks are unified for all schools in the nation within the same secondary school 
track and specialization and are all prepared under the control of one entity: the 
Ministry of Education. This does not include about 8% of students who study under 
the Azhar system and a very small segment of the population studying under various 
‗international‘ systems; who are still required to ―pass only‖ exams in the official 
curricula of Arabic, Nationalist Education and Religious Studies. This section focuses 
on Nationalist Education and Arabic Language textbooks to reflect both the ideal 
nationhood and citizenship project envisaged by the regime in the Nationalist 
Education curriculum, the subject directly concerned with these matters in Egyptian 
education, and the actual taught everyday curriculum exemplified by the Arabic 
Language textbook. These two subjects are also understudied in analyses of 
contemporary textbooks, where researchers have mostly focused on Religious 
Education textbooks (Carre 1979, Toronto and Eissa 2008, Starrett 1998 and Groiss 
2004) as well as History textbooks (Sami 2009a, 2009b). I have looked at all the other 
textbooks studied by students in the six schools and while there certainly are relevant 
references in the textbooks for English Language, French Language, Sociology, 
Philosophy, Economic Geography, Commercial and Maritime Law and other subjects, 
they are not significant enough to warrant analysis here. 
 
Different subjects carry very different importance and meaning for students and 
teachers in the day-to-day life of the school. Religious and Nationalist Education are 
pass/fail subjects that do not affect final marks. With the predominance of private 
tutoring and high student truancy, most students do not typically receive much 
instruction in pass/fail subjects. Pass/Fail subjects suffer huge teacher shortages and 
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their classes are frequently taken over by teachers for other subjects. For example, 
History teachers, who usually also teach Nationalist Education, habitually take over its 
allocated class time to cover the crammed history curriculum; while Arabic teachers, 
who usually also teach Religious Education, frequently take it over to focus on the 
difficult and long Arabic Language curriculum. Exams for pass/fail subjects are not 
only easy, but grading is also very lenient, so that it is rare that students in fact fail these 
subjects. In fact, for ‗political‘ reasons, students are almost guaranteed to pass Religious 
Education exams. Therefore, many students may only open these textbooks on the 
night of the exam, especially Nationalist Education. Attending one or two 
tutoring/revision sessions in these subjects, coupled with a few days [or even hours] of 
studying, could be enough to earn students a passing mark. Furthermore, the actual 
content of the official Religious Studies textbooks should be seen as a few drops in the 
sea of religious material most- Muslim and Christian- students are exposed to today in 
various types of media and institutional settings. As explained below, History, central as 
it is for identity issues, is usually hated as one of the most un-stimulating curricula of 
the school and is not compulsory on all secondary school students. For example, in 
general secondary, beyond first secondary, Arts (adabi) students (currently 70% of 
students) must study History but not students who choose a Mathematics or Science 
specialization („ilmi). 
 
Arabic Language is by far the subject that receives the strongest emphasis and closest 
attention among the identity subjects. A greater number of class hours are devoted to it 
and it forms a significant part of student marks. Importantly, significant portions of the 
Arabic language curriculum—especially the Qira‟a/Readings and Qisa/Novel 
components of the curriculum, with considerable identity content—constitute an 
improvement to the exclusionary nature of Egyptian textbooks. This was notable in 
observing their delivery and reception in classrooms, where not only could students 
interact with meanings in the readings, but even with some images in the assigned 
poetry pieces, despite the tedious manner in which they were expected to comment on 
the poetic techniques. Therefore, although Arabic was generally considered a very 
difficult subject, especially in terms of complicated grammar rules, memorization and 
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formulaic analysis of literary texts, some texts were relatively more approachable and 
engaging to students.  
 
The sample 2009/2010 textbooks examined for this chapter are:  
- Nationalist Education for First Secondary Technical Education (for 
Commercial, Tourism, Professional and Industrial Specializations), 
- Nationalist Education for the General Secondary Certificate,  
- Arabic Language for Second Secondary General,  
- Third Secondary Technical- for Commercial and Hospitality Specializations, 
- Third Secondary Technical for Industrial and Agricultural Specializations, 
- History for the General Secondary Certificate, and  
- Islamic Religious Studies for Third Secondary General.  
 
In addition, I also looked at a number of the corresponding external textbooks/study 
guides for each subject, as these are the textbooks actually used by students, in addition 
to with tutoring notes. I used the two most popular external textbook series: Al-Adwa‘ 
and al-Mu‗alim. I consulted:  
- Al-Adwa‘ for Arabic Language for Third Secondary Technical for Industrial and 
Agricultural Specializations, 
- Al-Adwa‘ for Islamic Religious Studies for Third Secondary General, 
- Al-Mu‗alim for Arabic Language for Second Secondary General,  
- Al-Mu‗alim History for the General Secondary Certificate and  
- Al-Mu‗alim for Nationalist Education for the General Secondary Certificate. 
 
NATIONALIST EDUCATION TEXTBOOKS 
The textbook for Nationalist Education for First Secondary Technical 2009/2010 
provides an excellent introduction to the ideal national identity and citizenship project 
of the late Mubarak era. Apart from a somewhat surprising emphasis on selected 
Islamic themes at the center of conceptions of ideal citizenship, the textbook resembles 
the discourse of the National Democratic Party, with its so-called ‗New Thought‘ 
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affiliated with the rise of Gamal Mubarak. This section focuses on this textbook and 
offers a number of remarks concerning the differences between it and the textbooks 
for the general secondary track. 
 
The goals of the Nationalist Education textbook revolve around promoting belonging 
to the nation and umma (Islamic nation) and the preparation of the ‗good productive 
citizen‘ adjusted to economic competition in a changing world and labor market. The 
first five goals of the curriculum were listed as follows (Nationalist Education for First 
Secondary Technical 2009/2010, page 8): 
1- Presenting the student with concepts and terms that deepen belonging and loyalty to 
the nation and umma. 
2- Preparing a generation that participates in and leads economic life in a new world 
based on competition 
3- Preparing a good productive responsible citizen aware of the requirements of the labor 
market 
4- Training the student on practicing the values and behaviors that allow for launching 
into a rapidly changing world 
5- Providing the student with some concepts and contemporary issues in the form of 
practical practices 
Like many other textbooks, a Quranic verse prefaces the textbook and identifies the 
best person and nation as the one that is more pious: 
―O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you 
into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each 
other). Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most 
righteous of you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things)‖. 
Surat al-Hujurat, verse 13 [Holy Quran 49:13- Yusuf Ali Translation]. 
The textbook was divided into four chapters: An introduction to Nationalist Education, 
Human Development, The Values of Progress and the Factors of Success of Advanced 
Countries, and Performance Development Skills in the Field of Work. The opening of 
this chapter showed the explicit description of the late Mubarak era citizenship project 
in education, with its emphasis on Islamist, nationalist, democratic and neoliberal 
themes. This section details the textbook‘s treatment of national identity and citizenship 
issues. As interesting as they are conceptions of development, progress and ‗the other‘ 
are not dealt with here. 
205 
DEFINING NATIONALISM 
In terms of national identity, the textbook focused on Islam and Ancient Egyptian 
civilization as the sources of pride, glory and identity for Egyptians. President Mubarak 
and his stances vis-a-vis Israel and Arab countries were highlighted as examples of 
protection of national interest and embodiments of national belonging and a number of 
youth practices were condemned as lacking in national belonging. There was limited 
space for Arab nationalism, which was articulated around hopes for an Arab common 
economic market (an idea which had been failing for decades). 
 
Nationalism was defined as ―belonging and love of the nation the human lives in‖ and 
the textbook presented students with distinct constructions of national belonging and 
national identity. In the introductory explanation of Nationalist Education and the 
justification for its study, the key idea is that the person belonging to a group naturally 
―owes it the duty of loyalty and sacrifice at any cost‖. The example presented to 
support this claim was ―the position of President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak when he 
was faced with the crisis of Israel‘s refusal to withdraw from the Taba strip and its 
claim that it is part of Israeli land. He stood tall to say: ‗Egypt will not give up one grain 
of sand, and it will also not close the doors of negotiation‘‖.  
 
In defining the very notion of nationalism (wataniya), the textbook starts out by 
mentioning that nationalism is one of the most important ‗discoveries‘ that the 
Egyptian people have given humanity, because ―we have inherited from our Ancient 
Egyptian forefathers a nation that they established thousands of years ago and is still 
present until our day as a testimony to the greatness and genius of the Egyptian‖ 
(Nationalist Education for First Secondary Technical 2009/2010, page 15). The text 
then explained that ―nationalism emerged with agriculture when people became 
attached to the land, settled in it and made sacrifices for it out of a sense of belonging 
and shared interests‖. The next point was that Islam achieved and emphasized equality 
based on piety, regardless of race or ethnic origin, and was therefore a corrective to 
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fanatic nationalism, and yet it affirmed nationalism and loyalty to one‘s nation and 
umma: 
―With the spread of Islam, equality predominated and discrimination was removed, as 
there was no superiority of an Arab over a non-Arab except based on piety, good 
deeds and an enlightened mind... This is because Islam came to all people, to fulfill the 
humanity of the human being as a vice-regent of God on earth, and is not exclusive to 
one race or nationality. This Islamic instinct continued to protect our nation and our 
nationalism from fanaticism; and belonging and loyalty to nations and the umma was a 
human instinct blessed by the noble Islam.‖ (Nationalist Education for First Secondary 
Technical 2009/2010, page 15). 
Three real life examples were then given to clarify the meaning of national belonging. 
In the first example, the meaning of nationalism was constructed in terms of rejection 
of foreign linguistic influences and pride in the Arabic language. Three patterns of 
behavior were presented as ―unacceptable‖ and revealing ―the weak nationalist 
sentiments of some youth‖ and lack of pride in the Arabic language: a) many youth 
who wear clothing with foreign script even when it is made in Egypt and those who are 
wearing them are our Egyptian youth (page 31); b) we see in many Egyptian streets 
banners that are written in Arabic letters but the meaning is foreign (like Carpet City, 
Power Clean, High Class); and c) the title ‗Mr.‘ has spread in schools instead of ustaz so 
that the Religious Education teacher and the Arabic Language teacher are being called 
‗mister‘ or ‗monsieur‘. A second example was given of Mubarak‘s effort ‗to remove the 
Iraqi aggression on Kuwait‘ in 1991 and students were asked to reflect on how they feel 
as Egyptians and Arabs about this stance, who the losers are in this war, and whether 
this position served the establishment of a common Arab economic market, and on the 
local and regional repercussions of this stance. The third example is a narrative about 
Mustafa Kamil, a nationalist leader who coined the famous phrase ‗if I were not 
Egyptian, I would have wished to be Egyptian‖, as a symbol and embodiment of true 
nationalism: 
―Mustafa Kamil has struggled/made jihad [jahada] for the independence of Egypt and 
its liberty internally and externally and exposed the faults of colonialism using the 
Dinshway incident until Lord Cromer was forced to resign. He also established the 
Liwa‟ Newspaper and the Nationalist Party to spread awareness and fire up the 
nationalist sentiment of citizens against British occupation. Mustafa Kamel‘s 
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jihad/struggle was not only slogans or speeches but constant movement, 
communication and messages overflowing with patriotism and expressing the feelings 
of a revolting Egypt. Mustafa Kamil was not a seeker of fame or power, but was a 
nationalist symbol concerned only with his nation‘s affairs regardless of the expenses 
and sacrifice in effort and money‖ (Nationalist Education for First Secondary 
Technical 2009/2010, page 32). 
 
The three examples implied condemnation of lack of youth and society‘s nationalism 
(reduced to linguistic symbolism) implying their susceptibility to western influence, 
nationalism as embodied in the Mubarak‘s stances on regional issues and nationalism as 
embodied in pre-1952 struggle against British occupation. Nationalism was therefore 
defined around themes that will recur throughout the textbooks: lack of youth national 
belonging (coupled with notions of bad citizenship), pride in the intellectual 
contributions of Ancient Egypt and Islam, and nationalism as a struggle (that has 
already been concluded) against foreign occupation of Egyptian land. 
 
CITIZENSHIP 
The textbook also introduces the key themes of the late Mubarak era citizenship project 
encountered in the rest of the textbooks through descriptions of the ‗bad citizen‘, the 
centrality of ‗science and faith‘ in the construction of ideal citizenship, the renaissance 
promise of volunteerism and developmental NGOs, along with the displacement of 
citizenship altogether through the focus on nationhood defined around stances against 
the ‗other‘. In terms of citizenship rights, the textbooks presents the rhetoric of a 
supposed support for democracy and freedoms, denial of sectarian tension and 
discrimination and presents its supposed achievements in the social sphere, such as the 
declaration of education as Egypt‘s national project.  
 
From the very first pages of the textbook- following the example of nationalist sacrifice 
by Mubarak in relation to Taba- students are invited to reflect, by way of contrast, on 
―the individuals who commit unacceptable acts in society from crimes and drug 
dealing, waste/ abuse (ihdar) of public funds, non-compliance with the manners of 
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public roads, lack of environmental awareness, lack of respect for the rights of others 
and many of the events we see in newspapers and different media day and night‖ 
(Nationalist Education for First Secondary Technical 2009/2010, page 14). The 
‗nationalist‘ President who takes a stance against ‗the other‘ is contrasted with the ‗bad 
citizen‘ who commits ―unacceptable‖ acts. In the middle are the ‗Egyptian models‘ to 
be proud of in all fields like ―Avicenna, Jamal Hamdan, Mustafa Musharafa, Naguib 
Mahfouz, Ahmad Zuweil, Magdi Yacoub and other Arab scientists across history‖ 
presented to students ―in order to take them as role models and become acquainted 
with their scientific achievements‖ (Nationalist Education for First Secondary 
Technical 2009/2010, page 14).  
 
In addition to its articulation of the Good Citizen around religious adherence, 
volunteerism, and hard work, the textbook also devoted a chapter to describing the 
desirable individual qualities that lead to national ‗progress‘. These values: time 
management, democracy, excellence in performing one‘s work, and ―community 
participation‖ (charity and volunteerism), while clearly linked to the ‗causes of the 
progress of advanced states‘, were often framed within Islamic traditions and backing 
(especially in the areas of democracy and excellence) and /or linked to the exemplary 
stances of President Mubarak. For example, the treatment of democracy was focused 
on how the principles of democracy had their grounding in Islamic tradition, how the 
regime supports democracy and how the education system supports democracy. 
Democracy is defined as a system where ―power is left to those whom the people chose 
to handle their affairs, with an expansion of the circle of participation of people in 
responsibility and decision making‖ and the citizen‘s right to express their opinions in 
complete freedom through ―legitimate channels‖, so that the people are the decision-
makers and participants in directing the agencies of the state and in oversight over them 
(page 65). The textbook emphasizes that Islam had called for democracy and its values 
and principles and applied those principles 14 centuries ago while Europe was in its 
dark ages. The democratic values of freedom of belief, brotherhood, equality, individual 
accountability and consultation (shura) were given textual support from the Quran and 
Hadith.  
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The textbook then describes the state‘s support for democracy and its protection and 
defense of freedoms, highlighting Mubarak‘s emphasis on ―consulting with opposition 
leaders in all situations that necessitate the adoption of a unified stance‖ and his 
insistence on the right of youth to ―participate with their opinions in confronting 
society‘s problems‖ (page 67). The textbook then moves to MOE‘s efforts in 
supporting democracy through initiatives such as Debating Societies, The School 
Parliament, the TV show A Dialogue with Adults, the introduction and deepening of 
concepts of tolerance, national unity and rejection of extremism, and convening video-
conference meetings with teachers to receive their feedback. The text then engages in 
further claims in the following lines: 
The main axis of education is that which is based on democracy and social peace, 
which are the natural outcomes of good education. The student who has been trained 
on understanding, dialogue and courageous expression of opinion, and acceptance of 
the opinion of others will be raised with the seeds of democracy within him and 
becomes the responsible citizen who participates with conscious will in choosing his 
leaders, a believer in team work and able to coexist with people (Nationalist Education 
for First Secondary Technical 2009/2010, page 68).  
Therefore, freedom of speech was the main citizenship right affirmed by the textbooks, 
while being denied in reality by the police state in most cases. There was no further 
mention or explanation of political rights, the political system, or the existing political 
parties. In general, the textbook presented a very limited conception of citizenship in 
terms of ‗rights‘, be they protective, provision or participation rights.  
 
In the place of any language of rights or public service provision, the textbook framed 
the issue around the state‘s role in human development. This textbook is the most 
explicit in identifying the developmental ideology of the regime, which is not merely 
neoliberal, but explicitly seeks to displace the responsibility for social issues, social 
provision and indeed ‗renaissance‘ unto ‗society‘. The lesson titled: The Role of the 
State in Human Development, was divided into brief sections on education, training, 
health, the environment and self-education. A number of listings of laws issued, 
national conferences held and the declaration of education as Egypt‘s National Project 
were presented as reflecting the interest of the state and its ‗achievements‘ in relation to 
210 
‗human development‘. This was followed by a section on Activating the Role of Civil 
Society in Human Resource Development, which was associated with the Mubarak era, 
had contributed to solving transportation, education and housing problems and is the 
hope for a true renaissance: 
―The term ‗civil society‘ began to appear since President Mubarak came to power in 
the beginning of the eighties, which is society with all its civil nongovernmental and 
non-profit organizations and institutions that contributes in economic social and 
political activities and conclusively and effectively confront the chronic problems the 
state is suffering from in the fields of transportation, education and housing. It is futile 
to rely completely on the state to solve these problems, and the hope in bringing about 
a real renaissance will not come about except by reviving the institutions and 
organization of civil society‖ (Nationalist Education for First Secondary Technical 
2009/2010, page 50). 
While the reference is to ‗civil society‘, the ‗civil society‘ constructed in the regime‘s 
discourse is made up of organizations that provide services and assistance to the poor, 
most of which are either faith-based or funded through international organizations. The 
President, however, is indirectly credited with this explosion of charitable citizenship. it 
Notably, ‗civil society‘ is not used by the textbook to refer to advocacy groups, 
professional syndicates or human rights organizations, which were more typically the 
targets of periodic repression and condemnation.  
 
While the focus on development implicitly acknowledges the existence of social 
problems, another section implicitly and briefly acknowledges the existence of 
inequality and unemployment. This came within a general discussion about 
globalization and its critics, where inequality (in the world, in general) is caused by 
global patterns and is unavoidable. A brief discussion of globalization presented a 
rather balanced view of the arguments put forward by critics (inequality, 
unemployment, environmental impact, Americanization, power of multinational 
corporations) and proponents of globalization (offering technological solutions in many 
areas, better products due to competition, greater international cooperation). It 
concluded that globalization is simply a fact that has taken over the world and ―cannot 
be avoided by hiding in the caves of the past‖ (page 35). 
 
211 
National unity and combating extremism are also highlighted as aspects of good 
citizenship, with a section on the role of the state in supporting national unity and 
preserving society‘s values (the ironic—and as always ‗nationalist—example given being 
the rejection of foreign intervention in educational curricula) and the role of Egyptians 
in terms of ‗commitment to their values in light of global changes‘. The role of 
Egyptians- in a world defined by technological, communications, and economic 
changes- was to achieve excellence in their work in order to perfect local production, to 
buy local products to reduce unemployment, to refrain from overzealous buying of 
unnecessary foreign products, and to arm themselves with spiritual values and avoid 
psychological illnesses (page 30). Egyptians are portrayed as a tolerant people ‗whose 
hearts fanaticism had not entered‘. Sectarian incidents are declared as attempts at 
weakening the nation. They were linked to ‗old attempts‘ practiced by the British when 
they were occupying Egypt and tried to cause disunity by claiming to protect Coptic 
Christians; who realized this plan and emerged in demonstrations for the liberation of 
Egypt; so that the ‗conspiracies‘ that caused strife between the sons of the same nation 
were destroyed.  
 
Once more, it was the external enemy that was the cause of problems, not any concrete 
state or societal discourses or practices. The textbook affirmed that all Egyptians have 
the same rights and duties; and that places of worship provide services to all Egyptians 
―without discrimination; providing educational, health and cultural services to all 
sectors of society with the goal of developing society. President Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak affirmed this fact by issuing his important political decision whereby the 7th of 
January [Coptic Christmas] became a national holiday in Egypt to all Muslims and 
Christians, which is a clear message to anyone who dares to tamper with national unity 
in our dear Egypt‖ (page 72). Sectarian tension was therefore 1) foreign-directed, 2) 
countered by the declaration of a new national holiday and 3) was not really a problem 
because there was no discrimination in Egypt or fanaticism among its people. 
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NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE GENERAL 
TRACK 
The content and focus of the general secondary Nationalist Education textbook for 
first secondary, as well as for the general secondary certificate, were markedly different 
from the technical secondary textbook discussed above. They significantly replicated 
material studied by students in history and geography curricula throughout the various 
educational stages. They did provide, however, additional brief discussions of the 
intellectual trends in Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century, introducing 
students (superficially) to the work of a number of well-known Egyptian figures. While 
operating within the same general nationhood and citizenship framework as the 
technical education textbook, notions of citizenship were not as explicitly articulated; as 
in discussions of the Good Citizen, the centrality of religious adherence to citizenship, 
the role of civil society or the importance of democracy. It is not clear whether the 
‗New Thought‘ of the National Democratic Party under Gamal Mubarak the technical 
education textbook, had simply not yet arrived to general secondary, or whether there 
was an intention to provide redundant material so that overburdened general secondary 
students do not have to study additional material, or whether the greater emphasis on 
Islam at the center of citizenship was specifically targeted at working class students in 
technical education‘; an issue discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
 
The first secondary textbook was divided into sections on: the Historical Importance of 
Egypt‘s Location, the Genius of the Egyptian people (which focuses on the established 
of the first centralized state in history and details the apparatuses of the Ancient 
Egyptian state, the production of paper, and the wonders of construction) and the 
Crusades and the military responses to them. These are all issues covered elsewhere in 
geography and history textbooks. The second part of the textbook provides discussions 
of a number ‗modernist‘, liberal, nationalist and Islamist figures (clearly ignoring any 
leftist figures): Rafa‗a al-Tahtawy, Muhamad Abdu, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayid, Sayyid 
Darwish and ‗A‘isha Abdul Rahman. The presentations were very cursory and best 
resembled bullet points to be memorized as opposed to detailed narratives to reflect 
upon. For example, the section on the revivalist ‗modernist‘ leader Muhammad Abdu 
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emphasized a number of discrete ideas: his respect for the mind (reason) and its use in 
explaining the Quran and the rejection of blind adherence to tradition, the compatibility 
of Islam with the demands of modern times, the permissibility of relying on non-
Muslims in areas that ―benefit Muslims‖, the permissibility of wearing hats and 
depositing money in savings accounts, encouraging learning of foreign languages, that 
predestination does not mean surrender and despair but reliance on God through work, 
the importance of perseverance and trust in God, and finally his rejection and 
condemnation of Sufi Orders that ignore the value of work and call for abandoning life 
in the name of reliance on God. Despite the obvious importance of these issues, the 
textbook was not so much inviting students to reflect on them, as it was attempting to 
set them as authoritative and close them for discussion or debate. They were probably 
too cursory to serve either purpose. 
 
In terms of the provision citizenship rights, the textbook for the general secondary 
certificate mentioned very briefly the achievement of the values of social solidarity in 
terms of social insurance, pensions and insurance against old age and sickness from 
before 1952. These were expressed by the text as ―Islamic‖ values. The text then states 
that these rights were expanded by the July Revolution and that recently the state 
ensured the provision of services to citizens through its specialized National Councils: 
the National Council For Women, the National Council For Childhood and 
Motherhood, and the National Council for Human Rights. It should be noted that the 
work of these councils is very limited in terms of any impact on the ground and much 
of it is actually funded through donor projects and private donors, not through the 
state. Furthermore, instead of crediting the Nasser regime with the expansion of social 
protection, the pre-1952 regime is somehow credited with the ‗achievement‘ of these 
values. While the values are claimed as Islamic, this is nowhere else used to provide 
religious grounding for an understanding of these forms social protection as part of a 
more comprehensive understanding of Islam or of a religion-centered citizenship. 
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ARABIC LANGUAGE TEXTBOOKS 
This section focuses on the textbook for Arabic Language for Third Secondary 
Technical Schools for Agricultural and Industrial Specializations for 2009/2010 and 
draws upon issues of identity and citizenship in the other textbooks, especially the 
novel: Wa Islamah. The readings in the three Arabic Language textbooks examined in 
this chapter present a varied collection of topics falling within the nationhood and 
citizenship framework defined by the ‗faith and science‘ discourse. Reading topics in 
the selected textbooks also emphasize the impact of Arab culture in Europe, the 
disadvantages of smoking and drugs, the Environment, or essays on famous Egyptians. 
In addition to the Readings section, poetry pieces included pieces reflecting on the 
universe and nature, love of the nation, and memories of the past. To give an overall 
image of textbook Readings and their themes, the content of the Arabic Language for 
Third Secondary Technical Schools for Agricultural and Industrial Specializations for 
2009/2010 can be taken as an example:  
 Justice 
 Islamic Civilization: The Impact of Arab Culture in Europe 
 Population and Environmental Issues: The Hidden Enemy  
 The Age of Scientific Achievements: Can We Catch Up with It?  
 Sportsmanship and How We Can Promote it  
 Social and Literary Figures: The Liberator of Women: Qasim Amin,  
 Sinai [a geographical description]  
 Smoking and Addiction  
 Currency: A Means not An End [a historical and economic analysis of the 
emergence of currencies and their use]  
 Humor is Therapy 
 Fine Arts and the Position of Islam on Them 
 An Article by Muhammad Abdu  
 A Portrait of A Poor Girl [Poetic article by Al-Rafi‗i]  
 Article by nationalist leader Saad Zaghloul [one of the main leaders of the 1919 
Revolution against British occupation, upon his return from exile in 1921].  
 Friendship  
 Manhood [emphasizing honor, self-respect, duty] by Ahmad Amin, an Islamic 
Azharite writer.  
 A poem by Umar ‗Asal [with faith and science we protect youth and build 
Egypt]   
 
The textbooks contain numerous pieces of readings and poetry on the nation and the 
duty to protect and serve it. Literary pieces included a sermon by a pre-Islamic poet 
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urging his tribe to fight the enemy (because dying in dignity is better than life in 
humiliation [thul]). Another typical example of how national belonging was articulated 
in the textbooks is the poem of the celebrated poet Ahmad Shawqi from the pre-1952 
era, which includes the famous verses that almost elevates the nation over heaven itself: 
watani law shughiltu bil khuldi „anhu, naza„atni ilayhi bil-khuldi nafsi57.  
 
However, even when the textbook discusses anti-British nationalist Saad Zaghloul, the 
iconic figure of the 1919 ‗Revolution‘ against British occupation, there is no discussion 
of revolution or struggle per se. The emphasis is rather on negotiations with the British 
and de-mobilization of the people. In the article, Zaghloul expresses his gratitude for 
the reception upon his return from exile by the patriotic, conscientious and enthusiastic 
Egyptian people, bursting with nationalist sentiment (―their hearts beating with true 
patriotism/nationalism‖), confirming that he will proceed with formal negotiations 
[with the British regarding independence] and that all that remains is for each of us to 
return to his work; ―and to believe that he is increasing with his work ―a treasure to the 
nation‘s treasures‖, and ―a power to its powers‖. Zaghloul declares, ―All to work! Let us 
lift up the lighthouse of the nation, and elevate its word, and long live Egypt‖. This was 
the type of political speech the textbook authors could include, emphasizing that 
patriotic Egyptians who need to ―go back to work‖, to disengage from the revolution 
(demonstrations and civil disobedience against British rule) and in this way add to the 
power of Egypt; the same discourse that was employed in order to pacify people after 
the deposition of Mubarak.  
 
Literary pieces also included a central piece of Muslim heritage: the speech of the first 
caliph Abu Bakr upon assuming the caliphate after the death of the Prophet, which 
emphasizes political consultation with the people and equal rights to rich and poor:  
I have been given the authority over you, and I am not the best of you. If I do well, 
help me; and if I do wrong, set me right. Sincere regard for truth is loyalty and 
                                            
57 The verse has been subject to many interpretation but basically implies that the poet would be conflicted if he 
had to choose between heaven and the nation; a statement which has been taken to put the nation above God 
himself.  
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disregard for truth is treachery. The weak amongst you shall be strong with me until I 
have secured his rights, if God wills; and the strong amongst you shall be weak with 
me until I have wrested from him the rights of others, if God wills. Obey me so long 
as I obey God and His Messenger. But if I disobey God and His Messenger, ye owe 
me no obedience. Rise for your prayer, God have mercy upon you. 
As in the Nationalist Education textbook, and as in Wa Islamah below, love and 
belonging to the nation is supreme, Islam is the main source of political inspiration and 
nationalism is confined to struggles against the other. The centrality of religion was 
reflected in the explicit desired sense of national identity and citizenship as well as in 
frequent use of religious content, readings and exercise questions. As Khalil (2009) 
notes, direct or derived religious material amounts to 30% of Arabic curricula in general 
education. Under the heading ―With faith and science we protect youth and build 
Egypt‖, an excerpt from the poem by a lesser known poet named Umar ‗Asal (roughly 
translated) declares: 
And Egypt whose banner youth raise high   
the day of victory was achieved and the clouds cleared 
It wants the youth of the Nile a blessed generation   
through religion and piety growing up and guided 
 
Grammar and literary analysis texts—that were not presented and analyzed in terms of 
content and meaning—reflected similar features, with focus on the Quranic texts, 
discourses of Early Muslims, discourses by 20th century writers on Early Muslims or 
texts involving nationalist (pre-1952 or 1973 war) themes or general interests such as 
friendship and smoking. In general, Quranic and religious examples represented 10 to 
25% of examples given for literary analysis or grammar, while this was higher in the 
parallel external textbook examined here, reaching 50-100% of examples in some 
sections. 
 
In terms of citizenship, protective, provision and participation ‗rights‘ were not 
mentioned in any of the Arabic Language textbooks. However, two of the textbooks 
open with readings on justice, which were fully based on, and referred back, to early 
Islam or the Quran and other grounding Islamic narratives. The first lesson in one of 
the textbooks (Technical Secondary- Agriculture and Industry Specialization) presented 
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a more politicized discourse that linked Islamic notions of justice to the state, its 
governance and the condition of the nation. It explained that justice is the basis of 
religion, governance and the civilizing (development/ prosperity) of the world, 
emphasizing that the nation is only in good stature if there is protection for the weak 
and the deprived. The stated main ideas of the lesson included: The justice of the ruler 
is to rule by what God has decreed, Religion‘s call to justice, the Prophet‘s cautioning 
from injustice, the just have a high status among people and reward from God, the 
history of Islam is based on justice, and (caliph) Abu-Bakr establishes justice as the just 
Prophet had taught him.  
 
In the textbook for the general secondary certificate, the lesson on justice stated that 
the whole history of Islam was established on justice alone and equality in everything; 
that Islam made justice the basis of all triumph and blessing; and that the unjust will be 
the fuel of hellfire. The stated main ideas in the reading included themes such as: ‗the 
concept of justice in the Holy Quran‘; ‗with Godly justice the conditions of human 
societies improve‘; and ‗justice is the first of God‘s attributes on which he establishes 
his creation‘. Therefore, the only readings that related to state-society relations were 
fully based on Islamic and Islamist framework: where the progress of the nation and 
the establishment of justice was premised on and stemmed from ‗Islam‘ in general, and 
not on any other—more concrete—notion of legal, political, economic or social 
‗rights‘. 
 
WA ISLAMAH 
The theme of nationalism defined around struggle with the ‗other‘ is best crystallized 
than in the mandated novel for general secondary Arabic throughout the Mubarak era: 
Wa Islamah. Authored by Ali Ahmad Bakathir, who has been called ―the pioneer of 
Modern Islamic/ Islamist Literature‖ [ra‟id al-ruwaya al-Islamiya], the novel seems to have 
been introduced into the curriculum as early as 1945, although it was removed after the 
1952 Revolution; and the author was reportedly spared clampdown by the Nasserite 
regime due to the prestige and influence of the novel, despite links with the Muslim 
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Brotherhood (Hamid 2010). The novel is also part of the curriculum of other Arab 
countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and was produced as a major feature film 
which continues to be frequently broadcast in Egypt. Revolving around the struggle 
against and defeat of the invading Crusades and Mogul Empire, it is an Islamist 
nationalist novel par excellence. Its key premise is that the ultimate expression of 
Islamic and nationalist identity is the defense of the nation against foreign forces 
repeatedly attempting to subdue it. It emphasizes the importance of personal morality 
based on the Islamist idea that ―abandoning Islam‖ leads to foreign occupation and all 
the misery caused by it. In its emphasis on the role of religious authorities in relation to 
the war effort, it also lends great importance to their fatwas as the legitimate guidance 
for the ruler and community.  
 
Wa Islamah includes themes of the importance of obedience to the good ruler who 
establishes jihad, stories of collaborators with the invaders, betrayals between princes, 
and the ruler‘s tactics in mobilizing the war effort. It portrays Egyptians as docile 
people, but with inert power when it comes to the defense of the nation from external 
enemies. As one teacher, put it while explaining the incidents in one chapter, ―Qutuz 
called for jihad and this is the character of Egyptians... the Egyptian personality is 
moderate in its reactions... When jihad was announced, people refrained from vice and 
sins, they refrained from alcohol consumption, houses of worship were filled up... this 
is a trait in Egyptians from ancient times and still exists until now. The true caliber of 
Egyptians shows in trying times‖.  
 
The novel is also notable in how, like most historical constructions across the 
textbooks, it is concerned not at all with the conditions of ordinary people, justice, 
poverty or inequality (for example, the burden of the war effort or the huge tax levies 
on them). Instead, Egyptians are portrayed as willingly and honorably sacrificing for the 
nation. When the (bad) Mumluk Princes reject making extra payments for the war 
effort, the ruler decides to take these funds by force. He then collects more money 
from every able Egyptian household, while sending preachers across the country to 
emphasize the duty and virtue of supporting the (defensive) jihad effort. The ruler, 
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Qutuz, is presented as heroic and exemplary; and the Egyptian people are praised for 
their sacrifices.  
 
One scene in the novel highlights its key message. The long lost beloved of Qutuz was 
injured in the final battle and when he ran to her and cried out: ‗oh my beloved, oh my 
dear‘, she urged him to continue fighting and said to him, ‗do not say oh my beloved, 
say oh my Islam: ―wa Islamah‖‘. As one teacher in the girls‘ private school commented 
in explaining the final scene, ―so this sentence if you understand it correctly means: do 
not put personal interests above the interest of the nation.‖ Clearly, the nation, Islam 
and ―Jihad‖- the name of the beloved of Qutuz- were all merged. The jihad the novel 
refers to and sanctions throughout is the jihad against the aggression of a foreign 
‗other‘, not against the vices of the self, local tyrants or to establish a better or just 
society. 
 
REPRODUCING THE NATION 
The following examples of exam essay topics in general secondary certificate Arabic 
Language past exams reveal rather vividly the desired sense of nationhood and 
citizenship supported by the curriculum: 
 Love of the nation is part of (religious) faith and should be translated to words and 
deeds. Write expressing your noble feelings, and what youth should do to serve their 
nation. 
 Egypt will rise with the thought of its scientists, the arms of its youth, the flourishing 
of its economy, the strength of its army, and its adherence to its religious values. 
 Egypt is in greatest need of the efforts of all of its sons, in order to compensate what it 
has missed due to its engagements in wars, and to achieve its major launch in the field 
of construction and development. 
 Egypt, God‘s kinana [lit.: arrow bag] on his earth, has unified its people and sacrificed 
its youth and its money to fight off the barbaric attacks of the Tartars and Europeans; 
and still has the prominence in defending its nation and unifying it. Write about the 
role that Egypt undertook, and undertakes in the defense of the Arab nation, and 
achieving its unity. 
 Egypt has adopted monumental stances towards its Arab nation across history, and it 
has never rescinded in carrying out this duty and its support to the Palestinian people is 
the best example of this. 
 The 25th of April commemorates the liberation of the Sinai. Write a message of love 
and appreciation to our brave soldiers, clarifying the hopes and efforts exerted to 
develop this dear part of Egypt‘s land.  
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 ―Education is a matter of national security‖ is a slogan that we should work to achieve, 
and it is the route to a productive citizen and a strong economy; and a weapon to 
protect the nation. 
 
Although no guiding content is spelled out in the textbook, the essay topics build on 
the overall spirit of the textbooks and quite succinctly reflect the key political messages 
that students are expected to echo. As apparent in the first essay topic on the list above, 
love of nation and faith were intimately linked and students were expected to expound 
on their ‗noble feelings‘ of love of the nation. The rest of the themes are also well 
represented, in terms of the importance of science, Egypt being under constant external 
threat and the duty of citizens in developing the country. It was clear to students that 
only answers that fit very closely with the spirit and letter of textbook discourse would 
receive good marks. It was understood that essays that did not toe the line would either 
be marked down as a minimum measure or the student could fail the essay or the 
subject as a whole. 
 
Although most cases receive little or no national coverage, opposition newspapers 
occasionally reported on cases where students or teachers were penalized for voicing 
any opinions critical of the regime, however mildly. In one of the more publicized 
cases, a technical education student in Luxor had attempted suicide in 2008 after failing 
to find employment because employers feared harassment by state security if they hired 
him. The student was famous for his phrase ―an unjust leader and an oppressed 
people‖ written on an examination answer sheet for which his school failed him in the 
final exams. In 2010, a preparatory school student who had written an oppositional 
essay on her Arabic exam received a failing grade, underwent security investigations, 
and was going to be made to repeat the year if her case had not reached national media. 
In fact, even after the removal of Mubarak, police officers stormed a school in Qena in 
an attempt to obtain the names of students who had been demonstrating to request the 
removal of Mubarak‘s photographs from official textbooks and for the removal of the 
Governor of Qena (Umana‘ Shurta Yaqtahimun 2011). Despite larger margins of 
freedom, expression in the schools was clearly not going to simply be ‗free‘ after the 
‗Revolution‘. 
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As a student of the system myself, I remember receiving a lower than expected mark on 
an essay and going to the teacher to discuss what had went wrong. He implicitly let me 
know that he had to mark the essay down because of its oppositional content. It 
seemed bizarre to me that a teacher would care to do such a thing for a routine essay 
[in a private school], not even on an MOE-organized national exam. I can now 
appreciate the extent to which teachers are monitored and their every mark—in fact, 
any of their or their students‘ writing—may be scrutinized by supervisors and cause 
them trouble with security personnel in the ministry and beyond. It is not only subject 
supervisors and other supervisors who monitor teachers, but this may be coordinated 
with security personnel at each school and educational district. In fact, throughout their 
own schooling and university years, teachers also undergo different forms of political 
monitoring and investigations by State Security for engagement in oppositional action 
of any kind. However, students who do not wish to engage in flattery to the regime or 
give credence to its claims have to choose non-political essay questions, of which there 
was always at least one topic among the three choices given on final exams, on topics 
of relating to friendship and family, or issues such as smoking or drugs.  
 
ISLAM, NEOLIBERALISM AND THE BAD 
CITIZEN 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Across the textbooks examined, nationalism was defined around love, belonging and 
sacrifice to a country that was under continuous attack by foreign and outside forces. 
Exemplary nationalism was embodied in struggles that had been concluded against 
foreign occupation of Egyptian land. Religious faith, science, volunteerism and charity 
on the part of citizens were the means to lifting Egypt up into development, progress 
and ‗renaissance‘. The focus on nationalism and the besieged nation across the 
textbooks served to conceal issues of citizenship and the actual conditions of the 
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people; who were not part of the story of the nation, except when they were subjected 
to ‗the other‘ and fought against its injustices. In this sense, the West is established as 
the clear ‗other‘ and ‗we‘ as Muslims and Egyptians as the victims.  
 
Islam—as a moral and nationalist force—was central to constructions of national 
identity and citizenship articulated throughout the textbooks. The textbooks presented 
a solid base for the propagation of the ‗Islamist Creed‘ (Sobhy 2009): that only the 
faithful adherence to Islam could bring about power and prosperity. As in many 
mainstream Islamist discourses, this was accomplished while removing potentially 
oppositional themes of Islam and Islamism and redefining it almost entirely around 
personal morality and individual responsibility. 
 
The notion of the nation presented by the curricula is centered on pride in Egypt, 
especially in its Ancient Egyptian past and struggle against waves of foreign occupation. 
Love and sacrifice for the country is elaborated and spread across the textbooks of 
different subjects, from poetry and novels to history and nationalist education, 
throughout the different stages and tracks of education. The key positive quality 
attributed to Egyptians is their sacrifice for the nation in times of war and is typically 
supported by Islamic traditions that credit Egyptians with special warrior status (that 
they are ‗the finest of earth‘s soldiers‘- incidentally based on a weak Hadith); in contrast 
to public discourses decrying the weakness and docility of the Egyptian army and the 
scientific and military superiority of Israel. The need to give religious backing to 
nationalist sentiments perhaps already signaled a deep crisis of ‗Egyptian‘ nationalism 
and of the state; where love for Egypt is not in fact simply ‗natural‘, but needs 
additional justification. It signals as well that such legitimacy is best derived from 
religion, so that even if the nation does not compel student to feel love and belonging, 
it can be pointed out that Islam instructs them to do so. This is similar to the 
commonly circulated discourses that students reached out to in search for justification 
to love the nation. As described in the following chapter, ―Egypt is mentioned in the 
Quran‖ was one of the few narratives students used to reflect on their sense of love 
and belonging to the country [or to avoid actually answering the question]. 
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The repression which the Mubarak regime has periodically unleashed on Islamists, 
whether they engage in violence or not, has been ―tempered by willingness to permit 
Islamicization to make significant inroads into areas previously secularized, presumably 
out of the calculation that accommodation and even appeasement will not necessarily 
buy off the Islamists, but will deprive them of symbols which they could utilize to 
mobilize the masses against the government‖ (Springborg 2003, 24). In fact, technical 
education textbooks seemed to be distinctly more Islamist than general secondary 
textbooks. This may have been be related to a greater fear of the spread of more 
militant and politicized Islamist discourses and recruitment among working class 
students. The Mubarak regime promoted a de-politicized version of Islamism that 
steered away from the role of the state in ‗applying Islam‘ and cohered with the U.S. 
and western desires and regional interests (Sobhy 2009). It was structured around and 
cohered with the neoliberal and authoritarian citizenship project of the regime, which 
erases from view almost all political or economic citizen rights. Its focus was on 
improving the moral character of each individual. Islam is redefined around these 
qualities of personal morality, chastity, charity/ volunteer work and industrial and 
business entrepreneurship; and it is through the cultivation of these qualities by each 
individual, that the real goals of Islamism can be achieved: power and prosperity, or 
‗renaissance‘. 
 
The textbooks gave very little attention to the domestic practices of the Muslim 
empires, the evolution of Muslim legal thought, practice, and institutions, as well as the 
conflicts between different Muslim political forces, focusing instead on the ‗nationalist‘ 
struggles of Muslim empires against other empires. Islam is portrayed as the source of 
justice, equality, freedom, fraternity, tolerance and democracy. This contributes to a 
view of Muslim history as one of unity, power and piety (see Sobhy 2007 for a brief 
overview) reinforcing the key Islamist message that Islam is the solution‘; that has 
historically led and would lead to ‗power‘: national independence and dominance, as 
well as prosperity. Furthermore, as witnessed in different classrooms, the curriculum as 
taught in schools in the different years is fully embedded in a ―mainstream Islamist‖ 
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(Sobhy 2009) sensibility. For example, this Arabic Language grammar practice piece, 
given by a teacher in a 2nd secondary general classroom, puts forward the key Islamist 
premise that links personal religious adherence with national and global security, 
prosperity and progress: 
―humanity will not be able to enjoy safety and stability except if it returns to the heavenly 
messages, to their refined values, free from personal interests and extremism, at which 
point every citizen feels that he is responsible before God, so he performs his work with 
sincerity and honesty, watching his Lord, delivering the dues of his nation, and this 
security predominates, and love spreads among the children of the nation, and they 
reach heights of progress and prosperity.‖ 
Similarly, this grammar practice piece from one of the most popular external textbooks 
(Al-Mu‗alim, 2nd Secondary General, 296) states: 
―The world is about to explode with weapons in the hands of powerful states. People are 
starting to be fed up of the control of poor states by rich states. Famines are usurping 
souls while grains are thrown into the sea so that they become scarce. Is there a way to 
remedy this condition? The way is religion which mandated the meeting of people on the 
basis of compassion, mercy and cooperation; a meeting which should bear its fruit. 
There is no way for the removal of vice from the world except through religion, for it 
tames instincts, strengthens the soul, establishes justice, organizes human relations on 
the basis of virtuous morals, and shows that (virtue) and justice do not discriminate 
between races, but are applied to the people of the earth.‖  
 
So the message is that the injustice and inequality in the world is caused by powerful 
rich exploitative non-Muslim countries that dump grains into the ocean while poor 
people die of famine. However, if these nations faithfully adhere to religion, justice, 
mercy and cooperation would prevail. No parallel message is provided concerning stark 
inequalities within Egyptian society or any other Muslim society at any point in history; 
nor between Muslim states at the present or at any point in history; or any reference to 
forms injustice and exploitation carried out by Muslim states. Injustice and exploitation 
are externalized to the non-Muslim realm and justice and prosperity are premised on 
adherence to religion. 
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CITIZENSHIP 
The overriding nationalist and Islamist themes almost completely overshadowed other 
constructions of the state, state-society relations and citizenship in the textbooks, 
especially in relation to legal, constitutional, political and economic rights. In fact, they 
served to merge the state with the nation and define and confine politics to nationalist 
issues centered on relations with ‗the other‘. Not only was the ‗withdrawal‘ of the state 
from the provision of social services ignored and erased from view, volunteerism 
through ‗developmental‘ NGOs was actually presented as the only hope for real 
renaissance. With much rhetoric about citizen duty to shoulder responsibility for 
improving conditions in the country and ―lead economic life in a new world based on 
competition‖, the textbooks reflected the regime‘s desire to fashion and idealize 
neoliberal subjectivities. There was an attempt to lay the ground and legitimize a variant 
of neoliberal citizenship; but one essentially stripped of the most basic citizen rights 
guaranteed in other neoliberal settings, such as in many countries of the Global North.  
 
The thin veneer of legitimacy on which the Mubarak regime finally promoted itself is in 
fact evident in its Nationalist Education curricula. Textbooks referred to 
―accomplishments‖ on the social front such as ―the establishment of the National 
Council for Motherhood and Childhood‖. Most ironically, they emphasized 
―education‖ as the National Project of Egypt promoted under Mubarak; a failed and 
non-existent project in the view of almost all students. Overall, there was very little 
discussion of protection and participation rights and the examples given of provision 
rights seemed more ironic- and generated sarcasm when presented in classrooms- than 
actually reflecting services provided. There was almost no mention of the fundamental 
concerns of citizens in terms of poverty, rising inflation and unemployment or poor 
education.  As reflected in textbook discourses, the erasure of ‗poverty‘ from official 
discourse has been a key feature of the neoliberal period in Egypt, where the regime 
refrained from even the use of the word ‗poverty‘ or ‗the poor‘, using instead the 
ambiguous and all-encompassing term ―those of limited income‖ (mahdudi al-dakhl). 
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While the textbooks sometimes explicitly promoted the desired autonomous flexible 
neoliberal citizen subjectivity, overall they actually sought to erase any notion of 
citizenship from view. Citizenship, as a relationship between state and citizen, is 
obscured by discursively merging the state with the nation, so that the primary and only 
relationship of the individual is to the nation. This serves to legitimize the definition of 
that relationship as a non-reciprocal one-way relationship of loyalty, sacrifice and 
personal excellence on the part of the individual for the sake of the nation. 
Consequently, there was little treatment of the state‘s role as a provider of social 
services, such as poverty reduction, healthcare, education; and key public services, such 
as security and the rule of law, and close to nothing on any role in relation to job-
creation and unemployment. That is, the state was not constructed in its citizenship-
related roles. Protection rights (rule of law and protection from discrimination) were 
hardly referred to. Provision rights (economic and social welfare rights) were 
sometimes briefly presented as achievements of the regime and participation rights 
were briefly listed in the Nationalist Education textbook as defining the Good Citizen, 
but received little detailed treatment in the textbook itself or in other more important 
textbooks.  
 
Ideology and domestic politics as a whole were almost entirely ignored. While Egypt‘s 
state socialist experience was given very limited treatment and portrayed in more 
nationalist and less ideological light, even economic liberalization under Sadat was 
ignored. Within the overall Islamist framework of nationhood and the actual repression 
of any expression of political rights, citizenship became more easily and intuitively 
defined around personal morality understood in religious terms, where the Good 
Citizen is the one who adheres to religious teaching and improves his own personal 
conduct for the sake of the elevation of the nation.  
 
An example of how the textbook used nationalism to obscure citizenship, social issues 
and the social history of Egypt is how the History textbook described the conditions of 
Egyptians society under British occupation. Here, poor social conditions are a reason to 
reject British rule and it becomes appropriate to show the injustice befalling the 
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Egyptian people under occupation. The neglect of education by the British, its high fees 
and limited recipients are highlighted, as well as the introduction of English as the main 
language of instruction. Even the otherwise ‗forbidden‘ term ‗poverty‘ is used. The 
spread of feudalism, poor distribution of agricultural land and its concentration in the 
hands of the few are examples of the negative social realities under colonialism, where 
most peasants were deprived (mu„damin), suffering poverty and need; and workers had 
no rights protecting them from the oppression (istibdad) of employers, a pension law or 
social insurance; so that ‗major capitalists exploited workers in the worst manner‘. This 
sudden snapshot of social conditions simply stands alone across almost the entire 
textbook. There is no mention of how these conditions compared to the preceding 
ruling dynasties, nor indeed the succeeding regimes, and certainly not to corresponding 
contemporary conditions. The passage is clearly an abridged remnant of Nasserite 
textbooks. However, it serves to show that the only citizenship-related and the 
politicized references- to capitalism, exploitation, poverty, social insurance and to ‗the 
people‘ as workers and peasants- retained in history textbooks 40 years later were those 
that referred to conditions under rule by the ‗other‘. The other can be responsible for 
poverty, inequality and lack of access to education. Otherwise such terms and issues are 
hardly ever referred to. Another notable discussion of state provision and taxation 
policies was under Islamic dynasties. This was most concretely presented in detailing 
taxes on agricultural land, determined based on the religion of the holder.58 This was 
followed by an explanation of the categories of distribution of zakah to the poor and 
needy, in one of the rare mentions of ―the poor‖ in the text. Here, poverty was related 
to an Islamic framework and linked to the ‗individual‘ religious duty of paying alms, 
albeit regulated by the state, but not a citizenship rights per se. It was therefore far 
closer to charitable citizenship than legally guaranteed social protection. 
 
The textbooks attempt to provide a legitimizing discourse for poverty, inequality and 
corruption in terms of promoting a neoliberal subjectivity where individuals must learn 
                                            
58 Khiraj was taken from non-Muslims (an unspecified amount in the textbook, although 50% of the produce of 
Jewish lands is listed in the same lesson), and zakah was taken from Muslims or converts to Islam (10%). The 
jizya, another tax on non-Muslims is mentioned, along with a discussion about how it is not an Islamic innovation. 
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to ‗adapt‘ to ‗market conditions‘ and globalization is inevitable; along with a selective 
reading of Islam where personal responsibility, morality and accountability is extended 
to encompass and determine the political and economic fate of the nation. The onus is 
on each individual to live up to standards of integrity and to be ‗conscientious‘. There is 
no role for the institutions of the state or the legal system to ensure accountability. This 
is in stark contrast to Islamic and Islamist discourses that hold the ruler- not the 
citizen- accountable for any form of injustice or inefficiency in the territory on which 
he reigns- even if it befalls roaming cattle, as in the often cited example from the reign 
of the Caliph Umar. The emphasis on ‗corruption‘- especially as reinforced in the 
Islamic studies textbook- provides the only available discourse to explain negative 
socio-economic realities, morally, individually and Islamically; not structurally or 
politically. It was not only the personal responsibility of each person that determined 
and drove corruption, it was also part of being a ‗man‘. A lesson on ‗manhood‘ in the 
technical secondary Arabic textbook also highlighted manhood in terms of integrity in 
taking up public office, so that the minister who is a real man is the one who considers 
his office a duty, not a source of pride and thinks first if his people and last of himself, 
remains in office so long as he preserves the rights of his nation and only cares for the 
voice of his conscience.  
 
The dominant themes of mainstream Islamism and general public discourse in Egypt 
typically malign ‗the self‘/ Egyptians—especially youth and women—and displace unto 
them negative qualities and responsibility for the negative state of the nation (Sobhy 
2009). The citizen is frequently portrayed as bad and not possessing the right Islamic 
and modern values necessary for success, prosperity, and national empowerment. The 
‗bad citizen‘ and the ‗nation under external threat‘ work together as one of the key 
rhetorical tactics of the late Mubarak regime. Maha Abdelrahman (2007) has 
highlighted the discourse used by the state to malign citizens, especially when it is under 
pressure by human rights groups regarding its violations. The regime had been able in 
many cases to successfully divert attention from human rights violations by casting 
human rights organizations as promoting ‗foreign‘ agendas, a staple strategy of many 
authoritarian regimes (Pratt 2005). Building on the general notion promoted in the 
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textbooks, and in public discourse, that Egypt is a unified whole (not, for example, a 
corrupt regime and disentitled citizens) constantly under threat from the ‗other‘, the 
regime seeks to move the terms of debate onto its preferred terrain of nationalism and 
‗us‘ versus ‗them‘. Maha Abdelrahman has traced some of these debates as they evolved 
in terms of human-rights and ‗nation-rights‘, where ―several articles in the semi-official 
press have condemned what is regarded as an overemphasis on human rights at the 
expense of the citizens‘ responsibilities towards the nation and respect of the nation‘s 
rights‖ (Abdelrahman 2007, 290). The theme of ‗bad citizens‘ is amply clear in these 
discourses. As Abdelrahman explains: 
In these articles, Egyptians, irrespective of their class background, are portrayed as 
‗spoiled citizens‘ who are provided for by a caring and devoted government, but who, 
inexplicably, enjoy violating the law, neglecting their work responsibilities and 
destroying public services at every possible opportunity. For example, a recent article 
from the ‗nation‘s rights vs. human rights‘ school demonstrates how the government 
does its utmost to employ hundreds of thousands of citizens in the public sector every 
year, only for these new employees to neglect their work in search of more lucrative 
extra jobs in the private and informal sectors (2007, 290). 
 
Finally, the official textbooks for different subjects blatantly marginalize different 
religious, class and regional identities. Apart from the explicit emphasis on the ‗national 
unity‘ of Egyptians: Muslims and Christians, the frame of reference for discussing 
critical political and moral issues are clearly ―Islamic‖ and emphasizes the supremacy of 
Islam over all other religions and presents it as the basis and predecessor of all human, 
and especially European, intellectual and scientific achievements. Shirif Yunus 
emphasizes that the forcing of Islamism onto the history textbooks is not only aimed at 
establishing an Islamic and Islamist identity to replace Egyptian identity, but serves to 
humiliate and spite minorities to the extent that the few pages devoted to Coptic 
history in one textbook ended with an assignment to ―write 10 lines to the Danish 
cartoonist who maligned the Prophet‖ (MARED 2010). Clearly as well, only certain 
elements and interpretations of Islam and Islamism were given space and expression. 
Furthermore, Upper Egypt, the Bedouin communities of the Sinai and the Western 
desert did not receive any more than passing references across the different textbooks. 
The authors of the curricula put very little effort into drawing upon the realities or 
experiences of communities outside urban and middle class sectors of the nation. 
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Other than a section of the Islamic Religious Education textbook which outlines 
traditional female occupations as more appropriate for women (teacher, nurse) and 
explained their differentiated inheritance rights (commensurate with their differentiated 
financial responsibilities), the textbooks did not put across many discourses that 
explicitly discriminated or differentiated between men and women. Sexist and 
derogatory discourses, widely employed in public and private discourse in Egypt, were 
not replicated by the textbooks. As with national unity and poverty, inequality, 
disentitlement and discrimination were erased from view. On the other hand, the focus 
on defending the nation clearly elaborates a gendered citizenship and nationhood 
discourse that privileges men as the real nationals and citizens. But with such nationalist 
struggle ‗completed‘, the focus on faith, religious adherence and personal morality 
could theoretically equalize male and female citizenship, as the moral message is 
directed at both men and women. On the other hand, where Islamic morality is 
increasingly defined around female modesty and chastity, ideal citizenship for women is 
further reduced to issues of chastity and the related comportment and behavior. With 
their claims to sound Islamic morality consistently undermined (see Chapter Five), the 
citizenship and entitlement of women is further narrowed and rendered precarious. 
Their extreme vulnerability to harassment (lack of entitlement to protective rights) and 
their entitlement provision rights (through the state or charitable NGOs) can be 
critically premised on their embodiment of the ideals of Islamic comportment, their 
status as mothers or as carers for [male] dependents or family members. The 
participation rights of women have been rendered painfully precarious due to targeted 
sexual harassment against female demonstrators and activists. The dominant 
constructions of Islamized citizenship arguably serve to further undermine female 
citizenship rights and the legitimacy of their very appearance in public space.  
 
Similarly, the instances where religious faith, Muslim or Christian, is articulated as the 
basis of good citizenship can potentially position ideal citizenship as inclusive of 
Muslims and Christians. On the other hand, with the saturation of the public sphere 
and official state textbook with the supremacy of Islamic identification, this can only be 
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seen as fundamentally undermining the citizenship status and entitlements of 
Christians, as many Christian Egyptians experience it on a daily basis. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion may have made the textbooks seem more coherent and 
developed than they really were. Textbooks were structured in a very exclusionary 
manner in their presentation, content and expected modes of reproduction and 
assessment; and this was fully recognized by students and teachers. They were 
composed, and often approached by students and teachers, as sets of definitions, lists 
of factors, dates and likely exam questions with ―ideal‖ answers prepared by tutors and 
found in external books. The textbooks were not treated as exalted sources of 
authoritative knowledge. They were so often called ―stupid‖ and ―retarded‖, ―rubbish‖, 
―do not reflect reality‖ and almost always condemned as too long and full of useless 
detail (hashw). Engagement with textbook content seemed so minimal, that for a long 
time it was not entirely clear to me whether it was worthwhile for a study of ‗lived 
schooling‘ to give significant attention to textbook content. I finally accepted that the 
textbooks and in fact the ways they were approached are indeed a critical component of 
lived schooling. 
 
In addition to the way that many students engaged with the texts instrumentally and 
with distance and indifference, there were frequently running commentaries of humor, 
ridicule of the official curriculum and guarded sarcasm about constructions of the state 
(and citizenship) within them, especially in regards to its provision of social services. 
For example, when commenting on the accomplishments of the state, one teacher in 
the girls private school simply changed his tone to convey sarcasm, employing 
rhetorical questions: ―the state provides what, my children (ya wilad)? It provides 
everything for us‖. This kind of subversion was far more common, at least in the 
schools where I conducted my research, than more overt and elaborate critique. This 
type of ridicule was applied to discourses on the state but not to discourses that 
invoked religion (see Chapter Seven). 
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Finally, modes of engagement with textbook discourse are further framed and 
diminished by the quality of instruction and assessment in the system, especially in 
terms of exam-oriented tutoring and pervasive cheating. The content and message of 
the texts is also mediated by teachers, and importantly, by tutors operating outside the 
formal system. Textbooks do not speak in the classroom. Teachers speak for them and 
students receive them, and they are mediated by the whole of the discursive field they 
arrive to. Textbook discourse and its actual reception can only be understood in 
relation to the setting in which it is introduced. The same textbooks in a culture that is 
not saturated with Islamist discourse may be delivered and received very differently. As 
Magdi Khalil (2009) notes in terms of intolerance and discrimination, the flaws of the 
textbooks in this regard are multiplied many fold when they are translated by teachers 
in classrooms. To give one example, in the rare incident that Nationalist Education was 
actually taught in a classroom, the main message of the lesson became that believing in 
God is the basis of citizenship and the definition of the Good Citizen, which the 
teacher repeated over and over, intermitted with her admission that she was not 
familiar with the material and her complaint that this was not her specialization. While 
the importance of religious adherence was indeed listed clearly in the textbook, other 
themes were also mentioned, including respect for the beliefs of others, knowledge of 
civic and political rights and participation in political and volunteer work. The teacher 
however seemed to be unwilling, unqualified or unsure how to elaborate on them.  
 
It is now appropriate to explore how textbook constructions of citizenship and 
nationhood linked to teacher and student discourses and practices. Did students 
articulate national belonging and citizenship in a nationalist, moralist and Islamist vein 
and in reference to relations with the unjust ‗other‘, as the textbooks did? The 
discussion in the next chapter provides an idea of the power of these discourses to 
shape the discursive reproduction of nationhood and citizenship by students and 
teachers. As detailed in the chapter, much of these discourses were not reflected in the 
key ways in which students articulated the nation and national belonging. It elaborates 
on the strikingly open lack of belonging and love to the country expressed by students, 
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using the nation as a platform and entry point from which to launch critiques of the 
regime and Mubarak himself, particularly emphasizing negative economic and political 
realities and thereby highlighting a very distinct understanding of citizenship. 
  
234 
CHAPTER SEVEN:  NATION AND 
STATE IN SCHOOL RITU ALS AND 
DISCOURSES  
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed how textbooks defined nationhood and citizenship and 
hinted at the divorce between textbook discourses and the discourses and practices of 
students and teachers across the schools. This chapter explores in greater depth these 
discourses and school rituals and the ways in which they appropriate or subvert the 
meanings and themes found in the textbooks, and therefore in the official state project 
of national identity and citizenship. It discusses some of the ways in which nationalist 
rituals had been undermined across the schools and elaborates on the strikingly open 
lack of belonging and love to the country expressed by students. The chapter also 
highlights the ways in which discourses of the ‗bad citizen‘ were variably appropriated 
and resisted, while discourses of the ‗bad state‘, regime and President took center stage 
in discourses of citizenship, especially among students. Importantly, it emphasizes that 
most students expressed a very different notion of citizenship and the role of the state 
than the one reflected in the textbooks; one that was especially centered on provision 
and protection rights, equal opportunity and rule of law; while paying little attention to 
participation rights. In particular, public school students used the ‗absent‘ term inology 
and meanings of poverty and inequality to explain their realities and the protection and 
provision rights they received. In this sense, they seriously revised the ‗unitary‘ notions 
of history and nation presented in the textbooks where the nation and Muslim society 
were portrayed as a uniform whole juxtaposed to a hostile ‗other‘. 
 
Their reflections on national belonging were fundamentally merged with discourses on 
the state, regime and president. Perhaps in this sense, they had replicated the textbook 
merging of nation, state and president; while reversing their meaning and implications. 
In the lack of separation between state and nation, they gave primacy to citizenship and 
entitlement over nationhood and loyalty.   This fusing of nationhood and citizenship 
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was not only a reversal of textbook discourses that downplay citizenship and obscure it 
under nationalist devotion. It meant as well that as a fundamental component of their 
oppositional discourse, students expressed little ‗love‘ or belonging to the nation; a 
blatant failure of the goals of curriculum and of Egyptian education itself. They 
subsumed nationhood under citizenship issues so that the failure of the state‘s 
citizenship projects seemed to be expressed as lack of faith in and rejection of the 
nation itself. This forceful reaction is not taken as a verdict on enduring emotions 
towards the nation. More than anything, it reflects a rejection of the state, the regime 
and its practices. 
 
The chapter begins with a discussion of the morning assembly ritual as a key practice 
and concrete example of the production and performance of nationhood in the schools 
and the ways in which this performance is influenced by the general dysfunction of 
contemporary secondary schools. The second section discusses student and teacher 
discourses of nationhood and citizenship. It also discusses student, teacher and 
classroom discourses that relate to notions of the bad citizen, bad youth and the 
complex constitution of Muslim identity in relation to citizenship. The final section 
elaborates on the ways in which students and teachers appropriated or subverted 
textbook constructions of nationhood and citizenship. 
 
TABUR: THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE 
PERFORMANCE OF THE NATION 
There isn‟t even a flag salutation. The flag is torn in the first place. It doesn‟t even have an eagle [the 
eagle in the middle of the Egyptian flag]. Other students, yes they know something about Egypt: 
“Long Live Egypt”. There are a lot of songs about Egypt. They‟re all obscene words. They compose 
new songs to curse their country (yishtimu baladhum); that‟s how much they love it.. they don‟t love 
something called Egypt. General School Student 
Schools provide the space and the material for the promotion of constructions of 
national identity and citizenship by the state as well as other competing parties. 
Symbols, discourses and rituals of the nation and state were clearly present in schools in 
flags, maps, posters, drawings, rituals, civic and national education curricula, school 
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radio and extra-curricular activities. Furthermore, pictures of the then President (and 
sometimes the ex-First Lady) existed in all schools and in almost all classrooms. The 
chapter does not however deal in great depth with the visual representation of the 
nation in the schools. Attention is given to the morning assembly as the key daily ritual 
where the nation is meant to be present and performed in the schools. Studies have 
emphasized the importance of school activities of various kinds in fostering national 
belonging, including volunteer and cooperative work, social, cultural, religious, sports, 
artistic, creative activities, trips, psychodrama and seminars about social issues (see Al-
Sayid 2006, 141-3). School activities and the actual production of representational 
material across the school are not only heavily dictated from higher educational 
authorities and reflecting official discourses, they were also undermined by the poverty 
of resources and the marginalization of activities of all kinds across the schools (see 
Chapters Three and Four). 
 
 
Figure 14: Glazed Mubarak on Flag in Classroom—and Boys Posing—in the General School 
 
Rituals have received special attention in educational studies, especially in terms of their 
role in creating a sense of school community. Various studies have indicated the 
importance of ritual in creating and transmitting ‗culture‘ within educational settings 
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(Bekerman 2003, McLaren 1999). As McLaren (1999, 38) posits, rituals serve as ―the 
foundation of institutional life such as that found in schools‖. ―Rituals play an essential 
role in socializing members of school communities, communicating to them what the 
institution values most highly, and building a sense of cohesion amongst students, 
teachers, and administrators‖ (Bjork 2002, 466). McLaren has argued that ―rituals do 
more than simply inscribe or display symbolic meanings or states of affairs but 
instrumentally bring states of affairs into being‖ (1999, 141).  There has also been some 
attention to nationalist rituals in schools and the ways in which they embody notions 
and myths of national identity that include or exclude, as well as norms and values that  
are normalized, contested or resisted(see Bjork 2002, Ben-Amos and Bet-El 1999, 
Adely 2010). In addition to texts and discourses, rituals are key sites of the production 
of the nation in schools. The deployment of national symbols is particularly strong in 
schools as they are considered crucial sites for inculcating national loyalties (Adely 
2010). It should not be surprising therefore that one of the key areas where ―Islamic‖ 
schools introduce changes are rituals, and especially the tabur/ morning assembly (see 
Herrera 2006, Saad 2006, Starrett 1998). The morning assembly is the opportunity to 
increase the amount of religious content as well as develop and alter nationalist flag 
salutations with religious ones (see Chapter One). Schools ―often operate under the 
implicit assumption that habituation to a ritual will lead to the absorption of its 
symbolic content... Though the link between practice and ideology is rarely so direct as 
such rituals might imply, the existence of such a link is the basis of many disciplinary 
practices... ―Docile bodies‖ are molded in the hopes that docile minds will follow‖ 
(Luykx 1999, 101). As Wadeen (1999) has demonstrated in the case of Syria and as 
Cohen argues in reference to state rituals in former Soviet states: ―state ceremonies 
suffered the fate of imposed ritual anywhere: that however well contrived their forms, 
they could not control the meanings read into them by their audiences‖ (Cohen 1994, 
163).  
 
The main formal ritual of Egyptian schools is the tabur (literally: queue/ line): the daily 
morning school assembly that all schools are required to hold. The patriotic morning 
ritual is common to most Arab schools and many educational systems across the world. 
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In Egypt, this is a ritual decreed and carefully delineated by the ministry. Schools 
receive regular directives about tabur and its contents, its importance, upcoming 
inspections and specific injunctions such as the need to ―to emphasize the 
achievements of the minister and the government‖. Tabur is meant to have a number of 
components, including the flag salutation, singing the national anthem, a Quran 
recitation or a chosen prophetic hadith, daily news of the country, school radio, student 
talents such as a poem or music, a morning exercise routine, general school 
announcements and school and district level activities such as student elections, yearly 
festivals and exhibitions, wall journals, debating, sports, art or music competitions or 
tournaments. 
 
As highlighted in Chapters Three and Four however, music, sports, arts and other 
creative and intellectual activities have almost completely been removed from school 
life in most public schools. This is not only in order to focus on ‗important‘ subjects 
that affect student grades, but fundamentally because of lack of school resources- or 
the corruption and bureaucratic procedures that prevent their utilization; and critically 
because of severe shortages in teachers in these specialization who simply cannot make 
a living on government salaries- without private lessons. Therefore, despite the 
importance of school activities in cementing nationhood and citizenship projects at the 
school level, in most schools, activities of all kinds are effectively absent due to lack of 
resources, crammed curricula, teacher shortages in these courses (where there are no 
opportunities for private tutoring and therefore no possibility to make a living on a 
teacher salary), or reportedly because of fear of their appropriation by Islamist forces. 
The first blow then to the performance of the nation and state in school is that there is 
no music accompanying it, no developing and displaying student talents and hardly any 
real activities to report. Most of the components of tabur cannot be genuinely 
developed in many schools. But because of the general deterioration of schooling in 
Egypt, the very existence of the morning ritual is highly variable across the schools of 
the capital and the country. In many schools, the morning school meeting is simply not 
prepared, performed or attended.  It becomes solely an endeavor at escorting students 
to classes in a somewhat orderly manner. The process of maintaining order during 
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assembly is rarely very smooth. Sporadic ―relatively‖ minor insults (―come on you two 
animals‖: yalla ya hayawan inta wi huwa) frequently opened into a severe collective 
―reprimand‖ of the whole student body with varying levels of obscenity and physical 
violence involving the use of the canes and hoses (see Chapter Five). In many other 
schools, tabur, if performed, is typically reduced to four components: invocations to 
stand in line properly, the flag salutation, one couplet of the national anthem and more 
often than not collective reprimand and humiliation of the student body (usually for 
lack of order or lack of proper comportment during the nationalist rituals). 
 
In addition to all of this, most secondary school students do not in fact attend tabur. 
Especially in general secondary schools, most students do not regularly come to school 
due to private tutoring (See Chapter Four) and many of those who do come arrive in 
the end of assembly. In fact, in the girls‘ public general school, which was the most 
―orderly‖ and strict of the public schools, special incentive, warning, reminder and 
threats had to be made to students in order to attend the morning assembly on a 
particular date. The school had entered into the Assembly Competition (Musab‟it il-
Tabur) for the selection of the best assembly in the district. An exemplary tabur was 
being prepared and competition officials were going to be present on that date to 
inspect the Assembly. 
 
Despite the diminished audience on most days, the four public schools actually did 
attempt to maintain a semblance of tabur at least in the first weeks of term, albeit in an 
abridged and hasty format. There was some attempt at having student stand in line and 
chant the flag salutation. The singing of the national anthem was also attempted. In all 
the schools, particular teachers and administrators were more interested than others in 
tabur discipline and student embodiment of the correct patriotic comportment and 
vigor during the flag salutation and national anthem. For example, two of the principals 
gave this matter particular importance; in the boys‘ technical school and in the mixed 
private school. They brought up tabur in their reflections on the school and students 
and were invested in trying to cement the ritual. For these principals and other teachers, 
tabur and discussions of tabur were occasions to lament lack of student sense of national 
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belonging and rebuke students for it. In the technical boys‘ school, students singled out 
for more marked violation of ‗the mannerisms of tabur‟ (akhlaqiyat al-tabur) were 
retained for special rebuke and punishment by the principal, including his difficult 
courtyard physical drills. Proper tabur comportment included the vigorous singing of 
the national anthem and flag salutation, refraining from any speech or movement and 
standing tall, upright and embodying a sense of pride, respect, devotion and 
commitment to the nation.     
 
It is useful to bear in mind that most public secondary schools are only secondary 
schools. That is, they do not enroll students in primary or preparatory stages (except for 
the semi-private Experimental Schools). Most private schools however enroll students 
in all stages. This explains why they retain far more semblance of discipline overall and 
why tabur remains populated with students and the nation and state retain a daily 
audience, of mainly primary and preparatory students. In both private schools, tabur 
was certainly performed and prepared by teachers and students. Students came up to 
the microphone and led the flag salutation, read headlines from official newspapers, 
recited a chosen piece of poetry or shared a ‗useful‘ piece of general knowledge with the 
student body. Teachers led a brief morning exercise and the students marched to their 
classes in a fairly orderly manner. Because secondary school students in the private 
schools had very low attendance indeed (less than 10% of the cohort) and many arrive 
at the end of Assembly, they were hardly party to this ritual. 
 
Finally, as hinted in the opening quote, even in assemblies that were being in fact 
performed, as in the private schools, most secondary students and many preparatory 
students did not even utter the salutations of the flag. Some uttered them without the 
required vigor, others made fun of enthusiastic performances of the national anthem 
from younger students, while some murmured ―alternative‖ lyrics to the national 
anthem. These highly critical songs were widely known and circulated, primarily among 
boys, in the schools. These were typically short verses fitted to the same tune or other 
popular tunes. The lyrics were in fact deemed by the boys to be too obscene to repeat 
in front of me. They were typically variations on themes of abuse by the nation and 
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state, of disentitlement and failure, of being violated or raped by the nation, or the 
nation being a ‗prostitute‘.  Adely (2010, 141) has suggested that the existence of  
symbol-laden rituals in schools may in fact create opportunities for engagement with 
conflicts around such symbols ―and for the possibility of constructing new symbols 
with new meanings‖. In this sense, students were indeed constructing and solidifying 
new symbols and meanings in relation to the nation; meanings bound up with their 
experiences of citizenship, as elaborated below. 
 
The reluctance to sing the national anthem or enthusiastically salute the flag were not 
solely forms of ‗teenage rebellion‘ against authority, or the mandated pious 
embodiment of discipline or enthusiastic performances of national devotion. For 
example, many students also chatted with friends during the Quran recitation in tabur. 
Clearly this was not only disrespectful and inattentive, it contravened the explicit 
religious injunction to listen attentively when Quran is being recited. It would be very 
difficult however to encounter popular songs of ridicule of the Quran. When they 
deviate from what may be considered as proper religious conduct, students typically 
employ a variety of other discourses to describe their behavior; contextualizing their 
actions, exonerating or blaming themselves (e.g. that they cannot really hear the 
recitation because there is a lot of noise). No such justification is needed to excuse un-
patriotic discourses and practices. Rather as described below, many students openly 
expressed lack of love or belonging to the country. 
 
NATIONHOOD AND CITIZENSHIP IN STUDENT 
AND TEACHER DISCOURSES 
Why should I love it as long as I do not get my rights in the country? One can be proud of their 
country when they see something good in it, when they do something good for him (Ahibaha lih law 
mish wakhda ha‘i fil-balad. Il-wahid yib‘a fakhur bi-baladu lama yishuf fiha haga 
kuwayisa, lama yi‗milulu haga kuwayisa).  Private School Student 
 
One of the most common registers used to describe youth in Egyptian public discourse, 
at least prior to January 2011, had been that they do not have a sense of belonging to 
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the country (ma„anduhumsh intima‟ lil balad). As described in the previous chapter, 
‗belonging‘ is constructed a ‗natural‘ feeling people have toward their nation. In 
textbook and public discourse, ‗belonging‘ was used primarily in a negative sense: not 
possessing a sense of belonging and was fundamentally bound up with discourses of 
‗the bad citizen‘, who uses foreign languages or are susceptible to western influence and 
engage in un-civic or illegal practices, from corruption to the violation of traffic laws. 
To legitimize such critique of the citizen, it was more effective to couch it in nationalist 
terms, again merging the state with the nation. The use of legal or citizenship terms or 
notions of reciprocity would not as convincingly condemn such behavior, given the 
various failings of the state in terms delivering protective, provision or participation 
citizenship rights. The nation however is not constructed to owe ‗its sons and daughters‘ 
anything in order to receive their ‗naturally‘ felt love. The common characterization of 
youth as lacking in belonging is part of the maligning of young people in an 
authoritarian gerontocracy, as well as reflecting the strong sense of alienation and lack 
of nationalist zeal among young people. As detailed in the previous chapter, promoting 
national belonging is however one of the fundamental goals or in fact the goal of 
Egyptian education.  This section details student and teacher discourses of nationhood 
and citizenship, reflected both in answers to more or less direct questions, and in the 
course of everyday activity within the schools. Within long conversations, using 
different overtures, I asked students individually or in groups about their views on love 
or sense of belonging to the country for themselves or their peers, and how they would 
describe or characterize their ‗generation‘ or peers. I also asked teachers and principals, 
individually and collectively about the sense of belonging or knowledge of the country 
among students and how they would describe the students as a whole or as a 
‗generation‘. 
 
Because after all I did ask students to reflect on ‗love‘ and ‗sense‘ of belonging, there is 
some overlap between what I explore in the schools and the sociology or anthropology 
of emotions, for example as explored by Goodwin, Jasper and Polleta (2000) or by Abu 
Lughod and Lutz (1990). As highlighted in Chapter One, emotions are fundamental to 
political identity and its concomitant issues of citizenship and national identity. In this 
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sense, I did approach ―discourses on emotion and emotional discourse as social 
practices‖ (Abu Lughod and Lutz 1990, 1). Although I talked with students about love 
and feelings of belonging to the country, I saw these discussions as discourses and 
practices on nationhood and citizenship, not as exploration of emotion or emotional 
expression, despite the supreme importance of emotion in relation to nationhood and 
citizenship, as well as of course to protest and mobilization.  That is, emotional 
experiences of indignation, humiliation, anger, hatred, disgust, sadness, or empathy 
were arguably critical to the development of student and teacher discourses in the 
course of their own experiences of the state, whether in their daily lives or through 
media exposure and public and private discourse. However, I conceived of my question, 
and it proved to be, an avenue for getting at constructions of citizenship, the state and 
the regime. The invocation of love of country was an opening to enter freely into a 
discourse on the state. It was not used to reflect on emotional states or to attempt to 
interpret emotional experiences and intensities; an excellent area for future research.  
 
In terms of my choice of terms, I chose ―the country‖ (il-balad) as a more neutral term 
and more commonly used than any other term for the nation in Egypt. Egyptians 
hardly use watan or umma to signify Egypt in everyday talk. Il-Balad is also not associated 
with a certain camp or ideology in the way that watan may be associated with the Arab 
world and umma with the Muslim world. Egypt is referred to as Egypt/ Masr or el-balad: 
the country. Masr, I felt, carries within it more nationalist, (perhaps recalling pre-1952 
nationalism, see Chapter Six), grandiose, formal and exalted undertones. As a more 
‗nationalist‘ term, it may also recall a juxtaposition to ‗the other‘, to Egypt‘s relation to 
the outside world, to war and borders, to soccer matches; that is, to ‗nationalist‘ themes. 
Il-Balad also has a more domestic undertone, as it hints at society as well as nation. It is 
used when discussing social, economic or political issues. It may also signify moral 
issues. In this sense, it would be more hospitable to commentary on the state of 
morality in the country or Islamist critiques of governance or society. It is therefore a 
more encompassing term and I did not wish to close up opportunities for students and 
teachers to reflect on these issues by choosing the somewhat more ‗nationalist‘ term 
‗Egypt‘. As with any other term however, using it already deploys certain discourses. In 
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the end, my question was supremely a nationalist one: to comment on the sense of 
belonging and love to the country, and was going to be appropriated by students based 
on their own discursive repertoires. Because of this and because the act of asking the 
questions invariably sets the tone of the conversation, throughout my presence in the 
schools I avoided direct questions or reference to nationhood and citizenship. I was 
interested in instances where students or teachers brought up or discussed these issues 
in their ongoing interactions. The themes that emerged in open ended discussions also 
came up in the course of these interactions. 
 
It is appropriate to emphasize once more the level of political control of schools and its 
classed nature. For the poor, being involved in any kind of oppositional activity, 
especially with religious undertones, is a matter with possibly grave consequences. 
Testimonies of men, including very young teenagers, detained for years on account of 
attending a religious youth camp, sporting a beard or praying in the ‗wrong‘ mosque are 
regularly featured in media and human rights reports. The consequences of being 
reported to have political activity are not a small interrogation, a brief beating or 
blocked opportunities for career advancement. They can include years of detention and 
the most brutal and humiliating forms of torture. Unofficial and undocumented 
discourses are different however and many but not all students and many teachers felt 
‗some‘ liberty to engage in oppositional discourse. Especially in the general public 
schools, students wanted to open up many critical comments on the government and 
the regime, until I unfortunately felt that I had to censor them by changing the topic, as 
I feared jeopardizing my access to the school. This kind of self-censorship was arguably 
occurring all the time during my presence in the schools. They also wanted to pursue 
the discussions of politics and corruption, including those they were directly familiar 
with, in public schools, bribes and falsified leases to enter particular schools. At times, 
my attempts (half-heartedly and clearly as a required performance) at limiting 
oppositional ―political‖ discourse were directly countered by students. As one student 
objected, ―but everything is related and this is related to education‖. Self-censorship 
was exercised by teachers, students, principals and myself much of the time; suggesting 
that many views may have been more oppositional than the discussions here reflect. 
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Such censorship often happened visibly, where students would silence each other 
through words or gestures, teachers would ‗correct‘ other teachers or ask them to refer 
to ‗officials‘ not the President and the Ministers by name, or when I would jokingly tell 
students when they criticized the President and regime, ―do you want them to take 
away my permit or what?‖ 
 
School authorities of course made sure that there was no oppositional political 
discourse in any ‗public‘ forum in all of the schools. As Abdul Hamid (2000) has 
observed in his study of social control in Egyptian schools, students were not allowed 
to discuss political issues with their teachers or in the school radio/ morning assembly 
program. The main reasons were framed around ―fear‖: of teachers or the principal, or 
fear of what this permission may entail, fear of political oversight by the state, fear of 
arrest, fear of punishment or expulsion or trouble, and fear of the occurrence of 
unruliness (shaghab).  There was of course some ‗political‘ expression in the schools, if it 
remained within the lines defined in the textbooks. For example, ‗nationalist‘ poetry or 
other material revolving around the injustices of the ‗other‘ was allowed in the school 
radio or official competitions, but never anything on domestic politics. It is obvious 
therefore that in most school contexts, protective and participation rights relating to 
freedom of speech and organization were very limited. 
 
CONSTRUCTING THE NATION AND STATE 
Given the insistence on national belonging in textbooks, daily rituals and the media, I 
expected at least significant expression or even lip service to ‗love‘ of the nation among 
students, especially that most discussions were conducted inside the schools. However, 
even when students started with affirmations of love of the country, it seems that they 
could not locate further content to support it with and quickly began to articulate the 
opposite view: that there was no reason to love the country. After their preliminary 
responses, whether negative or affirmative, students developed further reflections that 
almost always centered on negative conditions in the country. They developed 
narratives revolving distinctly around domestic, economic and ‗citizenship‘ issues. 
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There were a number of common themes that they typically drew upon: 
unemployment, poverty (including rising prices), humiliation, inequality and corruption. 
The main reasons not to love the country were most consistently articulated in terms of 
unemployment, poverty, and the interlinked themes of inequality, corruption and crime. 
Even private school students framed their own expressed lack of belonging in terms of 
blocked opportunities and lack of desirable jobs, as well of course as systematic 
corruption and cronyism. 
 
The discourses and emotions described here arguably reflect the growth of independent 
media and other forums where dissent can be voiced and information can be shared 
more freely. The media, newspapers (Al-Tukhi 1999), and more recently satellite 
television channels (Abdullah 2007), have been considered to be the main sources of 
knowledge on politics; and shaping the perceptions of political issues and their 
importance among Egyptian students; representing ―the most important source of 
political socialization‖ for students (Al-Tukhi 1999, 215). Arabic satellite channels, 
importantly Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, held a privileged position in this regard 
(Abdullah 2007). This has been balanced in more recent years however by the growth 
of relatively independent Egyptian satellite channels. For example, in the course of our 
conversations, especially in the general schools, students and teachers referred to issues 
that were raised on the famous political, social and news programs aired on privately 
owned Egyptian channels. These popular shows (such as al-„Ashira Masa‟an, Wahid min 
al-Nas and Al-Qahira al-Yum) regularly discussed forms of corruption extending across 
the system, and highlighted—to varying degrees—the plight of the poor especially 
those living in informal neighborhoods. In 2011, new and more openly oppositional 
channels were either established or gained increasing prominence, notably Ontv and 
Tahrir Channels and others. Furthermore, popular films in recent years have dealt with 
systematic corruption, increasing poverty and daily police repression. These may have 
had even more significant impact on student discourses, as the news may not of high 
importance to most students in comparison to films and television drama (see Mahmud 
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2004).59 In an era of far more open media, the vivid multiplication of Egypt‘s ―others‖ 
may have made the image of Egypt worse in the eyes of young people as well as 
strengthening alternative notions of citizenship. 
 
While lower middle class students of the public general schools seemed to be by far the 
most vocal and oppositional in their discourses, similar attitudes prevailed across the six 
schools and for boys as well as girls. Boys however tended to be more direct in 
expressing a distinct and open lack of belonging. Many simply answered that ‗no‘ or ‗of 
course not‘; that they do not feel love or belonging to the country; some quickly linking 
this with the desire to leave the country. Girls frequently began their reflections with 
short affirmations, ―of course,‖ ―surely‖ we love the country. Then they would open up 
into: ―not a lot;‖ ―we like it in words not in deeds.‖ This would progress into 
statements like: ―if we as a people benefit from Egypt we would like it,‖ and ―we are 
oppressed in the country… we don‘t feel our freedom or anything‖. This escalation and 
progression in one conversation with a group of girls in the general school was 
characteristic of many student responses. This may indicate why surveys of nationalist 
sentiment find such overwhelming expressions of national belonging (see UNDP 2010, 
67-74).60 While the first and socially sanctioned response may be ‗yes of course we love 
the country‘, this is not always the final answer. 
 
There was something of a gender difference therefore in expressions of lack of love 
and belonging to the nation/state, which may indicate how boys may indeed feel more 
grievances due to blocked opportunities for upward mobility, as future breadwinners. 
However this may have also been informed by differences in political interest between 
                                            
59 Mahmud found that all teenagers watched television, about half of them watching it regularly; and almost all of 
them watched, regularly or irregularly, television serials (musalsalat) aired on Egyptian state television, be they 
romantic, social, historical or political (Mahmud 2004). Their preferred television viewing was for Arabic films, 
followed by religious programs, Arabic plays, Arabic songs, television serials, foreign films, sports, then 
educational programs (Mahmud 2004, 486). 
60 A recent nation-wide survey asked young people directly about their feelings of national pride, religious 
sentiment and practice and political and civic participation (UNDP 2010, 67-74). In the survey, seventy-one 
percent of youth are proud of their Egyptian identity, among them, females with university level education have 
the strongest sense of allegiance. This put Egypt fifth in the international comparison in youth pride in national 
belonging with a difference of 13% above the international 58%.  The survey also shows that national belonging 
among youth in Egypt is expressed in the response of 85% of the sample who showed readiness to go to war in 
defense of their nation, most of them males with university level education. 
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boys and girls and therefore difference in their exposure to political news and media, 
including oppositional variants, and revelations of corruption and repression. Girls‘ 
oppositional discourse shared the same themes with boys but with one significant 
difference. Girls in the public schools frequently emphasized the lack of ‗safety and 
security‘ within their reflections on love and belonging to the country. Girls in the 
popular neighborhood seemed to feel acutely physically vulnerable and feared for their 
safety from sexual harassment as well as other forms of crime. Safety however was a 
general concern in the informal neighborhood. School authorities and students in the 
general boys‘ school also expressed security concerns and had also attempted to secure 
some police presence around the school to deter violent fights among students, drug 
dealing and drug use near the school. 
 
Previous studies of youth political discourses and priorities have also linked both class 
and gender to political knowledge and national belonging among students, although 
their conclusions do not reflect a clear consensus. It has been argued in a number of 
studies that economic factors, especially in terms of income distribution and unmet 
basic needs, impacted student sense of national belonging (see Al-Sayid 2006, 137-9). 
Other studies noted higher rating of nationalist identity and belonging among girls than 
boys (Sabah 2004), although some studies noted higher male ratings or no gender 
differences (see Al-Sayid 2006, 133). Girls many experience greater pressures for 
obedience and conformity to social norms (see Al-Sayid 2006). Although the general 
tone was similar, I did find that boys were generally more engaged in oppositional 
discourses and perhaps better informed of the details and concrete examples of 
corruption than girls. Interest in politics among students has been shown to be 
primarily influenced by family factors (Awad 2006). Gender and class however do play 
a role. One study among Egyptian school students found that boys had higher rates of 
reading newspapers than girls, and more knowledge of political facts; attributing this to 
different interests and socialization and the fact that girls spend more time doing 
household chores and studying (Al-Tukhi 1999 and UNDP 2010, 41). Boys were 
portrayed in other studies as having more sense of belonging due to greater levels of 
participation in different (public) activities and because they had more freedom, more 
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social engagement and participation (Al-Sayid 2006). Another study of Egyptian school 
students found that older students, male students and private school students were 
more politically aware than younger, female or public school students (Al-Tukhi 1999), 
although other studies did not note this gender difference (see Awad 2006), or class 
difference (see Al-Sayid 2006, 137). The current research is of course conducted among 
urban students in the capital, and this may suggest that students are more politically 
informed and bolder in expressing their views. 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT, POVERTY AND HUMILIATION 
Most students brought up unemployment and underemployment at the heart of their 
reflections on national belonging (and the reasons for the lack thereof). Unemployment 
was such a strong theme for public general school students that it seemed to define 
their whole outlook on their generation and on national belonging. Unemployment was 
intimately linked with their reflections on love and belonging to the country. As one 
student put it, ―if I finish and sit, will I love Egypt?‖ Teachers and principals equally 
focused on unemployment in their reflections on national belonging. As the principal 
of the boys‘ general school put it, students want to ―graduate and find work but most 
men graduate and sit at home… you know how much money he needs to get married 
and have a home? So they want to leave the country.  They think of things financially.. 
not love of the country… It‘s all because of this unemployment‖. 
 
Therefore, intimately related to unemployment was the desire or hope of leaving the 
country in search for jobs. The desire to leave the country was perhaps even more 
pronounced for upper middle class students, perhaps because it was a more realistic 
option given their higher qualifications. The desire to leave the country was clearly an 
aspiration for many students as well as teachers. As one French teacher expressed in 
her sentences for grammar exercises: ―Je ne souhaite qu‟une chose: vivre en Amérique…. Je 
souhaite que mon frère réussis, et que vivions au Canada‖. A national survey of youth found 
that more than 28% of male youth expressed their intention to migrate, with socio-
economic background being positively correlated with the intention to migrate, as those 
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who showed intention to migrate are coming from the highest socio-economic level 
(UNDP 2010, 39). 
 
Strong imagery and emotions were in fact used in relation to unemployment: ―it‘s all 
black and closed in front of the kids‖, as one principal put it. Students themselves used 
language that reflected the powerful emotional impact of unemployment. They 
reflected on ‗this generation‘ as ―frustrated‖, ―in a bad emotional state‖, ―feeling in a 
closed circle‖ and ―with no way out‖. They drew upon the experiences of their relatives 
and acquaintances among whom unemployment was prevalent or even dominant. 
Many in the general schools noted that even graduates of good faculties and universities 
could not find jobs, commenting that most boys end up lingering in cafes and seeking 
to leave the country. ―There are no jobs. We expect that we too will take the certificate 
and ‗sit‘ [nu‟„ud] (stay at home unemployed). All our friends are in open universities and 
in the end they too ‗sit‘‖. Technical school students did not seem to feel themselves to 
be as vulnerable to unemployment per se (after all, the boys were almost all employed, 
albeit in temporary, seasonal, low-skilled and very low paid work in the informal 
economy). Some did however express desire to leave the country and were concerned 
about the difficulty of getting jobs in the future, especially well-paying jobs in the 
formal economy. This is not uniformly the case across the country as unemployment 
rates among technical school graduates are very high and unemployment rates vary 
considerably across the country and are much higher in Upper Egypt in particular (see 
Chapter Three for details). Unemployment is highest among youth who come from 
households in the fourth wealth quintile, slightly drops for those in the highest wealth 
quintile, and is lowest among youth who come from households in the lowest wealth 
quintile (UNDP 2010). 
 
This intense concern with unemployment is framed by the general lack of social safety 
networks in the country. There is no unemployment insurance to speak of and other 
welfare provision for poverty, disability, sickness or old age is limited and difficult 
obtain. This accentuates the implicit framing of employment as a sort of primary 
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citizenship right and need in a context where survival needs cannot be met except 
through employment.  
 
PROVISION RIGHTS: POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 
Students were also aware of their disentitlement from other citizenship rights. As 
evident from the preceding chapters, when it came to the concrete provision rights of 
supposedly free public education, students were bitterly critical of the education they 
were receiving and the conditions of education in the country. Education was described 
in variably disparaging terms as: corrupt-dysfunctional, retarded-backward and rubbish 
(bayiz, mutakhalif, zibala), or as one student put it, ―should be set on fire, all of it, with 
the teachers and students‖. Many students did not hesitate to condemn the whole 
system, along with minister and government. Importantly, public schools students felt 
that the quality of education they were receiving was premised on their social class: 
―well this is the free education that they make us feel indebted for (yiziluna bih) and they 
don‘t (actually) give us anything‖. Private school students were also exasperated with 
the quality of education and its relation to their future prospects. They equally mocked 
regime claims of free education and lamented the poor quality of public universities and 
the relatively poor prospects it implied for them. As one student put it, public 
universities ―are becoming like ma„ahid [low status two year institutes]. Even the new 
private universities, people say it‘s expensive and people still enroll in tutoring as well! 
Good education costs money (il-ta„lim il-hilw bi fulus). Now it‘s either AUC or GUC‖. 
This student was obviously considering options beyond the hopes of almost all 
students in the public general school, but was equally frustrated with the low prospects 
most options promised, not only among public universities, including the most 
competitive [and fee-charging] faculties within them, but even in new  private 
universities. According to this view, ‗good education‘ that led to good job prospects 
was only available in the two most expensive foreign universities in Egypt: the 
American University in Cairo and the German University in Cairo, with fees ranging 
from 50,000 to over 100,000 EGP/year. 
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Inequality, poverty, and rising prices were also strong themes in the reflections of 
public school students. In their reflections on national belonging, students made 
statements such as: ―I see people who cannot eat and those who can eat chicken every 
day‖ and ―there are people whose salaries are huge and here there are people who sleep 
in the street‖. Several students explicitly expressed that incomes in the country should 
be more equal. There was clear awareness of the privileges and rights afforded to other 
Egyptians based on income, where students made statements like: ―those who are living 
in this country are those who have money‖. As Ghannam (2002, 173) has also found, 
people strongly believe that the rich, who have more money and better connections, 
enjoy more protection and are better able to secure access to various resources. Not 
only were unemployment and poverty the key themes, but even hunger featured in many 
student discourses, which they linked to inequality, to government policy and to crime in 
their neighborhoods. Students remarked for example, ―how can someone see people 
dying of hunger, how can they go to bed at night?‖, or ―they are about to starve the 
people‖, or as one student in the public general girls‘ school elaborated, ―poverty makes 
people do these things. And more and more, the poorer we get, we are killing each 
other. Even rape, if a guy can‘t afford to marry...  The poorer the country, the more we 
are tearing each other apart (bin‟ata„ fi ba„d)‖.  
 
As such, there was a sense of gravity in the discourse of some students on these matters 
and a rather discernible narrative of causality leading from regime and state to poverty 
and social ills. Notably, there was little culturalist or moralist explanation of these issues 
even among private school students, such as the ‗bad citizens,‘ the ‗lazy poor,‘ the ‗bad 
Muslims‘, God‘s punishment for decadence or even foreign conspiracy or the greed of 
wealthy nations. Furthermore, as opposed to neoliberal ideology and the discourse of 
the textbooks, job creation and social protection were firmly conceived as state 
responsibilities. As a recent national study of causes of poverty as perceived by the 
poor concluded, ―youth, both urban and rural, explained poverty on the basis of the 
failure of state policies to protect low income groups in the face of the trend towards 
privatizing the economy‖ (El-Laithy 2007, cited in UNDP 2010, 86). They also 
253 
emphasized that they found the future less predictable, jobs are uncertain and income 
very irregular.61  
 
While articulations of themes of poverty and social inequality varied from one student 
to the other, they tended to be less intense and common in the discourses of private 
school students. While clearly frustrated with conditions in the country, students from 
the upper middle classes used themes of recognition instead of livelihood and survival 
in relating to opportunity and employment. Poverty per se was not a key concern or 
theme in their discourses. Many still felt there was limited sense of national belonging 
in their generation and limited opportunities. As a female private school student put it, 
―most people are not interested in the country. For example, if they say there is a war 
tomorrow, will all the guys want to go? Do you think they care about it? No. They all 
curse it and the day they were born in it and will flee it whenever they can. If you say I 
want to stay and build my future, he will say: where is the future? ‖. Or as another 
private school student, put it, ―Yes. It‘s true. We don‘t have belonging. We are coming 
out in an age when the country doesn‘t give us anything. People say it didn‘t give us 
anything to give back. They don‘t know how to give back.‖  
 
PROTECTIVE RIGHTS: HUMILIATION, CORRUPTION AND 
HARASSMENT  
However, for public school students, it was not only poverty that shaped their 
narrative, in terms of not being to secure certain goods or services, but the humiliation 
and abuse that came with it. Both in reference to love of the country and in the course 
of ongoing discussions in the schools, students referred to humiliation and bad 
treatment when dealing with agents of the state in the school which they understood to 
be related to their low social status. Students were aware not only of their lack of access 
to legally available rights such as medical insurance or freedom from physical 
                                            
61 ―This uncertainly about the future seems an integral aspect of the experience of poverty in Egypt. It brings an 
intolerable sense of insecurity and vulnerability to lives of the poor. They feel vulnerable to trivial and accidental 
incidents. Insecurity is related to lack of health security as indicated by the poor when expressing their fears about 
tomorrow. The first fear they describe is being sick and unable to afford treatment. All interviewees of focus 
groups considered health as a major asset whose absence necessarily leads to poverty‖ (El-Laithy 2007, cited in 
UNDP 2010, 86). 
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punishment in the school, but also of facing humiliation if they attempted to access 
those rights or challenge any violations of their rights (see Chapter Five). For example, 
each school should have medical supplies, a nurse, occasionally a doctor and all 
students are officially covered by national medical insurance. Students knew however 
that the nurse or doctor hardly come to school and usually had little or no medical 
supplies. Students were also frequently treated very badly when seeking such public 
services. As one student commented, ―they are disgusted of us when we go to the 
ta‟min [medical insurance room at school] and they tell us to get out…as if we are 
beggars‖.  Humiliation was interlinked with student reflections on national belonging 
and the desire to leave the country. As one student put it, ―here, what do we get? We 
get insulted and humiliated and that‘s it (binitshitim wi nitbahdil wi khalas).‖62  Student 
reflections on national belonging included statements that highlighted the theme of 
humiliation based on poverty, like: ―the poor are treated like dogs.‖ As it was in terms 
of their concrete and lived citizenship, as discussed in Chapter Five, student statements 
in relation to patterns of physical punishment in the public schools also highlighted the 
understanding that the beating and humiliation they were subjected to was premised on 
their social status. Finally, some boys also linked humiliation to being harassed by the 
police or treated abusively if drafted in the army, and at least one student referred to the 
possibility of being arrested in a demonstration and the police treatment associated with 
it as another reason to hate the country (that student was indeed arrested on January 25, 
2011 on the first day of the protests; fortunately released several days later).  
 
Student discourses on the nation also reflected the focus on protective citizen rights 
and the rule of law in terms of their discourses on corruption. Poverty was frequently 
linked to corruption in the discourses of public school students: ―would we be like this, 
if we did not have all this theft and corruption?‖, as one student asked rhetorically. This 
was directly linked to the regime and the President in particular, not individual petty 
corruption in institutions of the state. As students in the boys‘ general school asked 
rhetorically, ―the income of the Suez Canal, where does it go?‖ Whose pockets is it 
                                            
62 Bahdala is ―something that unsettles or disturbs one‘s sense of honour and integrity‖ (Ismail 2011b, 850). 
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entering?‖ In the girls‘ technical school, girls also linked conditions in the country with 
the President; some by immediately needing to disentangle the wedding of nation and 
President: I love Egypt but the President, I hate him. The same sentiment was echoed 
by general school girls: ―I love it but I don‘t love the one controlling it.‖ ―He is taking 
the county down (midayya„ il balad)…  girls get kidnapped and body parts get stolen.. 
and education; there is nothing‖. In fact, at points students made statements like: ―we 
want the president to be changed‖, or ―to fix things, everyone has to be removed… the 
minster, everyone… We need all new people‖.  
 
Private school students also frequently brought up corruption in their reflection on the 
country: ―The people responsible for the country; they are the ones stealing it.‖ They 
also linked national belonging to the massive scale of corruption being revealed and 
how this encourages further corruption across the system. Therefore, across the 
schools there was a direct attribution of bad conditions in the country to the President 
and the regime; not to globalization or the practices of ‗other‘ countries, nor certainly to 
bad citizens, as in textbook discourses. There was also the boldness to express this and 
in some cases to explicitly express the desire to remove him. The emphasis on 
corruption in the textbooks came up in student discourses where there was a recurrent 
theme of attributing poverty to corruption. However, this was not a replication of 
official discourse, but rather a subversion centered on the use of the forbidden term 
‗poverty‘, absent and erased from the textbooks, and where corruption was not 
generalized and related to individual morality but to the regime and the President.  
 
While their primary focus was on provision rights, rule of law/ lack of corruption, 
freedom from humiliation, other protective rights were highlighted as well, especially 
for girls in terms of their vulnerability to sexual harassment. Girls in the public 
technical school brought up their discussions of harassment within their reflections 
about ‗sense of belonging to the country.‘ In these cases, in addition to other themes of 
unemployment, poor education and humiliation, they articulated the state‘s function 
directly in terms of security and mocked regime claims of ―the country of security and 
safety‖ (balad al-amn wal-aman). Girls, especially in the public schools, expressed serious 
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concerns and lacking citizenship rights around physical vulnerability and fears for their 
chastity, while boys saw economic opportunities as more primary in achieving their 
future goals, as expected primary breadwinners. As mentioned earlier, participation 
rights featured little in student discourses, even for private school students. There was 
little mention of rigged elections, even in discussion of corruption. While some 
students did use statements like ―there is no democracy‖ in their reflections on national 
belonging, this was not an aspect expressed in significant detail. 
 
Therefore, young people across the schools, as well as their teachers and principals 
linked disentitlement to citizenship rights and the dysfunctional state to national 
belonging. Among teachers, while many lamented the lack of belonging of students, 
this was frequently ‗explained‘, excused or contextualized by teachers. Lack of national 
belonging was evidenced in two key issues for teachers and principals. They frequently 
referred to the lack of vigor in the salutation of the flag as the most immediate 
manifestation, but mainly focused on youth desire to leave the country and their despair 
or anger with conditions in the country. For example, when reflecting on ‗this 
generation‘, the principal of the public general boys school said that there is no 
‗belonging‘; that this is the first thing that can be noticed. She explained that this was 
because students did not know the national anthem and were not getting the lyrics 
right. She then continued that the students were ‗frustrated‘ because everyone tells 
them that there are no job opportunities and nowhere to go.  The principal of the 
mixed private school voiced remarkably similar themes, ―the children have lost faith in 
us. The state they are in, we are the reason for it, all of the role models are corrupt… 
They hear about corrupt people. They do not have belonging to the country; many of 
them want to travel. They didn‘t used to greet the flag when I got to this school‖. 
Teachers sometimes blamed public discourse or parents for being a source of student 
lack of belonging, because students could hear in their homes statements like ―God 
curse this country; is this a life we are living?‖ (yikhrib bit dih balad, hiya dih „isha illi 
„ayshinha?). As the principal of the girls‘ private school put it, ―unfortunately, there‘s not 
this power of feeling loyalty to the country. They hear what‘s going on around them, 
from their parents, about everything, transportation, economic crisis, private tutoring 
257 
costs, living expenses… I feel that they always say: there‘s nothing.. they don‘t have the 
hope or loyalty to improve anything… They feel the future is not bright. I don‘t want 
to say they are lost (dayi„), they are better than that but the circumstances around them 
are not good.‖ Across the different schools teachers found immediate explanations for 
the lack of national belonging they believed was indeed present among students. These 
explanations were not about unpatriotic youth, bad citizens, or of course the wise 
President, as articulated in the textbooks. As a male teacher a private school put it, ―at 
the core is the relationship between the state and the person.. if it is normal, then there 
will be love and belonging to the country‖. 
 
Teachers sometimes also expressed a special difficulty or contradiction in dealing with 
themes of the nation. A number of teachers expressed that they wanted to instill love 
of the country in their students or lamented its absence. In their own reflections 
however, many digressed into an affirmation of student alienation, and even their own 
lack of national belonging. As teachers in the girls‘ general school reflected, ―it‘s true, 
why should he love it, he has no apartment, no job and no good treatment, even 
ourselves, we don‘t feel belonging.‖ A teacher in the technical girls‘ school offered the 
following reflections about the sense of belonging and knowledge of the country 
among students and its links with inequality and corruption: 
No they know nothing about the country. You know the social situation we 
have. Sometimes I talk to them about Egypt.. to love Egypt.. but the country 
gives them nothing.. we have class backwardness (inequality). These people are 
neither blind nor idiots. They know the income coming in to Egypt and where it 
goes. Sometimes, I tell them, if only you knew about the miracles of ancient 
Egypt (you would feel, act differently), but the level of culture is low. For me, I 
look at Ramses statue or pyramids I feel I am the son of a civilization‖. 
 
Many teachers therefore voiced contradictory views, where lack of belonging was 
lamented but justified. Even when students were deemed as having no belonging, this 
private school teacher concluded that ―if the citizen is treated humanely then he will 
have belonging and he will want to give to the country. If you treat the citizen as less 
than an animal, he sees that this country deserves nothing.‖ 
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BAD YOUTH, BAD CITIZENS 
In one of the Islamic Education classes in the general girls‘ school, the teacher 
explicated and elaborated on hadith from the official textbook. One of the hadith was 
about the importance of itqan: excellence and diligence in performing one‘s work. In his 
commentary on the text, the teacher employed frequently voiced Islamist assumptions 
about the importance of itqan in how ―they‖ (in the west) progress and that it is because 
each person is not performing his role that ―we‖ have backwardness (for a discussion 
of itqan in non-oppositional Islamist discourses, see Sobhy 2007). The teacher said that 
‗abroad‘ (barra), ―they work eight hours; but here you wake up, go to work, have 
breakfast, bring onions, sit and chat… A large percentage do not do their work well‖. 
He continued, ―our factories are losing and closing down. Why? Because of people not 
doing their work well and being careless („adam al itqan wal-ihmal)‖. The next brief hadith 
was about the grave sin involved in harming one‘s neighbors. The teacher elaborated 
that those who leave their laundry dripping on that of others and causing them harm 
are not really Muslim. The woman who does this, ―is she a Muslim?‖, he asked the 
class. They nodded that no, she is not. Another example was about people disposing of 
their garbage close to the houses of neighbors. These were also declared as not Muslim; 
an assessment seconded by the students every time. 
 
I felt that these were grave pronouncements on who is or who is not a Muslim; 
assessments which would be considered outright ―wrong‖ in mainstream Muslim 
jurisprudence. More importantly, as part of the state citizenship projects, agency and 
responsibility was placed on the individual for negative realities in society, regardless of 
the wider context and government inaction. Quite simply, the municipality failed to 
regularly collect the garbage in the neighborhood, despite the large garbage collection 
fees paid by citizens. If the residents preferred to throw the garbage further from their 
homes, and likely closer to the homes of others, was this really making them worthy of 
condemnation as infidels? Perhaps what was more alarming was the willingness of 
students to accept and defend such statements, perhaps especially because I had 
challenged the statements in subsequent discussions. After class, I asked students what 
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they thought of the lesson and wondered if it was right to pronounce on the infidelity 
of Muslims. A student tried to explain that the teacher was only really talking about the 
ones who intentionally meant to harm their neighbors. Another student stood up, as if 
to give an official speech, and in a pious demeanor reiterated the message of the teacher 
and the importance of obedience to the words of the Prophet and God to be good 
Muslims. So the situation was somewhat heightened as I was perceived to have 
challenged orthodox understandings of ‗Islam‘ and the very status of hadith; not the 
textbook or the teacher‘s interpretation. In fact, one of the students subtly signaled to 
me to end the conversation and later told me that she agrees with me, but that students 
―are not used to discussing anything about religion‖ and that anyone who does this is 
―a transgressor and wrong‖: (kharig wi ghalat). This was despite the fact that I only 
referred to the well-known prohibition on making pronouncements on the 
―Muslimness‖ of others, and especially so for such a matter which (I assessed) was not 
grave; suggesting that we know many people who may engage in such behavior, 
including in this neighborhood, are they not ―Muslims?‖ 
 
 
Figure 15: Piling Garbage—and Tutoring Advertisement on the Wall—opposite the Gate of 
the Boys‘ Technical School 
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This was an example of the strength of Islamization across the schools, as described in 
Chapter One and demonstrated in different survey research (See UNDP 2010).63 
Perhaps it was an example as well of the ‗deference‘ that educational scholars attributed 
to authoritarian ‗Arab‘ education (see Chapter Two), which I only witnessed in relation 
to discussions that involved religion. Clearly however, my reception of these words was 
very different from that of the students. It was as though I took the words to their 
depth and length, while the students passed through and beside them. Most of the 
students stayed outside, beside and in deference to the text and the authoritative 
discourse. They did not negate them, accept any challenge to them, nor affirmed the 
way I took the discourse to its logical conclusion: that many of the residents of the 
neighborhood would not really be Muslim in this framework. But this ‗deference‘ was 
partial and distanced. The discourse had to remain suspended; ―true‖ as discourse, but 
loosely linked or separate from such close to home implications. However, students did 
seem to significantly appropriate their construction as bad Muslims, as reinforced 
across various Islamist discourses, and did not have the power, tools or desire to ally 
themselves with a critique of its received orthodoxy. In this sense, while it did not 
override their discourse on nationhood and citizenship and the role of the state, it was 
perhaps the strongest appropriation of some of the textbook discourses on citizenship. 
 
However, the condemnation of the ‗bad Muslim‘, even with student deference before 
it, does not reflect an understanding of agency as firmly placed within the individual or 
neatly divided between individual and state. ‗Deference‘ is complex and incomplete. 
Alternative and competing constructions as well as practices were operating in the same 
context and often for the same people. For example, when I asked a teacher in the 
same school to tell me a little bit about the neighborhood, ―garbage‖(zibala) was not 
only the word she used to describe the neighborhood as a whole, but a main theme in 
                                            
63 Concerning religion, survey data show overwhelming religious sentiment among youth at 96%, slightly higher 
for females and those with higher education (UNDP 2010, 71-73). International comparisons rank Egypt first in 
the world in this respect with 38% percentage points above the international average 58% (UNDP 2010, 71-73). 
Although there are no significant social differences among youth categories on this question, there are relatively 
stronger religious feelings among females, urban dwellers and the middle class. If religiosity increases among 
persons with higher education, this may suggest that currently, education has a fundamental role in spreading 
religious values. 
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her narrative on the place. She commented on how the neighborhood was full of 
uncollected garbage. This was clearly evident around the school. The municipality 
cleaned the streets, removed the garbage and placed plants in the streets at one point 
when a high official was rumored to be planning a visit to the area.64 Parallel to the 
absence of garbage removal, the teacher explained that all other services in the 
neighborhood were also very poor. In fact, no public transportation reached the 
neighborhood and all residents had to depend on private microbuses.  In terms of the 
school itself, one of the school gates had to be closed off with cement because 
residents were disposing garbage in the passage way to the gate and setting it on fire, 
both effectively blocking the entrance and creating choking fumes every morning. (This 
was the gate, referred to in Chapter Five, which students had used to escape constant 
harassment from boys from the adjacent schools). The point here is that although this 
teacher (who displayed a very pious demeanor), did speak disparagingly of those who 
disposed of the garbage, blaming them for throwing it near the school, she mainly 
focused on ―services‖ and the actions of the municipality. She certainly did not call the 
residents non-Muslims or bad Muslims. Further, she explained that ―they‖ in the school 
had written many letters to the educational authorities and the municipality, and made 
attempts with the help of influential sponsors of the school to remedy the situation. 
School actors were not simply docile, nor did they make those appeals to the residents 
themselves. They took action and demanded it from government bodies, and tried to 
get influential individuals to mediate between them and those government bodies to 
achieve their goals. 
 
Many of the more popular religious discourses, whether among poor or affluent 
students, do focus almost exclusively on the agency of the individual and only forcefully 
blame the state in relation to issues of identity (such as foreign intervention in 
education) or sexual morality (moral laxity in the media). However, there seemed to be 
a critical divide in student and teacher discourses on the self with profound 
                                            
64 This was a significant event in the life of the community that several people also referred to, saying that they 
had never seen their neighborhood like that. The plants were removed however on the same day and garbage 
quickly piled up again especially close to schools. This is also a reality for many schools across the country, as 
frequently covered by the press (likely because there are open unused spaces around them that are not residential). 
262 
implications for citizenship; as well as political protest and change. There was a 
continuous tension between constructions of citizens as bad and therefore responsible 
for negative conditions in the country and youth as oppressed and unjustly treated 
where bad conditions are mainly caused by those in power. This tension does not 
divide students into ‗individual agency‘ and ‗state agency‘ camps, but often exists jointly 
in the discourses of many students and teachers. As this student in the girls‘ general 
school commented: ―In the end, we are treated unfairly (fil akhir ihna binitzilim). If we 
[were educated well] from the beginning, we would have been great people (nas hayla). 
Now we turn out disgraceful‖ (binitla„ „irar: a strong expression implying being 
worthless and disgraceful). This complexity and overlap is inseparable from the way 
that the late Mubarak regime had made corruption integral to the daily functioning of 
citizens (see Chapter One). From cheating on exams, to bribing government officials 
for different services (private tutoring included), almost every citizen was in some 
respect a participant in extralegal, illegal and questionable practices. Every citizen could 
be corrupt. This was especially true for the lower strata of society. Staying within the 
education system, upper middle class students and their parents were not involved in 
illegal practices in the way that lower middle class parents sometimes paid teachers to 
obtain exam questions, solved their own children‘s homework or falsified rent contracts 
to enroll in certain schools. Even if such parents still paid bribes when renewing their 
driving licenses or to obtain other public services, privatization for them meant 
somewhat more removed from extra-legality. This embeddedness in corrupt or 
extralegal practices was more endemic and more blatant for lower middle class and 
working class parents, whether it was because of the way they disposed of their 
garbage, built their homes without permits on agricultural land (as in much of the 
neighborhood) or ‗stole‘ electricity from the main public connections without license 
(See Singerman 1995, Ismail 2006, Dorman 2009). 
 
It was not only the Islamic messages of the curriculum that were instrumental in 
reinforcing constructions of students as bad and unworthy. As detailed in Chapter Five, 
disrespect and negative labeling of students was systematic and normalized through the 
patterns of physical beating and humiliation across the public schools, but far less so in 
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private schools. Many teachers- and according to students, their own parents- were 
constant sources of charges and portrayals of failure and worthlessness. 
 
While derogatory language was not used to describe students in interviews, lack of 
ambition, materialism and having trivial interests were key themes articulated by 
teachers in their reflections on ‗this generation‘. Many teachers often labeled students as 
being without aim or ambition: an empty generation that ―does not work and had been 
brought up that way‖; that wants money without putting in the effort; that is 
―dependent and will always be like that; that their state is saddening because they are 
the future of the country and they ―just care about soft drinks, crisps and ringtones‖. 
There were of course clear tensions where the same teachers portraying students as 
‗lacking in ambition‘ would also assert that students are ‗frustrated‘ because they could 
score above 95% and not get into any good college. In terms of materialism, teachers 
frequently lamented that students only cared about money and future incomes and 
made all decisions on that basis. In the private schools, they asked teachers which 
faculties they should enter to make better income and in the public schools, teachers 
joked that many students wished they could have become football players in order to 
make huge amounts of money. Contrary to the idealized neoliberal active citizen, 
interest in financial success was critiqued by school authorities across the schools. 
While, both girls and boys received negative labeling for lacking in ambition and 
patriotism, it seemed to be easier for teachers to label girls as superficial and ‗empty 
inside‘, while excusing boys as the subjects most affected by the negative economic 
conditions and repression in the country: ‗why would he love the country if he has no 
apartment, job or good treatment‘. In this sense, the neoliberal citizenship project of 
the state was seen as especially disempowering for boys because of their construction as 
primary breadwinners. Their lack of nationalist sentiment was therefore more 
understandable and stronger. 
 
In discussions with teachers and principals, the theme of ‗bad youth‘ was also related to 
construction of Islam understood in moral terms, especially sexual morality. Here when 
the blame was placed outside youth, it was directed at the other and the West as 
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corrupting youth, often intentionally. For example, in reflecting on ‗this generation‘, the 
principal of the technical school mixed apologetic and sympathetic views of the 
students as a disadvantaged generation (gil ma„thur) with moral blame to youth and 
society. His focus was not on poor economic conditions, but on ―the lack of adherence 
to moral and religious values‖. In many cases, teachers were referring to increased 
access to pornography; a phenomenon that seemed to be widespread. This was a 
frequently voiced concern especially in the public schools and immediately linked to 
new media, technologies and the internet and patterns coming from abroad. Other 
teachers also placed the weight on foreign plans for the weakening of the country and 
the targeting of its youth. As a vocal Islamist teacher in the general public boys‘ school 
put it, this generation is ―oppressed (mazlum), targeted and its destruction is 
[deliberately] planned out (mitkhatatlu izai yitdammar)‖. A religiously observant teacher in 
the girls‘ private school also opened his reflections on ‗this generation‘ in terms of a 
loss of identity due to conscious intentions to ―marginalize youth, direct them away 
from what is important and corrupt their awareness (tughyyibuh)‖. Foreign intervention 
in education was seen by these teachers as a key means by which this intentional 
corruption of the generation was being carried out through high level education 
officials. Here, as in mainstream non-oppositional Islamism (see Sobhy 2007), symbols 
of identity and issues of sexual morality were given primacy in reflecting on youth, and 
the ‗other‘ was the source of negative conditions, especially in terms of changing gender 
norms. 
 
This framework was not however the key theme for most other teachers or students. 
Many teachers and administrators in fact explicitly resisted the articulation of the 
students as a corrupt and lost generation and therefore as bad citizens. As highlighted 
above, across the schools, teachers often referred to the bad conditions in the country 
(zuruf) and to students as oppressed, unfortunate or crushed by living conditions and 
helpless before them (mazlum, ghalban or maghlub „ala amruh). In fact, students as 
‗frustrated‘ and having no faith in society or in the future was articulated by teachers 
and principals in all the schools, and again intimately linked with national belonging. 
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THE ‘OTHER’, SCIENCE AND NEOLIBERAL CITIZENSHIP 
As described in Chapter Six, textbook discourses of nationhood and citizenship also 
focused on building Egypt through science, on good citizens adjusting to the demands 
of a changing economy and on Egypt as being under external threat from the ‗other‘ 
that is a major cause of injustice and disentitlement. Student discourses however hardly 
reflected these themes. In their generally critical mood, many students reversed the 
significance of the intended sources of national pride provided in the textbook. 
Celebrated Egyptian scientists and the accomplishment of Ancient Egyptian civilization 
were not key themes in their discourses. When they were mentioned however, they 
were frequently used to mount further critique on current affairs in the county. The 
only times students mentioned ‗science‘ in relation to nationhood or citizenship was to 
comment that ―no one gets their rights in the country‖ because world class Egyptian 
scientists like Nobel Laureate Ahmad Zuweil had to leave the country ―to get their 
chance‖. The only times that Ancient Egypt was mentioned was also in negative 
commentary on current affairs: ―we say we have the pyramids, but what did we invent 
this year?‖ 
 
In fact, students often negatively constructed Egypt in contrast to ‗other‘ countries that 
progress and prosper. In this sense, the image of the oppressive and unjust ‗other‘ was 
hardly present in the discourses of students. School level discourse on the ‗other‘ 
reflected the general tendency to attach to the West and ‗the other‘ the opposite of 
what is constructed as lacking in Egypt or about Egyptians. The other was primarily 
just, fair and offered contexts where people were treated with respect, especially poor 
people; and where one does not need connections to get a job. The other is also hard 
working and productive. Therefore, when students brought up the ‗other‘, this still 
generally reflected the sense of lack of justice or access to rights for most Egyptians, 
especially in themes of favoritism to the rich and powerful, cheating and corruption. 
Comparisons with other countries were also typically employed by students as evidence 
of Egyptian inferiority and Egyptians as bad and lazy. Not only was the west or the US 
frequently employed in student critique of the condition of ‗Egypt‘, but so was China 
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and other rich Arab countries. As a student in the public general girls‘ school put it, ―in 
China, they beg people to take a vacation and the students here they just dance or sleep 
in the playground.‖ Just the mention of China could prompt a student to declare that 
Egypt is the most backward country in the world, revealing the depth of this sense of 
‗backwardness‘ or inferiority. Even one of the most vocal Islamist teachers argued that: 
―we have to admit that in the U.S. there is fairness and justice‖, juxtaposing this to 
patrimonialism and connections in accessing opportunities and resources in Egypt.  In 
fact, the ‗other‘ mainly featured as the ‗good‘ standard against which to measure the 
country. As one student put it, ―you can see films about the life of American youth, the 
lives of other countries. [Young people] grow up with the idea that Egypt is bad. Its 
debts are endless. America is much better, or Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Australia, China, or 
the Emirates‖. As one female student put it, ―if I were not born here, I would not like 
to live here‖. These themes have clear resonances of discourses in popular films or TV 
programs. These were clearly discourses that were far more appropriated in student 
discourses than textbook constructions of ‗self‘ and ‗other‘. 
 
Quite surprisingly, only some teachers, but none of the students, cast Egypt in 
geopolitical terms and articulated issues of national power along with issues of 
unemployment and corruption in their discourses of the nation and state. In this view, 
the destruction of education is a deliberate policy by the U.S. to maintain the 
superiority of Israel (See El-Sayed 2006 for more on the ‗conspiracy theory‘ in 
education, and Herrera 2008a on U.S. intervention in Egyptian education). The 
weakness of education, and especially of science education, and scientific research was 
juxtaposed to the strength of Israel, which produced advanced weapons. For example, 
in reference to the choice of many students to study arts instead of sciences, a teacher 
in the public general boys‘ school commented:  
There is a problem in science subjects in Egypt... Israel is so small and produces 
weapons... It‘s a problem of curriculum. Iran is rising too. They started putting 
obstacles in science. Even in putting schedules they have science subjects right 
after each other. The minister is a just a big employee. They tell him the main 
lines and he applies them... This is a predetermined policy... They include things 
to destroy the identity of students. 
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Perhaps in this sense, they were the ones who had most appropriated, albeit in an 
oppositional vein, the official discourse of Egypt as a state under threat from external 
powers, interlinking this with Islamist themes. Such issues featured very little in the 
discourses of students (although it is possible to imagine they might agree with some of 
these sentiments, if put forward to them). In their own discourses and framework of 
nationhood and citizenship, these issues were quite marginal. 
 
Finally, neither in their discourses nor in their reported practices was there a strong 
interest in active, participatory and charitable citizenship as promoted in textbook 
discourses. Participation in civic activities was very limited among students (because it 
was not truly encouraged or tolerated by the state), despite a growth in charitable 
activity among the upper classes.65  There were very limited forms of local participation, 
except for religious lessons and Quran recitation. In the private schools, the school 
tried very hard to engage the largely ‗absent‘ and academically overwhelmed students in 
school ‗activities‘ to promote an image of a vibrant school, and a small number of them 
did engage in charitable activities; small numbers also engaged in creative and civic 
programs over the summer vacation that were not attached to the school. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Geertz (1965) has argued that rituals are both ‗models of‘ and ‗models for‘ society. That 
is, they are representations or idealizations of the society that produces them and are 
models or programs for action in the social world (Kapferer 1981). The absence of 
tabur, and its breakdown into chaos and violence is in this sense symbolic of the loss of 
sanctity of the nation, the state and its institutions. Tabur was not only undermined 
because students did not regularly attend school, teachers also colluded in the 
                                            
65 According to a recent national survey, less than 3% of young people are participating in volunteer work (UNDP 
2010). In terms of group membership; including participation in youth centers and sports clubs, political parties, 
unions and associations, housing and school boards, only 4% of young people appear to have participated in any 
of these groups; the majority in recreational activities with 67% participating in youth centers and sports clubs 
(UNDP 2010, 40-41).  Those who participate in political parties represent only 0.12% of young people in the age 
group of 18-29; and eighty four percent of eligible youth did not exercise their right to vote in the last election 
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cancellation of the ritual, sealing the reality of the emptiness of the school of its 
purpose and inhabitants and confirming the lack of commitment of all school actors to 
the institution. The exalted deliberate construction and performance of the nation in 
school ritual envisaged by the state is either absent or frequently disintegrates into 
nothing more than the humiliation and physical beating of ‗the citizen‘. In a 
dysfunctional institution, the nation had no audience and in fact ceased to be 
ritualistically performed. Berezin has argued that emotion ―is the pivot upon which 
political ritual turns. It is a vehicle of political learning that has the capacity to create 
new identities‖ (2001, 93). However, the nationhood project of the state was so 
undermined in school ritual and discourse that the national anthem could be replaced 
with curse words recited among students. Instead of embodying love for the nation or 
belonging and commitment to it, it was discourse and emotions of violation, 
humiliation and disentitlement that seemed to dominate this subversion of school ritual 
by some students and its marginality for many others; creating and fostering in its own 
right new oppositional identities, emotions and meanings. On the other hand, how 
individuals feel, see or relate to these narratives and histories varies not only from one 
individual to another, but goes through different fluxes and intensities, as apparent 
from the change in nationalist belonging and expression after the ‗January 25 
Revolution‘. 
 
The issues discussed in this chapter are necessarily framed by the ‗dysfunction‘ of the 
secondary school. As described in the previous chapters in terms of informal 
privatization and arbitrary and abusive forms of discipline and punishment in public 
schools, the secondary school is a place where the de-facto citizenship project of the 
state is lived and de jure citizenship rights were not available to most students due to 
both marketization and the absence of administrative and legal enforcement of 
protective and provision rights. If education is dysfunctional and/or happens outside of 
formal schooling, this clearly limits the avenues for the expression and experience of 
official citizenship and nationhood projects in schools, whether in school activities, wall 
journals, homework assignments or even the morning assembly. The only remaining 
expression of these state projects is in textbook discourses. 
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However, the ideal construction of the nation articulated in the textbooks and 
described in the previous Chapter was hardly reproduced by students. Many students 
could not express love and belonging to the nation and focused on explaining reasons 
not to love the nation. Therefore, as opposed to pride in Egyptian identity as put 
forward in the textbooks, students often affirmed and repeated disparaging statements 
about themselves and about ‗Egyptians‘ and ‗Egypt‘ as a whole, especially when 
juxtaposed to the ‗other‘. While they sometimes acknowledged positive aspects of 
historical achievements of Ancient Egypt, and contemporary Egyptian scientists, they 
tended to use these to critique the current state of ‗progress‘ and scientific achievement 
in the country. The role of science and faith in uplifting the country were not major 
themes used in student discourses on national belonging, neither were the discourse of 
the nation under constant threat by the other and therefore the glorious duty to defend 
and save the nation. In fact, students hardly constituted Egypt in its regional, 
geopolitical or Islamic roles and identities. Ideas of the nationalist President who takes 
tough but ‗wise‘ stances vis a vis the ‗other‘ were also not significant themes, certainly 
not in relation to Mubarak, nor as an ideal. Even Islamic notions of justice and the just 
ruler were not utilized by students. 
 
Above all, the way that citizenship entitlement was overshadowed by nationalist 
sacrifice was completely reversed by students. Students articulated love, belonging, and 
essentially the legitimacy of the state in relation to the socioeconomic sphere, not 
around issues of identity, morality, authenticity or the ‗other‘. The focus was on 
education and jobs, not for example, the role of Islam, the application of sharia, or 
Israeli or American occupation in the region. In fact, there was significant discussion 
around social class, entitlement and inequality; as students in the popular quarter, even 
lower middle class students, articulated themselves as poor and placed this at the center 
of their discourse of the nation-as-state. ―Egypt‖ and ―the country‖ were constructed 
as a ―state,‖ which does or does not provide certain services or opportunities, and more 
often than not as a failing state; a state that was failing them.  Especially in general 
secondary schools and especially among boys, students constructed the country as 
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corrupt and not worthy of allegiance, service, or domicile. Notably, students used a 
language of rights, equality, injustice, humiliation/dignity and poverty; vocabulary that 
is by and large absent and removed from state and textbook discourses. While clearly 
frustrated with conditions in the country, students from the upper middle classes used 
themes of recognition and ―underemployment‖ instead of livelihood and survival in 
relating to opportunity and employment. It is nonetheless critical that the concern with 
blocked opportunities (or the reproduction of their class status) had reached high up 
into the upper middle classes. The turn to neoliberal citizenship and the withdrawal of 
the state also has a significantly gendered impact as men are understood as having the 
primary- and sometimes the sole- responsibility for breadwinning, implying a greater 
openness of boys in expressing lack of belonging and indignation. 
 
In terms of the state‘s citizenship project, its neoliberal aspects seemed to therefore 
meet with overwhelming failure. Discourses of neoliberal citizenship had not taken root 
across the schools and were undermined in different ways in student discourse. First, 
students clearly articulated the primacy of provision rights in their implicit construction 
of ideal citizenship. Second, there was little use of the language and themes of ideal 
citizens who need to develop themselves and adjust to the market. Third, poverty and 
poor social services were not to be remedied through volunteer work, charity or 
‗renaissance‘ through service-providing and developmental associations. Poverty was 
linked to state policies, inequality and systematic corruption and not the effort of each 
individual to access market opportunities. School actors articulated the state in its role 
as a provider of social services/provision rights like education and other public 
services/protective rights like security and the rule of law (undermined by systematic 
corruption). Students also emphasized humiliation and disentitlement based on class, 
underlining the impact of repressive measures on their conceptions of citizenship and 
nationhood. As Ismail has shown in relation to the ―narratives of young men of their 
experience of interaction with the agents of the state is organized around values of self-
respect and dignity and feelings of humiliation and injury‖ (2006, 127). 
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Muslim identity and non-oppositional Islamist morality as the core of good citizenship 
and their links with notions of the ‗bad citizen‘ represented perhaps the strongest and 
least adulterated overlap between student discourses and textbook discourses on 
nationhood and citizenship. It is not at all surprising therefore that the regime had 
chosen to incorporate and promote such Islamist themes in its discourse. This was 
evidently the most effective element in its citizenship project; the element that was least 
challenged or susceptible to challenge by students and teachers. However, while such 
challenge did not come directly in terms of explicit collision with constructions of 
Muslim piety or orthodoxy, it came indirectly from the needs and resources of the 
school agents themselves.  Even while affirming religiously framed discourses on the 
‗bad citizen‘, school actors engaged in practices that implied competing notions of 
citizenship. They did engage in demands on the state for better access to its protection 
and provision rights and did not act as though the solution was simply in the reform of 
the personal character and conduct of each individual. The hegemony of such 
discourses was also partial in the sense that they could remain ‗suspended‘, ‗true‘ as 
discourse, but not taken to their logical conclusions and not determining the relevant 
practices. For example, students certainly used notions of individual morality to discuss 
grievances at a more micro scale; notably characterizing teacher practices in terms of 
lack of ‗conscience‘. However, the textbook focus on corruption from an individual 
morality perspective, legitimated within an Islamic framework, was largely subverted in 
student discourses. Corruption was articulated by students as systemic and extending to 
the head of the state and the nature of the regime, not stemming from the individual‘s 
conscience of each citizen. Textbook and other public discourses of the bad citizen or 
bad Muslim were of course coupled and reinforced for many students at the school 
level by daily practices of negative labeling and humiliation (see Chapter Five). It is not 
surprising therefore that the construction of the bad, unworthy and disgraceful self had 
significant resonances in teacher and student discourses. However, overall it only had a 
limited impact on student discourses on the state itself. These discourses did not 
thoroughly ‗de-politicize‘ all students or seal a discourse of acquiescence or of deserving 
the kind of treatment or rights obtained from the state.  Whatever measure of lack of 
entitlement and a negative self-image may have been reinforced into student discourses, 
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it did not erase the realities that many students articulated as informing their 
relationship to the state and nation, or crowd out the alternative discourses they 
appropriated to understand these realities. 
 
Therefore, students and teachers engaged with the discourses on bad Muslims, bad 
youth and bad citizens in complex ways. Dynamics around the appropriation of 
discourses of entitlement or moral blame cannot however be understood without 
reference to direct repression and punishment of dissent, both at the level of school 
and classroom extralegal practices or wider oppositional discourses. Expressions of the 
responsibility of the state for negative conditions or demands for citizenship 
entitlement can obviously come with a high price if they escalate to certain intensities 
and organizational forms or are voiced in relation to immediate dynamics in the school. 
Such expression is not the discursive path of least resistance. The relationships between 
disentitlement, unworthiness, deference and direct repression are complex and delicate, 
but the state was still ultimately able to punish dissident teachers or students, especially 
among the poor (just as school authorities were able to punish protesting students as 
described in Chapter Five). This is clearly reflected in the lack of any oppositional 
discourses in the formal forums of the schools, in stark contrast with the discourses 
articulated in everyday discussions and conversations with school actors. 
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CONCLUSION:  SCHOOLING AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE L ATE 
MUBARAK ERA  
The educational dysfunction of the late Mubarak era occurred in a general context 
where provision, protective and participation citizenship rights were seriously 
undermined, and where young people have been disproportionately paying the price of 
neoliberal policies and demographic realities through high unemployment and lower 
quality of education. Despite significant openings, especially in relation to independent 
media, citizenship rights of participation and expression were undermined by increased 
securitization and repression structured by social class. These patterns were clearly 
reflected in the education system, which suffered decreased spending and pervasive 
corruption and informality, experienced rapid forms of privatization and exclusion and 
where teachers increasingly resorted to harsh forms of physical and emotional 
punishment to control students, extract resources from them and silence forms of 
complaint or dissent.  
 
Schools are important sites for the production, construction and performance of the 
nation and state. They are institutions where the power of the state and its practices of 
government are manifested. They are key sites where young people encounter the state 
and learn about it; are disciplined into classed and gendered subjects; and encounter, 
share and make sense of discourses and forms of discipline that shape their 
differentiated production as citizens of the state. They are institutions explicitly aimed 
at shaping subjectivities and producing students as citizens of modern states. At the 
same time, schools are not sites where ‗the state‘ or official curricula simply shape 
student discourses and practices. They are spaces that reveal the complex ways in which 
such discourses and practices are appropriated or subverted by school actors.  
 
This research has been concerned with some of the ways in which mainstream national 
secondary schooling in Egypt constructs and produces students as subjects and citizens 
and how students construct schooling, the state, the nation and themselves. The 
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research has emphasized the ways in which the schools offered different subjectivating 
experiences to students from different social classes. It has outlined some of the key 
ways in which school relations inform and reflect the lived citizenship of students, their 
differentiated access to legally-guaranteed protective and welfare rights and the de-facto 
social contract of the state with different social classes. It has explored ideal citizenship 
and national identity projects as constructed in official textbook discourses and the use 
of religion in legitimating them. It has contrasted these with notions of citizenship and 
nationhood implied in school-level rituals, discourses and practices. It has emphasized 
the role of marketization and school practices of humiliation and punishment in 
disciplining students into classed and gendered citizens and the ways in which this has 
informed their discourses on the state and nation; highlighting the informality and 
―extra-legality‖ of both privatization and school relations of control, especially in public 
schools. It has demonstrated the extent to which the uncontrolled growth of private 
tutoring had undermined various aspects of discipline, attendance and examination in 
large parts of the system. It has detailed the ways in which the production of classed 
and gendered citizens is fundamentally shaped by forms of physical punishment and 
humiliation. It has highlighted as well the ways in which the complex appropriation of 
the notions of the ‗bad citizen‘ and the ‗bad Muslim‘ may be linked with the normalized 
discourses and relations of disentitlement with the state and within its institutions. 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the main findings of the research; reflecting on 
their links with broader political, educational and theoretical issues in terms of 
privatization, discipline, nationhood and citizenship. It looks at how the Egyptian case 
can nuance our understanding of neoliberalism and privatization in education. It 
reflects on realities of discipline and punishment in the schools and how they relate to 
Foucauldian discussion of discipline. It revisits the popular discourse of mafish ta„lim 
(there is no education), highlighting concrete examples of what this means for students 
across the system. Finally, it reflects on constructions of nationhood and citizenship 
and how they may be linked to the events of 2011. 
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PRIVATIZATION AND NEOLIBERALISM  
This research was conducted at a time of educational crisis; a time when education was 
thought to be failed and dysfunctional. This reflects something profound about the 
Egyptian state and its social contracts with different classes under Mubarak. It is also a 
reflection of a more global neoliberal moment that structures the forms of citizenship 
available to students. Neoliberal policies including educational privatization have 
contributed to the impoverishment of not only those already poor, but vast sections of 
the middle classes. The current sense of crisis in education, and in fact the growing 
protest movement over the past years, cannot be understood in separation from the 
increasing impoverishment and precariousness of the (urban) middle classes and the 
increasing alienation of the upper middle classes. However, neoliberal educational 
policies and the de-facto privatization of secondary education in Egypt have been 
carried out within distinct contexts of repression and informalization that set them 
apart from patterns of educational privatization in the global North.  
 
The state is a principal actor in the process whereby the school is given over to the 
market in the different types of schools. Tutoring markets were perpetuated through a 
web of interests and corruption in a billion pound industry supported by various MOE 
policies and practices, and an almost complete absence of accountability across the 
system. It is concrete practices and policies of the state that have allowed for 
institutional and market forces to extract additional income from households for a 
service that is meant to be constitutionally ‗free‘. Although this mode of privatization 
has taken place ―informally‖, it is inseparable from state policies that facilitated it, left 
its growth unchecked through various forms of corruption; but critically through the 
massive reduction in real teacher wages in its attempts to ‗cut spending‘. The informal 
and de-facto privatization of schooling in Egypt has profoundly contributed to 
undermining the legitimacy of the state by altering the social contract and subjecting the 
poor and middle classes to heightened forms of exclusion, corruption and abuse. The 
hollowing out of formal schooling has also resulted in the destabilization of the state‘s 
nationhood and citizenship projects by undermining the school as a key institution 
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where young people are available to engage in discursive and ritual reproduction and 
performances of the nation. 
 
Privatization has also affected students from different classes differently. Tutoring 
meant very different things for students in each track. In the technical schools (in the 
track enrolling almost 60% of secondary students), tutoring was an almost forced 
payment extracted from students in schools where little formal education of any kind 
was occurring and where cheating was in fact pervasive. This payment was extracted in 
return for conferring a degree unto students who were not being ‗taught‘ significant 
material or provided with actual skills and abilities. In general secondary, although most 
students still perceived little choice in whether or not to enroll in tutoring, the context 
was markedly different. Tutoring was an intensive affair designed to impart significant 
knowledge and content to students and to assist them in achieving better scores in 
competitive national examinations. This meant however that student school attendance 
was minimal; and the general school, both public and private, has been almost 
completely replaced by tutoring centers and home tutoring. Students in the public 
general schools were universally enrolled in the private market. They incurred huge 
costs in the process although their chances of university enrolment were increasingly 
low and uncertain. The even higher cost of tutoring for private school students was 
also a considerable burden on family finances. Private school students actually had 
realistic chances of entering university, whether public or private. However, they were 
not only faced with double privatization; paying almost as much in private tutoring as 
in private school fees, they also expected to pay for further private instruction in 
valuable skills, such as English language; the skills for which they had enrolled in 
private language schools in the first place. Despite their greater financial means, many 
families tended to experience this situation as unfair and corrupt, decrying the high 
prices charged by tutors and often blaming the government for having let tutoring 
spiral out of control. As discussed below, the fact that these parents continued to buy 
into these multiple forms of privatization highlights the question of what purpose 
education actually served for different classes. 
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This level of privatization has nullified the state‘s de-jure commitment to free public 
education and imposed a huge financial burden on most families, structuring access to 
education based on financial ability across the system, but especially at the secondary 
level. In the three school systems, access to the available forms of schooling- and 
freedom from extralegal emotional and physical punishment- depended upon the ability 
to pay for private tutoring. It reflects the diminished citizenship entitlement across the 
system. Importantly, it also eliminated actual instruction/school time devoted to any 
sports, creative or leadership and civic-engagement activities, adding to the ‗poverty‘ 
and repressiveness of educational experiences. 
 
The introduction of the market into the deep fabric of the school across the system has 
fundamentally altered modalities of observation, normalization and examination. 
Informal privatization has opened up the possibilities for different relations of power, 
interest, privilege and sociability. This is especially so because of the concrete ways in 
which privatization was been carried out, primarily through private tutoring, within 
public schools and within private schools; hollowing out, informalizing and 
transforming the very institution of secondary schooling. This privatization-through-
tutoring has fundamentally undermined notions of equity, merit or learning itself. 
Students offered many vivid examples of how ―money‖ solved all problems and moved 
the dynamics in their schools. Students in the public schools frequently articulated the 
marketization of education as a kind of corruption. They referred to lack of 
―consciousness‖ in the general schools; and almost to extortion in the technical 
schools; that the system of the school is simply ‗you pay, you pass‘ (tedfa„ tengah). They 
frequently articulated their own education as a kind of hopeless futility. They 
commented on how they and their younger siblings now found little incentive to study, 
because everybody passes through paying and/or cheating. General secondary students 
felt an added frustration and a greater vulnerability to unemployment, referring many 
times to ending up ‗on the sidewalk‘: waiting for a job that would never come. In 
private schools, the huge cost of tutoring was a key concern, but there was also 
recurring emphasis on the lack of value in the learning obtained. Students and teachers 
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expressed their frustration with the emphasis on memorization and rigid forms of 
assessment and the dependency of students on tutoring.  
 
It is argued that the neoliberal state seeks to create an individual who is an enterprising 
and competitive entrepreneur (Olssen 1996, 340). It is not apparent that many of the 
expected or desired neoliberal changes have come about in the educational context in 
Egypt in similar ways. For example, in the place of positivism and self-help and 
individuals as separate but equal, many parents and teachers expressed dismay that 
students are becoming more passive, ―dependent‖ in their learning styles and unable to 
approach learning material without direct assistance from an adult or tutor. The system 
is seen as breading dependence, cheating, cynicism, as well as a sense of oppression, 
unfairness, pervasive corruption, abuse, futility and closed up opportunities. Although 
not exactly the ones predicted by its proponents, the policies and practices of the 
privatization of education are indeed ―creating new ethical spaces and new clusters of 
goals, obligations and dispositions‖ (Cribb and Ball 2005, 115). 
 
As described in the detailed examples in Chapter Four, the patterns of marketization in 
Egyptian education have also had a huge and differentiated impact on teachers; their 
livelihoods, their survival strategies and the new behaviors demanded of them in order 
to succeed in the new environment. As Elyachar (2005, 214) puts it, ―the expansion of 
the neoliberal market may be practiced in the name of scientific objectivity…but it can 
succeed only if it creates new subjectivities on the ground. Certain mechanisms as well 
as certain ethical attitudes must take hold for that free market to be established‖. 
Among teachers, there was certainly a realization that the ethic required for their 
‗success‘ has been shifting, and with it their attitudes, dispositions and desired skills. 
Many teachers in urban centers are now expected to build and maintain customer 
relations, craft and manage a market image and reputation, develop their style—
including elements of entertainment and charismatic theatrical performance, use 
advertising and marketing strategies, have catchy slogans and offer promotions and 
combinations of services: indeed to make enterprises of themselves. Indeed, the effects 
of privatization, commodification and market forces can be seen in terms of the 
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possible forms of self that they make available to us, and the ―practices through which 
we act upon ourselves and one another in order to make us particular kinds of being‖ 
(Rose 1992, 161). This is a context which clearly privileges certain dispositions and 
marginalizes and impoverishes others (see Chapter Four). Different skills and attitudes 
become more valued and better rewarded in this context. It should not be assumed 
however that teachers are now responding to a simple logic of profit. Teachers‘ 
dispositions interact with the wider trends of marketization in complicated ways. For 
example, strictness on academic matters, the class image of the teacher and the tutoring 
centre, leniency with gender mixing and the reporting of student performance or 
attendance to parents, are all elements more valued by some students and parents than 
others. In fact, while some teachers were portrayed by students as facilitating gender 
interaction to gain more popularity and clients, other teachers did not hesitate to call a 
parent when a student was systematically skipping class (presumably to go out with her 
male friend). Finally, this type of marketization seems to have fundamentally 
disadvantaged women and deprived many of them of the decent livelihood that was 
obtainable in one of their key traditional occupations. Tutor ‗lifestyles‘ of working late 
and long hours, ‗jumping‘ from one tutoring center to another and dealing with 
clientele, parents and diverse employees, is seen as decidedly less appropriate, 
acceptable or feasible for women, whose primary duties are in the home.  
 
PUNISHMENT AND GENDER 
The ‗neoliberal‘ project alone is clearly not an adequate framework to explain the 
experiences of subjectivation in schools and the mode of governance of social services 
in the late Mubarak era. Gendered practices of humiliation and physical abuse are 
fundamental components of the social contract of the regime with working and lower 
middle classes and of their de-facto citizenship status, as reflected in the schools. In 
turn, these disciplinary practices were also significantly driven by the modes of 
privatization that functioned in the crony capitalist economy. 
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Through its focus on school punishment and surveillance, the research has examined 
some of the ways in which classed and gendered citizenship was constructed and 
enacted in the everyday life of the schools. It presented an image of the use of physical 
and emotional violence in schools, the gendered and classed dimensions of the violence 
and students‘ discourses about it. It also highlighted the key discourses used to 
construct and legitimize beating by teachers and MOE officials; including beating as 
means of preserving respect and authority, beating as a form of caring and moral 
instruction in an extension of parental roles, beating as the only available mode of 
discipline in the system, and beating as sanctioned by Islam. It explored the issues 
around student ―noncompliance‖ with school and classroom rules, especially in its 
gendered dimensions.  
 
Working and middle class students in the public schools were subjected to far more 
violent, corporal, arbitrary and humiliating forms of punishment than more affluent 
students in private schools. Students in public schools experienced on a daily basis the 
knowledge that they do not have access to formally guaranteed ‗protective citizenship 
rights‘, in the form of freedom from physical harm and humiliation and freedom from 
sexual harassment for female students. Unsanctioned extralegal practices in public 
schools extended from beating and humiliation to demanding that students clean the 
school and perform other chores; and included the various practices used to coerce 
students to enroll in tutoring. In the public schools, boys were beaten and girls harassed 
with impunity within multiple discourses justifying the abuses and blaming the victims. 
Religious discourses were used to legitimize violations against both boys‘ and girls‘ 
rights. Students of private schools experienced other forms of punishment and negative 
labeling, but did not endure the kind of physical beating and humiliation practiced in 
public schools. Not only were key protective rights only guaranteed in private schools, 
students in the public schools also frequently expressed that the treatment they received 
in school was premised on their social class. Financial ability had therefore become a 
pre-condition of access to formally available protective rights, just as it had become a 
pre-condition for accessing basic ‗provision rights‘. 
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The actual patterns of punishment and control used by school authorities highlight the 
informality or ―extra-legality‖ of school relations of control, especially in public schools, 
both in terms of physical and emotional punishment as well as forms of gender control 
that ran counter to or independently from school regulations. This underlines the 
weakness of the state and the erosion of its powers and institutions, feeding the sense 
of undermined rule of law and its classed nature in authoritarian neoliberalism. The 
situation of intensified punishment and the dysfunction of education parallels the more 
general ―shift from welfarism and corporatism toward an articulation of security politics 
with neoliberal politics‖ captured by Ismail in terms of ―ordinary citizens‘ encounters 
with the everyday state‖ (2006, 128).  
 
Furthermore, beating and humiliation were clearly used to limit the right to complain 
and voice their concerns for students in the public schools. The humiliation and 
negative labeling of students was essential for legitimizing abuses against them and 
preventing them from speaking out against various forms of corruption and 
dysfunction in the schools. These were critical mechanisms used to compensate for the 
decline in the authority and status of teachers due to their impoverishment, their 
dependence on tutoring and on other forms of corruption. The erosion of formal 
disciplinary powers held by teachers has impelled patterns of ‗invented‘ or ‗pretend‘ 
discipline, arbitrary and illegal punishment, as well as permissiveness; where codes of 
the school were regularly violated by students, especially those who could get away with 
noncompliance based on social or physical capital. This has further contributed to the 
sense of the arbitrariness and informality of state regulations so that much of school 
practices were conducted ‗extra-legally‘ or outside the codified rules of the institution. 
This led to increased noncompliance on the part of students and a sense of chaos in the 
schools. As elaborated in Chapters Three and Four, the general institutional setting also 
informed extralegal teacher practices that undermined various facets of ‗discipline‘ such 
as the facilitation of cheating, the presentation of inaccurate attendance data and other 
school information and activities and various other issues around the appeasement of 
supervisors and inspectors. 
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Beating and humiliation were almost an integral and necessary part of the regime‘s 
particular neoliberal project of governance. Education Minister Ahmad Zaki Badr‘s 
shocking statement endorsing beating discussed in Chapter Five, in fact, came shortly 
after he had declared that he had received tutoring himself as a student and that ―there 
has to be a way for the teacher to improve his income‖ (ECER 2010a). Badr‘s desire 
seemed to have been for docile consumers in a privatized system where the market can 
be enforced by extra legal and violent means.66 The other alternative would have been 
that the state actually pays the teachers it hires and addresses the fundamental issues of 
educational quality. In order to avoid doing so, the option seemed to be to unleash 
those in positions of relative authority onto their subordinates in a kind of Darwinian 
struggle in which those with greater access to financial or state power can deter 
violence against their children while the weaker must both endure the abuse and pay up 
in the form of forced private tutoring. In Badr‘s statement, there was a clearer and 
more honest expression of attitudes and policies that had been concealed, obfuscated 
and white-washed by previous ministers. Badr is emblematic because he exemplifies the 
masks-off neoliberal and security approach of the late Mubarak era associated with the 
rise of Gamal Mubarak and the new business elite; and the close alliance with the head 
of police Minister of Interior Habib Al-Adly. Badr was in fact famous for being the son 
of a former minister of interior, and was nicknamed in the media as the ‗minister of 
interior of education‘ (wazir dakhiliyat al-ta„lim). He had already exercised his policing 
mode of governance as head of one of the nation‘s largest universities, reportedly 
releasing thugs on the university campus to assault politically active students (Baltajiyat 
al-Intikhabat 2010). His selection as education minister and his statements shed light on 
the governance approach and credentials favored by the late Mubarak regime.  
 
As observed across the schools, there were clear gender differences in the modes of 
discipline and punishment in the schools. Boys were far more likely to be beaten or 
subjected to physical violence, while girls were far more likely to be monitored, rebuked 
                                            
66 It is noteworthy that one of the most visible waves of school protest happened under his reign amidst 
allegations that his intention was to sell off valuable school assets to selected NDP- affiliated businessmen (See 
Chapter One, p.26). 
283 
and punished for failing to adhere to standards of modesty and chastity. Beating and 
control of chastity constituted critical ways in which schools produced dominant 
gender constructions and conveyed to students ideal masculine and feminine 
performativities. Multiple techniques of enforcing female modesty were employed by 
different school authorities in all the schools. Direct rebuke, humiliation, threats and 
physical beating were used to deter girls from violating the codes of modesty. The 
functioning of these techniques highlights not only the disciplinary power of school as 
a state or public institution, but also its subversion by school actors who enforced their 
own notions of ideal femininity regardless of whether or not these were supported by 
state regulations. It therefore highlights the ‗extra-legal‘ means through which this 
control was established and enacted. It reveals the subversion of that order as well by 
students who continually breached the directives and expectations of school authorities, 
especially in the public schools. Competing constructions of fashion and distinction 
(promoted through different media, music videos and fashion industries) pushed girls, 
across the schools, to express their femininity in ways that were in contradiction—and 
daily conflict—with the expectation of school authorities.  
 
The grave daily concerns relating to sexual harassment around the girls‘ public schools 
also informed and reinforced patterns of gender control by the schools. Harsh forms of 
rebuke and punishment seemed to be ways of dealing with the frustration of school 
actors with their lack of access to citizenship rights of public safety. The weakening and 
corruption of the protective powers and functions of the state meant that students and 
schools could not call upon the police or rely on other institutions of the state to 
protect the girls from harassment, despite their various attempts to do so. Islamist 
discourses on the other hand defined and emphasized the limitations on female 
modesty. In this way, they partly obscured the withdrawal of the state from its 
protective functions, and enabled the framing of the failure of public safety as a result 
of the improper or immodest personal conduct of the citizen. Perhaps in this sense, 
they offered school actors a semblance of control and agency to draw upon in a 
situation they had failed to tackle in practical terms. 
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Beating however was not only disproportionately experienced by boys, it was more 
frequently (and almost exclusively in its severe forms) administered by men. It was 
therefore arguably part of a distinctly masculine discourse or masculinity training, where 
physical dominance becomes central in the construction of ‗successful‘ or hegemonic 
masculinity. This the same logic that sanctions the physical punishment and repression 
of younger males by older authority figures; in the workplace (Shehata 2003), on the 
streets by arbitrary police power (Ismail 2006), or of female partners or family members 
by male members of the household. Because it was fundamentally related to the social 
class and financial ability of the students, beating represented an injury to ideal 
masculinities both in terms of physical vulnerability and in terms of its relation to social 
class. Public discourse and practices of socialization into masculinity construct 
manhood in terms of guardianship of honor and responsibility for providing for the 
family‖ (Ismail 2006, 127). Arbitrary beating, especially by male teachers, may have also 
been an outcome of the frustration of teachers with their own low pay and their need 
to resort to extralegal—and less than honorable—practices to survive and fulfill the 
masculine duties of breadwinning. It was also an attempt to deal with the diminished 
motivation and compliance of students due to the increasingly low and uncertain 
returns to secondary schooling.  
 
Despite the harsh forms of punishment in public schools, noncompliant behavior was 
in fact pervasive in all the schools. Regulations and expectations of attendance and 
good behavior were systematically violated in all of the schools. This may not be very 
surprising in a context where most students received their education through private 
tutoring and many of them felt their education to be of limited intrinsic or extrinsic 
value (in its own right or in terms of future job opportunities). Pervasive 
noncompliance was therefore a byproduct of changing job market structures, 
privatization and pervasive unemployment in the neoliberal era. It may have also been 
linked to particular gendered response to these low educational returns, where boys 
adopted more challenging and confrontational behavior and girls‘ violation of school 
rules centered on expressions of their femininity. 
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In the final analysis, if the school is a disciplinary technique aimed at the creation of 
‗useful‘ subjectivities and endowing citizens with appropriate cultural capital for their 
advancement or the reproduction of their class status, it is possible to see that where 
this process of capital accumulation is seriously impaired, the institution may use a mix 
of repressive and permissive measures to compensate for the breakdown of its 
authoritative disciplining position. The increased prominence of violent punishment in 
schools is therefore premised upon the ‗impotence‘ of the institution or its inability to 
provide rewarded cultural capital to students; to the breakdown of its disciplinary role 
and authority. 
 
REVISITING DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT  
How do these findings relate to broader theoretical questions about disciplinary 
regimes under neoliberalism? How do these findings relate to arguments about the 
‗docility‘ and obedience created by schools as disciplinary institutions in countries of 
the North (Raby 2005, Deacon 2006)? Can these frameworks of discipline and docility 
help us understand such school ‗dysfunction‘ and ‗lack of discipline‘ where boys and 
girls—with full collusion from school authorities—have subverted school discipline 
(observation, normalization and examination) in major ways; ranging from 
predominant truancy to widespread cheating in parts of the system?  Can they account 
for schools that come to be frequented as soccer playgrounds that boys rent for money 
(the losing team pays); a stopping point to meet friends before jumping the fence and 
going to a café; or a social club where girls only come to meet each other? Can they 
account for schools as contexts where students are forced to clean the floors of 
classrooms, sweep the playground or make tea for teachers in exchange for marks, 
attendance leniency or being spared physical abuse? The findings clearly point at an 
ambiguity in relation to how ‗discipline‘ as an analytical concept applies to dysfunctional 
secondary schools in Egypt.  
 
One- perhaps less than satisfactory way- of thinking about these questions could be 
that given the ‗breakdown of discipline‘, such institutions cannot be considered 
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‗disciplinary‘ in the first place, but rather repressive, violent or pre-modern. Another 
way is to consider that there are different levels of analysis implied in thinking about 
discipline; one level looking at the modern school as a disciplinary institution and 
another level where one can examine, as this research does, the concrete workings of 
discipline across different schools. Ultimately however, the research findings contradict 
the assumptions of the disciplinary society under neoliberalim and its role in the 
production of docile citizens; and point to the different ways in which discipline could 
be enacted and meaningfully studied under neoliberalism. This section elaborates these 
issues, discussing the relevant constructions of discipline and punishment and how the 
research findings fit within them. 
 
One can agree with Foucault that the superimposition of the power relations and the 
knowledge relations assumes in the examination all its visible brilliance (Foucault 1977, 
185). On the other hand, if the examination does not do the work of normalization and 
judgment, then can we talk of effective ‗discipline‘ in these contexts? Should we talk of 
‗dysfunctional discipline‘ in such schools? The examination can be an arena where such 
little power is exchanged and such little knowledge is controlled or imparted, as in 
technical schools. The functioning of that kind of examination indeed renders the 
schooling experience behind it brilliantly visible. That is, in contexts of dysfunctional 
education (mafish ta„lim) and open cheating, the functioning of such key disciplinary 
techniques brings to light the irrelevance and marginalization that indeed disciplines 
students into classed and gendered subjects. This (mal)functioning of discipline itself 
can be argued to produce certain kinds of subjectivities, discourses and practices. This 
allows us to explore the production of subjectivities in institutions that do not 
effectively observe, normalize and judge, where ‗neat‘ discipline may be replaced and 
permeated by repression, permissiveness or arbitrariness. This recalls the works of 
Timothy Mitchell (1991) and Ben Fortna (2002) on education and discipline. Both, like 
Foucault's discussion of schools, were working on historical material. While Mitchell 
looked at the models of schools desired by the engineers of modern education in 
Egypt, Fortna (2002) attempted to compliment his work on designs of modern 
Ottoman education with available records of disciplinary issues in concrete schools. 
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While looking at actual practices in schools is far more difficult in historical analysis, 
contemporary analysis can benefit from exploring discipline in its lived and everyday 
manifestations. 
 
Looking at discipline at the level of concrete schools and divergent schooling 
experiences necessitates greater complexity in understanding how subjectivation 
actually works through discipline, as well as how discipline works through class and 
gender. Disciplinary institutions do not only act upon subjects by virtue of their 
normalizing power and their surveillance and examination techniques, they do so 
differently; and these differences are fundamentally structured around class and gender 
(in addition to other sometimes critical factors such as ethnicity and religion). As this 
research shows, discipline worked in very different ways across the schools; so that it 
cannot be said that schooling per se, discipline students into certain kinds of subjects. 
The examination itself can be an intense national event with high material and symbolic 
returns in upper middle class schools, while having an ambiguous position in the 
disciplining of middle class students with uncertain prospects for university enrollment, 
a much as it can be a theatre of mass cheating and irrelevance for working class 
students. Research that engages at that level of the actual functioning and dysfunction 
of discipline therefore highlights class-based differences and other critical variables in 
the functioning of disciplinary institutions. 
 
Finally, discipline may be distinct from ‗repression‘ and violent punishment in ways that 
are important for the production of subjects. However, the distinction that Foucault 
seems to have been drawing between repression/sovereign power (or relationships of 
violence) and disciplinary power (or power relations) is not easily observed in many 
situations across the schools or other institutions in the social world. It was clear that 
relations in the technical and public schools exhibited daily patterns that were 
repressive, arbitrary and violent. On the other hand, even if violence was less 
prominent in the private schools, discipline in those schools was also seriously 
undermined. ‗Discipline‘ and the lack or breakdown thereof, as well as violent 
punishment and humiliation also normalize, judge and punish; and all work in 
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imperfect and incoherent ways. Regardless of whether Foucault‘s historiography of 
power is broadly accurate (at least insofar as it traces out predominant patterns of 
change), ―the ―regimes‖ of power in question are less than hegemonic in their scope. 
Strands of so-called pre-modern power coexist with modern, disciplinary techniques 
and interact with them in complex and varied ways in the lives of many people‖ 
(Westlund 1999, 1055). As Deacon (2002, 112) notes, ―[n]ot only are power relations 
not reducible to the disciplines, or the latter to the apparatuses of the state, but it would 
also be wrong to see the disciplines as replacing or transcending sovereignty, as if 
Foucault had merely reversed Enlightenment histories of progress in order to relate the 
story of the rise of unfreedom‖. Ismail has also pointed to the difficulty in drawing ―a 
definite line separating the modern and the traditional‖ with regards to ―Foucault‘s 
genealogy of disciplinary regimes in the context of historical practices of control in 
non-Western societies‖ (2006, xxix). Perhaps even for Foucault, the distinction did not 
always seem very sharp or the displacement of one form of power by the other 
complete.67  
 
Therefore, despite the repressive and violent means of control found in disadvantaged 
schools, it is not possible to talk about a lack of ‗discipline‘ in the Foucauldian sense, 
unless we imagine a clear distinction between repression and discipline. Relations that 
include or are dominated by forms of physical and emotional violence also discipline 
subjects. Even slavery, which is the extreme example of captive and physical control for 
Foucault (1982) cannot be said to function solely repressively without relations of 
observation and normalization that discipline and govern. It is difficult to make a 
fruitful distinction between the disciplinary role of physical punishment in the technical 
                                            
67 That the omnipresence of the monarch was a condition for the extension of disciplinary power relations into 
everyday life (Foucault 1979, 87) also helps to explains why discipline still bears many of the violent and 
spectacular trappings of the age of absolutism: even the Panopticon, that emblem of the disciplinary society, 
testifies to the continued presence of sovereignty in being organized around a central tower (Foucault 1977, 317, 
n. 4). Thus: ―At the moment of its full blossoming, the disciplinary society still assumes with the Emperor the old 
aspect of the power of spectacle‖ (Foucault 1977, 217). 
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schools and less violent and more codified forms of discipline and punishment in 
general and private schools and tutoring centers. The school does ‗discipline‘ students 
into classed and gendered subjects, whether it is a violent and dysfunctional technical 
school, a laid back and dysfunctional private school, or a disciplined and functional 
tutoring center. It always normalizes and judges, even if it does not always really 
examine; and the differences in its disciplinary role are fundamentally premised on 
social class and gender. 
 
MAFISH TA‘LIM? 
Education was portrayed by the Mubarak regime as ―a national project‖ and repeatedly 
expressed as a reform priority, especially from the 1990s onwards. At the end of his era, 
the state of education in Egypt was so negative that many Egyptians habitually 
commented on educational issues using the simple phrase: mafish ta„lim: there is no 
education. This is a statement that may be difficult to understand at some level. How 
can there be no education if about 17 million students enroll in pre-university education 
alone and about 1.2 million persons are employed by the Ministry of Education in a 
truly massive system? On top of this, millions enroll in various additional forms of 
private tutoring. Enormous sums of money are spent, materials and school uniforms 
are bought and millions commute back and forth to schools and tutoring centers 
throughout the year. This section attempts to explain what ‗no education‘ meant in 
different parts of the system and reflects on what purposes [dysfunctional] ‗education‘ 
was really serving for students and the state. 
 
The first class I attended in my fieldwork remains the best illustration of what mafish 
ta„lim could mean. It was a computer science class; a subject recently introduced in 
Commercial specializations in technical schools in an effort to upgrade and modernize 
their programs. The lesson at hand consisted of the following four sentences: 1) to 
insert a symbol, place the cursor where the symbol is to be inserted; 2) open the 
―Insert‖ dialogue box; 3) select the symbol and choose the command ―insert;‖ and 4) 
note that operations applicable to normal text are applicable to symbols, like changing 
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the size of the font or highlighting the symbol. These four sentences were repeated in 
different ways throughout the class time of about thirty minutes. First, they were stated 
by the teacher—after she had written the title on the board and spent some time 
directing casual insults at the students [calling them zifta/scum] to urge them to sit 
down and be quiet. Second, the students were asked to repeat each sentence after the 
teacher. Third, she dictated the sentences to them, stopping and repeating herself 
several times, as the students wrote them out in their notebooks. Fourth, she 
mentioned that it was a frequent question in exams to be asked to insert a symbol and 
that the students would have to know these steps, which she overviewed quickly. Fifth, 
she dictated an exercise homework question: ―what are the steps of inserting a 
symbol?‖ She then asked for the attendance sheet, counted the students, signed it and 
said that she would look at the notebooks next class to check each student‘s notes. The 
class ended. This was a third secondary class. There were no computers in the 
classroom. The lesson was one of a series of six lessons on the ―Insert‖ function 
(inserting symbols, footnotes and endnotes). 
 
This lesson remains for me the best illustration of how ‗education‘ often happened in 
the technical schools. The content of the lesson, the way it was delivered, the way it 
would be examined and the ‗knowledge‘ and ‗skills‘ it was meant to impart show just 
what kind of education was available in technical schools where nearly 60% of 
secondary students are enrolled. There was simply no measure of contextualization 
throughout the class: when and why one may need to use ―symbols‖, what are 
―symbols‖, and no indication as to why the ―insert‖ function is so critical and so 
complicated that sixteen year old secondary school students needed six different classes 
on it. Students were not asked to use this material in any way throughout the school 
year. They were never given assignments involving the insertion of symbols or that 
required computer use in the first place. Students were not really allowed to use the 
computers at school either.68 They clearly graduated without obtaining any meaningful 
                                            
68 There was however a lab in the school, provided through a donor project. Students were sometimes 
actually allowed to enter the lab, where many computers were in fact functional; rare occurrences in 
other public schools. In other classes in the lab in this school, students were in fact taken to the lab, but 
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computer skills from school. Students did obtain the four sentences they would need to 
write if this question showed up on an exam paper, but more likely, they would not 
need even such knowledge, as cheating would be readily available in most exam 
contexts and summarized exam preparation sheets would be made available to them if 
they enrolled in tutoring with school teachers, as elaborated in Chapter Four. Exam 
questions were remarkably similar—and disturbingly ‗simple‘—every year. Students 
only spoke in class to mechanically repeat the simple sentences after the teacher or ask 
her to slow down her dictation—and of course to make whisper side comments to each 
other. 
 
In subjects like history, Arabic, geography and economics, there was more ‗substance‘ 
in the material at hand, especially in the textbooks themselves. However, its truncation, 
the style of its presentation and lack of contextualization was similarly disturbing. The 
larger patterns around examinations, tutoring and cheating were however the same. 
Each class presented students with small bits of data and lists of items often without 
context, meaning or use. This is not because they did not develop the ‗whole person‘ or 
their full range of faculties. They were of little use even in the most practical, pragmatic 
or immediate sense. This was true even when students attended and teachers actually 
entered classes and ‗taught‘ the material at hand. As detailed in Chapters Four and Five, 
the opening insults and the fact that the teacher actually entered the class was likely an 
improvement on the norm, due to my presence. Initially, the teacher was actually eager 
to let me ‗take the class‘.69 I have found it difficult to describe or comment on classes 
like this and on the style of instruction in most classes without value judgment, without 
a measure of outrage, without criticism. Students were acutely aware of these 
deficiencies however and used the same kind of normative judgment I wanted to use to 
describe their education; in two words: mafish ta„lim: there is no education. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
were not given the opportunity to use the computers, or to ‗learn‘ or practice the extremely basic skills 
at hand in any meaningful way (see Chapter Four for a description of such an incident). 
69 Perhaps she had planned to leave early that day to run an errand or preferred to continue socializing 
with other teachers. She may have wanted to ‗withhold‘ the lesson from the students in order to 
pressure them to enroll in tutoring or simply did not feel comfortable being monitored. 
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There really was very little education going on in the classes I attended in the general 
and private schools as well. The memorization and recitation style of teaching in this 
class was by no means unique to technical schools, but extended to public schools and 
tutoring centers. In fact, some sought after ‗star tutors‘ are famous for creating 
attractive songs and rhymes to help students memorize the material (see Hartmann 
2008). For general secondary students, the content however was far denser—and in 
tutoring, it was covered at length and in great detail. Students were still very critical of 
the quality of education they received and used the same statement that ‗there is no 
education‘. They usually either meant: there is no education in the school, but there is 
education in private tutoring, or they meant that education—even in tutoring—did not 
really develop their knowledge and skills, prepare them for the job market or offer solid 
prospects for enrollment in a good university. Their sentiments are confirmed by rising 
unemployment for secondary school and university graduates. 
 
Marketization and accumulated lack of political commitment to educational spending 
have weakened not only classroom teaching but also dominant pedagogies and the 
ability to control and support better teaching practices. This state of education was a 
reflection of poor quality and poor accountability or ‗discipline‘ across the system. 
Simply, if teachers are not trained to teach a certain subject and students in most 
schools had hardly been able to learn the basics of the subject (see Chapters Three and 
Four), memorization is the only way to pass students from one stage to another. If 
workshops in technical schools have no functioning equipment, or are locked in fear 
that they be ruined, what option is there except to memorize a few points for the exam? 
To give a concrete example from general secondary, in one of the rare occasions when 
I observed a supervisor inside a classroom, he rebuked, interrupted and directed in an 
authoritarian manner the English teacher giving the class in the girls‘ general public 
school. The teacher however had simply not received the training to apply the methods 
the supervisor was advocating (who had briefly received training outside of Egypt), and 
in fact had very weak knowledge of English in the first place. He himself had graduated 
out of university with poor subject knowledge. Furthermore, his students, who had 
been through several years of poor English instruction, did not really have the ability to 
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deal with the curriculum at hand and therefore relied on what they could memorize by 
repeating after him. They needed to focus on how exam questions would be placed, so 
that they could better target their memorization efforts. They, in fact, voiced support 
for the teacher‘s memorization-focused approach over the more participatory methods 
promoted by the supervisor. In turn, exam question and exam preparation guides were 
geared to these skill levels and rewarded memorization, not participation or 
communication skills on the part of students.  
 
In fact, many ‗subject‘ supervisors who are meant to monitor and advise teachers with 
regard to their teaching performance, do not even enter classes. They sign in the main 
visitor register in the principal‘s office, stay for tea and a chat and look at teacher 
‗preparation‘ notebooks. In remote areas of the country—where transport to the school 
may require a few hours and transport allowance is a negligible fraction of the 
frequently considerable transport costs—supervisors may call the principal by phone in 
lieu of a visit. That is, similar to how beating and punishment was conducted in the 
schools, there may be quite harsh rebuke to the teacher, even in front of the class, but 
no formal disciplinary measure that could structure teacher incentives to alter their 
behavior, no formal rewards or punishments or remedial programs. Teachers whose 
notebooks are not prepared in accordance with strict regulations may be harshly 
rebuked, but supervisors have limited disciplinary or remedial powers over them and 
usually end up giving them ‗Excellent‘ annual appraisals (due to complications in the 
appeal process of receiving less than ‗Excellent‘ appraisal ratings).  
 
A whole system was in fact in place, which rendered supervision, as a disciplinary 
technique, meaningless; along with examinations and pedagogy. Due to the 
pervasiveness of private tutoring, it is very difficult to attribute student familiarity with 
the material to the school teacher in the first place. Student competence is more likely 
developed in private tutoring; a fact not unknown to supervisors. The dysfunction of 
supervision and its operation as a pretence meant that it offered teachers little incentive 
to work on student learning, while providing an incentive for them participate in the 
maintenance of appearances, by giving due attention to their preparation notes and 
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student notebooks that are constantly monitored by (in-school and external) 
supervisors. When supervisors were known to enter classes, teachers also tried to alert 
and prepare the class beforehand, so that the end performance was a satisfactory one. 
This was sometimes accomplished by explaining a lesson that had been explained 
before in class.  
 
The clearest expression of mafish ta„lim is a degree of educational marketization that has 
essentially emptied the schools and therefore transformed them profoundly.  Its 
clearest cause is the poor investment in quality across the system. Technical secondary 
schools—enrolling students from poor schools where they were hardly equipped with 
literacy skills—suffer such poor resources, permissive cheating and forced private 
tutoring, that many students understood the school as a place where one got beaten 
and humiliated, but where no learning or education occurred in the first place, even in 
effectively compulsory in-school tutoring. For students in general secondary schools, 
education was a highly demanding affair that occurred almost entirely in private 
tutoring centers. It was focused however on memorization and exam preparation in 
such an intense manner that students still expressed that there was ‗no education‘, as 
they felt that they were not really developing any useful knowledge, skills and abilities. 
Education was not only incredibly dull and difficult, it was also not equipping them 
with marketable skills, from analytical thinking, organizational abilities and 
communication skills, to English language and computer skills.  
 
One of the biggest puzzles in Egyptian education is not only understanding that ‗there 
is no education‘, but also why then families remained invested in the same educational 
contexts and continued to incur massive costs in the process. This puzzle is partly 
explained by the larger issues around employment and education, discussed in Chapter 
Three. Why did students stay in the technical schools, despite the daily forms of abuse, 
low returns and lack of learning? One reason boys gave was that enrolment in 
secondary school reduced the duration of compulsory drafting into the army; seen as a 
negative, unrewarding and humiliating experience. Having a secondary certificate also 
made it theoretically possible to obtain a formal job. While this has been a shrinking 
295 
prospect (see Chapter One), there was still an expressed hope of possibly attaining this 
goal among students. Critically, obtaining a secondary degree more easily enabled them 
to marry (within their social class); a key issue voiced by boys and girls. It seems 
however that for boys it was increasingly apparent that it is more important to have a 
job at the point of proposing to a family than holding a particular type of degree. This 
was an increasingly difficult prospect given rising unemployment among technical 
school graduates and many students may have felt that having the degree along with a 
precarious job was better than only having a low paid job or none at all. 
 
The situation seemed to have been worse for general students in public schools. While 
there is a decline in the demand for general secondary education (see Chapter Three), 
there are still millions enrolling in it. They seemed stuck in a class background that they 
could not reproduce. They faced higher barriers in terms of employment and university 
enrolment and yet they were in a system where tutoring costs were very high indeed. 
The tension was apparent between their aspirations to join university and obtain a high-
quality job and the realization that they were more likely to join a two-year institute, end 
up unemployed or severely underemployed [sweeping staircases, attempting to find a 
job as a driver or security guard or various unskilled work]. It was still unacceptable for 
many of them to abandon such aspirations and the middle class status that comes with 
general secondary, as glaringly evident in their insistence on the expressed goal of 
becoming a doctor or engineer. Girls particularly saw the school itself, even if useless 
educationally, as a legitimate escape from household chores and an arena for socializing 
with friends outside the house. Overall, boys and girls also agreed that many or most 
students had a special interest in tutoring due to the opportunities it provided for 
gender-mixing, which was not available in the formal school. So long as their parents 
could secure or borrow the necessary funds, general secondary—and its tutoring—was 
the only and most desirable option available to them. 
 
For private school students, again their costs of education were very high, but the 
returns to their education were uncertain. Mostly for social status reasons, they could 
not abandon their school enrolment even though they were obtaining all of their 
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education in tutoring. One‘s school is still an important marker of status. However, 
students typically paid as much for yearlong tutoring as they did for the schools they 
attended a few days per year. They were also increasingly competing against graduates 
of more prestigious international diplomas, who would have an edge on the job market. 
They were also aware that public universities offered low quality of education and 
limited places in desirable colleges. They were feeling increasingly compelled to 
consider a range of far more expensive private university options. They too were 
nervous about the reproduction of their class status. Most private schools catering to 
this stratum of society, including both schools where the research was conducted, have 
already created further tracking in the system by offering foreign diplomas (mainly 
IGCSE and the ‗American Diploma‘) in addition to the ‗national‘ track; leading to an 
almost visible decline in its status where school resources are diverted to the 
‗International‘ tracks and class differences become more pronounced within each 
school.  
 
The state on the other hand was able to maintain a huge system of patronage and 
employment through the education system, where little service was provided while 
massive costs were incurred by the state and the citizen. With the exodus of the upper 
classes from public schooling and from national schooling altogether, the state also got 
rid of a key source of pressure for reform within the system. Middle and upper middle 
class parents had little knowledge or interest in technical school issues, while the elite 
had little firsthand knowledge of the issues of national schooling altogether. This still 
did not deter most people from declaring education non-existent in the country.  
 
NATIONHOOD AND CITIZENSHIP IN TEXTBOOKS 
AND SCHOOLS 
They taught us by the cane 
And breastfed us fear 
They taught us in school 
The meaning of the words: “All Rise” 
They taught us to fear the principal 
So that all talk is ceases 
بٍّٔٛع خٌبصعٌبث  
بٔٛعضسٚ فٛخٌا خعبضس  
بٍّٔٛع ًف طساذٌّا  
ىٕعٌ ٌٗإ خٍّو َبٍل  
بٍّٔٛع فبخٔ ِٓ شظبٌٕا  
عّٕزٍف َلاىٌا  
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They taught us how to fear 
And how to cower 
But they forgot to teach us respect 
So don‟t be upset  
When I turn out not listening to you 
And don‟t be upset if I‟m out of order [against the system] 
What do you expect from a child they raised by shouting 
Other than trouble and fighting 
All those who tell you I love you, this is hypocrisy 
I, when I told you I loved you, 
it was hypocrisy 
... 
Love means two people giving  
Not one hand building and 600 bleep beeps tearing down 
... 
Love means a vastness in the hearts of lovers for the beloved  
It means the poor sleep at night feeling warm 
Love means an answer to all the imprisoned 
Why have they become imprisoned  
It means to live for a goal 
For a message 
To feel my worth in you 
That I am not living as a dependent  
It means when I sweat [work] you reward me fairly 
Love is a state  
Love is not poetry and talk 
Love is something that cannot exist among people who get their 
lunch from garbage bins 
Love inside you 
Is an impossibility 
 
From the poem Juha, by Hisham El-Gakh, (Al-Gakh 
2010) 
بٍّٔٛع ياصإ فبخٔ  
ياصإ ٚ ؼىٔ  
ظث اٍٛغٔ بٍّٔٛعٌ َاشزحلاا  
ػٍٛعضزّف 
بٌّ ىمثأ ؼِ عّعبث ُىِلاو  
ػٍٛعضربِٚ بٌّ ىمثأ جسبخ ٓع َبظٌٕا  
ًٕزغِ ٌٗإ ِٓ ًفع ٖٛثس ٌبثقبعض  
شٍغ ًوبؾٌّا قبٕخٌاٚ  
ًو ًٌٍا هٌٛمٍث هجحث يٚد قبفٔ  
بٔأ بٌّ ذٍل هٌ هجحث  
ْبو قبفٔ  
… 
تحٌا ًٕعٌ ٍٕٓرا اٚذٍث  
ؼِ ذٌإ ًٕجزث ذٍّزعٚ ذٍر ذٍر ٚذٌٙ  
... 
ٍٓلٛؾعٌٍّ ٍٓمؽبعٌا تٍل ًف حاشث ىٕعٌ تحٌا 
ًٌٍٍا ًف اِٛبٌٕ خثلاغٌا ىٕعٌ ٍٓٔبٍفد  
تحٌا ىٕعٌ ةاٛج ًىٌ ٍٓٔٛجغٌّا  
بّ٘ ٌٍٗ اٛمث ٍٓٔٛجغِ  
ىٕعٌ ؼٍعأ ْبؾٍع فذ٘  
ْبؾٍع خٌبعس  
ىٕعٌ ظحأ ًزٍّمث ًىٍف  
ًٔإ ؼِ ؼٌبع خٌاٛع  
ىٕعٌ بٌّ قشعأ ًٍٕئفبىر خٌاذعث  
تحٌا خٌبح  
تحٌا ؼِ شعؽ خٌاٛلٚ  
تحٌا خجبح بِ ػذجٛزر ًف ظعٚ طبٔ  
تٍجزث ب٘اذغ ِٓ كٌدبٕص خٌبثضٌا  
ًواٛج تحٌا 
خٌبحزعا 
 
 
The evolving mode of governance of social services in Egypt has entailed its 
legitimating discourses and official projects of citizenship and nationhood. In addition 
to repressive measures across society, or unleashed into the school through silence on 
beating and extra-legal practices, the state‘s effort to bridge actual and official 
citizenship entitlements appears in the attempts of official textbooks to craft different 
notions of citizenship that are focused away from provision and protection rights and 
geared towards love and sacrifice for the nation, active neoliberal citizenship and 
Islamist personal morality. There is a critical relationship between the forms of 
citizenship made available to segments of the population and the centrality of 
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nationalist devotion that redefines good citizenship as the duty to serve the nation, 
especially the nation under threat, and obscures all other definitions of citizenship and 
entitlement to protective or provision rights. Constructions of both the nation and 
Islam were used in the regime‘s attempt to stabilize de-facto citizenship projects. In fact 
within and through their constructions of nationhood, the textbooks also sought to 
fuse the state—and the regime and President—with the nation; so that the primary 
relationship of the individual is to the nation not the state; a relationship that is then 
continuously emphasized as one where the individual embodies natural feelings of love 
and belonging to the nation/state and owes the nation the duty of loyalty and sacrifice. 
Mubarak himself was set up as the example of the adoption of sound nationalist stances 
(vis-a-vis ‗the other‘), while ‗youth‘ were frequently portrayed as lacking in national 
belonging and hardly ever portrayed in a positive light. Constructions of the ‗bad citizen‘ 
and the ‗nation under external threat‘ work together to undermine alternative 
citizenship discourses in one of the key rhetorical tactics of the late Mubarak regime. 
 
Egyptians were only glorified for the scientific achievements of ancient Egyptians and 
for rising to the challenge of foreign occupation under the correct leadership. The 
textbooks therefore emphasized to contemporary youth the duty of contributing to 
Egypt‘s civilizational glory through personal morality and faith, as well as scientific 
progress. While Egyptian youth were to somehow single handedly come up with major 
scientific breakthroughs, the lack of any supportive atmosphere for anything that 
resembles ‗science‘ in Egypt is evident not only in 70% of general secondary students 
choosing to study non-science subjects, the state of education itself, the corruption and 
lack of resources overwhelming any form of scientific research; but also in student 
discourses to the effect that ‗real‘ Egyptian scientists, like Nobel laureate Ahmad 
Zuweil, had left Egypt because they simply had no context to excel in it.  
 
The strong emphasis on Islam as a moral and nationalist force articulated throughout 
the textbooks was mixed with elements of neoliberal citizenship where science and 
technology, time-management and efficiency, volunteerism and charity would develop 
Egypt, and lead it to progress and renaissance. While the classic Islamist emphasis on 
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ruling by sharia was not explicitly promoted in the textbooks, there was greater 
presence of the non-oppositional Islamist message that adherence to ‗true‘ Islam by 
each individual leads to power and prosperity for Muslim nations. Within the overall 
framework of the textbooks, where Islam is defined as personal morality in non-
oppositional terms, citizenship was increasingly articulated and understood in religious 
terms so that the Good Citizen is the one who adheres to religious teaching and 
improves his personal conduct for the elevation of the nation. Secondary school 
textbooks highlight the extent to which the regime had selectively crafted, promoted 
and appropriated aspects of Islamist discourse that served its projects of governance 
and the construction of citizenship in neoliberal and nationalist terms that almost 
completely obscured protection and provision rights, while paying lip service to 
supposed participation rights and ‗democracy‘. 
 
In various forms of official and semi-official discourse, the citizen is portrayed as not 
embodying the correct values and practices, grounded in Islam and necessary for 
success, prosperity, and national empowerment. Textbook discourses placed the blame 
and responsibility on youth to become hard working citizens adjusted to the demands 
of the neoliberal economy and lift up the nation to higher levels of ‗progress‘ and 
development. Therefore, notions of ideal ―active‖ neoliberal citizenship, as articulated 
in countries of the North, were reflected in secondary school textbooks and official 
state discourses with the same focus on charity and assistance to the less fortunate 
(through ‗civil society‘), but within the moral framework of Islamist citizenship. 
However, ‗active citizenship‘ was articulated in countries of the Global North to 
promote adjustment to the withdrawal of the state (reduced provision rights) in a 
neoliberal economy with functional judicial and police services (relatively secure 
protective rights and rule of law), and indeed with functional public education and 
health services. The articulation of such concepts of citizenship in contexts where 
protective and participation rights- and the rule of law itself -are either effectively 
absent or severely undermined has markedly different meanings and consequences. In a 
context like Egypt, neoliberal citizenship is a mask for disentitlement at a very different 
scale when charity and entrepreneurship are the solution for 40% poverty rates, 
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pervasive corruption and repression, and failing education, health and transportation 
services. Similar to developments noted elsewhere in Africa and Latin America, 
―philanthropy and charity are increasingly becoming modes of provision of social 
needs, eroding social rights of citizenship and transforming citizens into clients of 
notables‖ (Ismail 2011b, 858).  
 
The textbooks revealed a sense in which ‗Egyptian‘ nationalism was something of the 
past (in contrast with religious identity, which is current). Poetry pieces about love of 
the nation (as Egypt) and Egyptian nationalist writings typically came from the pre-
1952 era during the struggle against the British—but not from the more ‗revolutionary‘ 
phases of that struggle, such as the Urabi Revolt or the 1919 Revolution. Not only was 
the nation about relations with the ‗other‘, it was also about relationships that are over 
and done with: formal colonialism. Other themes of nationhood, especially those 
articulated under Nasser, had no place in the textbooks. The nation that had been 
defined to students through the discourses of ‗liberation‘ from imperialism, solidarity 
with the struggles of Arab peoples and ‗other‘ oppressed peoples, freedom from 
exploitation, expanding social provision and the equality of women had been erased 
from history. It should have seemed extremely plausible therefore that if the ‗liberation‘ 
nation did not exist, there was no context for scientific excellence, and even struggle 
against the aggression of the ‗other‘ was largely over, what was left of nationalism was 
indeed creating neoliberal renaissance through Islamist personal morality. 
 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of textbook discourses—equally reflected in 
official media discourses throughout the late Mubarak era—was the ability to put 
forward a discourse that so crudely and blatantly twisted reality, notably on two major 
issues. A regime that was an ally and client of the United States continued to portray 
itself as protecting national and Arab interests against foreign influence. It accused the 
citizens at large—and its opposition more vehemently—of betrayal to the nation 
through adoption of western cultural norms and deficient citizenship, or tarnishing the 
image of the nation abroad. These themes found echoes in many quarters in discourses 
that maligned youth and dealt with opposition forces with suspicion. This was perhaps 
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only paralleled by the other myth the regime promoted to the west and sections of the 
elite; namely that it was the last line of defense against the sweeping wave of Islamism. 
While it indeed repressed various politicized and militant variants of Islamism, there is 
little doubt that it gave vast organizational space and voice to less politically challenging 
forms of Islamism that in fact came to dominate popular discourse, the education 
sector, as well as the discourses of official national textbooks. These brands of 
Islamism or mainstream piety emphasized personal morality, chastity and ritual 
performance and cohered with the neoliberal and authoritarian projects of the regime, 
and the United States, which obscured almost all citizen rights. In contrast with the 
slogans of the popular protests that led to the removal of Mubarak, these dominant 
Islamist discourses made no demands for a regime that provides ‗bread, freedom, 
dignity and social justice‘, whether the ‗Salafi‘ or the ‗softer‘ elite Islamism (see Chapters 
One and Six for extended discussions).  
 
In terms of how these nationhood and citizenship discourses were translated in the 
schools, the research focused on school rituals and student and teachers discourses. 
The morning assembly ritual was approached as a key practice and concrete example of 
the production and performance of nationhood in the schools. While ritual and other 
school activities are arguably critical in the construction of collective identities, the 
emptying and hollowing out of the schools through privatization has meant that their 
ability to perform this function was seriously undermined. In fact, the key avenues for 
the expression and experience of official citizenship and nationhood in terms of school 
activities, homework assignments, wall journals as well as the morning assembly were 
either undermined or completely eliminated due to de-facto privatization, pervasive 
truancy and lack of resources in the public schools. The highly delineated and centrally 
decreed performance of the nation in the morning assembly envisaged by the state was 
either not performed or reduced to its most basic components and permeated with 
collective rebuke of the students (and in some cases replaced with alternative Islamic 
content). In the characteristic style of the permissiveness (lack of rule of law) and 
repression of the late Mubarak era, the morning nationalist ritual either ceased to be 
performed or was effectively reduced to the physical beating and humiliation of the 
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student body. On their part, students continuously subverted the nationalist rituals of 
the schools in different ways; by putting forward their own mocking and obscene 
versions of the national anthem, not uttering the anthem or flag salutation, 
pronouncing them without the required reverence or not attending assembly altogether. 
Critically, the rituals, discourses and legitimacy of the state were undermined because 
the very institutions meant to promote them had effectively disintegrated under the 
weight of a mixture of abuse, corruption and de-facto privatization throughout the 
secondary school system.  
 
The research also explored the key themes in student and teacher discourses of 
nationhood and citizenship. It showed how the ideal construction of the nation 
articulated in the textbooks was hardly reproduced by students. In fact, many students 
could not express love and belonging to the nation at all and focused on explaining 
reasons not to love the nation. As opposed to pride in Egyptian identity, students often 
affirmed and repeated disparaging statements about themselves and about ‗Egyptians‘ 
and ‗Egypt‘ as a whole, especially when juxtaposed to the ‗other‘. Students did not 
construct ‗Egypt‘ in regional or geopolitical terms or in terms of Islamic themes and 
identity. Egypt was constructed as a ―state,‖ which does or does not provide certain 
services, job opportunities and dignified treatment. Students and teachers related the 
conditions of education and patterns of privatization directly to government policy and 
weaved this into their constructions of nation and state. Students articulated love, 
belonging, and essentially the legitimacy of the state primarily in relation to the 
socioeconomic sphere, not around issues of identity, morality, authenticity or the 
‗other‘. In fact, there was significant discussion around social class, entitlement and 
inequality; as students in the popular quarter, even lower middle class students, 
articulated themselves as poor and placed this at the center of their discourse of the 
nation-as-state. Especially in general secondary schools, and especially among boys, 
students constructed ‗the country‘ as corrupt and not worthy of allegiance, service, or 
domicile.  
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Themes of neoliberal citizenship did not therefore seem to take hold among students 
or successfully ‗discipline‘ new neoliberal subjectivities. On the contrary, students 
implied distinctly different notions of citizenship that emphasized state protection and 
provision, not market rights and entrepreneurship. Notably, students used a language of 
rights, equality, injustice, humiliation/dignity and poverty; vocabulary that is by and 
large absent and removed from state and textbook discourses. In fact, public school 
students especially used the ‗forbidden‘ terminology and meanings of poverty and 
inequality to explain their realities and their actual access to the protection and 
provision rights of the state. [As reflected in secondary school textbooks, ‗poverty‘ was 
almost completely eliminated from official discourse throughout the neoliberal period 
in Egypt, where official discourses did not even use the word ‗poverty‘ or ‗the poor‘, 
using when necessary the all-encompassing term ―those of limited income‖ (mahdudi al-
dakhl).] Students especially emphasized humiliation based on class, underlining the 
impact of everyday repressive measures on their conceptions of citizenship and 
nationhood. Girls in the popular neighborhood also emphasized issues of public safety 
and security in this regard. While clearly frustrated with conditions in the country, 
students from the upper middle classes used themes of recognition and 
―underemployment‖ instead of livelihood and survival in relating to opportunity, 
employment, the lack of a ‗sense of belonging‘ and desire to leave the county. It is 
nonetheless critical that the concern with blocked opportunities (or the reproduction of 
their class status) had reached high up into the upper middle classes. 
 
In contrast with textbook discourses, the key issues highlighted by students in reference 
to constructions of nationhood and citizenship were framed around corruption, 
poverty and inequality and were usually not given any religious backing and framing. 
This is arguably telling in terms of the distance of the dominant non-oppositional 
Islamist discourses from these daily concerns of the students. These dominant religious 
discourses did not emphasize or mobilize for a citizenship project that insists on the 
delivery of protective, provision or participation rights by the state. Their focus was on 
improving the moral character of each individual. Religious discourses did not seem to 
provide them with the language and framing to legitimize their need for an alternative 
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citizenship project or to articulate their grievances on unemployment, inequality and 
poverty. These alternative citizenship discourses may have been significantly influenced, 
not only by the lived citizenship of students, but by new (largely ‗secular‘) independent 
media and the growth of new protests movements.  
 
On the other hand, Muslim identity and non-oppositional Islamist morality as the core 
of good citizenship and their links with notions of the ‗bad citizen‘ represented perhaps 
the strongest overlap between student discourses and textbook discourses on 
nationhood and citizenship. These discourse and their legitimization of notions of the 
‗bad citizen‘/ bad Muslim was the element of the state‘s citizenship project that was 
least susceptible to challenge by students and teachers in the schools. These discourses 
represented a significant limit on, and alternative to, other discourses that emphasized 
state agency and responsibility and articulated citizenship in terms of ‗rights‘ and 
entitlement. Despite this discursive limitation, alternative discourses did circulate 
among students and teachers in the schools shaping different practices that implied a 
logic of entitlement and citizenship. In this sense, it was the needs and resources of 
school actors that structured their practices, not merely their exposure to sanctioned 
forms of religious discourses. 
 
In sum, there was a bounded set of themes that structured most student and teacher 
discourses relating to the nation, the state and socioeconomic and political realities. 
First, the main registers when discussing ‗the country‘ and/as state- revolved around 
provision rights and rule of law, equal opportunity, respect and reciprocity. Second, 
these discourses were not reproductions of official textbook discourses. They utilized 
their concepts and themes quite selectively, mostly stripping them of their determining 
power. Third, these discourses are not assumed to have straightforward or automatic 
implications for political behavior and protest, despite the events of 2011. The level of 
boldness and opposition voiced by students (despite evident self-censorship) points to 
how deep the resentment and indignation ran among youth from different social 
classes; especially in the lower middle classes; emotions that are of course critical for 
305 
political mobilization. However, grievances, and the emotions accompanying them, are 
understood in studies of social movements as ―relatively constant and pervasive‖ 
(Jenkins and Perrow 1977, 250), so that their existence cannot explain why frustration 
only sometimes leads to collective action. Different political process theorists have 
argued that ―aggrieved groups are likely to mobilize when new political opportunities 
are exploited by people within indigenous networks, networks which provide ordinary 
people solidary incentives to participate‖ (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000, 70).70  
 
On the other hand, this should not obscure the fluidity and different possibilities within 
these discourses. First, what I am implicitly characterizing as a relatively ‗secular‘ 
citizenship discourse among these urban Cairene youth should not be simply 
generalized to all parts of the country and does not dictate the shape of nationhood and 
citizenship projects after 2011, especially in light of the dominance of variants of 
Islamism in public discourse and in education, especially outside the capital. Political 
discourses before the Iranian Revolution, for example, offered only partial indications 
of what came about during and after the revolution and how it got consolidated and 
solidified (Ashraf and Banuazizi 1985, Kurzman 2004). Second, just as the lines of 
discourse and practice could not be easily drawn between the use of discourses that 
implied citizen entitlement and those that implied citizen blame, a distinction between 
discourses of love and sacrifice for the nation as opposed to discourses of lack of 
belonging or even hate, is also a very delicate one. The poem above by the young 
Egyptian poet Hisham al-Gakh—viewed close to three million times on Youtube 
alone—is a powerful expression of many of the themes put forward by these Cairene 
youth across the different schools and social classes. The excerpts above draw out in 
particular the links between schooling, humiliation, poverty, inequality and love of the 
nation. Al-Gakh has in fact emerged as one of the voices of a new (oppositional) 
Egyptian nationalism, where his powerful expression of the impossibility of loving the 
                                            
70 While ―[m]oral outrage over feared practices, the shame of spoiled collective identities or the pride of 
refurbished ones, the indignation of perceived encroachment on traditional rights, the joy of imagining a new and 
better society‖ are emotions all relevant to politics and mobilization, it is perceptions of open opportunity and 
expected outcomes, as well as existing networks for mobilization that are critical for political mobilization 
(Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 2000, 79). 
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nation (above), and his other famous phrase from the same poem: Mantish habibti min il-
naharda, Habibti matit/ You are not my beloved from today, my beloved is dead, are 
both expressions of a powerful love-hate relationship and arguably lay the ground for a 
passionate nationalism. 
 
Powerful contemporary events are more important in shaping discourses on the nation 
than anything that can be deduced from gauging a political culture or discourse that is 
stable over time. Constructions of the self, of the state and of national identity and 
perception of political opening are all elements that can change significantly and quite 
rapidly based on changing political realities. It is easy to imagine for example that if 
Egypt is attacked by another country or the state enters into strong confrontations with 
a clear ‗other‘, students may shift their discourses on the nation considerably and rather 
rapidly. Clearly, in light of recent events, the ‗January 25 Revolution‘ itself and the 
powerful experiences around it can profoundly change student discourses on the 
nation. Research has suggested, for example, based on the examination of discourses of 
national character and consciousness before and after the Orange Revolution in the 
Ukraine, that High school students‘ experience of new forms of community and 
solidarity during the ―revolution‖ led to the emergence of novel articulations of national 
identity; that national consciousness was therefore an effect rather than a cause of the 
Orange Revolution (Fournier 2007).  
 
After the ‗Revolution‘, Al-Gakh explicitly renounced in his poem Mikamilin71 the verse 
declaring the death of the beloved Egypt; and also wrote the celebrated verse on the 
eve of the removal of Mubarak: Mazziq dafatirak al-qadima kulaha, wa uktub li misr al-
yawm shi„ran mithlaha/ Tear up all your old notebooks, and write to Egypt today poetry 
that becomes it. The explosion of nationalist sentiments, song, symbolism and flags 
during and after the 2011 ‗Egyptian Revolution‘ was sparked by euphoria of hope and 
faith in a possible new ‗Egypt‘; that is, a possible new ‗citizenship‘ contract. These 
nationalist sentiments were clearly not there for many youth prior to the events. It was 
                                            
71 He said in Mikamilin (Al-Gakh 2011): ten‟iti„ idi ama „ult habibti matit [roughly translated: Cursed is my hand when 
it wrote my beloved is dead.] 
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the events that brought about the songs and new symbols. This underlines that feelings 
of national belonging are not stable or permanent. It arguably underlines as well that 
feelings about the nation were indeed more an expression of and fundamentally linked 
to the regime and its practices as found in this research; that indeed citizenship and 
nationhood were fundamentally linked for significant strata of Egyptians. Pride and 
faith in Egypt therefore hinged on the perceived relations with the regime and the 
disentitlement and humiliation it was seen as inflicting upon citizens. With the hope of 
a change of regime, nationalist feeling could be more comfortably experienced and 
expressed. While many people clearly embraced these nationalist symbols, the use of 
flags was of course an intentional strategy promoted by key protest organizers from 
[less disentitled] upper middle class backgrounds (making protest as well as new forms 
of nationalism ‗cool‘ and ‗in‘). This strategy arguably worked by mobilizing latent 
themes of devotion to the nation continually propagated in official discourses. It is 
notable that there was a clear theme of framing the protests around love of the nation, 
not only in officially commissioned songs that sought to contain the ‗Revolution‘, but 
in the songs developed and sung in Tahrir as well. This, and the importance of framing 
Mubarak as a traitor to the nation [not only an unjust tyrant], arguably drew upon 
existing nationalist themes and continued to link and perhaps subsume citizenship 
under and within nationhood, albeit while critically redefining nationhood around the 
struggle for a better society. The construction of the nation during and after the 
‗January 25 Revolution‘ is certainly a rich area of research that should receive 
considerable attention in the coming years.  
 
The place of humiliation in constructions of the nation in particular should receive 
significant attention in future research. Commentators in the Egyptian media have 
already noted the symbolism of one of the key chants of the night of the fall of 
Mubarak: Irfa„ Rasak Fu‟ Inta Masri/ ―Lift your head up high, you are Egyptian‖. Al-
Gakh—in a poem already viewed over a quarter of a million times on YouTube 
alone—has linked the persistence of Egyptians in Tahrir to the masculine pain of 
humiliation and oppression [mahanit il-rijal and qahr il-rijal] under the old regime (Al-
Gakh 2011). It was as though the regime—especially through practices that were 
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received as humiliating and undermining human dignity and ideal masculinity—had 
destabilized pride in the nation; bringing about constructions of Egypt as ‗violated‘ and 
‗violating,‘ as students had put forward in their alternative lyrics to the national anthem. 
 
 
Figure 16: Flag and Victory in the Boys‘ General School 
 
CONCLUSION 
If zifta [scum] was the very first word I heard in a classroom in my fieldwork in the 
girls‘ technical school, and my introduction to the constant rituals of humiliation in the 
public schools, the closing of my fieldwork in the girls‘ general school was a situation 
that highlighted the fundamental modes and discourses of disentitlement and 
unworthiness were normalized in the schools. This was a situation where Mrs. Mirvat 
(see Chapters Four and Five)—one of the most exemplary, ―conscientious,‖ diligent, 
respectful and caring (towards the students) teachers in the school—told me that the 
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students did not deserve the computer-based English Language course that I had 
bought for them, and for which they had asked me a number of times. Having always 
been incredibly warm with me, on that last day, she firmly rebuked me for buying the 
course, arguing that students were not serious about their request nor had the will to 
make use of the material or really develop their English language skills. She preferred to 
take the course and then give it out to ‗some‘ serious students and only in a phased out 
manner. The school principal for her part effectively prevented me from sharing the 
course with the students as well as the teachers. She resented and was almost appalled 
that I had intended to bypass her and simply ‗democratize‘ student and teacher access 
to this special resource by allowing them to make direct copies of the digital material.72 
She did not only prevent me from meeting again with the students, but also effectively 
asked me to leave the school. Students themselves had no doubt that the course would 
not be shared with them if it went through the principal. They seemed however 
disappointed in me. They were upset that I should have been so naïve as not to have 
realized this on my own. I had come face to face with the norms of entitlement, power 
and hierarchy in the school. My minimal gesture of gratitude and educational support 
was too offensive to the personalized hierarchical clientelism by which resources were 
meant to be dispersed in the school.73 On a methodological note, this brought home to 
me once more that only by breaking the norms of the ‗field‘, do they show themselves 
most vividly to researchers. It was a very humbling reminder of our very limited 
‗knowledge‘ of any given ‗field‘. On my last day at the school, I had not yet 
‗understood‘ the school. In fact, I so blatantly violated its norms and disappointed its 
                                            
72 What I later realized was that the principal probably initially understood the present to be a personal 
gift to herself (even if it were given under the guise of a gift to the school). Gifts to principals are a 
common practice for ‗nominal‘ postgraduate education researchers who pass through schools and 
receive a principal‘s signature that they have completed considerable fieldwork in the school. In a best 
case scenario, it could have been understood as a gift to the school, but certainly in that case, it would 
be the principal and the principal alone who controlled teacher and student access to it; a process that 
would have been highly selective so as to reward favored teachers and students and deprive others. 
73 Perhaps as Dorman has suggested in relation to [donor-backed] urban upgrading programs, they 
―failed, in part, because they were implicitly predicated on the logic of dealing with the sha‗b [people] as 
citizens with rights and responsibilities, as opposed to clients seeking protection and favour‖ (2007, 
255). 
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different actors. I hope however to invite others to keep going back and trying to get 
inside the ‗black box‘ of the school. 
 
This research has argued that the secondary school can be seen as a space where the de-
facto citizenship projects of the state are lived and official citizenship rights have 
collapsed under the weight of marketization, informality and the absence of 
administrative and legal enforcement. The marketization of secondary education in 
Egypt has only been made possible through the symbolic and physical violence against 
teachers and students involved in the creation of such markets. The chapters elaborated 
on the concrete ways in which financial ability become a pre-condition for access to 
legally guaranteed protective and provision rights in the late Mubarak era. However, 
this research was not only conducted but also almost entirely written before the 
removal of Mubarak. It therefore documents some of the discourses and practices of 
nationhood and citizenship in this critical historical juncture, without the benefit of 
hindsight or an attempt to reconstruct the Mubarak era after its end. It therefore 
provides a fine-grained image of key state institutions immediately before 2011; 
shedding light on some of the underlying patterns that acted as the backdrop of the 
explosion of January 25. It shows the disintegration and direct humiliation pervading 
key institutions of the state catering to different classes. The thesis has clearly not dealt 
with forms of informality or noncompliance in the schools as expressions of counter-
hegemonic ‗resistance‘. The disintegration of discipline in the schools should not be 
taken as a precursor to the outburst of protest in 2011. It is an indication however of 
the progressive decline of the authority and legitimacy of the state and its extension 
across the working and middle classes. 
 
This research has attempted to present a preliminary reading in the understudied areas 
of education and citizenship in Egypt. It has opened up different lines of analysis on 
some of the key issues in secondary education and lived and ideal citizenship and 
nationhood in Egypt, each of which deserves its own detailed analysis. The research is 
therefore an initial step and invitation for more detailed studies of lived citizenship in 
schools, paying greater attention to the experiences of students from different ethnic, 
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regional and religious backgrounds. It is appropriate to highlight once more that the 
schools in which the research was conducted are relatively privileged by virtue of the 
upgrading efforts they experienced and of being Cairene schools. As emphasized in 
Chapter Two, although this work refers to ‗working class‘, ‗disadvantaged‘ and ‗poor‘ 
students, these students—despite their diminished citizenship entitlements—should not 
be mistaken for the poorest of the poor or the most disadvantaged children who are 
less likely to enroll in secondary education (one fifth of children do not access 
secondary education) or live in urban centers in the first place. Citizenship contracts 
with the poor in rural areas await extensive and detailed study. 
 
Furthermore, the silence of this research on the experience of Christian citizens of 
schooling and textbooks saturated with Muslim identity and discourses calls for more 
detailed work on this front. There is much to explore in terms of the impact of 
neoliberal policies and the modes of privatization in Egyptian schools on the 
production of teacher discourses and practices; and their complex insertion into 
informal markets as well as hierarchies of repressive relations in the schools. My work 
with students and inside classrooms leaves much unsaid about critical power relations 
across the school and various levels of administration. Studies of punishment, 
surveillance and the construction of heterenormativity can also be given more detailed 
treatment across different kinds of schools. Studies of rural schools and schools in 
different parts of the country and the system are also greatly needed. In fact, almost 
every aspect of Egyptian education is understudied and deserves far deeper exploration.  
 
In terms of citizenship, there is great need for work that examines concrete institutions 
of the state in Egypt and their embeddedness in evolving governance projects and 
state-society relations. Research is also greatly needed on the detailed working of 
networks of patronage and corruption across key sectors and public institutions, 
including the education sector. The workings of these networks would also provide rich 
arenas for more detailed understanding the nature of the regime and its social contracts 
with different classes. The field of state-society relations, national identity and political 
emotions are all areas where further and continuous work would be very fruitful.  
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